Oaks v. Westfield Insurance Company et al

Filing 32

ORDER granting 17 Motion in Limine; Dr. Harding's expert testimony and report shall be inadmissible at the trial on this matter. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 1/16/14. (sek, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
OAKS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 13-1637

WESTFIELD INS. CO., et al.

SECTION: “J” (3)

ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion in Limine (Rec. Doc.
17), Defendants' opposition (Rec. Doc. 23), and Plaintiff's reply
memorandum (Rec. Doc. 30). The motion was set for hearing on
January 15, 2014, on the briefs.1 Having considered the motions and
memoranda of counsel, the record, and the applicable law, the Court
finds that Plaintiff's motion should be GRANTED for the reasons set
forth more fully below.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter involves claims for personal injuries allegedly
resulting from a simple rear-end collision. Plaintiff alleges that,
while her vehicle was stopped at a red light, Defendant, who had
also been stopped at the light, suddenly accelerated and rear-ended
her vehicle causing certain injuries. (Rec. Doc. 1-1, pps. 1-2) The
matter is set for a jury trial on March 10, 2014. At trial,
Defendants seek to introduce the testimony of Dr. Richard Harding

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The oral argument scheduled for this motion on January 15, 2014 was
cancelled in the Court's Order dated January 13, 2014. (Rec. Doc. 31)

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("Dr. Harding"), an expert in "biomechanical engineering, impact
kinematics

and

injury

causation

analysis,"

to

prove

that

Plaintiff's claimed injuries were not caused by the collision at
issue. (Rec. Doc. 23, p. 1) Plaintiff's instant motion seeks to
exclude Dr. Harding's report and testimony.
LEGAL STANDARD AND DISCUSSION
Rule

702

of

the

Federal

Rules

of

admissibility of expert witness testimony.

Evidence

governs

the

The rule states:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably
to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.

The United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),
provides the analytical framework for determining whether expert
testimony

is

nonscientific

admissible
expert

under

Rule

testimony

are

702.

Both

subject

scientific
to

the

and

Daubert

framework, which requires trial courts to make a preliminary
assessment of “whether the expert testimony is both reliable and
relevant.” Burleson v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d
577, 584 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).

When expert testimony is

challenged under Daubert, the party offering the expert’s testimony
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bears the burden of proving its reliability and relevance by a
preponderance of the evidence.

Moore v. Ashland Chem. Co., Inc.,

151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1064
(1999).
In the instant case, based on the standard articulated above,
the Court finds that the proposed expert testimony is inadmissible
because it is (a) unreliable, (b) beyond the expert witnesses'
expertise, and (c) unhelpful to the trier of fact.
Dr. Harding's proposed testimony is unreliable because the
analyses and testing that he relied upon to arrive at his opinions
are based upon insufficient facts and data. Dr. Harding did not
inspect the actual vehicles involved in the collision at issue.
Rather, he relied on previous testing on different vehicles than
those involved in the accident. Further, the testing assumed
certain facts as to the angle of the impact, etc.. Finally, Dr.
Harding never personally examined the Plaintiff, yet he renders
opinions on the causation of her injuries.
In addition to the testimony and report's foundations in
insufficient data, the Court finds that Dr. Harding's opinions
speak to matters beyond his expertise. Though Defendants present
Dr.

Harding

as

a

"biomechanical

expert,"

his

biomechanical

qualifications are only partially relevant because his report does
not present solely a biomechanical analysis. Instead, Dr. Harding
speaks to both biomechanics and medical causation by opining that

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the force of the impact could not have caused Plaintiff's injuries.
Dr. Harding is not qualified to testify about Plaintiff's medical
condition because he is not board certified or qualified in any
medical specialty, he has not practiced clinical medicine in over
a decade, and he has never been licensed to practice medicine in
the United States. Although he was at one time licensed to practice
medicine in the United Kingdom, he has since lost his license due
to inactivity. See Thomas v. G & K Servs. Co., et al., No. 01-1637,
2002 WL 34720493 *3 (E.D. La., Aug. 16, 2002) (Lemmon, J.).
Moreover, Dr. Harding's "accident reconstruction" certification is
irrelevant because his report does not reconstruct the exact
accident at issue. Rather, he either re-created a loosely similar
accident or relied on prior testing that presented an allegedly
similar scenario.
Finally, Dr. Harding's opinion will not assist the trier of
fact in any way, but rather will likely confuse the jury or cloud
its common sense fact-finding role. See, U.S. v. Wiley, 57 F.3d
1374,

1389

(5th

Cir.,

1995)

(generally,

expert

testimony

is

unhelpful if it supplants the "jury's independent exercise of
common sense.") (internal citation omitted). As this Court has
previously

held

when

determining

the

admissibility

of

expert

testimony, in cases where there is a simple collision such as there
was in this matter, "[t]he jury can assess credibility and make
appropriate

factual

findings

without

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the

aid

of

any

expert

testimony." Scineaux v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., No. 032947, 2005 WL 2050281 *2 (E.D. La., Aug. 9, 2005) (Barbier, J.)
(excluding four experts in a "simple vehicular accident" because
the primary issue would be credibility and the jury should be
allowed to determine if plaintiff's or defendant's rendition of the
accident was more plausible).
Accordingly,
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine (Rec. Doc. 17) is GRANTED. Dr.
Harding's expert testimony and report shall be inadmissible at the
trial on this matter.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 16th day of January, 2014.

_______________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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