Grand Ltd et al v. Linder Oil Company et al

Filing 52

ORDER & REASONS denying 23 & 24 Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 3/12/2014. (caa, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GRAND LTD ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

v.

13-2385

LINDER OIL CO. ET AL.

SECTION "F"
ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court are motions for partial summary judgment.
For the reasons that follow, the motions are DENIED.
Background
This

admiralty

allision.

action

was

born

out

of

an

early-morning

At about 3:30 a.m. on April 29, 2012, while navigating

the Gulf of Mexico from Freshwater City, Louisiana to Galveston,
Texas, the M/V Trinity hit a submerged oil and gas caisson.
The allision significantly damaged the vessel.
owner,

The

Grand,

Ltd.,

its

owner/operator,

The vessel’s

Laredo

Offshore

Services, Inc., and its insurers, Atlantic Specialty Insurance
Company, Markel American Insurance Company, Procentury Insurance
Company, Caitlin Indemnity Company, United States Fire Insurance
Company, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, and Certain
London Market Companies sued the owners of the downed caisson,1
Linder Oil Company, Linder Energy Company, Louisiana General Oil

1

The parties have identified the downed caisson as Linder
Platform No.2, located in West Cameron Block 168, or "West Cameron
168 #2."
1

Company, Destin Resources, LLC, Reserves Management, LC, and Sojitz
Energy Venture, Inc. for damage to the vessel, alleging that
defendants failed to properly mark the obstruction.2
Plaintiffs and plaintiffs-in-subrogation now move for partial
summary judgment.

They contend that there is no genuine dispute

regarding whether: (1) defendants breached their duty to properly
place the buoy marking the obstruction; and (2) defendants breached
their duty to file truthful, accurate documents with the United
States

Coast

obstruction.

Guard

regarding

the

submerged

Plaintiffs-in-subrogation

add

status

that

there

of
is

the
no

genuine dispute regarding defendants' liability.
I. Standard for Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs that summary
judgment is proper if the record discloses no genuine issue as to
any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

No genuine issue of fact exists if

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the non-moving party.

See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

A genuine issue of

fact exists only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party."

2

Anderson v.

Plaintiffs allege that the M/V Trinity sustained physical
damage to her hull and starboard leg and that plaintiffs' damages
including repairs and lost income from the vessel amount to
approximately $5 million.
2

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Court emphasizes that the mere argued existence of a
factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion.

See

id.

Therefore,

"[i]f

the

evidence

is

merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is
appropriate.

Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

Summary judgment

is also proper if the party opposing the motion fails to establish
an essential element of his case.
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

In this regard, the non-moving party

must do more than simply deny the allegations raised by the moving
party.

See Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 974 F.2d

646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992).

Rather, he must come forward with

competent evidence, such as affidavits or depositions, to buttress
his claims.

Id.

Hearsay evidence and unsworn documents do not

qualify as competent opposing evidence.

Martin v. John W. Stone

Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987). Finally, in
evaluating the summary judgment motion, the court must read the
facts

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

non-moving

party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
II.

Application

The movants contend that defendants were negligent in placing
the marker buoy to the north, rather than the south, of the
obstruction, and in filing a form with the Coast Guard that
indicated that the structure remained standing when, in fact, it

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had fallen. They submit that partial summary judgment on liability
should be granted in their favor.

The Court disagrees; whether

defendants properly marked and provided the Coast Guard with
truthful and accurate information regarding the obstruction are
disputed material issues of fact precluding summary judgment.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs maintain that defendants must be
presumed negligent under the rule of The Pennsylvania.

“[A]ny

party to a maritime accident who violates a federal statute is
[presumed to be] at fault for the allision.”

Tidewater Marine,

Inc. v. Sanco Int’l, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 987, 997 (E.D. La. 2000)
(explaining the rule of The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125 (1873)). The
rule

of

The

Pennsylvania

“shifts

the

burden

of

proof

as

to

causation on the violator to prove that the violation could not
have been a contributing cause of the allision.” Id. (holding that
the duties to mark sunken craft, imposed on owners of wrecked ships
by the Wreck Act, are “non-delegable, non-imputable duties which
cannot be assigned or assumed--to the absolution of the owner from
liability--by any third party”) (citations omitted); see also
Chevron Oil Co. v. The M/V New Yorker, 297 F. Supp. 412, (E.D. La.
1969) (holding that well owner was partly at fault in not having
the well structure’s light and horn operating on the night of the
collision).

The Court certainly agrees that the Pennsylvania rule

could

force

have

here.

The

rule

applies

in

allision

cases

involving violations of statutes intended to prevent the injury

4

that

actually

occurred,

such

as

where

those

responsible

for

properly marking stationary objects in navigable waters failed to
do so, as alleged here.

See Gele v. Chevron Oil Co., 574 F.2d 243,

247 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that owner of pipe in the Gulf of
Mexico failed to overcome its burden of showing that its failure to
mark

the

structure

did

not

contribute

to

the

cause

of

the

collision).
But, the Pennsylvania rule concerns only the burden of proof
for

causation;

damages.

it

does

not

determine

ultimate

liability

Tidewater Marine, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 998.

for

All parties

against whom the rule is applied may be liable if their negligence
proximately caused the accident, and damages are to be assessed in
accordance with the principles of comparative negligence.

Id.

Although the rule of The Pennsylvania applies to shift the
burden of causation if it is shown that the marker buoy was
improperly placed at the time of the allision, that fact remains
hotly

disputed

here.

Accordingly,

summary

judgment

as

to

defendants' liability for the damages caused by the allision is
inappropriate.
Accordingly, the motions for partial summary judgment are
DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, March 12, 2014
____________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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