Charles v. Social Security Administration

Filing 27

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25 . Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/16/14. (NEF: Mag 2)(jjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
THERON CHARLES

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 13-2517

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

SECTION: R

ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff Theron Charles objects to Magistrate Judge Joseph
Wilkinson's Report and Recommendation ("R&R"), which recommends
that plaintiff's complaint under the Social Security Act be
dismissed with prejudice. Having reviewed de novo the record, the
Magistrate's R&R,1 the plaintiff's objections thereto,2 and the
applicable law, the Court agrees with the Magistrate's
recommendation and adopts the R&R as its opinion.
Plaintiff objects to the R&R on two primary grounds. The
Court finds plaintiff's arguments unpersuasive for the following
reasons.
First, Charles argues that "[t]he ALJ . . . ignored vast
amounts of highly relevant medical evidence and, additionally,
ignored evidence of Plaintiff's compliance with treatment after
May, 2011" when she assessed plaintiff's credibility and residual

1

R. Doc. 25.

2

R. Doc. 26.

functional capacity.3 Judge Wilkinson addressed this argument at
length in the R&R and found it to be without merit.4 The Court
agrees with Judge Wilkinson's thorough analysis. As he correctly
noted, an ALJ may discount a plaintiff’s subjective complaints
when the alleged symptoms are not consistent with the objective
medical evidence. See Quijas v. Astrue, 298 F. App’x 391, 393
(5th Cir. 2008) (citing Chambliss v. Massanari, 269 F.3d 520, 522
(5th Cir. 2001)). Credibility determinations of this sort rest
primarily with the ALJ because they are "precisely the kinds of
determinations that the ALJ is best positioned to make." Spruill
v. Astrue, 299 F.App’x 356, 356 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Falco v.
Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1994)). Here, the ALJ
analyzed medical evidence demonstrating Charles' ability to
perform certain activities, including household chores, limited
walking, and light lifting,5 and accordingly concluded that
Charles's subjective account of his limitations was not entirely
credible. That conclusion was entirely permissible.

3

Id. at 1.

4

R. Doc. 25 at 19-25.

5

See, e.g., R. Doc. 15-7 at 114 ("He can feed and dress
himself. He can stand for 15 to 20 minutes at one time and for
about four hours in a span of eight hours. He can walk for 10
minutes on level ground, can sit for four hours, can lift a
gallon of milk, and does not drive a car. According to him, he
can perform household chores of sweeping, mopping, vacuuming, and
cooking.").
2

Moreover, Charles’s contention that the ALJ "ignored"
evidence of his compliance with treatment beginning in June 2011
is meritless. In fact, as Judge Wilkinson explained, records from
plaintiff's June 25, 2011 hospital admission reflect that he had
continued to smoke marijuana after being repeatedly advised that
he should spend his money on his diabetes medication instead of
on marijuana.6 When plaintiff was discharged, he was told
unequivocally not to "smoke anything."7 Nevertheless, records
from an August 2011 examination reflect that plaintiff continued
to smoke marijuana.8 It was permissible for the ALJ to infer,
based on this evidence, that Charles had continued his past
practice of failing to comply with his treatment plan. See
Bradley v. Astrue, 528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Our case
law permits the ALJ's reasonable inferences."). The Court
accordingly concludes that the ALJ's determinations in this case
are supported by substantial evidence.
Second, Charles asserts that Judge Wilkinson and the ALJ
erred at Step Three of the disability analysis "by solely
focusing on whether Plaintiff’s impairments individually met the
requirements of a particular listing, ignoring altogether the

6

R. Doc. 15-7 at 205-06.

7

Id. at 206.

8

Id. at 218.
3

issue of equivalence."9 But, as the R&R correctly notes, in order
to obtain a remand based on an error at Step Three, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that he meets, or at least appears to meet, the
requirements for a listing. See Aulder v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446,
448-49 (5th Cir. 2007); Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 619
(5th Cir. 1990) ("The claimant must provide medical findings that
support each of the criteria for the equivalent impairment
determination."). Plaintiff has failed to do so here. He simply
provides a laundry list of his symptoms, just as he did in his
initial briefing to Judge Wilkinson.10 As Judge Wilkinson's
exhaustive analysis demonstrates, none of plaintiff's individual
impairments meets the medical listings to which plaintiff
adverts,11 and plaintiff has presented no medical evidence
suggesting that the combination of those impairments is
equivalent to one of those listings. This failure is fatal to
plaintiff's claim under the standards set forth in Aulder and
Selders.

9

R. Doc. 26 at 6.

10

Compare R. Doc. 26 at 2-3 with R. Doc. 21 at 8-9.

11

R. Doc. 25 at 28-33. Plaintiff argues that "the
Magistrate and ALJ both conveniently ignored the detailed exam of
8/23/11 which did reveal neurologic deficits," R. Doc. 26 at 6,
but the page of the record plaintiff cites in support of that
contention simply does not support a finding that plaintiff had
neurologic deficits. It merely documents foot pain, hypertrophic
nails, dry skin, rear foot varus, and equinus. See R. Doc. 15-8
at 7.
4

For the foregoing reasons, the Court agrees with Judge
Wilkinson's conclusion: "The ALJ considered all relevant medical
evidence when assessing plaintiff's credibility and functional
capacity, and her findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff has failed to identify substantial evidence that he
meets or medically equals Listings 1.02(A), 8.04, and/or
11.14."12 Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with
prejudice.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 16th day of April, 2014.
__
_________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12

R. Doc. 25 at 33.
5