United States Department of Labor v. National Association of Letter Carriers

Filing 17

ORDER AND REASONS granting 12 Motion for Default Judgment. The November 6, 2012 election is hereby declared VOID. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 13–3735

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
LETTER CARRIERS

SECTION "H"(3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Default Judgment.1 For the following
reasons, the Motion is GRANTED, and the November 6, 2012 election is hereby
declared VOID. Defendant shall conduct a new election under the supervision
of the Secretary of Labor as soon as practicable.

1

R. Doc. 12.

1

BACKGROUND
This is a civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief under the LaborManagement and Reporting Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
The plaintiff is Seth Harris—the Acting Secretary of Labor for the United States
Department of Labor. The Defendant is Branch 2730, National Association of
Letter Carriers.
Defendant is a local labor organization as defined by the LMRDA. There
are 64 members in good standing. On October 27, 2012, Defendant mailed ballot
packets to 53 members for an upcoming officer election.2 The election was held
on November 6, 2012 (the "Election").
Terence Roberts ("Roberts")—a member of Defendant in good standing—
protested the Election to Defendant's Election Committee on November 14, 2012.
The Election Committee denied the protest. Roberts appealed this decision to
Defendant's Executive Board and to the National Committee on Appeals but
never received a final decision from either body. Roberts also appealed to
Defendant's Recording Secretary. The post office returned the appeal with the
following stamp: "Returned to Sender Refused."
Roberts filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor (the "Secretary") on
March 11, 2013, alleging the Election did not comply with Defendant's bylaws
and constitution. The Secretary investigated the complaint. On April 18, 2013,
Defendant agreed to extend the deadline by which the Secretary must file suit
under the LMRDA to May 24, 2013.
2

The ballot packets contained (1) a ballot, (2) voting instructions, (3) a secret ballot
envelope, and (4) a stamped ballot return envelope.

2

The Secretary filed the instant action on May 22, 2013, alleging various
violations of Title IV of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481–83. Despite being served
with the complaint, Defendant did not respond. Upon motion of the Secretary,
the Court entered default. The Secretary now moves for default judgment
declaring the Election void and ordering Defendant to conduct a new election
under the Secretary's supervision.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 55(a) requires the court to enter default against a party that has
failed to plead or otherwise respond to the plaintiff's complaint.3 Once the court
has entered default, all well-pleaded allegations are deemed admitted,4 and the
plaintiff may move for default judgment.5 If the plaintiff's claim is for a sum
certain and the defendant has not appeared in court and is neither a minor nor
an incompetent, the motion may be directed to the clerk of court.6 "In all other
cases," the motion must be filed with the district court.7

The district court

should be mindful that "[d]efault judgments are a drastic remedy" only
appropriate in "extreme situations."8

3

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).

4

See Nishimatsu Constr. Co., LTD. v. Hous. Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.

5

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).

6

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1).

7

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).

8

Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274, 277 (5th Cir.

1975).

1989).

3

LAW AND ANALYSIS
Before entering default judgment, the Fifth Circuit has admonished
district courts to examine the basis of jurisdiction "both over the subject matter
and the parties."9 In accordance with this mandate, the Court first examines
jurisdiction.
I.

Jurisdiction
The basic statutory grants of federal court subject matter jurisdiction are

contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Subject matter jurisdiction in this case
is premised upon Section 1331, which vests district courts with “original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.”10 The well-pleaded complaint rule governs the existence
of federal question jurisdiction vel non.11

Pursuant to this rule, "federal

jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the
plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint."12 A federal question is present "when the
plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon
[federal law]."13

9

Sys. Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V Viktor Kurnatovskiy, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir.

2001).
10

28 U.S.C. § 1331.

11

Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 2003)

12

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

13

Vaden v. Discovery Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)); see also Carpenter v.
Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[A] suit arises under federal
law if there appears on the face of the complaint some substantial, disputed question of federal
law.").

4

The complaint alleges Defendant violated the LMRDA. Because a federal
question is clearly presented on the face of the complaint, subject matter
jurisdiction is proper. Jurisdiction over the parties is also proper, as Defendant
resides in the forum state.
II.

Violation of the LMRDA
The "special purpose" of Title IV of the LMRDA is to ensure free and

democratic union elections.14 Title IV furthers this purpose by fixing the terms
during which union officials can hold office, guaranteeing all members have an
opportunity to participate in union elections, requiring election by secret ballot,
regulating campaign literature, and authorizing the union to impose
qualifications for office but only if those qualifications are reasonable and
uniformly applied.15
Title IV provides a comprehensive procedure for enforcing its terms.16 Any
union member may initiate the enforcement procedure, but he must first
exhaust any internal remedies provided by the union or invoke those remedies
for three months without obtaining a final decision.17 The member must then
file a complaint with the Secretary within one month of exhausting his remedies
or the expiration of the three-month period of futile attempts to invoke those

14

Int'l Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Brown, 498 U.S. 466, 476 (1991).

15

See Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964).

16

See generally 29 U.S.C. § 482.

17

See 29 U.S.C. § 492(a)(1–2); Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528,
531 (1972).

5

remedies.18
Roberts first invoked his internal union remedies on November 14, 2012.
Because he did not receive a final decision by February 14, 2013, Roberts had
until March 14, 2013 to file a complaint with the Secretary. Roberts filed the
complaint on March 11, 2013.
When a union member timely files a complaint, the Secretary must
conduct an investigation to determine if there is probable cause that a violation
of Title IV occurred.19 If he finds probable cause, the Secretary must file suit in
federal court within sixty days after receipt of the union member's complaint.20
The suit shall petition the district court "to set aside the invalid election . . . and
to direct the conduct of a[] [new] election . . . under the supervision of the
Secretary."21
The Secretary conducted the required investigation, found probable cause
that Defendant violated Title IV, but did not file suit within sixty days of
Roberts's complaint (May 11, 2013). Presumably relying on the agreed-upon
extension between he and Defendant, the Secretary filed the instant suit on May
22, 2013. The question presented is whether the parties can agree to modify the
sixty-day deadline in 29 U.S.C. § 482(b).
The answer depends on whether the deadline is jurisdictional or instead
18

Herman v. Local 305, Nat'l Post Office Mail Handlers, LIUNA, AFL–CIO, 214 F.3d
475, 478 (4th Cir. 2000); Reich v. Local 399, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 3 F.3d 184, 188 (7th
Cir. 1993); see also 29 U.S.C. § 482(a).
19

29 U.S.C. § 482.

20

Id.

21

Id.

6

operates more like a statute of limitations.22 If the latter, the deadline would be
subject to "certain equitable considerations."23

If the deadline is instead

jurisdictional, it would be immutable.24
The Fifth Circuit has not yet addressed whether the deadline in Section
482(b) is an absolute jurisdictional requirement, but other circuits have. All
agree that the sixty-day deadline is subject to extension when equity warrants.25
Two circuits have applied this rule to the circumstances at bar, finding
permissible an agreement between the Secretary and the union to extend the
deadline for filing a civil action under the LMRDA.26 The Court agrees with the
analysis in these opinions and finds the instant suit was timely filed.
Having determined that all prerequisites to suit under the LMRDA are
satisfied, the Court may now consider the merits. The Secretary will prevail if
he proves by a preponderance of the evidence (1) a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 481
(2) that "may have effected the outcome of [the challenged] election."27 The
Court examines each requirement in turn.
Union elections must accord with the bylaws and constitution of the union
to the extent those rules are consistent with Title IV.28 Defendant's bylaws and
22

See Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO,
452 F.2d 545, 552–53 (7th Cir. 1971).
23

See Marshall v. Local Union 1374, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
AFL–CIO, 558 F.3d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1977).
24

Cf. id.

25

See id. at 1357–58; Hodgson, 440 F.2d at 1118; Local 851,454 F.2d at 553.

26

See Hodgson, 440 F.2d at 1119; Local 851, 454 F.2d at 553.

27

29 U.S.C. § 482(c).

28

See 29 U.S.C. § 481(e).

7

constitution incorporate the National Association of Letter Carriers' Election
Manual (the "Manual"). The Manual requires that election packets (1) contain,
inter alia, a prepaid enveloped addressed to a Post Office Box, and (2) be mailed
to all members at least twenty days before the election date.
Defendant violated both of these provisions. As to the latter, Defendant
did not mail election packets to 11 members in good standing. Furthermore, by
mailing election packets to the other 53 members on October 27, 2012 for a
November 2, 2012 election, Defendant failed to comply with the twenty-daysnotice provision. As to the former, the stamped ballot return envelope was not
addressed to a post office box.
The Court must now determine whether these violations of the LMRDA
"may have affected the outcome" of the Election.29 A proved violation establishes
a prima facie case,30 which the defendant can rebut by showing the violation did
not effect the outcome of the election.31 Because the Secretary has established
a prima facie case which Defendant, by virtue of his default, has failed to
disprove, the Court must declare the Election void and order a new election to
be conducted under the Secretary's supervision.32
III.

Entry of Default Judgment
Having verified jurisdiction and liability, the Court now considers whether

29

29 U.S.C. § 482(c).

30

Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Emps. Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 506–07 (1968).

31

Reich v. Local 89, Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., AFL–CIO, 36 F.3d 1470, 1478 (9th
Cir. 1994); see alsoWirtz, 391 U.S. at 507.
32

See 29 U.S.C. § 482(c).

8

to enter default judgment.

Judgment by default is warranted "when the

adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party"
thereby making impossible the "just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of [a]
case[] on [its] merits."33 This lawsuit has been pending for approximately fifteen
months. The record reveals no excuse for Defendant's total failure to respond.
Accordingly, the Court will enter default judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons previously stated, the Motion is granted.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 2nd day of September, 2014.

______________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

33

See Sun Bank, 874 F.2d at 276.

9