Robin v. Chartis Property Casualty Company
Filing
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ORDER & REASONS that defendant Chartis Property Casualty Company's 22 Motion to Bifurcate is DENIED. Signed by Judge Eldon E. Fallon on 5/14/14. (dno)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CATHERINE M. ROBIN
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versus
CHARTIS PROPERTY CASUALTY CO.
CIVIL ACTION
No. 13-4807
SECTION “L” (4)
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Bifurcate, (Rec. Doc. 22), filed by Defendant Chartis
Property Casualty Company ("Chartis"). The Court reviewed the briefs and the applicable law
and now issues this Order and Reasons.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on September 13, 2012.
(Rec. Doc. 1 at 1). Plaintiff Catherine Robin claims that she was stopped at a traffic light when
she was struck from behind by another driver, Jill Mathies. (Rec. Doc. 1 at 2). Robin settled her
claims against Mathies and Mathies's insurer for the liability policy limits. (Rec. Doc. 1 at 3).
Robin brought the current lawsuit against her own insurance company, which she alleges insured
her for underinsured motorist's liability. (Rec. Doc. 1 at 1). She is asking to be compensated for
past and future physical pain, mental anguish, medical expenses, loss of enjoyment of life, and
past and future impairment to earning capacity. (Rec. Doc. 1 at 2). In addition, she claims that
she is entitled to damages, penalties, and attorneys' fees because Chartis has violated the
obligations imposed by La. R.S. §22:1973 and La. R.S. §22:1892. (Rec. Doc. 1 at 3).
Chartis filed an answer in which it denied all liability and asserted various affirmative
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defenses. (Rec. Doc. 6). Chartis admits that it issued an auto liability policy of insurance and an
excess liability policy of insurance to "John Robin and Mary Robin" and claims that these
policies are the best evidence of their contents. (Rec. Doc. 6 at 2). Chartis pleads certain
exclusions that were contained in the insurance policy. (Rec. Doc. 6 at 3). Chartis further
claims that at all times it "acted reasonably and in good faith in connection with the adjustment,
consideration, evaluation and review of Petitioner's claims." (Rec. Doc. 6 at 4).
II.
PRESENT MOTION
Chartis filed the present Motion to Bifurcate. (Rec. Doc. 22). Chartis explains that this
Court is given great discretion in determining whether to bifurcate a trial pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 42. Chartis asks this Court to bifurcate the trial in this matter and to
hold two separate trials, one regarding the issue of quantum and one regarding the issue of bad
faith penalties and fees. (Rec. Doc. 22-1 at 1). Chartis argues that these issues are very different
and distinct and, accordingly, involve different documents and witnesses. Chartis claims that a
joint trial on these separate issues would result in prejudice to Chartis, because evidence of
alleged arbitrary and capricious conduct will taint the jury's opinion. (Rec. Doc. 22-1 at 4).
Chartis claims that presentation of evidence on both issues will confuse the jury. (Rec. Doc. 221 at 4). Chartis further argues that bifurcation would be in the interest of judicial economy.
Chartis reasons that if the jury finds that Robin is not entitled to any damages, then the issue of
Chartis's alleged bad faith does not have to be tried at all. (Rec. Doc. 22-1 at 4).
Robin opposes the motion. (Rec. Doc. 27). Robin agrees that this Court has discretion to
bifurcate the trial, pursuant to Rule 42. However, Robin emphasizes that "separate trials should
be the exception, not the rule." (Rec. Doc. 27 at 3) (citing Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard
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Co., 791 F.Supp. 113, 114 (E.D. La. 1992)). Robin cites other cases from this court in which the
court has refused to bifurcate similar issues. (Rec. Doc. 27 at 3-4) (citing Ferguson v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 2007 WL 102127 *1, 06-3936 (E.D. La. 1/9/07); Peace Lake Towers, Inc v.
Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 2007 WL 925845 *3, 06-4522, 06-5136 (E.D. La. 3/23/07)). Robin
argues that any prejudice that Chartis might face can be cured by an instruction to the jury. (Rec.
Doc. 27 at 4). Last, Robin argues that the interest of judicial economy will not be served by
bifurcation. Robin explains that she plans to call only one witness to address the issues of bad
faith–Chartis's designated representative. Robin points out that this same witness will have to
testify regarding issues of liability and quantum. Therefore, Robin claims that separate trials
would result in this witness testifying twice. (Rec. Doc. 27 at 5).
III.
LAW & ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides that "[f]or convenience, to avoid
prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more
separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims." The decision to
bifurcate "is a matter within the sole discretion of the trial court." Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d
1285, 1293 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting First Tex. Sav. Ass'n Reliance Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 1171, 1174
n. 2 (5th Cir. 1992)).
In similar cases, this court has previously refused to bifurcate claims regarding insurance
coverage and bad-faith denial of coverage. See Ferguson, 2007 WL 102127; Peace Lake
Towers, 2007 WL 925845. While the court may have been partially motivated by a desire to
preserve judicial resources after Hurricane Katrina, the court's analysis in those cases is just as
applicable in the present case. The court in Peace Lake Towers, Inc. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co.
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explained that evidence pertaining to each issue–the coverage issue and the claims handling
issue–was necessarily interwoven. 2007 WL 925845 *3. Furthermore, the court found that
"[a]ny prejudice to [the insurance company] that could result from the joint trial of the claims of
coverage and bad faith can be cured by appropriate instructions to the jury." Id. In Ferguson v.
State Farm Ins. Co., the court explained that "[i]t was not this Court's custom to order bifurcation
in such insurance cases before the storm . . . ." 2007 WL 102127 *1. The court stated that the
possible prejudice to the defendant "would not be substantial enough to warrant separate trials
and would not be judiciously expeditious or serve economical [interests]." Id.
Like in those cases, in the present case it would not promote judicial economy to
bifurcate the trial. In her opposition to this motion, Robin explains that she only plans to call
one witness to testify about Chartis's handling of her insurance claim, Chartis's corporate
representative. Therefore, the Court would have to expend time and resources in order to
empanel a second jury and hold a second trial only to have one witness testify at that trial. The
fact that the issues of quantum and bad faith penalties and fees are interwoven only cuts against
Chartis's argument that bifurcation would serve the interest of judicial economy. Because
Chartis's corporate representative will also be called to testify regarding issues of liability and
quantum, bifurcation would require this witness to come to court and testify twice. Furthermore,
any prejudice to Chartis would not be enough to warrant separate trials and could be cured by a
proper instruction to the jury. This Court is confident that a jury will be able to separate the
issues and analyze them as necessary.
IV.
CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Chartis's Motion to Bifurcate, (Rec. Doc. 22), is hereby
DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 14th day of May, 2014.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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