Brennan et al v. Brennan's Inc

Filing 27

ORDER denying 21 Brennan's Inc's Motion to Reconsider the Award of Attorney's Fees. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 10/3/2013. (gbw, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHAWN TIFFANY BRENNAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

No. 13-4848

BRENNAN’S, INC.,
Defendant

SECTION “E”
ORDER

Before the Court is a motion by Brennan’s Inc. (“Brennan’s”) to reconsider the award
of attorney’s fees in the order and reasons remanding this action to state court.1
Intervenors Bridget Brennan Tyrrell, Theodore Brennan, Alana Brennan, and Teddy
Brennan, Jr. (“Intervenors”) oppose the motion.2 For the following reasons, the motion is
DENIED.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that an order that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims among all the parties “may be revised at any time” before the entry of a
final judgment, according a district court “the inherent procedural power to reconsider,
rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.” Melancon
v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981). The district court’s discretion
in this regard is broad, see Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d 1408,
1414–15 (5th Cir.1993), but this Court typically analyzes these motions under the standard
governing Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend a final judgment. See, e.g., United States
v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 2013 WL 3984058, at *4 (E.D. La. 2013) (Vance, C.J.);

1

R. Doc. No. 21.

2

R. Doc. No. 24.
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Rosemond v. AIG Ins., 2009 WL 1211020, at *2 (E.D. La. May 4, 2009) (Barbier, J.); Letap
Hospitality, L.L.C. v. Days Inn Worldwide, Inc., 2008 WL 2959649, at *2 (E.D. La. July
30, 2008) (Berrigan, J.). Under Rule 59(e), a moving party must satisfy at least one of the
following criteria: “(1) the motion is necessary to correct a manifest error of fact or law; (2)
the movant presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) the motion
is necessary in order to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) the motion is justified by an
intervening change in the controlling law.” B & C Marine, LLC v. Cabiran, 2013 WL
950562, *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 11, 2013).
Brennan’s does not assert as grounds newly discovered evidence, a change in
controlling law, or a necessity to prevent manifest injustice. Its motion is therefore one to
correct a “manifest error of fact or law.” This is a demanding standard, and one Brennan’s
does not meet. It was objectively unreasonable for Brennan’s to believe that Baccus v.
Parrish, 45 F.3d 958 (5th Cir. 1995), provides good authority to remove this case (whether
based on the All Writs Act or general federal question jurisdiction). Baccus itself requires
“a claim brought in state court [that] seeks to attack or undermine an order of a federal
district court.” Id. at 960. Brennan’s had no objectively reasonable basis to believe that the
petition for intervention put the order of this Court (concerning the Succession’s voting
rights) at risk.
As the Court noted in a related case on June 6, 2013—a mere thirteen days before
Brennan’s removed this action—“The rights and status of the Succession under the Security
Agreement have not been decided in the state court action and are not before the state
court even now.” Colbert v. Brennan, No. 12-cv-2442, at p. 4 (E.D. La. filed Oct. 4, 2013)
(R. Doc. No. 113). The only action in the state court that could have put the rights and
2

status of the Succession at issue after that order and before Brennan’s removal on June 19,
2013, was Intervenor’s June 10, 2013, petition for intervention. Yet the petition for
intervention, which requested “the [state court] order that [the Succession] accept the funds
in the registry of the [state court], in full satisfaction of [the state court’s] July 10, 2012
Judgment, and execute a Satisfaction of Judgment in favor of Brennan’s, Inc.,”3 did not
purport to attack or undermine the judgment of this Court holding that the Succession was
entitled to vote. Although that may have been Intervenor’s ultimate goal, any risk of
interference with the Court’s ruling regarding the Succession’s voting rights was several
steps removed from the relief requested by the petition for intervention. In any event, the
petition for intervention requested nothing more than Brennan’s had already requested in
its May 22, 2013, ex parte motion to deposit funds in the registry of the state court and
motion to compel the Succession to execute satisfaction of judgment.
Accordingly, Brennan’s knew as of this Court’s June 6, 2013, order in case number
12-2442 that the relief requested by Brennan’s on May 22, 2013 (and therefore the identical
relief requested by Intervenors on June 10, 2013) did not put “the rights and status of the
Succession under the Security Agreement” at issue. This, together with the clear reading
of the request for relief in the petition for intervention, rendered objectively unreasonable
Brennan’s decision to remove under Baccus because of some purported attack on a
judgment of this Court. This Court had already ruled there was not yet such an attack. And
even if Brennan’s could make some argument to the contrary, it was certainly not a
manifest error of law for the Court to so conclude.

3

R. Doc. No. 1-7, p. 20.
3

IT IS SO ORDERED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 3rd day of October, 2013.

_____________________________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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