Cassidy v. American Driveline Centers, Inc.

Filing 21

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 10 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Jay C. Zainey on 10/23/13. (jrc, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JAMES CASSIDY

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 13-4906

AMERICAN DRIVELINE CENTERS,
INC.

SECTION: "A" (3)

ORDER AND REASONS
The following motion is before the Court: Motion to Dismiss and Motion for
More Definite Statement (Rec. Doc. 10) filed by defendant American Driveline Centers,
Inc. Plaintiff James Cassidy opposes the motion. The motion, scheduled for submission on
October 23, 2013, is before the Court on the briefs without oral argument. For the reasons
that follow the motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I.

Background
Plaintiff James Cassidy was employed as a transmission rebuilder by defendant

American Driveline Centers, Inc. (“ADC”). ADC operated an auto service and maintenance
shop in Mandeville, Louisiana. (Comp. ¶ 22). ADC terminated Cassidy’s employment on
January 16, 2012. (Id. ¶ 8). Cassidy alleges that he was 69 years old at the time of termination
and that he suffered from a disability while employed at ADC. (Id. ¶¶ 5 & 6). Cassidy claims
that he was subjected to disparate treatment in light of his age and that ADC denied his
requests for reasonable accommodations for his disability. (Id. ¶¶ 5 & 7).
Cassidy has brought this suit pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12111, et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.,
Louisiana’s Employment Discrimination Law, La. R.S. § 23:301, et seq., and Louisiana’s antireprisal law, La. R.S. § 23:967. (Comp. ¶ 3).
1

ADC now moves pursuant to Federal Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(e) to dismiss the federal
age discrimination claims and the state law reprisal statutory claim arguing that Cassidy has
failed to allege facts to support such claims.1 ADC moves the Court to order a more definite
statement regarding the state law discrimination claims arguing that those claims are
pleaded so vaguely and ambiguously as to prevent ADC from answering them.
II.

Discussion
In the context of a motion to dismiss the Court must accept all factual allegations in

the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Lormand v.
US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Lovick v.
Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004)). However, the foregoing tenet is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Thread-bare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550, U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
The central issue in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is whether, in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief. Gentilello v. Rege, 627
F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir.
2008)). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court
does not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal

Cassidy concedes that the state law reprisal statutory claim is prescribed and therefore
does not oppose the motion insofar as ADC seeks dismissal of that claim. (Rec. Doc. 14,
Plaintiff’s Opposition at 2 n.1).
1

2

conclusions.” Id. (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)). Legal
conclusions must be supported by factual allegations. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
Age Discrimination Claims
ADC contends that the controlling law requires that age be the “but-for” cause of the
challenged employment action as opposed to a mere motivating factor. See Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009). According to ADC, because Cassidy alleges age
discrimination in addition to disability discrimination, Cassidy’s own allegations actually
negate the claim for age discrimination.
In Gross, the Supreme Court held that the text of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., precludes courts from applying the
burden-shifting that takes place in a Title VII mixed-motives case. 557 U.S. at 180. Thus, a
plaintiff in an ADEA case must prove that age was the “but-for” cause of the challenged
adverse employment action. Id. In contrast to a Title VII case, an ADEA plaintiff cannot
establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor. Id. at 174.
ADC characterizes Cassidy’s complaint as alleging that age was a mere motivating
factor (in violation of Gross) and ADC makes this characterization because Cassidy claims
age and disability discrimination in the same complaint. The Court does not concur in ADC’s
assessment of the complaint. In other words, the Court does not interpret Cassidy’s decision
to plead two types of discrimination as implicitly relegating age discrimination to a mere
motivating factor. Moreover, nothing in the Gross decision forecloses the possibility that an
ADEA plaintiff can plead two types of discrimination. In fact, specific language in the opinion
suggests that mixed-motives ADEA cases are still viable so long as the plaintiff can ultimately
prove “but for” causation with respect to age. 557 U.S. at178 (“Hence, the burden of
persuasion necessary to establish employer liability is the same in alleged mixed-motives
3

cases as in any other ADEA disparate-treatment action.”); id. at 180 (“The burden of
persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action
regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one
motivating factor in that decision.”) (emphasis added). And Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. DynMcDermott, which the Fifth Circuit released after Gross,
demonstrates that the presence of two types of alleged discrimination does not mean that age
cannot be the “but for” cause of the adverse employment decision. No. 12-40424, 2013 WL
3855553 (5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (unpublished) (alleging age and disability discrimination).
ADC’s motion to dismiss the ADEA claim is DENIED.
Louisiana Employment Law Claims
ADC moves the Court to order Cassidy to provide a more definite statement of his
state law discrimination claims because Cassidy did not name the specific statutory sections
applicable to his case and state law recognizes a plethora of types of discrimination. The
complaint was quite clear in that the discrimination being alleged is based on age and
disability. Cassidy has confirmed this in his opposition memorandum. (Rec. Doc. 14,
Plaintiff’s Opposition at 2). ADC’s motion for a more definite statement is therefore DENIED.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite
Statement (Rec. Doc. 10) filed by defendant American Driveline Centers, Inc. is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to the
reprisal claim under La. R.S. § 23:967 and is DENIED in all other respects.
October 23, 2013
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4