Robicheaux v. Caldwell
Filing
49
ORDER & REASONS denying 35 Motion for Reconsideration & 37 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 1/13/2014. (caa, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JONATHAN P. ROBICHEAUX, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
v.
NO. 13-5090
JAMES D. CALDWELL,
LOUISIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
SECTION "F"
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court are plaintiffs' motions to reconsider and for
leave to file a third amended complaint.
For the reasons that
follow, the motions are DENIED.
Background
This lawsuit challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana's
ban on same-sex marriage and its refusal to recognize same-sex
marriages permitted in other states.
his
same-sex
Louisiana;
he
partner
alleged
in
Iowa,
that
but
Jonathan Robicheaux married
lives
Louisiana's
in
Orleans
defense
of
Parish,
marriage
amendment to the state constitution (La. Const. art. 12, § 15) and
article 3520 of the Louisiana Civil Code (which decrees that samesex
marriage
violates
Louisiana's
strong
public
policy
and
precludes recognition of any such marriage contract from another
state) violate his federal constitutional rights.
Robicheaux named the Louisiana Attorney General James "Buddy"
1
Caldwell as the only defendant in this case. When Robicheaux first
brought suit, he alleged only violations of the full faith and
credit clause; however, he then amended his complaint to add claims
of due process and equal protection violations.
And although
Robicheaux initially brought this suit alone, he amended his
complaint for a second time to include as additional plaintiffs his
partner, Derek Penton, and another couple also married in Iowa but
now living in Louisiana, Nadine and Courtney Blanchard.
Attorney General Caldwell moved to dismiss or transfer the
case
for
improper
venue,
and
then
to
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity.
dismiss
for
lack
of
On November 26, 2013,
the Court granted the Attorney General's motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction and denied the motion to dismiss or transfer for
improper venue as moot.
The Court held that plaintiffs fell short
of satisfying the requirement of Ex parte Young1 that the state
official
have
"some
connection"
to
the
enforcement
of
the
challenged state law. Six days later, plaintiffs filed this motion
asking the Court to reconsider its ruling.
Plaintiffs have also
filed a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint.
I.
A.
Motions requesting reconsideration of court orders generally
fall under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil
1
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
2
Procedure.
See Higgins v. Cain, No. 07-9729, 2012 WL 3309716, at
*1 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2012).
Rule 59(e) provides that a motion to
alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than twenty-eight
days after the entry of judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
Rule
60(b), on the other hand, applies to motions filed after the
twenty-eight day period, but demands more “exacting substantive
See Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works,
requirements.”
Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173-74 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other
grounds, Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1078 (5th Cir.
1994) (en banc).
Because the Court entered the order dismissing
the case on November 26, 2013, and the plaintiffs filed the motion
to reconsider six days later on December 2, 2013, the motion is
timely under Rule 59(e), and such analysis is appropriate.
B.
“A Rule 59(e) motion ‘calls into question the correctness of
a judgment.’”
Templet v. Hydrochem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478 (5th
Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Transtexas Gas Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581
(5th Cir. 2002)).
Because of the interest in finality, Rule 59(e)
motions may only be granted if the moving party shows there was a
mistake of law or fact or presents newly discovered evidence that
could
not
have
been
discovered
previously.
Id.
at
478-79.
Moreover, Rule 59 motions should not be used to relitigate old
matters, raise new arguments, or submit evidence that could have
been presented earlier in the proceedings.
3
See id. at 479;
Rosenblatt v. United Way of Greater Houston, 607 F.3d 413, 419 (5th
Cir. 2010)(“[A] motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule
59(e) ‘must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or
fact or must present newly discovered evidence’ and ‘cannot be used
to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before
the judgment issued.’”)(citing Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d
854, 864 (5th Cir. 2003)(quoting Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d
1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)).
The grant of such a motion is an
“extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.” Indep. CocaCola Employees’ Union of Lake Charles, No. 1060 v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. United, Inc., 114 F. App’x 137, 143 (5th Cir. 2004)
(citing Templet, 367 F.3d at 479).
The Court must balance two
important judicial imperatives in deciding whether to reopen a case
in response to a motion for reconsideration: “(1) the need to bring
the litigation to an end; and (2) the need to render just decisions
on the basis of all the facts.”
Templet, 367 F.3d at 479.
II.
Plaintiffs contend that the Court should reconsider its order
dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity.
However, instead of asserting a mistake of law or fact,
plaintiffs submit for the first time a new claim that La. Const.
art. 12, § 15 violates not only the U.S. Constitution but also the
Enabling Act of the State of Louisiana.2 Plaintiffs also contend
2
ch. 21, 2 Stat. 641 (1811).
4
that notwithstanding Hans v. Louisiana3 and over one hundred years
of jurisprudence, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity does not
actually apply to suits commenced against a state by its own
citizens. Plaintiffs maintain that a state simply cannot be immune
from its obligation to comply with federal law.
Plaintiffs fail to persuade the Court that the extraordinary
remedy of reconsideration is warranted.
Plaintiffs merely try to
relitigate issues and add arguments that they ignored earlier; they
show no mistake of law or fact in the Court's prior ruling, nor do
they present anything that undermines the Court's order.
III.
Alternatively, plaintiffs urge the Court to permit them to
file a third amended complaint in order to name another state
official with the requisite enforcement connection necessary to
avoid sovereign immunity.
Plaintiffs contend that under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2), "[t]he court should freely give leave when
justice so requires."
However, plaintiffs do not dispute the more
exacting standard applicable to requests for leave to amend filed
after a case has been dismissed.
"Post-judgment amendment to a
complaint can only occur once the judgment itself is vacated under
Rule 59(e).” See Heimlich v. Harris Cnty., Texas, 81 F. App'x 816,
817 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Vielma v. Eureka Co., 218 F.3d 458, 468
(5th Cir. 2000)). The Fifth Circuit has instructed that “[i]n cases
3
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
5
where a party seeks to amend a complaint after entry of judgment,
‘we have consistently upheld the denial of leave to amend where the
party seeking to amend has not clearly established that he could
not reasonably have raised the new matter prior to the trial
court’s merits ruling.’”
Id. (citing Briddle v. Scott, 63 F.3d
364, 380 (5th Cir. 1995)).
The Court has declined to grant reconsideration of its order
dismissing plaintiffs' claims.
And plaintiffs provide no support
for their position that the Court should grant leave to amend for
a third time, nor do they provide any credible and competent
explanation why permission for such amendment was not requested
before now.
Accordingly, plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration and for
leave to file a third amended complaint are DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, January 13, 2014
______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6
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