In Re: The Matter of Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, LLC
Filing
38
ORDER AND REASONS granting 32 MOTION to Stay. Scheduling Conference set for 10/30/2014 11:00 AM before courtroom deputy. Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 10/22/14.(jjs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CIVIL ACTION
IN THE MATTER OF MARQUETTE
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY GULFINLAND, LLC, AS OWNER AND
OPERATOR OF THE TOWING VESSEL
FATHER SEELOS, ETC.
NO. 13-5114
SECTION: R
ORDER
Before
the
Court
is
Limitation
Plaintiff
Marquette
Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, LLC's ("Marquette") motion to
reinstate the Court's July 31, 2013 Order restraining prosecution
of any and all claims against Marquette arising out of the July 7,
2013 collision between FATHER SEELOS and a vessel owned by John
Tran.
Marquette contends that reinstatement is necessary because
a new party, Kirby Inland Marine, LP, ("Kirby") has filed claims
against Marquette that jeopardize Marquette's ability to limit its
liability.
Because Kirby is a "claimant" under the Limitation of
Liability Act and has not filed stipulations that adequately
protect
Marquette's
right
to
limitation,
the
Court
GRANTS
Marquette's motion to reinstate the stay.
I.
Background
On July 18, 2013, Marquette, as owner and operator of the
towing vessel FATHER SEELOS, filed a complaint seeking exoneration
from or limitation of liability regarding any loss, damage or
injury caused by a collision between FATHER SEELOS and a vessel
owned by John Tran. On July 31, 2013, the Court issued an order
that restrained, stayed, and enjoined the further prosecution of
any and all actions arising from the aforementioned collision.1
After
the
Court
ordered
the
stay,
claimants
Susan
Tran
(individually and as a personal representative and widow of the
decedent, John Tran, on behalf of herself and her minor child,
Marsha Tran), Quoc Tran, Jeanie Tran, and Nancy Pham filed a
stipulation agreeing that Marquette is entitled to litigate all
issues relating to limitation of liability in federal court and
waiving any claim of res judicata relevant to any issue related to
limitation of liability based on any judgment in any court other
than this one.2 Claimants further stipulated that they would not
seek or enforce any judgment in excess of the value of the FATHER
SEELOS and her freight pending the adjudication in this Court of
the petition seeking limitation of liability.3
stipulations
adequately
protected
Marquette's
Finding that the
right
to
seek
limitation of its liability, the Court lifted the stay "for the
limited purpose of permitting the aforementioned claimants to
pursue an action against Marquette in Louisiana state court."4
1
R. Doc. 5.
2
R. Doc. 22 (hereinafter "Tran stipulations").
3
Id.
4
R. Doc. 27.
2
After the Court lifted the stay, the Tran claimants filed a
Petition for Damages against Kirby Inland Marine, LP ("Kirby") in
Louisiana state court.5
FATHER SEELOS was towing two barges owned
by Kirby when the accident at issue occurred.
After receiving the
petition, Kirby filed an answer and claim in this Limitation action
seeking indemnity and contribution from Marquette for "all survey
fees, attorney's fees or any other related costs."6
Kirby has not
signed or otherwise agreed to be bound by the Tran stipulations.
Marquette now moves the Court to "reinstate its July 30, 2013
Order restraining prosecution of claims against Marquette arising
out of the collision between a vessel owned by John Tran and the
towing vessel Father Seelos."7
Marquette contends that such an
order is necessary to adequately protect Marquette's rights under
the Limitation of Liability Act ("Limitation Act").
30501, et seq.
46 U.S.C. §
Neither Kirby nor the Tran claimants have filed an
opposition.
5
Counsel for Kirby represents that Tran's service of the
petition on Kirby in the state court action was the first notice
Kirby received of any litigation relating to its barges. R. Doc.
28.
6
R. Doc. 30 at 5.
7
R. Doc. 32-1 at 4.
3
II.
Discussion
The Limitation Act establishes exclusive federal jurisdiction
to allow a shipowner to limit liability for damages arising from a
maritime accident to "the value of the vessel and pending freight."
46 U.S.C. § 30505(a). "A shipowner's right to limitation, however,
is cabined by the 'saving to suitors' clause."
Odeco Oil and Gas
Co., Drilling Div. v. Bonnette, 74 F.3d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 1996).
While the Limitation Act grants exclusive federal jurisdiction to
limit a shipowner's liability, the savings to suitors clause
"evinces a preference for jury trials and common law remedies in
the forum of the claimants choice."
Id.
See also Lewis v. Lewis
& Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 448 (2001)("One statute gives
suitors the right to a choice of remedies, and the other statute
gives vessel owners the right to seek limitation of liability in
federal court.").
Although tension exists between the Limitation
Act and the savings to suitors clause, "the [district] court's
primary concern is to protect the shipowner's absolute right to
claim the Act's liability cap, and to reserve the adjudication of
that right in the federal forum." Magnolia Marine Transport Co. v.
Laplace Towing Corp., 964 F.2d 1571, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992).
In
reconciling
the
right
of
shipowners
to
limit
their
liability in federal court with the rights of claimants to sue in
the forum of their choice, courts have recognized two instances
where a federal court must allow a state court action to proceed:
4
(1) when the total amount claimed does not exceed the value of the
vessel and pending freight; or (2) when all claimants stipulate
that
the
federal
court
has
exclusive
jurisdiction
over
the
limitation proceeding, and that the claimants will not attempt to
enforce an award greater than the liability cap determined by the
federal court.
In re Bertucci Contracting Co., 544 F. App'x 308,
317 n.8 (5th Cir. 2013)(citing Odeco Oil, 74 F.3d at 674).
In
either situation, permitting an action to proceed in state court is
contingent on protecting the shipowner's "absolute" right to limit
his or her liability.
In re Complaint of Port Arthur Towing Co.
ex. rel. M/V MISS CAROLYN, 42 F.3d 312, 316 (5th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 823 (1995).
Here, Kirby's indemnity and contribution claims jeopardize
Marquette's statutory right to limited liability.
The Fifth
Circuit has held that parties seeking contribution and indemnity
are "claimants" within the meaning of the Limitation Act.
See,
e.g., In re Complaint of Port Arthur Towing Co., 42 F.3d at 316
(recognizing
that
"a
'claimant'
in
this
context
includes
a
codefendant who is asserting a cross claim for indemnification,
costs, and attorneys' fees"); In re ADM/Growmark River System,
Inc., 234 F. 3d 881, 886 (5th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that "parties
seeking indemnification and contribution from a shipowner must be
considered
claimants
within
the
meaning
Act")(citing Odeco Oil, 74 F.3d at 675).
5
of
the
Limitation
Kirby has not joined or
otherwise agreed to be bound by the Tran stipulations. Thus, Kirby
is a "claimant" under the Limitation Act who has not stipulated to
the
conditions
rights.
necessary
to
safeguard
Marquette's
limitation
See In re ADM/Growmark River System, Inc., 234 F.3d at
885-86 ("In order for claims to proceed in state court after an
exoneration or limitation action has been filed in federal court,
all claimants must sign a stipulation protecting the vessel owner's
rights under the Limitation Act.")(emphasis in original).
Because Kirby has not filed the necessary stipulations, the
Court must reinstate the stay to protect Marquette's "absolute"
right to limit its liability.
Towing Co., 42 F.3d at 316.
In re Complaint of Port Arthur
See also Lewis & Clark Marine, 531
U.S. at 454 ("If the district court concludes that the vessel
owner's right to limitation will not be adequately protected-where for example a group of claimants cannot agree on appropriate
stipulations . . . the court may proceed to adjudicate the merits,
deciding the issues of liability and limitation.").
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Marquette's motion to reinstate the
stay is GRANTED.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the prosecution of any and all
actions,
suits
and
proceedings
already
commenced
and
the
commencement or prosecution thereafter of any and all suits,
6
actions, or proceedings, of any nature and description whatsoever
in any jurisdiction, and the taking of any steps and the making of
any
motion
in
such
actions,
suits,
or
proceedings
against
Limitation Plaintiff, against the towing vessel FATHER SEELOS, her
officers and crew, against any property of Limitation Plaintiff, or
against Limitation Plaintiff's employees or underwriters except in
this action, to recover damages for or in respect of any loss,
damage or injury, occasioned or incurred on the said voyage of the
towing vessel FATHER SEELOS as alleged in the Complaint, be and
they hereby are restrained, stayed, and enjoined until the hearing
and determination of this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the pretrial conference and trial
dates are hereby continued.
The parties are to participate in a
telephone scheduling conference with the Court's case manager on
October 30, 2014 at 11:00 a.m. for the purpose of scheduling new
trial and pre-trial conference dates and discussion of the status
and discovery cut-off dates.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 22ndday of October, 2014.
__
_________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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