Funez v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company
Filing
35
ORDER AND REASONS GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 21 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as set forth in document.Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 10/20/2014. (my)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JONHYE FUNEZ
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 13–5338
KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN
RAILWAY COMPANY
SECTION: "H"(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc.
21). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART. The Court
finds that Defendant violated the Safety Appliance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20301, et seq.
("SAA"), and the violation constitutes negligence per se under the Federal
Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 ("FELA"). The Motion is DENIED as to
causation.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Jonhye Funez, was employed by Defendant, Kansas City
Southern Railway Company, as a switchman. On June 26, 2013, Plaintiff was
1
working on a train that stopped at Defendant's yard in Baton Rouge, LA. While
setting handbrakes on one of the train's railcars, Plaintiff alleges that he was
holding onto the car with one hand and setting the brake with the other.
Plaintiff claims that the handhold suddenly gave way as he was holding it,
causing him to fall and injure himself. Plaintiff filed the instant suit seeking
damages under FELA. He now files this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on the issue of liability.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."1 A genuine issue of fact exists only
"if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party."2
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment, the
Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws all
reasonable inferences in his favor.3 "If the moving party meets the initial burden
of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to
the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the
1
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2012).
2
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
3
Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 1997).
2
existence of a genuine issue for trial."4 Summary judgment is appropriate if the
non-movant "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case."5 "In response to a properly supported
motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must identify specific evidence
in the record and articulate the manner in which that evidence supports that
party’s claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to sustain a finding in favor
of the nonmovant on all issues as to which the nonmovant would bear the
burden of proof at trial."6 "We do not . . . in the absence of any proof, assume
that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts."7
Additionally, "[t]he mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion."8
LAW AND ANALYSIS
FELA provides that “[e]very common carrier by railroad . . . shall be liable
in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier
. . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of
any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier."9 Thus, Plaintiff must
prove that (1) he was the employee of a common carrier by railroad; (2) that he
4
Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).
5
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
6
John v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th
Cir. 2004).
7
Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000).
8
Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).
9
45 U.S.C. § 51.
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suffered an injury while he was employed by such carrier; and (3) the injury was
caused by the negligence of the carrier or its employees. In this case, Plaintiff
alleges that his injury was caused by a defective handhold on the end of a
railcar.
He alleges that a defective handhold is a violation of the Safety
Appliance Act ("SSA"), 49 U.S.C. 20301, et seq. "The cause of action created by
[FELA], embraces claims of an employee based on violations of the Safety
Appliance Act. In such actions, the injured employee is required to prove only
the statutory violation and thus is relieved of the burden of proving
negligence."10
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant (a
common carrier by railroad), or that the alleged injury occurred during the
course of his employment. Thus, in order to prevail on this Motion, Plaintiff
must prove that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that (1) Defendant
violated the SSA, and (2) the violation caused Plaintiff's injury. Additionally, it
is important to note that the standard for causation in FELA cases is different
from that employed in traditional negligence cases. The Supreme Court has held
that, in order to satisfy the causation requirement of FELA, a Plaintiff must
prove that the FELA employer's "negligence played a part—no matter how
small—in bringing about the injury."11
Thus, if Plaintiff can prove that
Defendant violated the SSA and that the violation played even the smallest part
10
Crane v. Cedar Rapids & I. C. Ry. Co., 395 U.S. 164, 166 (1969); see also Trinidad
v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 949 F.2d 187, 188 (5th Cir. 1991) ("The Safety Appliance Act imposes
strict liability on railroads for violations of the Act's safety standards.").
11
CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2644 (2011).
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in causing his injury, he must prevail on this Motion.
I. Violation of the SSA
The SSA provides (in pertinent part) that "a railroad carrier may use or
allow to be used on any of its railroad lines . . . a vehicle only if it is equipped
with secure grab irons or handholds on its ends and sides for greater security to
individuals in coupling and uncoupling vehicles."12 Plaintiff argues that the
railroad car on which he was working had a handhold that was not secure at the
time of the accident. He supports this allegation through his own deposition
testimony in which he testified that the handhold gave way as he was holding
it. Plaintiff also provides deposition testimony of his coworkers and inspection
reports prepared by Defendant. The testimony and the internal reports all
confirm that a bolt was missing from the handhold following the accident. This
evidence is consistent with Plaintiff's own testimony that the handhold gave way
when he grabbed it, causing Plaintiff to lose his grip and fall.
Defendant admits that its own internal investigation revealed that the
handhold was missing a bolt after the accident. Despite the fact that the
missing bolt is, by any definition, a violation of the SSA,13 Defendant argues that
Plaintiff has not offered enough evidence that the bolt was missing at the time
of his fall. In making this argument, Defendant overlooks its burden to "identify
affirmative evidence from which a jury could find" in its favor.14 Defendant does
12
49 U.S.C. § 20302.
13
See, e.g., Roe v. Port Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 620 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)
(Finding that a grab iron which moved as little as one-half inch was not "firmly fastened" and
therefore not secure within meaning of the SSA).
14
Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 600.
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not point to a single piece of affirmative evidence that suggests that the
handhold was secure at the time of Plaintiff's fall. Instead it argues that,
because Plaintiff was the only person to witness the fall, this Court cannot find
a violation of the SSA without evaluating Plaintiff's credibility, a task reserved
for the jury. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. In light of the fact
that Defendant's own internal investigation confirmed the unsecured handhold
and Defendant's failure to offer any affirmative evidence demonstrating a
genuine factual dispute, the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion as to the first
element of his claim: that Defendant violated the SSA by failing to provide
secure handholds on the railcar in question.
II. Causation
Plaintiff must next prove that Defendant's violation of the SSA caused him
some injury. For liability purposes, it is enough that Plaintiff prove that he
sustained an injury. In support of his Motion as to the causation issue, Plaintiff
provided his own deposition testimony, which states that he fell onto the
drawbar15 running between the railcars when the handhold gave way, and
Defendant's internal reports that essentially reflect the same version of events.
In response to Plaintiff's motion, Defendant provided the affidavit of
Robert Morris, a purported expert in railway safety. Mr. Morris offers the
opinion that Plaintiff was solely at fault for the accident and that the unsecured
handhold would not have caused Plaintiff to fall if Plaintiff was exercising
proper care. Specifically, he alleges that Plaintiff failed to utilize a safe climbing
15
The drawbar is the device that connects two train cars to each other.
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technique as required by Defendant's safety manual. Mr. Morris offers the
opinion that, had Plaintiff utilized a safe climbing technique, the faulty
handhold would not have caused his fall.
While the Court has significant
doubts as to the plausibility of this opinion, such concerns are inappropriate on
a motion for summary judgment.16 In the event that a jury were to believe Mr.
Morris and find that Plaintiff was 100% at fault for the accident, Plaintiff would
not be able to recover under FELA. Accordingly, there is a genuine dispute of
material fact as to the cause of Plaintiff's fall. For this reason, Plaintiff's Motion
is denied as to the issue of causation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment is GRANTED IN PART. The Court finds that Defendant violated the
SSA when it failed to provide a secure handhold on the railcar in question. The
Court DENIES the Motion as to the issue of causation.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 20th day of October, 2014.
____________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16
The Court notes that this is not the first time that Mr. Morris has offered an
implausible opinion in a case such as this. See Glover v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., No. 11-2808,
2013 WL 5328507, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 20, 2013).
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