Galmon v. Columbia Casualty Company et al
Filing
5
ORDER & REASONS: granting in part and denying in part [doc #122, doc #124, filed in CA 12-2145] Motions to Dismiss; ORDERED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED with respect to: (1) all Section 1983 claims against Sheriff Edwards bas ed on his actions or inactions with respect to Lt. Redmond; (2) all Section 1983 claims against Lt. Redmond in his official capacity, (3) all Section 1983 claims against Lt. Redmond in his supervisory capacity; and (4) all Section 1983 claims against Lt. Redmond in his individual capacity inasmuch as the claim relies on a theory of excessive force. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motions are DENIED in all other respects. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 11/6/13.(sek, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WILLENE BRIGGS, ET AL
CIVIL ACTION
NO: 12-2145 c/w
13-5335 and 135342
VERSUS
APPLIES TO 13-5335
AND 13-5342
SECTION: "J" (4)
TANGIPAHOA PARISH SHERIFF
DANIEL EDWARDS, ET AL
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Rec.
Docs. 122, 124) and Plaintiffs' oppositions thereto (Rec. Docs.
125, 127). Defendants' motions were set for hearing on October
23, 2013, on the briefs. The Court, having considered the motions
and memoranda of counsel, the record, and the applicable law,
finds that Defendants' motions should be GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART
for the reasons set forth more fully below.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND FACTS
This
matter
arises
from
wrongful
death
claims
under
42
U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state law tort claims filed on behalf
1
of
Cjavar
"Dee
Jay"
Galmon
("Dee
Jay")
and
on
behalf
of
Plaintiffs individually. It is undisputed that, in the midst of a
scuffle outside of a nightclub in Tangipahoa Parish, a bullet
from Deputy William Phebus ("Deputy Phebus")'s weapon mortally
wounded
Dee
incident
Jay.
are
The
that
theories
Deputy
regarding
Phebus
the
either
cause
this
the
fired
of
gun
intentionally or that a twitch in Deputy Phebus' finger caused
the weapon to accidentally discharge. In support of the latter
theory, it is alleged that, at the request of Deputy Phebus,
Lieutenant
installed
Steven
an
Redmond
aftermarket
("Lt.
trigger
Redmond")
in
Deputy
had
previously
Phebus's
service
weapon which made it fire more easily; and, as a result, any
twitch in Deputy Phebus's finger would have caused the gun to
fire.
Several lawsuits have arisen from this incident. Willene
Briggs and Kim Brumfield, Dee Jay's mother and sister, initially
filed
a
complaint
("the
Original
Complaint")
against
Deputy
Phebus and Sheriff Daniel Edwards ("Sheriff Edwards") on August
21, 2012.1 On April 19, 2013, the parties deposed Deputy Phebus,
at
which
time
he
indicated
that
1
Lt.
Redmond
had
previously
Briggs and Brumfield later amended their complaint to add Kendra
Pendleton and Allen Briggs, Jr., Dee Jay's siblings, as plaintiffs and
Columbia Casualty Company as a defendant.
2
installed an aftermarket trigger on his weapon, and it was this
trigger that caused him to accidentally shoot Dee Jay. (Depo. of
Deputy Phebus, p. 70-71, Rec. Doc. 127-3) On April 30, 2013, Carl
Galmon, Sr. ("Mr. Galmon"), Dee Jay's father, intervened in the
original suit. (Exh. B to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Rec. Doc. 1223)
On
August
7,
2013,
the
parties
deposed
Lt.
Redmond
who
admitted that he installed the aftermarket trigger. (Exh. to
Def.'s Opp., Rec. Doc. 127-1, p. 3) On August 9, 2013, Willene
and
Allen
Briggs,
Brumfield,
and
Pendleton
(collectively,
"Briggs") filed suit against Lt. Redmond and Sheriff Edwards
alleging that they are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various
state laws. Mr. Galmon filed a nearly identical suit on the same
day, and the Court consolidated all three actions. In lieu of
answering the two later-filed complaints, Defendants filed the
instant
motions
to
dismiss.
As
the
arguments
in
both
of
Defendants' motions and Plaintiffs' oppositions are substantially
similar, the motions will be treated together in this order.2
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Defendants
essentially
assert
the
same
claims
in
both
motions to dismiss. Specifically, Defendants contend that these
cases must be dismissed because (a) the Court lacks subject
2
When both sets of Plaintiffs' claims and arguments are the same, the
Court will refer generally to "Plaintiffs."
3
matter jurisdiction;3 (b) Plaintiffs filed their complaints to
circumvent the scheduling order in the original case arising from
this incident; and (c) Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for
relief.
A. Claim-Splitting
Procedurally, Defendants argue that the instant Complaints
should be dismissed because they are duplicative of the Original
Complaint. Defendants further claim that Plaintiffs knew that
they may have had a claim against Lt. Redmond well before the
deadline for amendments in the Original Complaint, but simply
failed to amend it. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that
Defendants provide no legal support for this contention, and that
they filed these actions within the statute of limitations, thus
they are proper.
B. Substance of the § 1983 Claim
As to the substance of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim, Defendants
argue that Plaintiff must allege facts to show that there was a
"governmental termination of freedom of movement through means
intentionally applied to the object of detention." (Rec. Doc.
124-1)
Moreover, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to state
3
Defendants' basis for their argument that the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to hear this case is unclear and without merit; therefore,
the Court will pass on considering the parties' related arguments.
4
a claim based on a failure to train theory because the Sheriff's
Office met state training standards, and because the argument
that
different
training
would
have
been
constitute a cognizable claim under § 1983.
better
does
not
Further, Defendants
point out that liability based on a failure to train is rare, and
that the Fifth Circuit has only found such liability in one
instance where the sheriff failed to provide any training at all.
Finally,
Defendants
argue
that
Plaintiffs
have
failed
to
specifically allege any unconstitutional policy or custom, so
they fail to state a claim.
Plaintiffs
contend
that
they
state
a
claim
against
Defendants because Defendants' actions caused the shooting. Mr.
Galmon specifically contends that he only seeks to hold Lt.
Redmond liable individually; therefore, he does not need to show
proof of a policy or custom. Mr. Galmon argues that, to hold Lt.
Redmond
liable,
he
need
only
show
that
Lt.
Redmond
was
deliberately indifferent to a known or obvious consequence of his
action. Thus, Mr. Galmon argues that because he alleges that Lt.
Redmond
disregarded
the
obvious
dangers
of
installing
an
aftermarket trigger, he sufficiently states a claim against Lt.
Redmond.
Mr.
Galmon
further
argues
that
Sheriff
Edwards
is
personally liable for failure to train and supervise, negligently
hiring Deputy Phebus, and ratifying constitutional violations,
5
emphasizing that he seeks to hold Sheriff Edwards, and not the
municipality, liable.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Failure to State a Claim
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
The
complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005).
simple, concise, and direct.”
Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
The allegations “must be
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
must plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547
(2007)).
A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads
facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id.
A
court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Lormand v.
U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232-33 (5th Cir. 2009); Baker
v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
The court is not,
however, bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as
6
factual allegations.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
DISCUSSION
A. Claim-Splitting
The Fifth Circuit has held that "when a plaintiff files a
second complaint alleging the same cause of action as a prior,
pending, related action, the second complaint may be dismissed.”
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 95
F.3d 358, 362 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); Southern Snow
Mfg. Co., Inc. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 527,
540-41
(E.D.
particularly
La.
Jan.
30,
applicable
2013)
when
(Zainey,
"the
J.).
plaintiff
This
files
rule
the
is
second
complaint to achieve procedural advantage by circumventing the
rules pertaining to the amendment of complaints.”
Earth,
Inc.,
95
F.3d
at
362
(internal
Friends of the
citation
omitted).
Dismissal is not proper in all cases, however. For example, in
Curtis
v.
district
Citibank,
court
226
presiding
F.
3d
over
133,
a
136
(2d.
Cir.
discrimination
2000),
suit
a
denied
plaintiffs leave to amend to add a retaliation claim on the
grounds that the amendment was untimely, and then, when plaintiff
filed a second suit claiming retaliation, the district court
dismissed it as duplicative. Id. The Second Circuit reversed the
district
court
holding
that
the
retaliation
claim
was
a
subsequently arising claim that could not have been brought in
7
the first suit. Id.
Clearly, the instant claims against Lt. Redmond may not be
dismissed as he is not a defendant in the original suit. Sheriff
Edwards, however, is named in the original suit. The instant
suits against Sheriff Edwards arise from the exact same incident
and often repeat verbatim the allegations of the first-filed
complaint. But, even though the claims in the second suit are
nearly identical, the Court finds that: (a) unlike the plaintiffs
in Friends of the Earth, it does not appear that Plaintiffs filed
these suits to circumvent the amendment deadline in 12-2145,4 (b)
there are some differences in the claims, and (c) consolidation
of the claims is a sufficient remedy.
Much like the plaintiff in
Curtis who sought to add a retaliation theory to her Title VII
claim, Plaintiffs in this case seek to add alternate theories of
liability to their § 1983 and state law claims that are related
to
Lt.
Redmond
and
were
unknown
at
the
time
of
filing
the
original suit. Further, Plaintiffs did not conceal their filing
of the second suits, as did the plaintiff in Friends of the Earth
or engage in any other deliberate attempt to gain an unfair
4
Though the Court finds it curious that Plaintiffs risked passage of
the amendment deadline by waiting until after Lt. Redmond's deposition to add
him as a defendant, there is a paucity of evidence that these suits were filed
to gain a procedural advantage. This is not a situation wherein Plaintiffs
attempted to amend and were denied, thereby prompting them to file another
suit. Rather, Plaintiffs appear to have chosen to this course of action over
the option of an amendment.
8
advantage. In fact, had the parties sought leave to amend, the
Court likely would have granted the request. Therefore, the Court
will not dismiss the instant matters as duplicative.5
B. § 1983 Claims
Mr. Galmon states that he seeks to hold Lt. Redmond and
Sheriff Edwards liable in their individual capacities only; yet,
he
cites
to
legal
standards
that
pertain
only
to
municipal
liability. (Rec. Doc. 127, p. 17) Further, Briggs does not state
in her Complaint whether she seeks to hold Defendants liable in
their individual or official capacities. Therefore, out of an
abundance of caution, and because the Fifth Circuit instructs the
courts to examine the complaint to determine the nature of the
actions rather than dismiss the complaint on this technicality,
the Court will address the Defendants' liability in any relevant
capacity. Parker v. Graves, 479 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir. 1973).
1.
Claims against Lt. Redmond
a. § 1983 Individual Liability Claims
5
Plaintiffs and Defendants both intermittently refer to and make
arguments concerning Deputy Phebus' actions despite the fact that Deputy
Phebus is not a defendant in the instant suit. In light of this pattern, the
Court must emphasize that Deputy Phebus is a defendant in the original
complaint only, and all argument and claims relating to him will not be
treated in the instant motions to dismiss as those issues are only partially
briefed and are not specifically at issue. Therefore, all claims against
Deputy Phebus and all claims against Sheriff Edwards that involve Deputy
Phebus are still pending in the original suit arising from this incident (Case
No. 12-2145).
9
Plaintiffs assert that Lt. Redmond is liable under § 1983
because he deprived Dee Jay of: (a) his Fourth Amendment right to
be free from excessive force, and (2) his Fourteenth Amendment
right to not be denied medical care while detained by police.6
Each potential basis for liability is discussed below.
i. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Claim
A government actor is liable in his individual capacity
under § 1983 if the plaintiff can prove that
he was "deprived of
a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of
state law." Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 4950 (1999); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th
Cir. 2005). Supervisory liability exists when there is either
“personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or a
sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful
conduct and the constitutional violation." Thompkins v. Belt, 828
F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987).
Supervisory liability in § 1983 cases is a murky area of the
law. See Kit Kinports, The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory
6
The Court recognizes that, while Mr. Galmon brings a claim for denial
of medical care, the Briggs complaint does not explicitly make such a claim.
The Court will allow the Briggs claim to move forward based on this theory,
though, because, on a motion to dismiss, the Court is charged with the task of
examining the complaint for any possible theory of recovery, not just those
theories explicitly alleged. Due v. Tallahassee Theatres, Inc., 333 F.2d 630,
632 (5th Cir. 1964).
10
Liability in Section 1983 Cases, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 147 (1997).
Not
only
are
there
Circuit
splits
on
this
issue,
there
are
conflicting standards that arise from the same Circuit, and even
the same courts, and the Supreme Court has said little on the
subject. Id. at 150-51. In Rizzo v. Goode, the Supreme Court
indicated that there should be an "affirmative link" between the
constitutional wrong and the supervisor's actions or inactions.
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976) (emphasis added); see
also Kinports, supra, p. 152-52. Left to determine what types
actions or inactions constitute such an "affirmative link," the
Fifth Circuit has made clear that mere negligence on the part of
the
supervisor
does
not
give
rise
to
supervisory
liability.
Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1992). Rather,
the
Fifth
Circuit
has
repeatedly
applied
a
"deliberate
indifference" standard to supervisory liability claims where the
supervisor is not directly involved. Doe v. Taylor Independent
School Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a
showing of deliberate indifference is required for supervisory
liability in a failure to train case);
Rios v. City of Del Rio,
Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 427 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying deliberate
indifference standard to an excessive force claim); Estate of
Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375,
381 (5th Cir. 2005); compare to Sanders, 950 F.2d at 1160 (in a
11
false arrest and malicious prosecution case, the court applied a
standard employed by the Seventh Circuit which would require the
Court to ask whether the supervisor “[knew] about the conduct and
facilitate[d] it, approve[d] it, condone[d] it, or turn[ed] a
blind eye for fear of what [he] might see.”)
Accepting
the
fact
that
"deliberate
indifference
to
the
known or obvious fact that such constitutional violations would
result," is the standard for supervisory liability cases, the
Court
must
then
determine
how
to
apply
the
standard.
The
standard is best described in Estate of Davis wherein the Fifth
Circuit explains that:
For an official to act with deliberate indifference,
the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference. Deliberate indifference requires a showing
of more than negligence or even gross negligence.
Actions and decisions by officials that are merely
inept, erroneous, ineffective, or negligent do not
amount to deliberate indifference [...] To satisfy the
deliberate indifference prong, a plaintiff usually must
demonstrate a pattern of violations and that the
inadequacy of the training is ‘obvious and obviously
likely to result in a constitutional violation.
Estate of Davis, 406 F.3d at 381 (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added). The opinion goes on to recognize that, though
it is rare, and thus far has only happened in one case, a single
action can suffice to show deliberate indifference. Id. at 382-
12
83.7
Applying the deliberate indifference standard to the instant
case,
the
Court
finds
that,
though
Plaintiffs'
allegations
sufficiently allege that Lt. Redmond was deliberately indifferent
to the dangers or installing an after market trigger, Plaintiffs
do not sufficiently allege that Lt. Redmond was deliberately
indifferent
to
Dee
Jay's
constitutional
rights.8
Plaintiffs'
allegations, even taken as true, cannot show that Lt. Redmond's
actions
were
the
cause
constitutional violation.
of
or
affirmatively
linked
to
the
Lt. Redmond's actions may have been
the cause of Dee Jay's death9 because the gun would not have gone
off were it not for the aftermarket trigger, that is not the same
7
In Brown, the Court found that the single decision to not train a
deputy who had no experience gave presented so obvious a risk that the
omission gave rise to liability. Brown, 219 F.3d 450,463 Though Brown found
municipal liability, the Court finds that the Fifth Circuit often borrows
language from municipal liability cases when considering supervisory
liability. As was noted in Doe, "legal elements of an individual's supervisory
liability and a political subdivision's liability, however, are similar enough
that the same standards of fault and causation should govern." Doe, 15 F.3d
443, 453 (5th Cir. 1994).
8
Given the fact that the standard that must be applied is very murky
and that one court has found a failure to supervise based on a single
decision, it would be improper for the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' excessive
force claims. In a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need not prove that he has
a successful claim, but rather he must prove that he has a cognizable claim.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 ("even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual
proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.")
9
This assumption is made in the hypothetical and is not meant to
indicate that the Court finds that Lt. Redmond's actions caused Dee Jay
Galmon's death.
13
as saying that his actions caused the constitutional violations
of excessive force and/or denial of medical care. See Baker v.
McCollan,
443
constitutional
U.S.
137,
146
(1979)
torts
and
state
(drawing
law
torts);
line
between
Shillingford
v.
Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981) (same)(abrogated on
other grounds). Regarding the excessive force claim, Plaintiffs
argue that Deputy Phebus either intentionally shot Dee Jay or
accidentally shot him because of the aftermarket trigger. Under
the
former
theory,
there
is
no
way
to
conclude
that
the
installation of an aftermarket trigger caused Deputy Phebus to
intentionally shoot Dee Jay. If the latter theory is true, the
excessive force would be Deputy Phebus' decision to point the
weapon at Dee Jay, not the actual shooting. Watson v. Bryant, 1160699, 2013 WL 3227633, *4 (5th Cir., Feb. 4, 2013) (even where a
shooting
was
accidental,
an
officer
may
violate
the
"Fourth
Amendment if he acted objectively unreasonably by deciding to
make an arrest [or] by drawing his pistol.")
Again, there is
simply no logical way to conclude that the installation of an
aftermarket trigger on Deputy Phebus' weapon caused Deputy Phebus
to draw a weapon on a teenager who was allegedly unarmed and had
his hands in the air.
As to the denial of medical treatment
claims, there is, again, no way to determine that installation of
an aftermarket trigger would cause Lt. Redmond to deny treatment
14
to Dee Jay. Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss must be
granted on this issue.
ii. Fourteenth Amendment Denial of Medical Treatment
In his Complaint, Mr. Galmon asserts a claim under section §
1983 based on a denial of medical treatment.10 "After the initial
incidents of a seizure have concluded and an individual is being
detained
by
police
officials
but
has
yet
to
be
booked,
an
arrestee's right to medical attention, like that of a pretrial
detainee,
derives
from
the
Fourteenth
Amendment."
Nerren
v.
Livingston Police Dep't, 86 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1996) “The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that a
person detained by the police is entitled to medical care.”
Carter v. Reach, 399 Fed.Appx. 941, 942 (5th Cir.2010). "Officers
violate that right if they are deliberately indifferent to a
serious illness or injury. A showing of deliberate indifference
requires a showing that the defendant subjectively knew of a
substantial
and
significant
risk
and
that
he
effectively
disregards that risk." Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff's Dept.,
10
Though some Circuits recognize a Fourth Amendment right to medical
treatment, the Court will construe the claim contained in Paragraph 47 of Mr.
Galmon's Complaint as a Fourteenth, and not a Fourth, Amendment claim, as it
appears that the Fifth Circuit analyzes an arrestee's right to medical care
under the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nerren,
86 F.3d at 473; compare to Legg v. Pappas, 383 Fed. Appx. 547 (7th Cir. 2010)
(recognizing Fourth Amendment right to medical care).
15
228 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2000).
Under the theory that Deputy Phebus intentionally shot Dee
Jay,
it
is
clear
that
Dee
Jay
was
"seized"
or
"detained;"
therefore, in that situation, the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed
him that the officers at the scene would not exhibit deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs.11 Plaintiffs allege
that Lt. Redmond was on the scene and that Dee Jay was denied
medical treatment and left on the ground suffering from a severe
bullet wound. These allegations clearly state a claim for denial
of medical care that Defendants did not address in their motions
to dismiss. Therefore, though Plaintiffs' excessive force claims
against Lt. Redmond have been dismissed, Plaintiffs may maintain
their § 1983 claims on these grounds.
b. § 1983 Official Capacity Claims
A
claim
requires
against
proof:
1)
policymaker, 2) that a
there was
a
defendant
that
the
in
his
defendant
official
was
capacity
acting
as
a
constitutional injury occurred, 3) that
a policy, custom, or "single act" under Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), and 4) that the policy,
custom, or Pembaur act was the moving force behind the injury.
11
See, Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir.
2004)("An officer seizes a person when he, by means of physical force or show
of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. In
addition, the “governmental termination of freedom of movement must be made
through means intentionally applied."
16
See Brown, 219 F.3d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 2000). Applying these
elements to the instant case, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim
against
Lt.
Redmond
in
his
official
capacity
because,
even
accepting the facts in the Complaint as true, they have not
alleged that Lt. Redmond is a policymaker or that there was a
policy, custom, or single Pembaur act.
Plaintiffs do not allege that there is a policy or custom in
place that allows the alteration of service weapons, but rather
alleges that Lt. Redmond violated the official policy regarding
altering weapons. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not properly allege
that Lt. Redmond is a policymaker who may be liable for a single
act. Mr. Galmon falls short in his attempt to analogize the
instant
matter
to
Pembaur.
He
argues
that
Lt.
Redmond
is
analogous to the assistant prosecutor in Pembaur and notes that,
in that case, the Supreme Court allowed the county to be held
liable for the single action of an assistant prosecutor. Mr.
Galmon misreads Pembaur, however. In Pembaur, the law enforcement
officers did in fact call the assistant county prosecutor for
guidance, but the assistant prosecutor then turned to the County
Prosecutor,
authority,
who
and
was
who
statutorily
gave
the
granted
instruction
final
that
policymaking
caused
the
constitutional violation. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484. Liability in
Pembaur was therefore based on the single action of the County
17
Prosecutor, not the assistant county prosecutor, as is made clear
in the Supreme Court's opinion. Id. at 483-84.
Accordingly, Defendants' motions to dismiss will be granted
on these grounds.
2. Claims Against Sheriff Edwards
a. Official Capacity
Any official capacity claims against Sheriff Edwards must be
evaluated under the same standard for official capacity claims as
was discussed in the previous section.12
Applying these standards to Sheriff Edwards, Plaintiffs fail
to state a claim against Sheriff Edwards in his official capacity
based
on
his
actions
as
they
relate
to
Lieutenant
Redmond
because, regardless of the actions or inactions attributed to
Sheriff Edwards, there is no causal link to the constitutional
injury.
As
was
discussed
above,
the
installation
of
a
hair
trigger is not the cause of either excessive force or a denial of
medical care. Therefore, Defendants’ motions to dismiss must be
granted as to Plaintiffs' claims against Sheriff Edwards in his
12
Plaintiff must show that: 1) that the defendant was acting
as a policymaker, 2) that a constitutional injury occurred, 3)
that there was a policy, custom, or "single act" under Pembaur
v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), and 4) that the
policy, custom, or Pembaur act was the moving force behind the
injury. See Brown, 219 F.3d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 2000)(emphasis
added).
18
official capacity as they relate to Lt. Redmond. The parties
claims against Sheriff Edwards in relation to Deputy Phebus,
however, are not at issue in the instant motion to dismiss; and
therefore, remain pending in civil action 12-2145.
b. Individual Capacity
A sheriff may be held liable in his individual capacity for
his
failure
as
a
supervisor
to
train
and/or
supervise.
The
standard for liability is the same as the standard for a failure
to supervise or train in the municipal capacity, however, so
Plaintiffs still fail to state a claim due to their inability to
prove causation.
C.
State Law Claims
Briggs brings state law negligence and Lejeune actions, and
Mr.
Galmon
brings
wrongful
death,
survival,
negligence,
and
Lejeune actions under Louisiana state law. Defendants did not
specifically request dismissal of Plaintiffs' state law claims or
submit any briefing on the issue. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege
ample facts to state causes of action against Lt. Redmond on
these
claims.
With
the
pending
§
1983
claims
for
denial
of
medical care, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over these
claims,
thus
inappropriate.
dismissal
of
the
state
law
claims
would
be
Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,
349 (1988) (internal citations omitted) (Federal jurisdiction
19
exists over an entire action, including state law claims, when
the federal and state law claims “derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact and are such that [a plaintiff] would ordinarily
be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.”)
Accordingly,
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Rec. Docs. 122, 124) are
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
IT
IS
ORDERED
that
Defendants'
Motions
to
Dismiss
are
GRANTED with respect to: (1) all Section 1983 claims against
Sheriff Edwards based on his actions or inactions with respect to
Lt. Redmond; (2) all Section 1983 claims against Lt. Redmond in
his official capacity, (3) all Section 1983 claims against Lt.
Redmond in his supervisory capacity; and (4) all Section 1983
claims against Lt. Redmond in his individual capacity inasmuch as
the claim relies on a theory of excessive force.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motions are DENIED in
all other respects.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 6th day of November, 2013.
____________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
20
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