Maurer v. Independence Town
Filing
72
ORDER AND REASONS re: 35 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 47 Motion to Dismiss Case; granting 61 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The Court DENIES all defendants' motions to plaintiff's Due Pr ocess claims, and GRANTS Fire District Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's stigma-plusinfringement and defamation claims. Plaintiff's claims for stigma-plus-infringement and defamation against the Fire District Defendants are dismissed.. Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 9/5/14. (Reference: ALL CASES)(jjs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DAVID S. MAURER
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 13-5450
TOWN OF INDEPENDENCE,
LOUISIANA, ET AL.
SECTION: R
ORDER AND REASONS
Two sets of defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's amended
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1
Defendants Tangipahoa Parish Rural Fire Protection District Number
2 (TPD2), Nicholas Muscarello, Carlo Bruno, and Dennis Crocker
(collectively the "Fire District Defendants") filed the first
motion;2 defendant Tangipahoa Parish filed the second.3 For the
following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motions.
1
Two additional sets of defendants have also moved to
dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint. See R. Docs. 43 and 44.
The Court will address those motions in a separate order.
2
R. Doc. 47. The Fire District Defendants filed a motion
to dismiss plaintiff's initial complaint on February 28, 2014, and
set it for submission on March 26, 2014. R. Doc. 35. On March 18,
2014, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, see R. Doc. 39, and the
Fire District Defendants thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint. The Court will consider the arguments in both of
the Fire District Defendants' motions to dismiss in deciding
whether the amended complaint states a claim upon which relief can
be granted against the Fire District Defendants.
3
R. Doc. 61.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
David
Maurer
is
a
former
employee
of
the
Independence Volunteer Fire Department. After he was terminated
from his position as fire chief of the department, he brought
section 1983 claims for procedural due process violations and state
law claims for violations of Louisiana's "Whistleblower Law" and
defamation of character against thirteen defendants.4 Town of
Independence
(Independence),
Tangipahoa
Rural
Fire
Protection
District Number 2 (TPD2), and Tangipahoa Parish Government (TPG)
are political subdivisions of the state of Louisiana.5 Michael
Ragusa is the mayor of Independence.6 Nicholas Muscarello and Carlo
Bruno are members of the Tangipahoa Parish Council and members of
the Board of Commissioners of TPD2, and defendant Dennis Crocker is
the administrator of TPD2.7 Independence Volunteer Fire Department
is a domestic corporation that provides fire protection services to
Independence and the surrounding area.8 Jeremy Baham, Eric Anthony,
4
R. Doc. 39. Tangipahoa Parish's and Fire Distric
Defendants' motions to dismiss are addressed to the amended
complaint in member case No. 13-5910, which was consolidated with
case No. 13-5450 on October 2, 2013. See R. Doc. 7. The
plaintiff's allegations in the lead case, No. 13-5450, are not
relevant to the motion and will not be considered here.
5
R. Doc. 39 at 3-4.
6
Id. at 2.
7
Id. at 2-3.
8
Id. at 5-6.
2
Jonathan Tallo, Christopher McKinney, and Anthony Parrozzo are
members of the board of directors of IVFD.9 Plaintiff has sued all
of the individual defendants in their individual and official
capacities.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges the following facts.
A.
Plaintiff's Appointment and Early Tenure as Fire Chief
Plaintiff began working as a firefighter for the Independence
Fire Department (IFD) in October 2009.10 At the time, IFD and IVFD
jointly provided fire protection services for Independence and the
surrounding area.11 In September 2012, Independence and TPD2 decided
to close IFD and hire IVFD as the exclusive provider of fire
protection services for the area.12 The firefighters employed by IFD
were to be terminated and then rehired to work for IVFD.13
After the municipality made this decision, Dennis Crocker, the
fire chief of IFD, became the administrator of TPD2.14 Crocker asked
plaintiff to be the fire chief of IVFD under the "new regime," and
9
Id. at 3.
10
Id. at 5.
11
Id. A volunteer fire department is generally defined as
a fire department whose firefighting personnel serve on a volunteer
basis. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2229(a)(9).
12
Id. at 6.
13
Id.
14
Id.
3
accepted.15
plaintiff
In
December,
plaintiff
was
officially
confirmed as fire chief of Independence and of IVFD.16
Plaintiff's tenure as fire chief was marked by numerous
clashes with Crocker. One involved plaintiff's decision, made soon
after his appointment, to "change[] the way fire trucks responded
to emergency calls."17 Previously, all personnel on duty and all
available fire vehicles responded to every call as a matter of
course. Plaintiff instituted a more flexible system, "authoriz[ing]
the officer in charge and on duty to make the decision as to the
appropriate response to each call."18 Crocker did not agree with
plaintiff's
decision,
and,
according
to
the
complaint,
he
"continued to act as if he had supervisory authority over the
plaintiff," "frequently [coming] to the station and often call[ing]
plaintiff telling plaintiff how to do his job."19
On
January
20,
plaintiff
learned
that
Crocker
had
been
"undermining plaintiff as Fire Chief" in conversations with other
firefighters.20 Plaintiff complained about Crocker's behavior to
Mayor Ragusa and Nicholas Muscarello, both of whom stated that
15
Id. at 6-7.
16
Id. at 8.
17
Id. at 9.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 10.
20
Id. at 13.
4
Crocker should not have been "interfering" with the management of
IVFD.21
According
to
the
complaint,
however,
Crocker's
"interference" did not abate.22
Crocker
and
plaintiff
also
butted
heads
when
plaintiff
discovered in January 2013 that Crocker had failed to pay several
of the fire department's bills during the last portion of his
tenure as fire chief.23 Several months later, a newspaper ran a
story about IVFD's failure to pay its bills.24 Crocker asked
plaintiff why he had contacted the media, but plaintiff responded
"that he was responding to a press inquiry and that he was not
going to lie to cover up what was being done to IVFD."25
Yet another conflict arose between Crocker and plaintiff over
plaintiff's refusal to hire Crocker's son, Andrew, at IVFD.26
Plaintiff learned from the Board of Ethics that Andrew could not
work for IVFD because of his relationship with Crocker, the
administrator of TPD2.27 Crocker continued to "lobb[y] plaintiff to
21
Id.
22
Id. at 14.
23
Id. at 12.
24
Id. at 17.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 16.
27
Id.
5
employ Andrew" even after learning of the Board's decision.28
Finally, Crocker and plaintiff clashed over plaintiff's parttime
employment
with
Hammond
Rural
Fire
Department.
In
late
January, Crocker informed plaintiff that a complaint had been
lodged against him.29 The complaint apparently concerned plaintiff's
employment with Hammond. Plaintiff alleges that "Crocker told
plaintiff that he could not work part time for Hammond . . . and
also be employed as chief of IVFD."30 Plaintiff told Crocker that
he would not make a decision on the matter without speaking to an
attorney, and Crocker later told plaintiff "that everything had
been worked out."31
Plaintiff also encountered conflicts with other town officials
that
stemmed
from
a
dispute
about
"compensatory
time"
that
plaintiff believed was owed to several firefighters. In January
2013, after plaintiff had officially assumed his duties as fire
chief, he approached Mayor Ragusa about "unpaid compensatory time
owed to the firefighters who were formerly employed by the Town of
Independence."32 Ragusa originally promised to "take care of it,"
28
Id. at 17.
29
Id. at 14.
30
Id. at 15.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 10.
6
but the issue ultimately went unresolved.33 In April 2013, Ragusa
definitively told plaintiff that the town was not going to pay the
compensatory time.34
In May 2013, plaintiff decided not to invite Ragusa or the
Independence Aldermen to IVFD's annual "safety meeting/crawfish
boil" because the firefighters were "upset with the Town officials
about the compensatory time issue."35 Ragusa and the Aldermen were
not pleased with the snub. Ragusa intimated that plaintiff's hiring
as Fire Chief had created a significant amount of hostility between
IVFD and Independence, and one Alderman stated that if the town
intentionally failed to "make the next payment," it could select a
new fire chief.36
B.
TPD2's Investigation and Plaintiff's Subsequent Termination
In June 2013, Crocker and Ragusa met in Ragusa's office.37 At
this
meeting,
Crocker
allegedly
"told
Ragusa
that
he
needed
Ragusa's help to get rid of the plaintiff."38 On June 25, 2013,
Ragusa sent a letter to TPD2 stating that Independence intended to
33
Id. at 10-12.
34
Id. at 18.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 19.
37
Id. at 21.
38
Id.
7
withhold money from IVFD because plaintiff had not been adequately
fulfilling his duties as fire chief.39 Specifically, Ragusa claimed,
among other things, that plaintiff had failed to respond to calls
in the Independence area, caused several firefighters to quit IVFD,
and
improperly
deposited
a
$2,500
check
that
belonged
to
Independence in the IVFD account.40
On July 1, 2013, Bruno and Crocker advised plaintiff of
Ragusa's letter and told him that TPD2 would investigate Ragusa's
allegations.41 Bruno stated that TPD2 would inform plaintiff by
letter before the investigation began, but upon plaintiff's return
to the fire station, he discovered Crocker there, pulling fire
reports
for
the
investigation.42
Thus
learning
that
the
investigation had commenced, plaintiff wrote to TPD2 "refut[ing]
every allegation contained in Ragusa's letter."43 The complaint
specifically rebuts Ragusa's last allegation concerning the $2,500
check. According to plaintiff, that check was written by Austin
Davis, a former employee of IVFD.44 IVFD had paid $2,500 for Davis
to
attend
the
LSU
Firefighting
School,
conditional
on
Davis
39
Id. at 23-24.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 24-25.
42
Id. at 25-26.
43
Id. at 26; R. Doc. 39-1 (copy of plaintiff's letter).
44
R. Doc. 39 at 29.
8
remaining employed with IVFD for at least two years.45 Davis left
before the two-year period was up and accordingly refunded the
tuition.46 Crocker, who was still the IVFD fire chief at the time,
had the money deposited in the IVFD account, stating "that the
funds were originally budgeted for the fire department and if we
give it back to the town we will never see it again."47 Plaintiff
alleges
that
he
told
Ragusa
about
the
check
before
the
investigation began and promised to repay the money to the town.48
Crocker allegedly "made negative comments about plaintiff for
others to hear" during the time he spent at the station conducting
his investigation.49 Upon hearing of this, plaintiff complained to
Muscarello and stated that he was concerned that Crocker could not
be "fair and impartial" because plaintiff had refused to hire
Crocker's son at IVFD.50 Muscarello responded that TPD2 would
address plaintiff's concerns at the next board meeting, but this
solution was unsatisfactory to plaintiff, because the investigation
was set to conclude before that meeting occurred.51
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 22.
49
Id. at 26-27.
50
Id. at 27.
51
Id.
9
Several days into the investigation, Crocker came to the fire
station unannounced and conducted an interview with plaintiff.52
Crocker did not read plaintiff Louisiana's Firefighter Bill of
Rights before the interview, nor did he record the conversation.53
During the interview, Crocker asked plaintiff about the allegations
in
Ragusa's
letter,
and
plaintiff
"presented
Crocker
with
documentation refuting" each of the allegations.54 In response to
Crocker's questioning about the $2,500 deposit, plaintiff showed
Crocker documents proving that Crocker was the fire chief at the
time the deposit was made.55 Crocker, however, "refused to take the
documents with him."56
Plaintiff
alleges
that
"[o]ther
events
occurred
during
Crocker's investigation which indicated that [it] was not being
conducted in a fair and impartial manner and that some of the
information being provided to Crocker was false."57 Specifically,
plaintiff describes an instance in which Anthony told Crocker that
plaintiff had ignored a request to come to the scene of an
52
Id. at 28.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 29.
56
Id. at 30.
57
Id.
10
accident.58
According
to
plaintiff,
Anthony's
account
was
inaccurate: in fact, Anthony had explicitly told plaintiff that he
was not needed on the scene.59
On July 18, 2013, a TPD2 committee met with Independence
officials to discuss the investigation of plaintiff.60 Five days
after that meeting, Anthony Parrozzo stated, "All we are going to
have to do is vote and he [plaintiff] is out as fire chief."61
According to the complaint, Parrozzo had designs on the office of
fire chief and wanted to use his close friendship with Crocker in
order to replace plaintiff in that position.62
On July 25, the IVFD held a board meeting, and after the
meeting the Board told plaintiff that he would be placed on
administrative leave, with pay, pending the conclusion of the
investigation.63 Jeremy Baham, one of the members of the Board, told
plaintiff that Bruno had explained to the Board that Mayor Ragusa
planned to withdraw funding from IVFD and dissolve the corporation
if plaintiff remained fire chief.64 Bruno also told the Board that
58
Id. at 30-31.
59
Id. at 31.
60
Id. at 32.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 33.
63
Id. at 33-34.
64
Id. at 34.
11
plaintiff had been approved by TPD2 as the interim chief of IVFD,
not the permanent chief.65
Plaintiff complained to Muscarello that he had never had an
opportunity to defend himself against Ragusa's allegations before
being placed on leave, but Muscarello declined to give plaintiff
any details about the ongoing investigation.66 On July 29, following
a meeting of the IVFD Board, plaintiff was terminated from his
position as fire chief.67 Ragusa allegedly made several derogatory
statements
about
plaintiff
to
the
media
after
plaintiff's
termination.68 For example, Ragusa stated that "what [plaintiff] was
doing was no way to run the department" and that plaintiff had lied
about the reason why three firefighters left IVFD.69
According to the complaint, the IVFD Board never produced a
written report of the results of the investigation that led to
plaintiff's termination.70 Two board members who were not at the
July 29 meeting requested such a report from the rest of the Board,
but they did not receive one.71 On July 31, plaintiff's attorney
65
Id.
66
Id. at 35.
67
Id. at 35-36.
68
Id. at 39-41.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 36.
71
Id.
12
wrote a letter to officials from TPD2 and Independence to request
a meeting.72 In that letter, plaintiff's attorney claimed "that the
adverse action being taken by TPD2, . . . Independence, and IVFD
was motivated by the personal animosity of Crocker and Ragusa."73
Independence did not respond to the letter,74 but plaintiff and his
attorney eventually met with an attorney for TPD2, Clifton Speed,
on September 4.75
At that meeting, Speed stated that there was no report from
the investigation, and that Ragusa's allegations were not the
reason for plaintiff's termination.76 Instead, plaintiff had been
terminated because of three allegations, which the complaint terms
the "Speed allegations": (1) "plaintiff was only sending two
firefighters to fire calls;" (2) "IVFD was never short of money;
Crocker told TPD2 that IVFD had over $500,000.00 available;" and
(3) "two fire engines were broken down for an extended period of
time."77 Plaintiff responded that these allegations were false.78 His
complaint explains in some detail precisely why he believes the
72
Id. at 37; see also R. Doc. 39-2
letter requesting a meeting).
73
R. Doc. 39 at 37-38.
74
Id. at 38.
75
Id. at 42.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 42-43.
78
Id. at 43-44.
13
(copy of plaintiff's
allegations are untrue.79
Plaintiff also alleges that Parrozzo made negative comments
about him after his termination. Specifically, he alleges that
Parrozzo "made the statement to others in the community that
Parozzo had denied plaintiff's unemployment claim,"80 that Parrozzo
told the state Board of Ethics that plaintiff had misled them about
the situation with Crocker's son, and that Parrozzo also stated
that plaintiff had "misappropriated" the $2,500 check from Austin
Davis.81 Parrozzo was also allegedly quoted in the newspaper as
saying that "the list of problems that Ragusa and the Board of
Aldermen had with the plaintiff" were being corrected.82
II.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff's original complaint asserted four causes of action
based on the foregoing events.83 First, he claimed that each of the
defendants deprived him of his employment without due process of
law because the investigation of plaintiff violated the Louisiana
Firefighters' Bill Of Rights, La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2181, and because
TPD2,
Independence,
79
certain
contractual
Id. at 45.
82
violated
Id. at 42.
81
IVFD
Id.
80
and
Id. at 42.
83
See David S. Maurer v. Town of Independence, Louisiana
et al., No. 2:13-cv-05910, R. Doc. 1.
14
provisions that created a third-party benefit for firefighters.84
Second, plaintiff alleged a section 1983 "stigma-plus-infringement"
claim against all defendants.85 Third, plaintiff claimed that Ragusa
and Independence violated Louisiana's "Whistleblower Law," La. Rev.
Stat. § 23:967.86 Fourth, plaintiff alleged that Ragusa, Muscarello,
Bruno, Parrozzo, and Crocker defamed him.87
On February 28, 2014, the Court granted two motions to
dismiss, one filed by defendants IVFD, Baham, Anthony, Tallo,
McKinney, and Parrozzo (the "IVFD defendants"),88 and one filed by
Mayor Ragusa and Independence.89 The Court rejected plaintiff's
procedural due process claim because it found that plaintiff did
not have a property interest in his employment.90 Specifically, the
Court held that plaintiff was not a "fire employee" within the
meaning of the Firefighter Bill of Rights91 and that his conclusory
allegations that he was the beneficiary of a stipulation pour autri
84
Id. at 36-42.
85
Id. at 42-44.
86
Id. at 44-45.
87
Id. at 45-46.
88
R. Doc. 8.
89
R. Doc. 13.
90
R. Doc. 34 at 15-16.
91
Id. at 16-19.
15
were insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.92 The Court also
rejected plaintiff's argument, made in his opposition to the
motions
to
dismiss,
that
he
was
entitled
to
civil
service
protection.93 The Court explained that volunteer fire departments
are not required under the Louisiana Constitution to establish a
classified civil service system.94
The Court dismissed plaintiff's "stigma-plus-infringement"
claim against the IVFD Defendants, Ragusa, and Independence, on the
grounds that plaintiff had failed to allege the necessary elements
of such a claim as to those defendants.95 The Court also dismissed
the
whistleblower
and
defamation
claims
against
the
moving
defendants.96 The Court did, however, grant plaintiff's request for
leave to amend his complaint.97
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on March 18, 2014.98 The
amended complaint is similar to plaintiff's original complaint, but
it
contains
more
detailed
92
allegations
regarding
the
Id. at 19-21.
93
factual
Id. at 21.
94
Id. (citing Heintz v. City of Gretna, 683 So. 2d 926,
928 (La. Ct. App. 1996)).
95
Id. at 21-24.
96
Id. at 25-28.
97
Id. at 28.
98
R. Doc. 39.
16
allegedly defamatory statements made by various defendants. It also
explains in detail why plaintiff believes he has a property
interest in his employment protected by the Due Process Clause.
First, plaintiff contends that although IVFD was his nominal
employer, "TPG, acting through its special district, [TPD2], [was]
plaintiff's de facto employer."99 He alleges that TPG, acting
through TPD2, "has the right to control all of the volunteer fire
departments, such as IVFD, because of its authority concerning
personnel and finances."100 He claims that as a result he "meets the
definition of 'fire employee' in the Firefighter Bill of Rights
because he is a person employed in the fire department of a fire
protection district."101 He also claims that TPG, through TPD2,
"has" a fire district for purpose of the Firefighter Bill of Rights
statute, "consist[ing] of its Administrator, Dennis Crocker, each
nonprofit corporation which contracts with it for the provision of
fire protection services, and all paid fire employees assigned to
each non-profit corporation."102 He also supports his due process
claim with an argument that he is entitled to the protections of
the Louisiana Civil Service system, again relying on his "de facto"
employer argument to support his position.
99
Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
100
Id. at 52.
101
Id. at 54.
102
Id. at 55.
17
III. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
must plead enough facts to "state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A
claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. A court
must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 2009).
A legally sufficient complaint need not contain detailed
factual
allegations,
but
it
must
go
beyond
labels,
legal
conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of
action. Id. In other words, the face of the complaint must contain
enough factual matter to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of each element of the plaintiff's
claim. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257. If there are insufficient factual
allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,
or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is
an insuperable bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555.
18
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Procedural Due Process Claim
When confronted with a procedural due process claim, a court
must determine, first, whether the plaintiff has a property or
liberty interest that cannot be taken away without procedural
protections; and second, if so, how much process is due. See
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)
("[O]nce it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, 'the
question remains what process is due.'" (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972))). Plaintiff contends that the Due
Process Clause applies here for two reasons: first, because he had
a property interest in his employment by reason of a state statute,
the Louisiana Firefighter Bill of Rights; and second, because he is
a classified civil service employee. The Court finds no merit in
plaintiff's arguments that he has a property interest in his
employment, and therefore holds that plaintiff has failed to show
that he was entitled to any procedural protections before his
termination.
1.
Violation of the Firefighter Bill of Rights
The Louisiana Firefighter Bill of Rights mandates that certain
"minimum standards" apply whenever a "fire employee" is under
investigation, La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2181(B), and provides that
"[a]ny discipline, demotion, dismissal or adverse action of any
sort taken against a fire employee without complete compliance with
19
the provisions of [the statute] is an absolute nullity[.]" La. Rev.
Stat. § 33:2181(C).
As the Court held in its earlier order granting certain
defendants' motions to dismiss, these provisions do not apply to
plaintiff because he is not a "fire employee" within the meaning of
the statute.103 A "fire employee" is defined as "any person employed
in the fire department of any municipality, parish, or fire
protection district maintaining a full-time regularly paid fire
department, regardless of the specific duties of such person within
the fire department, and who is under investigation with a view to
possible disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal." La. Rev.
Stat. § 33:2181(A)(1). In its earlier Order, the Court explained
that plaintiff's complaint indicated he was employed by IVFD, a
private corporation, not by Independence or TFD2.104 Thus, under the
plain terms of the statute, the Firefighter Bill of Rights did not
apply to plaintiff.
In his amended complaint, plaintiff seeks to remedy this
deficiency and bring himself within the statute's definition of a
fire employee by alleging that although IVFD was his nominal
employer, Tangipahoa Parish, acting "through its special district
TFD2," was his de facto employer as a result of the significant
degree of control it exercised over the funding and personnel
103
R. Doc. 34 at 16.
104
See id.
20
decisions of IVFD. Plaintiff cannot finesse the clear language of
the statute in this fashion.
When a federal court interprets a Louisiana statute, it must
do so according to the principles of interpretation followed by
Louisiana courts. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Se. Health Care,
Inc., 950 F.2d 944, 950 (5th Cir. 1991). In Louisiana, the sources
of law are legislation and custom. Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser
Eng'rs,
Inc.,
395
F.3d
533,
546
(5th
Cir.
2004).
These
authoritative or primary sources of law are to be "contrasted with
persuasive or secondary sources of law, such as [Louisiana and
other civil law] jurisprudence, doctrine, conventional usages, and
equity, that may guide the court in reaching a decision in the
absence of legislation and custom." Id. (quoting La. Civ. Code art.
1). In Louisiana, "courts must begin every legal analysis by
examining primary sources of law: the State's Constitution, codes,
and statutes." Id. (quoting Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. General
Star Indem. Co., 179 F.3d 169, 174 (5th Cir. 1999)). In addition,
in Louisiana, "Laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted
in reference to each other." La. Civ. Code art. 13.
If the Louisiana Supreme Court has not ruled on an issue, then
this Court must make an "Erie guess" and "determine as best it can"
what the Louisiana Supreme Court would decide. Krieser v. Hobbs,
166 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1999). To make an “Erie guess” on an
issue of Louisiana law, the Court must "employ the appropriate
21
Louisiana methodology" to decide the issue the way that it believes
the Supreme Court of Louisiana would decide it. Shaw Constructors,
395 F.3d at 546 (quoting Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 328 F.3d 192, 197 (5th Cir. 2003)).
Therefore, the Court begins its analysis with the language of
the statute. The Firefighter Bill of Rights provides a precise
definition
specifically
of
"fire
defines
employee."
the
When,
as
employer-employee
here,
the
statute
relationship,
the
statute's definition governs. See Dejoie v. Medley, 9 So. 3d 826,
829-30 (La. 2009). Allowing an alternative definition, such as
plaintiff's proposed de facto employer formula, to compete with the
statutory definition would defeat the purpose of privileging the
statutory text in the first place.
To meet the statute's definition of a "fire employee," two
factors must be met. A person must be (1) "employed in the fire
department
of
[a]
municipality,
parish,
or
fire
protection
district," and (2) the employing municipality, parish or fire
protection district must "maintain[] a full-time regularly paid
fire department." La. Rev Stat. 33:2181(A)(1). The first element,
importantly, does not refer to employees of private nonprofit
corporations. Therefore, under the plain terms of the statute, the
Firefighter Bill of Rights does not apply to plaintiff.
The Court's conclusion that the Firefighter Bill of Rights
does not apply to plaintiff is buttressed by comparing La. Rev
22
Stat. 33:2181 with La. Rev. Stat. §§ 33:1991 and 33:2002, which are
also found in the Part of the Louisiana Revised Statutes entitled
"Fire Department." Section 33:1991 contains definitions for the
Subpart on minimum wages and maximum hours for firefighters and
provides as follows:
The word "fireman," as used in this Subpart includes all
persons employed or engaged full-time by municipalities
or municipal fire departments, parishes or parish fire
departments,
or
fire
protection
districts
for
firefighting or fire prevention duties and services, as
well as employees of nonprofit corporations under
contract with a fire protection district or other
political subdivision to provide such services, including
operators of the fire-alarm system when such operators
are members of the regularly constituted fire department.
The word "fireman" does not include carpenters,
storekeepers, machinists, clerks, building hazard and
similar inspectors, physicians, or other non-firefighting
employees detailed for such special duties, nor does the
word "fireman," except as otherwise provided in this
Subsection, include employees of privately owned or
operated firefighting or fire prevention services.
La.
Rev.
Stat.
§
33:1991(A)(1)
(emphasis
added).
Thus,
the
Louisiana legislature specifically included firefighters employed
by nonprofit corporations that contract with political subdivisions
to provide fire protection services in the definition of "fireman"
in section 33:1991, but it did not specifically include such
firefighters
in
the
definition
of
"fire
employee"
in
the
Firefighter Bill of Rights.
Similarly, section 33:2002, which governs supplemental pay for
employees of fire departments, specifies in four separate places
that it applies to
23
any municipality, parish, fire protection district, or
other
political
subdivision
maintaining
a
fire
department, or by the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana or
the Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana, hereinafter referred to
as "tribe", or by any nonprofit corporation contracting
with any such political subdivision to provide fire
protection services.
La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2002 (emphasis added). Thus, the supplemental
pay statute, unlike La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2181, makes clear that it
is intended to apply to nonprofit corporations.
Comparing these two statutes with the text of La. Rev. Stat.
33:2181 demonstrates that the Louisiana legislature specifically
included "employees of nonprofit corporations" and "nonprofit
corporations" in those statutes that it intended to be applicable
to nonprofit corporations. It follows that had the legislature
intended for the Firefighter Bill of Rights to be applicable to
employees of nonprofit corporations contracting to provide fire
protection services, it would have specifically included them in
the definition of "fire employee" provided in the statute.
West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S.
83 (1991), is instructive in this regard. There, the Supreme
Court held that the term "attorney's fees" in the fee-shifting
provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 did not include expert witness fees
because many other fee-shifting statutes explicitly allowed for
shifting of both attorney's fees and expert witness fees. Id. at
88-92. The Court explained that "this statutory usage shows
beyond question that attorney's fees and expert fees are distinct
24
items of expense. If . . . the one includes the other, dozens of
statutes referring to the two separately becomes an inexplicable
exercise in redundancy." Id. at 92. So it is here as well. If a
private corporation such as IVFD were considered to be the "fire
department of a[] municipality, parish, or fire protection
district" within the meaning of section 33:2181, there would have
been no need for the Louisiana legislature to refer separately to
"municipal fire departments, parishes or parish fire departments,
or fire protection districts," and to "nonprofit corporations
under contract with a fire protection district or other political
subdivision to provide [fire protection] services" in section
33:1991. Nor would there have been need for it to refer
separately to "any municipality, parish, fire protection
district, or other political subdivision maintaining a fire
department" and "any nonprofit corporation contracting with any
such political subdivision to provide fire protection services"
in section 33:2002. Cf. Casey, 499 U.S. at 101 (courts should not
"treat alike subjects that different Congresses have chosen to
treat differently"); Pa. Dep't of Public Welfare v. Davenport,
495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990) (expressing "a deep reluctance to
interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other
provisions in the same enactment"); La. Civ. Code art. 13 ("Laws
on the same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to
each other.").
25
Moreover, in making an Erie guess in the absence of a ruling
from the state's highest court, federal courts may look to the
decisions of intermediate appellate state courts for guidance.
See Howe ex rel. Howe v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 204 F.3d 624, 627
(5th Cir. 2000) (citing Matheny v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 152 F.3d
348, 354 (5th Cir. 1998)). Louisiana's intermediate appellate
court decisions provide "a datum for ascertaining state law which
is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is
convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the
state would decide otherwise." Id. (citing Labiche v. Legal Sec.
Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 350, 351 (5th Cir. 1994)). At present,
only the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal has decided the
issue of whether employees of non-profit corporations under
contract with a fire protection district to provide fire
protection services are "fire employees" within the meaning of
the Firefighter Bill of Rights. That court held that they were
not, employing a similar statutory analysis to the Court here.
See Marks v. Third Dist. Volunteer Fire Dep't, 131 So. 3d 1099
(La. Ct. App. 2013).
In Marks, the plaintiff was employed by the Third District
Volunteer Fire Department, a Louisiana non-profit corporation.
131 So. 3d at 1100. The Third District was under contract with
Fire Protection District No. 3 for Jefferson Parish to provide
fire protection services for certain areas in the East Bank of
26
Jefferson Parish. Id. The plaintiff alleged that his termination
by the Third District was illegal because the Third District
failed to comply with the Louisiana Firefighter Bill of Rights.
Id.
The trial court ruled that the plaintiff had no cause of
action because he was not a "fire employee" within the meaning of
the statute as a matter of law. Id. The Louisiana Court of Appeal
affirmed. The court held that the plaintiff did not meet the
definition of "fire employee" for two reasons. First, unlike the
plaintiff here, the plaintiff in Marks did not allege that he was
an employee -- de facto or otherwise -- in the fire department of
a political subdivision. Id. Second, the court held that by
contracting with a volunteer fire department in order to obtain
fire protection services, Fire Protection District No. 3 did not
"maintain" a full-time regularly paid fire department. Id. That
the Louisiana "legislature specifically referenced 'employees of
non-profit corporations under contract with a fire protection
district' in those statutes that it intended to be applicable to
non-profit corporations," but had not mentioned such employees in
the Firefighter Bill of Rights, buttressed the Court of Appeal's
conclusion. Id. at 1103 (citing La. Rev. Stat. §§ 33:1991,
33:2002). "Had the legislature intended for La. Rev. Stat. §
33:2181 to be applicable to employees of a non-profit
organization contracting to provide fire protection services,"
27
the court explained, "it would have specifically included those
persons in the statute." Id.
Citing principles of Louisiana statutory construction, the
Court of Appeal limited its analysis to the language of the
statute and decided the issue as a matter of law. See Marks, 131
So. 3d at 1102 (citing La. Civ. Code art. 9) ("When a law is
clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd
consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further
interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the
legislature."). It rejected the argument, made by Judge Johnson
in dissent, that "whether FPD No. 3 'maintains' a full-time
regularly paid fire department w[ould] depend on the language of
the contract between FPD No. 3 and the Third District, as well as
consideration of how the fire department is organized, funded,
and employed." Id. at 1104 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Applying the same principles of construction here, the Court
concludes that the text of La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2181 is clear and
unambiguous, and its inapplicability to plaintiff may be
determined as a matter of law. In addition to the problems
already identified under the first element of La. Rev. Stat. §
33:2181's definition of "fire employee," which requires plaintiff
to be "employed" by a "parish, or fire protection district,"
plaintiff faces similarly insurmountable problems in connection
with the definition's second element. The second element
28
specifies that the statute applies only to employees of
municipalities, parishes, and fire protection districts
"maintaining a full-time regularly paid fire department."
Following the logic of the Marks court, the Court rejects
plaintiff's suggestion that Tangipahoa Parish, through its
special district TFD2, maintains a fire department within the
meaning of the Firefighter Bill of Rights "consist[ing] of its
Administrator, Dennis Crocker, each nonprofit corporation which
contracts with it for the provision of fire protection services,
and all paid fire employees assigned to each non-profit
corporation."105 If the Louisiana legislature had intended to make
it possible to "maintain" a fire department for purposes of La.
Rev. Stat. §
33:2181 by means of contracting with a non-profit
corporation for the provision of fire protection services, it
would have said so. It did not. Therefore, the Court need look no
further than the text of the statute itself to conclude that the
protections of the Louisiana Firefighter Bill of Rights do not
apply to plaintiff.
Finally, even if the Court did look beyond the statutory
text and examine plaintiff's de facto employer argument, that
argument fails on the facts. The common law test for an employeremployee relationship under Louisiana law "relates to the right
of control." Id. In Louisiana, the right to control is evidenced
105
Id. at 55.
29
by four primary factors: (1) selection and engagement, (2)
payment of wages, (3) power of dismissal, and (4) power of
control. See Harrington v. Hebert, 789 So. 2d 649, 653 (citing
Boswell v. Kurthwood Manor Nursing Home, 647 So. 2d 630, 631 (La.
Ct. App. 1994)) (worker's compensation); see also Berthelot v.
Stallworth, 884 So. 2d 648, 654 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (vicarious
liability). None of these factors alone is determinative.
Harrington, 789 So. 2d at 653. The single most important factor,
however, is the fourth factor: the right of the employer to
control the work of the employee. See Roberts v. State, Through
Louisiana Health & Human Res. Admin., 404 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (La.
1981). Plaintiff's support for this critical factor consists
primarily of a bare recitation Louisiana's test: he alleges that
the Parish, acting through its special district TFD2, "has the
right of control and supervision over its employees."106 He
alleges no specific facts, however, to illustrate what type of
control, if any, the Parish or TFD2 exercised over the day-to-day
operations of IVFD or the work of IVFD employees. Moreover, the
contract in effect between the Town of Independence, TFD2, and
IVFD at the time of the events in question explicitly provides
that TPD2 was not to have direct day-to-day supervisory control
106
Id.
30
of IVFD.107 Specifically, the contract provides:
[T]he fire district does not have any direct supervision
of the Independence Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc.'s
firefighters, emergency services providers or officers
and as such no member of the Board of Commissioners or
the Tangipahoa Parish Rural Fire Protection District
Number Two nor any employee, agent or representative
thereof shall direct orders to the Independence Volunteer
Fire Dept., Inc.'s employees, firefighters, emergency
service providers or officers on issues of the day to day
operations of the said volunteer fire department.108
Nevertheless, plaintiff suggests that TPD2's authority over
IVFD's finances support a finding of control. Specifically, he
alleges that all IVFD expenditures must be "reviewed and approved
and processed for payment by TFD2."109 Plaintiff's allegations
about processing of payments are equally consistent with the way
bills generated by any independent contractor might be processed.
Thus, they do not support an inference that TFD2 exercised the
107
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "courts
must consider the complaint in its entirety," Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007), and
generally should not go beyond the pleadings, limiting their
inquiry to the facts stated in the complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(d); Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017
(5th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, to evaluate a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, a court may also consider documents incorporated into
the complaint by reference, such as the contract in question
here. See Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338
(5th Cir. 2008).
108
Cooperative Endeavor Agreement By and Between the
Independence Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., the Tangipahoa Parish
Rural Fire Protection District Number Two and the Town of
Independence, adopted and executed October 29, 2012, effective
January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2014, at 3.
109
Id. at 52.
31
type of supervisory, day-to-day control over the activities of
IVFD necessary to satisfy the right of control test. Accordingly,
under the facts alleged in plaintiff's amended complaint and
apparent from the clear terms of the contract between TFD2 and
IVFD, TFD2 was not plaintiff's de facto employer.
2.
Civil Service Protection
Plaintiff also contends that he is entitled to the
protections of the Louisiana Civil Service system, again relying
on his assertion that Tangipahoa Parish was his de facto
employer. For the reasons discussed above, this argument fails.
In addition, plaintiff does not qualify for the protections
of the Louisiana civil service system as a matter of law. The
Louisiana Constitution provides that all municipalities and fire
protection districts operating a "regularly paid fire department"
must establish a classified civil service system. La. Const. art.
10 § 16. In Heintz v. City of Gretna, the Louisiana Court of
Appeal held that this provision does not require volunteer fire
departments that contract with municipalities to provide fire
protection services to establish a classified civil service
system. 683 So. 2d at 928. The court reasoned that "[v]olunteer
fire departments "are 'operated' by their membership, and not by
the municipality . . . and therefore the . . . provisions for
civil service are inapplicable." Id. In Marks, discussed above,
the court treated Heintz's holding as a purely legal one -- that
32
is, as independent of the particular factual circumstances
surrounding the relationship among the government entity, the
volunteer fire department, and the plaintiff. See Marks, 131 So.
3d at 1102 (stating without qualification that "[i]n Heintz . . .
. [t]his court found that a municipality that contracts with a
non-profit corporation to provide fire protection does not
operate a 'regularly paid fire department'").
Here, plaintiff alleges that he was employed by IVFD -- not
by TPD2. Thus, under the reasoning of Heintz and Marks, he cannot
assert a procedural due process claim based on an entitlement to
civil service protection.
B.
"Stigma-Plus-Infringement" Claim
Plaintiff does not assert a stigma-plus-infringement claim
against
Tangipahoa
Parish.
Accordingly,
the
Court
limits
its
analysis to the Fire District Defendants.
If a government employee is "discharged in a manner that
creates a false and defamatory impression about him and forecloses
him from other employment opportunities," the employee has a
procedural due process right to "notice and an opportunity to clear
his name." Bledsoe v. City of Horn Lake, 449 F.3d 650, 653 (5th
Cir. 2006) (quoting White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680, 684 (5th Cir.
1981)). A plaintiff alleging a violation of this procedural right
must prove seven elements in order to make out a "stigma-plus-
33
infringement" claim:
(1) he was discharged; (2) stigmatizing charges were made
against him in connection with the discharge; (3) the
charges were false; (4) he was not provided with notice
or an opportunity to be heard prior to the discharge; (5)
the charges were made public; (6) he requested a hearing
to clear his name; and (7) the employer denied the
request.
Id. (citing Hughes v. City of Garland, 204 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir.
2000)).
Even assuming that plaintiff qualifies as a public employee
for purposes of this analysis, plaintiff has failed to plead a
stigma-plus-infringement
claim
against
the
Fire
District
Defendants. First, plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that any of
the Fire District Defendants made "stigmatizing charges" against
him in connection with his termination. Plaintiff does allege
generally that Crocker "undermin[ed]" him as fire chief,110 and
"made negative comments about plaintiff for others to hear,"111 and
that "Crocker told Ragusa that he needed Ragusa's help to get rid
of the plaintiff."112 Plaintiff also alleges that Bruno told IVFD
Board members that Ragusa would pull funding from IVFD and dissolve
the corporation if plaintiff remained fire chief,113 and that
plaintiff had been approved by TPD2 as the interim chief of IVFD,
110
R. Doc. 39 at 13.
111
Id. at 27.
112
Id. at 21.
113
Id. at 34.
34
not the permanent chief.114 But none of these alleged statements
qualify as "stigmatizing." To be stigmatizing, a statement must be
a false factual representation. Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42
F.3d 925, 936 (5th Cir. 1995). Moreover, it must be more than
merely adverse; "it must be such as would give rise to 'a badge of
infamy, public scorn or the like,'" id. (quoting Wells v. Hico ISD,
736 F.2d 243, 256 & n.16 (5th Cir. 1984)), and foreclose the
employee from other employment opportunities, see White v. Thomas,
660 F.2d 680, 684 (5th Cir. 1981) (damage to reputation alone is
insufficient to create a stigma-plus-infringement claim without
stigmatization
sufficient
to
foreclose
future
employment
opportunities). "Courts have routinely held that 'merely conclusory
allegations that Plaintiff was stigmatized, that her reputation was
substantially damaged and that she lost professional standing are
insufficient without factual support to allege a plausible stigmaplus claim.'" Miley v. Housing Auth. of City of Bridgeport, 926 F.
Supp. 2d 420, 432-33 (D. Conn. 2013) (collecting cases). Plaintiff
has not pled specific facts plausibly suggesting that the foregoing
comments were false and or that they exposed plaintiff to public
scorn or foreclosed his opportunities for future employment.
Second, plaintiff does not allege that the Fire District
Defendants denied him a hearing. To the contrary, after plaintiff
requested a meeting with TPD2, TPD2's attorney met with plaintiff
114
Id.
35
and his attorney "for a discussion of the situation."115 This fact
negates an essential element of a stigma-plus-infringement claim.
See Hernandez v. Kingsville ISD, Civil Action No. 2:13-CV-54, 2013
WL 5774864, at *14 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2013).
C.
Defamation Claim
Plaintiff
does
not
assert
a
defamation
claim
against
Tangipahoa Parish. Accordingly, the Court limits its analysis to
the Fire District Defendants.
None of the comments that the complaint attributes to the Fire
District Defendants are capable of defamatory meaning. As the Court
explained
at
length
"specifically
allege"
in
its
that
earlier
the
order,
defendant
a
plaintiff
made
a
false
must
and
defamatory statement with malice in order to adequately plead a
defamation claim under Louisiana law.116 Plaintiff's overly general,
conclusory allegations that Crocker made "negative" comments about
him are insufficient. See Roebuck v. Dothan Sec., Inc., 515 F.
App'x 275, 280 (5th Cir. 2013) (dismissing conclusory allegation
that
defendants
misrepresented,
"'in
defamed,
bad
faith
defrauded
maligned,
and
slandered
negligently
plaintiff
extremely and outrageously'" because "'[t]hreadbare recitals of the
115
Id. at 42.
116
R. Doc. 34 at 26-27 (citing Lamar Adver. Co. v. Cont'l
Cas. Co., 396 F.3d 654, 664 (5th Cir. 2005); Hardy v. Hartford Ins.
Co., 236 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2001); Badeaux v. Sw. Computer
Bureau, Inc., 929 So.2d 1211, 1218 (La. 2006)).
36
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice'" under Rule 8 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678) (alteration in original)); Cooper v. Paragon Sys., Inc.,
Civil Action No. 5:08-cv-169, 2008 WL 4187942, at *4 (S.D. Miss.
Sep. 5, 2008) (dismissing defamation claim because "plaintiff
fail[ed] to set forth information in her complaint regarding the
substance
or
nature
of
any
alleged
statement
or
how
it
was
defamatory").
Bruno's statement to the IVFD Board members that Ragusa would
pull funding from IVFD and dissolve the corporation if plaintiff
remained fire chief is a prediction of future events. A prediction
cannot be false and therefore cannot be defamatory. See WCP/Fern
Exposition Servs., LLC v. Hall, Civil Action No. 3:08-CV-522, 2011
WL 1157699, at *13 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 28, 2011) ("prediction about a
possible
future
event"
is
not
factual
and
hence
cannot
be
defamatory); Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 959 F. Supp. 1040, 1044
(E.D.
Wis.
1997)
(predictions
are
not
defamatory);
Bebo
v.
Delander, 632 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) ("prediction of
a future event" is "not a fact capable of verification" and
therefore is not defamatory as a matter of law).
Bruno's statement that plaintiff was approved by TPD2 only as
the interim chief is not capable of defamatory meaning. Defamatory
words are those "which tend to harm the reputation of another so as
to lower the person in the estimation of the community, to deter
37
others from associating or dealing with the person, or otherwise
expose a person to contempt or ridicule." Costello v. Hardy, 864
So.2d
129,
plausibly
140
(La.
suggesting
2004).
that
Plaintiff
Bruno's
has
not
statement
alleged
would
facts
tend
to
"prejudice him in the eyes of a substantial and respectable
minority" of his community. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559
cmt. e (1977); see also Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 737 So. 2d 706, 716
(La. 1999) (following the Restatement). More specifically, there
are no facts in the complaint tending to suggest that anyone in
plaintiff's community would think less of him if he were the
interim chief rather than the permanent one. Cf. Sassone v. Elder,
626 So. 2d 345, 352-53 (La. 1993) (holding that newscaster who
asked rhetorical questions insinuating that attorneys had taken
advantage of several people had not defamed the attorneys because
the questions would not be "reasonably understood to be intended in
a defamatory sense so as to harm [the attorneys'] reputations and
to lower their community esteem"); Restatement (Second) of Torts §
559 cmt. e illus. 1 (1977) ("A advertises in a newspaper that B, a
nurse, uses and recommends to her patients the use of a certain
brand of whiskey for medicinal purposes. If a substantial number of
respectable persons in the community regard this use of whiskey as
discreditable, A has defamed B."); id. illus. 3 ("A, a member of a
gang of hoodlums, writes to B, a fellow bandit, that C, a member of
the gang, has reformed and is no longer to be trusted with the loot
38
of the gang. A has not defamed B.").
Accordingly, the Court dismisses plaintiff's defamation
claims against the Fire District Defendants.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES all defendants'
motions to plaintiff's Due Process claims, and GRANTS Fire
District Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's stigma-plusinfringement and defamation claims. Plaintiff's claims for
stigma-plus-infringement and defamation against the Fire District
Defendants are dismissed.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 5th day of September, 2014.
__
_________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
39
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