Alford et al v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. et al

Filing 190

ORDER granting 162 Motion for Reconsideration. the Court revises its April 1st Order 161 in one narrow respect: the Court holds that plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Exxon violated the implied obligations of mineral servitude holders set forth in Louisiana Mineral Code articles 11 and 22.. Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 6/3/14. (Reference: 13-5464)(jjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CATHERINE P. ALFORD, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 13-5457
REF: 13-5464

CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., ET AL.

SECTION: R

ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant

Exxon

Mobil

Corporation

moves

the

Court

to

reconsider a portion of its April 1, 2014 Order and Reasons
granting in part and denying in part defendants' motions to
dismiss.1 Because the Court finds that the 1960 Servitude Agreement
in this case is not a "mineral servitude" as that term is defined
in the Louisiana Mineral Code, the Court GRANTS Exxon's motion.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in Louisiana state court on May

2,

2013,

alleging

that

defendants

engaged

in

oil

and

gas

exploration and production activities that caused severe damage to
property that plaintiffs own in Placquemines Parish.2 Plaintiffs
alleged that defendants were liable for that harm under multiple
provisions of the Louisiana Civil and Mineral Codes. The factual

1

2

R. Doc. 162.

Alford et al. v. Chevron U.S.A. et al., No. 2:13-cv5464, R. Doc. 1-3 at 24-25.

and procedural history of this suit is set forth in detail in the
Court's April 1 Order.3 Accordingly, here, the Court will relate
only the background necessary to provide context for the motion
under consideration.
In its ruling on defendants' motions to dismiss, the Court
held that plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that Exxon violated its
implied obligations as a servitude holder under articles 576 and
577 of the Louisiana Civil Code and articles 11 and 22 of the
Louisiana Mineral Code.4 The Court reasoned that plaintiffs had
attached to their complaint "a document showing that Humble Oil
[Exxon's predecessor in interest] was granted a mineral servitude
on plaintiffs' property on February 17, 1960," and had plausibly
alleged that Exxon breached its obligations as a servitude holder
by "negligently construct[ing] and operating[ing] oil and gas
exploration and production facilities and negligently discard[ing]
resulting waste."5 Exxon now argues that articles 11 and 22 of the
Mineral Code do not impose any obligations on Exxon by virtue of
the 1960 agreement because that agreement is not a "mineral
servitude" within the meaning of the Louisiana Mineral Code.

3

R. Doc. 161 at 2-8.

4

Id. at 29-32.

5

Id. at 31-32.
2

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Exxon styled its motion as a "motion for reconsideration" of

that portion of the Court's April 1 order denying Exxon's motion to
dismiss plaintiffs' claims under Mineral Code articles 11 and 22.
Exxon seeks relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),
which provides that a party may file a "motion to alter or amend a
judgment . . . no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment."
But an order denying a motion to dismiss is not a "judgment" within
the meaning of the Federal Rules. Carter v. Coody, 297 F. App'x
317, 319 (5th Cir. 2008) ("An order denying a motion to dismiss or
for summary judgment is not a final order or judgment."); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a) (defining "judgment" as "includ[ing] a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies"); Black's Law Dictionary
918 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "judgment" as "[a] court's final
determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a
case"). Accordingly, Rule 59 is not applicable here. The Court will
consider Exxon's motion pursuant to Rule 60, under which the court
may relieve a party from an "order." See Broadway v. Norris, 193
F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir. 1999) (motion styled as a motion for
reconsideration must be considered under Rule 60, not Rule 59, if
it is "directed [not] to a final judgment, but rather to a nonfinal
order").
Under Rule 60, the Court may relieve a party from a "final
judgment, order, or proceeding" for one of the following reasons:

3

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has
been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is
no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). In deciding a Rule 60(b) motion, the Court
must "balance the principle of finality of a judgment with the
interest of the court in seeing that justice is done in light of
all the facts." Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 638
(5th Cir. 2005). The Fifth Circuit has cautioned that relief under
Rule 60(b) is an "extraordinary remedy," because the "desire for a
judicial process that is predictable mandates caution in reopening
judgments." In re Pettle, 410 F.3d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1007 (5th Cir. 1998)). A
motion for reconsideration is generally not an appropriate vehicle
for advancing new arguments or supporting facts that were available
at the time of the original motion. Williams v. Toyota Motor Eng'g
& Mfg. N. Am., Inc., 470 F. App'x 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2012);
Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir.
2000); cf. Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir.
1990) ("Motions for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment
must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or
4

must present newly discovered evidence. These motions cannot be
used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made
before the judgment issued." (quoting Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986))); Charles Allen Wright,
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 n.22 (3d ed. 2009)
(same) (collecting cases).

III. DISCUSSION
In support of its motion for reconsideration, Exxon contends
that the 1960 servitude agreement is not a mineral servitude, and
hence that plaintiffs cannot state a claim under either article 11
or article 22 of the Mineral Code based on that agreement. Exxon
did not raise this argument in its initial motion to dismiss or in
its reply to plaintiff's opposition to that motion. In its original
motion to dismiss, Exxon simply adopted the arguments set forth by
Chevron.6 Chevron had argued that Mineral Code Articles 11 and 22
applied only to mineral servitude owners, not to mineral lessees,
and that plaintiffs had failed to allege that Chevron was a
servitude owner.7 Neither party mentioned the issue of servitudes
in its reply brief. Exxon also failed to raise this argument in its
recently-filed motion to dismiss that was submitted for hearing on

6

R. Doc. 47-2 at 8.

7

R. Doc. 25-1 at 30. Although Exxon adopted Chevron's
arguments on this subject, the Court notes that Exxon could not
plausibly argue that it was not a servitude owner at all. The 1960
agreement clearly conveys a servitude of some sort.
5

May 21, 2012.8 As noted above, a motion for reconsideration is
generally not an appropriate vehicle for new arguments that could
have been raised earlier.
Nonetheless, under Fifth Circuit law interpreting Rule 60(b),
the Court may entertain a motion for reconsideration containing new
arguments if it determines that those arguments have merit. See
Oliver v. Home Indem. Co., 470 F.2d 329, 330-31 (5th Cir. 1972);
see also Santa Fe Snyder Corp. v. Norton, 385 F.3d 884, 887 (5th
Cir.

2004)

(noting

that

a

court

may

grant

a

motion

for

reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(1) if the Court's original order
contains a "mistake"); Barrier v. Beaver, 712 F.2d 231, 233-35 (6th
Cir. 1983); Wright, et al., supra, § 2858.1. More specifically, a
district

court

may

grant

relief

under

Rule

60(b)(1)

if

the

aggrieved party raises a new point of law that "is determinative on
the question before" the Court. Barrier, 712 F.2d at 235. Such an
approach

is

justified

because

it

"prevent[s]

the

unnecessary

wasting of energies by . . . courts and litigants." Oliver, 470
F.2d at 330-31. Here, for the reasons that follow, the Court
concludes that Exxon's arguments are correct. Accordingly, in the
interest of judicial efficiency, it will exercise its discretion to
consider them and to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1).
The 1960 servitude agreement grants Humble Oil
servitudes to lay, maintain, operate, replace, change and
remove any and all pipe lines for the transportation of
8

R. Doc. 167.
6

oil, gas and/or water and/or their products, with all
incidental equipment, on, over, across and through
[plaintiffs' property] . . . .
. . . .
A servitude to install, maintain, operate, replace,
change and remove pipe lines, tanks, tank batteries,
compressors, dehydration facilities and appurtenances for
the treating, transportation and storage or oil, gas,
sulphur, salt water brine and other minerals and other
combinations thereof, and/or their products; and to
dredge, dig, maintain and use canals together with the
right to deposit spoil along side of same; and to build,
maintain, use and operate any other facilities and
appurtenances useful and convenient to Grantee's general
business on, over, across and through [plaintiffs'
property] . . . .9
The agreement further provides that
[t]he undersigned owners retain for themselves and their
heirs and assigns the right fully to use and enjoy said
premises, except as the same may be necessary for the use
of the servitudes herein granted.
It is distinctly understood that this does not
constitute a conveyance of any part of the land above
described nor of the minerals therein and thereunder, but
grants only the servitude as above provided.10
Article 21 of the Louisiana Mineral Code defines a mineral
servitude as "the right of enjoyment of land belonging to another
for the purpose of exploring for and producing minerals and
reducing them to possession and ownership." La. Rev. Stat. § 31:21.
The 1960 agreement does not grant to Humble Oil the right to
"explor[e]

for

and

produc[e]

minerals

and

reduc[e]

them

to

possession and ownership"; to the contrary, it explicitly states
that the grantee has no ownership interest in the minerals of
9

Alford et al. v. Chevron U.S.A.,
5464, R. Doc. 1-3 at 71.
10

Id. at 72.
7

et al., No.

2:13-cv-

plaintiffs' property. Accordingly, the 1960 agreement is not a
"mineral servitude" within the meaning of the Louisiana Mineral
Code.
Article 11 of the Mineral Code imposes obligations only on
owners of "mineral rights." "The basic mineral rights that may be
created by a landowner are the mineral servitude, the mineral
royalty, and the mineral lease." La. Rev. Stat. § 31:16. As
explained above, the 1960 agreement is not a mineral servitude. Nor
is it a mineral royalty ("the right to participate in production of
minerals from land owned by another or land subject to a mineral
servitude owned by another," La. Rev Stat. § 31:80), or a mineral
lease ("a contract by which the lessee is granted the right to
explore for and produce minerals," La. Rev Stat. § 31:114).
Instead, the agreement merely granted Humble Oil the right to erect
facilities on plaintiffs' property that would allow it to transport
certain minerals over the property.11 Thus, the Court finds that
article 11 does not impose any obligations on Exxon by virtue of
the 1960 agreement because that agreement did not bestow any
"mineral rights" upon Humble Oil.

11

The Court notes that article 16 also provides that its
enumeration of mineral rights as including the mineral servitude,
mineral royalty, and mineral lease "does not exclude the creation
of other mineral rights by a landowner." But plaintiffs have not
argued that the servitude agreement in question conveyed a mineral
right not enumerated in article 16, and any such argument would
likely fail, given that the 1960 agreement did not convey any
interest in the actual minerals within plaintiffs' property.
8

Article 22 of the Mineral Code imposes obligations on owners
of mineral servitudes. See La. Rev. Stat. § 31:22 ("The owner of a
mineral servitude . . . is entitled to use only so much of the land
as is reasonably necessary to conduct his operations[] and is
obligated, insofar as practicable, to restore the surface to its
original condition at the earliest reasonable time."). Because the
1960 agreement is not a mineral servitude, Article 22 is not
applicable to this case. See Walton v. Burns, Nos. 47,288-CA,
47,428-CW, 2013 WL 163739, at *10-11 (La. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2013)
(noting that Mineral Code article 22 is applicable only to mineral
servitude holders).
Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute either Exxon's premise -that the 1960 agreement does not convey a mineral right -- or its
conclusion -- that neither article 11 nor article 22 applies to
this case by virtue of the 1960 agreement. Instead, plaintiffs
merely point out that the 1960 agreement is a personal servitude of
use (if not a mineral servitude) and that articles 576 and 577 of
the Louisiana Civil Code impose certain obligations on the holders
of personal servitudes. But this argument is beside the point. The
Court has already held that plaintiffs plausibly alleged that
defendants violated their obligations as servitude holders under
articles 576 and 577,12 and Exxon has not asked the Court to
reconsider that portion of the April 11 Order.

12

Id. at 29-32.
9

IV.

CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court revises its April 1 Order in one narrow

respect: the Court holds that plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged
that Exxon violated the implied obligations of mineral servitude
holders set forth in Louisiana Mineral Code articles 11 and 22.13

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 3rd day of June, 2014.
__

_________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

13

As explained in the April 1 Order, however, plaintiffs
have plausibly alleged that Exxon and Chevron violated their duties
as mineral lessees under article 11. R. Doc. 161 at 26-27.
10