Mills v. Bogalusa City, et al

Filing 105

ORDER granting 68 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown on 3/15/16. (Reference: 14-1837)(jrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LOGAN N. MILLS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 13-5477
c/w NO. 14-1837

CITY OF BOGALUSA, et al.

SECTION: “G”(3)

ORDER
In this litigation, Plaintiff Douglas L. Dendinger (“Dendinger”) alleges that his
constitutional rights were violated when he was falsely arrested, imprisoned, and prosecuted. 1
Pending before the Court is Moving Defendants Sheriff Randy “Country” Seal (“Seal”), Chief
Deputy Michael Haley (“Haley”), and Deputy S. Barry Galloway’s (“Galloway”) (collectively
“Moving Defendants”) “Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rule 56(b) of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.” 2 Having reviewed the motion, the memoranda in support, the memorandum
in opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court will grant the motion.
I. Background
A.

Factual Background
In his complaint, Dendinger alleges that on August 20, 2012, he delivered a summons

and complaint to Defendant Chad Cassard (“Cassard”), a former active duty police officer with
the Bogalusa Police Department, on behalf of Logan Mills (“Mills”), in a suit against Cassard

1

Dendinger v. City of Bogalusa, No. 14-1837, Rec. Doc. 1 at p. 17.

2

Rec. Doc. 68.

1

and other members of the Bogalusa Police Department for excessive force. 3 Dendinger alleges
that at the conclusion of Mills’ criminal trial at the Washington Parish Courthouse for armed
robbery, he served Cassard outside the courthouse in the presence of Pamela Jean Legendre
(“Legendre”), Assistant District Attorneys Julie Knight (“Knight”) and Leigh Anne Wall
(“Wall”), Police Chief Joe Culpepper (“Culpepper”), Captain Kendall Bullen (“Bullen”), and
Scott Seals (“Seals”). 4
Dendinger alleges that his counsel received a phone call later that day from Legendre,
who is a staff attorney for Judge Hand, the judge who presided over Mills’ criminal trial, and
Legendre allegedly accused Dendinger of committing an assault on a police officer and
intimidation of a witness while attempting to serve Cassard. 5 Dendinger alleges that later that
day, he was arrested at his home by Washington Parish Deputy Galloway. 6 According to
Dendinger, he was then taken to Washington Parish Jail where he was verbally harassed by
Culpepper, Wall, and Knight. 7 Dendinger claims he was detained for roughly three hours before
posting bond and being released. 8 Dendinger further alleges that, prior to his arrest, Wall,
Legendre, Knight, Culpepper, Bullen, and Seals all provided false witness statements. 9

3

Dendinger v. City of Bogalusa, No. 14-1837, Rec. Doc. 1 at pp. 8–9.

4

Id.

5

Id. at p. 9.

6

Id.

7

Id. at p. 10.

8

Id.

9

Id. at pp. 12–13.

2

Dendinger alleges that Wall and Knight contacted District Attorney Walter Reed, who
authorized Dendinger’s arrest, and contacted Washington Parish Sheriff Seal, who also
authorized Dendinger’s arrest. 10 Dendinger claims that Wall improperly attempted to serve
Dendinger’s bondsman, rather than Dendinger himself, and then misrepresented the facts
regarding her non-service during Dendinger’s arraignment, leading to a No Bond Attachment
Order being issued for the arrest of Dendinger. 11
According to Dendinger, District Attorney Reed recused his office from the prosecution
of Dendinger. 12 On May 29, 2014, the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana informed
Dendinger that he had refused the charges against Dendinger. 13
B.

Procedural Background
Dendinger filed his complaint on August 12, 2014, alleging causes of action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, false imprisonment, and municipal liability, as well as state law
claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. 14 On July 29, 2015, Defendants Seal,
Haley, and Galloway filed the instant motion.15 Dendinger filed an opposition on August 18,
2015. 16 With leave of Court, Moving Defendants filed a reply on August 26, 2015. 17 On January

10

Id. at p. 10.

11

Id. at p. 12.

12

Id. at p. 14.

13

Id.

14

Dendinger v. City of Bogalusa, No. 14-1837, Rec. Doc. 1.

15

Rec. Doc. 68.

16

Rec. Doc. 71.

17

Rec. Doc. 79.

3

25, 2016, the Court ordered the parties to provide additional briefing regarding the issue of
immunity. 18 On February 5, 2016, Moving Defendants filed a supplemental memorandum.19
Also on February 5, 2016, Dendinger filed what appears to be a copy of Moving Defendants’
supplemental memorandum. 20
II. Parties’ Arguments
A.

Moving Defendants’ Arguments in Support of Summary Judgment
Moving Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment because Defendant

Galloway is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions. 21 Moving Defendants contend that the
usual summary judgment burden of proof is altered in the case of a qualified immunity defense. 22
Moving Defendants assert that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields “government officials
performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” 23 Moving Defendants contend that in order “[t]o determine whether a
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the court engages in a two-pronged analysis,
inquiring (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right and, if so, (2)
whether the defendant’s behavior was objectively reasonable under clearly established law at the

18

Rec. Doc. 86.

19

Rec. Doc. 89.

20

Rec. Doc. 90. As the Court need not address the issue of qualified immunity for the reasons given below,
the Court did not inquire as to whether Dendinger’s attachment of Defendant’s supplemental memorandum was
inadvertent.
21

Rec. Doc. 68-2 at p. 9.

22

Id. at p. 8 (citing Tolan v. Cotton, 854 F. Supp. 2d 444, 463 (S.D. Tex. 2012)).

23

Id. at p. 9 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

4

time the conduct occurred.” 24 According to Moving Defendants, once an official pleads that his
actions were taken in good faith, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut the qualified immunity
defense by showing that the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established
law. 25
Moving Defendants contend that Dendinger has failed to offer specific facts that
“evidence the irrationality or unreasonableness of D[eputy] Galloway’s actions.” 26 Moving
Defendants assert that the evidence demonstrates that Galloway possessed reasonable factual
allegations that were more than adequate to support probable cause for arrest. 27 Moving
Defendants contend that to prevail on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must
show that he was arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.28
Moving Defendants aver that probable cause for a warrantless arrest “exists when the totality of
the facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient
for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed an offense.” 29 According to
Moving Defendants, the probable cause standard is incapable of precise definition or
quantification into percentages because it depends upon the totality of the circumstances. 30

24

Id. at p. 10 (quoting Hampton v. Oktibbeha Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 480 F.3d 358, 363 (5th Cir. 2007)).

25

Id. at p. 8 (citing Tolan, 854 F. Supp. at 463).

26

Id. at p. 12.

27

Id.

28

Id. at p. 13 (citing Parm v. Shumate, 513 F.3d 135, 142 (5th Cir. 2007)).

29

Id. (quoting United States v. Brown, 558 F. App’x 386, 391 (5th Cir. 2014)).

30

Id. at p. 14 (citing Jordan v. Garrison, No. 11-CV-0723, 2014 WL 1379157, at *8 (W.D. La. Apr. 8,

2014)).

5

Moving Defendants contend that courts grant law enforcement the latitude and leeway to make
judgment calls based on reasonable, even if incorrect, views of evidence. 31
Moving Defendants contend that Galloway had probable cause to arrest Dendinger as
evidenced by the contemporaneous reports, witness statements, and Galloway’s affidavit.32
Moving Defendants aver that there were five written statements produced by five different
alleged eyewitnesses and, other than minor details of wording and timing, the statements are
internally consistent and consistent with each other. 33 Moving Defendants assert that the
witnesses were two Assistant District Attorneys, a state district court judge’s staff attorney, the
Chief of the Bogalusa Police Department, and a high-ranking officer of that department. 34
Moving Defendants aver that although Dendinger has alleged that the statements were all gross
fabrications, Dendinger does not offer any facts to support a claim that Galloway either knew or
should have known that the statements were false. 35 In addition, Moving Defendants contend
that Galloway also consulted with and sought the advice of supervisory personnel before moving
forward with Dendinger’s arrest. 36
In support of their assertion that the evidence Galloway had was sufficient for probable
cause to arrest Dendinger, Moving Defendants cite a Western District of Louisiana case, Brown
v. Hill, in which they assert that the plaintiff was arrested after incriminating statements had been

31

Id. at p. 15.

32

Id. (citing Rec. Docs. 68-4, 68-5, 68-8).

33

Id. at p. 16.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id. at p. 17.

6

provided to police by three of the plaintiff’s co-conspirators and after the plaintiff admitted his
own guilt. 37 Moving Defendants contend that on appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted the presence of
disputed factual issues surrounding the plaintiff’s confession; however, the court concluded that
the statements of three witnesses standing alone, even though they were co-conspirators, were
adequate to give the arresting officers probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. 38 Moving Defendants
also cite Mackey v. Jarrott, a case from another section of the Eastern District of Louisiana,
where the court stated that a determination of whether probable cause existed must be analyzed
under the totality of the circumstances and there must be a determination only that there was a
fair probability that a crime occurred, which is more than a bare suspicion, but need not reach the
fifty percent mark. 39 In addition, Moving Defendants state that it is “well-established” that
probable cause may be based on a single and reasonably reliable eyewitness identification, even
though the identification may be tarnished by discrepancies in the witness’ description of the
perpetrator. 40
Moving Defendants contend that although Dendinger may argue that Galloway had an
obligation to look for additional witnesses and obtain the alleged video footage from the
courthouse security cameras prior to making an arrest, any such additional requirement “runs
afoul of the clear and established body of case law discussed above regarding the determination

37

Id. (citing No. 09-2170, 2010 WL 5582936 (W.D. La. Nov. 24, 2010)).

38

Id. (citing Brown v. Hill, 428 F. App’x 336, 337 (5th Cir. 2011)).

39

Id. at p. 18 (citing No. 13-cv-4919, 2015 WL 422979, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2015) (Berrigan, J.)).

40

Id. (citing Greene v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV. A. 97-4264, 1998 WL 254062, at *7 (E.D. Pa.

1998)).

7

of probable cause.” 41 Moving Defendants also assert that Dendinger can point to no evidence
that Galloway could not have objectively believed that probable cause existed based on the
witnesses’ statements or that Galloway knowingly relied upon material falsehoods or omissions
or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. 42
Moving Defendants also assert that Dendinger’s claims against them have prescribed. 43
Moving Defendants contend that Judge Berrigan, in granting in part motions to dismiss by other
Moving Defendants, has held that Dendinger’s causes of action for false arrest and false
imprisonment had prescribed because Dendinger filed his complaint more than one year after his
incarceration had come to an end on July 21, 2012. 44 Moving Defendants assert that the same
analysis applies to Dendinger’s claims against them as Dendinger’s complaint was not filed until
August 12, 2014. 45
Furthermore, Moving Defendants contend that Dendinger’s claims against Seal and
Haley are legally deficient and should be dismissed because neither of them had any personal
involvement in the case. 46 Moving Defendants assert that there is no respondeat superior liability
under § 1983. 47 However, Moving Defendants contend that a supervisory official can be held
liable if it can be shown that he had in place “a policy or procedure that caused [the plaintiff’s]

41

Id. at pp. 18–19.

42

Id. at p. 19.

43

Id.

44

Id. (citing Rec. Doc. 67 at pp. 4–5).

45

Id. at p. 20.

46

Id. (citing Rec. Doc. 68-7 at pp. 6–7; Rec. Doc. 68-8 at pp. 6–7).

47

Id. at pp. 20–21 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of New York City, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).

8

injury.” 48 Moving Defendants aver that such an analysis necessarily implies an underlying
constitutional violation on the part of one or more individual Moving Defendants and because
there is no § 1983 liability against Galloway, any claims about policies or training lack merit.49
In addition, Moving Defendants assert that a plaintiff may not infer a defective policy merely
because a harm resulted from an interaction with a government entity, but rather a plaintiff must
specifically identify the policy or custom that allegedly caused the alleged deprivation of
constitutional rights. 50 According to Moving Defendants, although Dendinger alleges that there
was a “policy and practice” and “custom and policy” in his complaint, these “bald and general
characterizations, without any elaboration, fail to meet the test that a § 1983 official-capacity
claim against a governmental official must ‘state with factual detail and particularity the basis of
the claim.’” 51 Moving Defendants contend that these same arguments are applicable to
Dendinger’s “bald and unspecified assertion of failure-to-train and other similar claims.” 52 In
support, Moving Defendants cite what they assert is an analogous case from another section of
the Eastern District of Louisiana, Davis v. Evangelist, where the court found that the plaintiff had
not pointed to any evidence to support his conclusory assertion. 53
Turning to Dendinger’s state law claims, Moving Defendants assert that the state law
claims should be dismissed for the same reasons as the federal claims as Dendinger has offered

48

Id. at p. 21 (quoting Parm v. Shumate, 513 F.3d 135, 142 (5th Cir. 2007)).

49

Id.

50

Id. (citing Murray v. Town of Mansura, 76 F. App’x 547, 549 (5th Cir. 2003); Colle v. Brazos County,
Texas, 981 F.2d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 1993)).
51

Id. at p. 22 (quoting Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994)).

52

Id.

9

no evidence of a § 1983 violation on the part of any of the Moving Defendants. 54 Moving
Defendants contend that the Fifth Circuit has held that because the Fourth Amendment principles
underpin Louisiana law relating to false arrests, the Fourth Amendment inquiry is applicable to
both federal and state law claims for false arrest. 55 In the alternative, Moving Defendants assert
that plaintiff’s state law claims should be dismissed because after the federal law claims have
been rejected, there are no grounds for federal jurisdiction. 56 Moving Defendants assert that: (1)
the factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity weigh in favor of declining
supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims; (2) no federal claims remain; (3)
comity favors dismissing the state law claims because of Louisiana’s interest in adjudicating
claims involving its own citizens brought under its laws; (4) judicial economy does not weigh in
favor of maintaining jurisdiction because the state law claims have not been addressed at all in
this court; and (5) fairness and convenience are equal whether the claim is brought in state or
federal court. 57
B.

Dendinger’s Arguments in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment
In response, Dendinger agrees that his claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

false arrest/imprisonment and procedural due process should be dismissed against Moving

53

Id. (citing No. 06-3037, 2009 WL 2447987, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2009) (Feldman, J.)).

54

Id. at p. 23.

55

Id. (citing O’Dwyer v. Nelson, 310 F. App’x 741, 745 (5th Cir. 2009)).

56

Id. at pp. 23–24.

57

Id. at p. 24 (citing Fabre v. Yoli, No. 14-0220, Rec. Doc. 13 at p. 5).

10

Defendants on prescription grounds. 58 However, Dendinger contends that he has viable claims
for malicious prosecution and municipal liability. 59
Dendinger contends that a claim for malicious prosecution under Louisiana law requires a
plaintiff to show the following elements: “1) Commencement or continuance of a criminal
proceeding; 2) Legal causation by defendant against plaintiff; 3) Bona fide termination in favor
of the present plaintiff; 4) Absence of probable cause; 5) Presence of malice; and 6) Damage to
Plaintiff.” 60 Dendinger contends that the Washington Parish Sheriff’s Office (“WPSO”)
commenced a criminal proceeding against him and although Moving Defendants are not the sole
cause of the commencement of the proceedings, they are one cause due to their “reckless
investigation and by deliberately ignoring exculpatory evidence.” 61 Dendinger asserts that
although a failure to investigate is insufficient to find WPSO culpable, recklessness and
deliberate indifference of exculpatory evidence does support liability under a malicious
prosecution claim. 62 Dendinger contends that exculpatory evidence in the form of courthouse
video was available to WPSO right across from WPSO’s headquarters, but no one showed any
interest in that video. 63 Furthermore, according to Dendinger, his cell phone video shows a
courthouse deputy in the doorway, but WPSO did not interview him or anyone else. 64

58

Rec. Doc. 71 at p. 1.

59

Id. at p. 2.

60

Id. at p. 7 (citing Miller v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 511 So. 2d 446, 452 (La. 1987)).

61

Id. at pp. 7–8.

62

Id. at p. 8 (citing Bibbins v. City of Baton Rouge, 489 F. Supp. 2d 562, 580 (M.D. La. 2007)).

63

Id.

64

Id.

11

Dendinger also asserts that Moving Defendants’ argument that there was probable cause
for his arrest fails. 65 First, Dendinger asserts that the rejection of criminal charges against him by
the Attorney General creates a presumption of a lack of probable cause, as well as a presumption
of malice. 66 Second, Dendinger contends that verification of a witness statement may be required
in order to establish probable cause where the source of the information seems “unworthy” or
where further information about a serious charge would be readily available. 67 Dendinger
contends that Culpepper, Bullen, and Seals were all Moving Defendants in the excessive force
case for which Dendinger was serving Cassard. 68 Furthermore, Dendinger contends that Chief
Deputy Lyons’ brother, Patrick, was a named defendant in the case. 69 Therefore, according to
Dendinger, the statements were per se suspect and valueless. 70 In addition, Dendinger asserts that
the two Assistant District Attorneys who gave statements against Dendinger had just completed
Mills’ criminal trial.71 Dendinger argues that, despite the serious felony charges involved, and
the fact that the video was readily available to WPSO, WPSO took no action to obtain the
video. 72

65

Id.

66

Id. (citing Hope v. City of Shreveport, 37,759 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/16/03); 862 So. 2d 1139, 1143).

67

Id. at p. 9 (citing State v. Raheem, 464 So. 2d 293 (La. 1985)).

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.

12

Third, Dendinger asserts that the need for prompt action is another factor to be
considered in determining whether unverified information supports probable cause. 73 Dendinger
contends that Cassard suffered no physical injury, Dendinger lived close to the courthouse, and
the District Attorney waited approximately a year before filing a Bill of Information against
Dendinger. 74
Fourth, Dendinger contends that the evidence shows that Deputy Chief Shannon Lyons,
who had a personal interest in the case, conferred with Sergeant Vallarie, the officer who
physically placed Dendinger under arrest, concerning Dendinger’s arrest. 75 Dendinger asserts
that a reasonable inference can be drawn that the family connection played a role in the
investigation. 76 In addition, Dendinger avers that a jury may draw an inference of malice from
the lack of probable cause, the reckless investigation conducted by WPSO, and the “reckless
disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.” 77 Dendinger also asserts that his treatment at the Washington
Parish Jail further evidences malice given the large number of witnesses “milling around” at the
jail. 78 Dendinger asserts that WPSO “was playing host to a lynching party.” 79 According to
Dendinger, he was also led to the booking room, suffered jeering by the witnesses, and was

73

Id. at p. 10 (citing Hibernia Nat’l Bank v. Bolleter, 390 So. 2d 842 (La. 1980)).

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id. (quoting Miller v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 511 So. 2d 446, 453, 455–56 (La. 1987)).

78

Id.

79

Id.

13

handcuffed against the wall for an extended period of time. 80 Dendinger asserts that given this
treatment, a jury could find that WPSO had “partnered up” with the co-Moving Defendants and
that they were “hell-bent” on putting Dendinger away for life. 81 Dendinger contends that there is
no qualified immunity because of the deliberate indifference to exculpatory evidence and
reckless investigation. 82
Turning to the municipal liability, Dendinger contends that based upon Seal’s admission
that there were deficiencies in the WPSO policies and procedures and that WPSO “was lacking
in the development, adoption, and implementation of formal policies and procedures,” there is a
failure to train issue under Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York City.83
Dendinger contends that in order to show municipal liability he must show that: “1) training
policy procedures were inadequate; 2) [there was] deliberate indifference in adopting the training
policy; and 3) the inadequate training policy caused the alleged harm.” 84 Dendinger asserts that
Seal has admitted to deficiencies in WSPO’s policies and there is sufficient evidence from which
a juror could draw the reasonable inference that there was a deliberate indifference to adopting a
training policy and that this inadequacy caused the alleged harm through the ignorance of
exculpatory evidence and the treatment of Dendinger in jail. 85

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id. at p. 11 (citing Bibbins v. City of Baton Rouge, 489 F. Supp. 2d 562, 581 (M.D. La. 2007)).

83

Id.

84

Id. (citing Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir. 2010)).

85

Id.

14

Dendinger contends that should the Court determine that he needs more evidence to
sustain his burden, he requests the opportunity to conduct additional discovery. 86 Dendinger
asserts that that he has submitted a declaration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(d). 87 Dendinger contends that there has been no trial date set and no discovery deadline and
Dendinger only recently received written discovery responses. 88
C.

Moving Defendants’ Arguments in Further Support of Summary Judgment
In reply, Moving Defendants assert that in Dendinger’s “Statement of Facts,” he

acknowledges that most of the facts are undisputed. 89 Moving Defendants contend that, in places
where Dendinger attempts to distinguish or add to Moving Defendants’ stated facts, Dendinger’s
comments are limited to irrelevant matters or are reproductions of his arguments from his
memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 90
Moving Defendants assert that Dendinger’s malicious prosecution claim fails because
Galloway had probable cause to arrest him. 91 In support, Moving Defendants again cite Mackey
v. Jarrott, where Moving Defendants assert that another section of the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted summary judgment to the defendant police officer as a result of its finding that
the officer had probable cause based upon a single photo identification where the witness

86

Id. at p. 12.

87

Id. (citing Rec. Doc. 71-10).

88

Id.

89

Rec. Doc. 79 at p. 2 (citing Rec. Doc. 71-1).

90

91

Id.
Id. at p. 3.

15

commented that he was only 60-70% sure of his choice. 92 Moving Defendants contend that the
factual basis for probable cause in this case is significantly more compelling. 93 Moving
Defendants assert that in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Dendinger cites
only three cases to contest Moving Defendants’ argument that Galloway had probable cause to
arrest him. 94 However, Moving Defendants argue that none of these cases are persuasive. 95
Moving Defendants contend that Hope v. City of Shreveport, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court
of Appeal case cited by Dendinger, stands for the proposition that the eventual dismissal of
criminal charges against a malicious prosecution plaintiff shifts the burden of proof regarding
probable cause to the defendant. 96 Moving Defendants assert that they do not challenge that
principle and maintain that they have more than met their burden of proof on this issue. 97
Moving Defendants contend that the Louisiana Supreme Court case cited by Dendinger,
State v. Raheem, is distinguishable because, in that case, the court found that additional
investigation was required to establish probable cause because the reliability of a confidential
informant was at issue. 98 Moving Defendants assert that in this case, Galloway had six identified
eyewitnesses, all of whom were employed by law enforcement or the judiciary. 99 Moving

92

Id. (citing No. 13-cv-4919, 2015 WL 422979, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2015) (Berrigan, J.)).

93

Id.

94

Id. at p. 4.

95

Id.

96

Id. (citing 37,759 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/16/03); 862 So. 2d 1139, 1143).

97

Id.

98

Id. (citing 464 So. 2d 293 (La. 1985)).

99

Id.

16

Defendants assert that although Dendinger claims that Hibernia National Bank v. Bolleter,
another Louisiana Supreme Court case, supports his contention that “the need for prompt action
is another factor to be considered in determining whether unverified information supports
probable cause,” there is no language in the opinion that supports this contention.100
Furthermore, Moving Defendants assert that the facts in Bolleter are “drastically different from
this case,” and therefore any comparison would be irrelevant. 101
Moving Defendants assert that “probable cause is an absolute defense to any claim
against police officers for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.” 102 In
addition, they contend that even if there was a malicious motive, if an accusation is based upon
probable cause, there is no liability for malicious prosecution. 103 Moving Defendants aver that
the Fifth Circuit has stated that “the probable cause analysis only requires that [the court] find a
basis for an officer to believe to a fair probability that a violation occurred.” 104 Moving
Defendants contend that because Galloway had probable cause to arrest Dendinger, the motion
for summary judgment on Dendinger’s malicious prosecution claim should be granted. 105
In addition, Moving Defendants assert that Dendinger’s reliance on information that
Galloway might have discovered if he had chosen to expand his investigation beyond the six

100

Id. (citing Rec. Doc. 71 at p. 10; Hibernia Nat’l Bank v. Bolleter, 390 So. 2d 842 (La. 1980)).

101

Id.

102

Id. at p. 5 (quoting McMasters v. Dep’t of Police, 2013-0348, pp. 15–16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/15/15); 172
So. 3d 105).
103

Id. (citing Ferrant v. Parish of Tangipahoa ex rel. Coroner’s Office, 2001-2278, pp. 4–5 (La. App. 1
Cir. 6/21/02); 822 So. 2d 118, 120).
104

Id. (quoting Piazza v. Mayne, 217 F.3d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 2000)).

105

Id. at p. 3.

17

eyewitnesses is misplaced. 106 Moving Defendants contend that although Dendinger avers that the
video camera located on the front of the Washington Parish Courthouse and the alleged existence
of additional eyewitnesses to the incident who failed to present themselves to Galloway would
have been exculpatory evidence, Moving Defendants assert that Dendinger fails to provide any
proof that the evidence was in fact exculpatory, nor does he explain how this evidence would
have changed Galloway’s determination that there was probable cause. 107 Moving Defendants
contend that the relevance of these items is dependent upon an existence of a legal duty on the
part of Galloway to conduct an exhaustive investigation prior to his determination that there was
probable cause to arrest Dendinger. 108 However, Moving Defendants contend that Dendinger has
failed to cite even one reported case supportive of the existence of such a duty. 109
According to Moving Defendants, it is an undisputed fact that Galloway had six credible
eyewitnesses recounting a consistent narrative of Dendinger’s actions, and therefore Galloway
had probable cause to arrest Dendinger. 110 In support, Moving Defendants cite a Louisiana First
Circuit Court of Appeal case, Ross v. Baton Rouge City Police Department, where, Moving
Defendants contend, the court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment on the
claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution in a case where the arresting officer relied upon
the statement of a single witness, despite the fact that the statement differed significantly from

106

Id. at pp. 5–6.

107

Id. at p. 6.

108

Id.

109

Id.

110

Id. at pp. 6–7.

18

the information provided by the victim, in finding that there was probable cause to arrest. 111
Furthermore, Moving Defendants assert that the video footage offered by Dendinger
supports, rather than rebuts, a finding of probable cause. 112 Moving Defendants contend that
under Louisiana law, “battery” is defined as “the intentional use of force . . . upon the person of
another,” and “simple battery” is defined as “a battery committed without the consent of the
victim.” 113 Moving Defendants quote the Louisiana Supreme Court in Caudle v. Betts, stating
“The [actor’s] intention need not be malicious nor need it be an intention to inflict actual
damage. It is sufficient if the actor intends to inflict either a harmful or offensive contact without
the other’s consent.” 114 Moving Defendants assert that a careful review of the cell phone video
clearly demonstrates that Dendinger intentionally used some degree of force in slapping a large
envelope full of papers against Cassard’s chest and that it was without his consent. 115 Moving
Defendants argue that, presumably, any other video that may have been taken of the incident
would have shown the same thing, lending even more support to a finding that there was
probable cause to arrest. 116 In addition, Moving Defendants contend that the video supports a
similar conclusion as to the other charges of obstruction of justice and intimidating, impeding, or
injuring a witness. 117

111

Id. at p. 7 (citing 2009-0360 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2009); 2009 WL 3447267).

112

Id.

113

Id. (citing La. Rev. Stat. §§ 14:33, 1435).

114

Id. (citing 512 So. 2d 389, 391 (La. 1987)).

115

Id. at p. 8.

116

Id.

117

Id.

19

Moving Defendants assert that in order to survive a motion for summary judgment,
Dendinger must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific, contested facts contained in the
record to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. 118 Moving Defendants contend that
Dendinger offers nothing more than a “reformatting of the allegations set out in his Complaint
and/or bald statements of counsel without any genuine evidentiary support.” 119 Moving
Defendants assert that because Dendinger has not presented relevant, contested evidence
supportive of his position, the motion for summary judgment should be granted. 120
D.

Moving Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum in Further Support of Summary
Judgment
On January 25, 2016, the Court, noting that it had conducted an initial review of the

briefs regarding the motion for summary judgment, stated that the parties had raised, but had not
addressed with sufficient clarity, the issue of immunity as it does or does not apply to the various
federal and state law claims the plaintiff has raised against each of the moving Moving
Defendants. 121 In their supplemental memorandum, Moving Defendants assert that qualified
immunity is generally available to law enforcement officers as a defense to § 1983 claims. 122
Moving Defendants assert that “the defense of qualified immunity is particularly applicable to
each of the moving Moving Defendants and for each of the plaintiff’s claims.” 123 In asserting

118

Id. at pp. 8–9 (citing Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996)).

119

Id. at p. 9.

120

Id. at pp. 9–10.

121

Rec. Doc. 86.

122

Rec. Doc. 89 at p. 4.

123

Id.

20

that Galloway is entitled to qualified immunity, Moving Defendants repeat their arguments in
their original memorandum, stating that qualified immunity requires only “reasonable objectivity
judged on the circumstances at the time” and that Dendinger has failed to offer any specific facts
that evidence the irrationality or unreasonableness of Galloway’s actions. 124 Furthermore,
Moving Defendants contend that they have discussed at length in their original memorandum the
jurisprudential guidelines that have been developed to deal with cases involving a warrantless
arrest, and this argument “can [be] viewed either as a sub-part of the qualified immunity doctrine
or as its own separate ground for granting the motion in favor of [] Galloway.” 125
Turning to the claims against Seal, Moving Defendants assert that Dendinger has
expressly conceded that his claims against Seal based upon § 1983 are virtually non-existent
apart from Monell-type liability. 126 Moving Defendants contend that the weakness of any
surviving claim against Seal on the basis of malicious prosecution is set out in Moving
Defendants’ reply memorandum. 127 Moving Defendants assert that for all of the same reasons,
Dendinger’s federal law claims against Haley are without merit and should be dismissed. 128
As for Dendinger’s state law claims for false arrest, Moving Defendants state that
“[b]ecause Fourth Amendment principles underpin Louisiana law relating to false arrests, the
Fourth Amendment inquiry here is applicable to both [plaintiff’s] federal and state law

124

Id. at p. 6.

125

Id. at pp. 6–7.

126

Id. at p. 7 (citing Rec. Doc. 71 at p. 1).

127

Id. (citing Rec. Doc. 79 at pp. 2–5).

128

Id.

21

claims.” 129 Therefore, Moving Defendants contend that for the same reasons that they are
entitled to summary judgment on Dendinger’s Fourth Amendment false arrest claim, they are
entitled to summary judgment on his Louisiana state law false arrest claim. 130 Furthermore,
Moving Defendants contend that without tortious conduct on Galloway’s part for which Seal and
Haley could answer under respondeat superior, Dendinger cannot maintain his state law claims
against those superior officers with respect to Galloway’s conduct for the same reasons as those
set out regarding Dendinger’s § 1983 claims. 131 Therefore, Moving Defendants contend that the
motion for summary judgment should be granted regarding Dendinger’s Louisiana false arrest
claims. 132 Moving Defendants assert that as for any state law claim for malicious prosecution,
they direct the Court’s attention to their reply memorandum. 133
E.

Dendinger’s Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment
It appears that in filing his supplemental memorandum, Dendinger simply attached

Moving Defendants’ supplemental memorandum. 134
III. Law and Analysis
A.

Legal Standard on a Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery, and any affidavits

show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

129

Id. at pp. 7–8 (quoting O’Dwyer v. Nelson, 310 F. App’x 741, 745 n.4 (5th Cir. 2009)).

130

Id. at p. 8.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Id. (citing Rec. Doc. 79 at pp. 2–5).

134

Rec. Doc. 90.

22

judgment as a matter of law.” 135 When assessing whether a dispute as to any material fact exists,
the court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrains from making credibility
determinations or weighing the evidence.” 136 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the
nonmoving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory
facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary
judgment.” 137 If the record, as a whole, “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,” then no genuine issue of fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. 138 The nonmoving party may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify
specific facts in the record and articulate the precise manner in which that evidence establishes a
genuine issue for trial. 139
The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 140 Thus, the nonmoving party should
“identify specific evidence in the record, and articulate” precisely how that evidence supports his
claims. 141 To withstand a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must show that there is a

135

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Little v. Liquid
Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
136

Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008).

137

Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

138

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

139

See, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998).

140

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

141

Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994).

23

genuine issue for trial by presenting evidence of specific facts. 142 The nonmovant’s burden of
demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact is not satisfied merely by creating “some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” “by conclusory allegations,” by “unsubstantiated
assertions,” or “by only a scintilla of evidence.” 143 Rather, a factual dispute precludes a grant of
summary judgment only if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find
for the nonmoving party. Hearsay evidence and unsworn documents that cannot be presented in a
form that would be admissible in evidence at trial do not qualify as competent opposing
evidence. 144
B.

Analysis
Moving Defendants make several arguments in support of their motion for summary

judgment: (1) Galloway is entitled to qualified immunity as to the false arrest claims; (2)
Dendinger’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims have prescribed; (3) Dendinger’s claims
against Seal and Haley are deficient because neither of them had any personal involvement in the
case and it is well established that there is no respondeat superior liability on a supervisor
pursuant to § 1983; (4) because Fourth Amendment principles underpin Louisiana law relating to
false arrests, Dendinger’s false arrest claim fails for the same reasons as his federal claim; and
(5) in the alternative, Dendinger’s state law claims should be dismissed because no federal
claims remain. 145 In opposition, Dendinger states that he agrees that his claims in count one and

142

Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 460 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty, 477 U.S. 242, 248–

49 (1996)).
143

Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

144

Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987); Fed. R .Civ. P. 56(c)(2).

145

Rec. Doc. 68-2.

24

two brought under § 1983 for false arrest/imprisonment and procedural due process against
Moving Defendants should be dismissed as they have prescribed. 146 However, Dendinger asserts
that he has viable claims for malicious prosecution and for municipal liability. 147 In the
alternative, Dendinger asserts that should the Court determine that he needs more evidence to
sustain his burden, he requests the opportunity to conduct discovery for this purpose. 148 The
Court will address each of these claims in turn.
1.

False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and Procedural Due Process Violations

In counts one and two of his complaint, Dendinger brings claims for violations of his
civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was falsely arrested and imprisoned
and that his procedural due process rights were violated. 149 Dendinger agrees that his claims
brought under § 1983 for false arrest/imprisonment and procedural due process violations should
be dismissed on the basis of prescription. 150 Therefore, the Court grants Moving Defendants’
motion for summary judgment regarding these claims. 151
Moving Defendants also move for summary judgment on Dendinger’s state false arrest
claims. 152 In his complaint, Dendinger only alleges a false arrest/false imprisonment claim

146

Rec. Doc. 71 at p. 1.

147

Id. at p. 2.

148

Id. at p. 12.

149

Dendinger v. Bogalusa, No. 14-1837, Rec. Doc. 1 at pp. 15–18.

150

Rec. Doc. 71 at p. 1.

151
Moving Defendants also argue that Galloway is entitled to qualified immunity as to these claims. Rec.
Doc. 68-2 at p. 12. However, the Court need not address this argument as the parties agree that these claims have
prescribed.
152

Id. at p. 23.

25

pursuant to § 1983, not state law. 153 Furthermore, in his opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, Dendinger asserts that he has viable claims only for malicious prosecution and
municipal liability. 154 Therefore, the Court need not address any Louisiana false arrest claim.
2.

Malicious Prosecution

Moving Defendants move for summary judgment on Dendinger’s malicious prosecution
claim on the grounds that Dendinger cannot show that there was no probable cause for his
arrest. 155 In opposition, Dendinger contends that Moving Defendants’ argument that there was
probable cause fails. 156 In order to prove a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must
show: “(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil proceeding; (2) its
legal causation by the present defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination
in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) the
presence of malice therein; (6) damage conforming to legal standards resulting to plaintiff.”157
Although the plaintiff ordinarily bears the burden of proof on all the elements of a malicious
prosecution claim, there is a presumption of malice and a lack of probable cause in cases where
the prosecuting officer has dismissed the charges. 158 In those cases, the burden shifts to the

153

Dendinger v. City of Bogalusa, No. 14-1837, Rec. Doc. 1 at p. 15.

154

Rec. Doc. 71 at p. 2.

155

Rec. Doc. 79 at p. 5.

156

Rec. Doc. 71 at p. 8.

157
Lemoine v. Wolfe, 2014-1546 (La. 3/17/15); 168 So. 3d 362, 368 (quoting Jones v. Soileau, 448 So. 2d
1268, 1271 (La. 1984)).
158

Hope v. City of Shreveport, 37,759 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/17/03); 862 So. 2d 1139, 1143; see also Keppard
v. AFC Enters., Inc., 2000-2474 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/28/01); 802 So. 2d 959, 965.

26

defendant to show that he acted on probable cause and without malice. 159 “Probable cause for
arrest exists when facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer and of
which he has reasonable and trustworthy information are sufficient to justify a man of average
caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing an offense.”160
Under Louisiana law, probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to a claim against a police
officer for malicious prosecution. 161
In support of their assertion that there was probable cause for the arrest, Moving
Defendants submit the written statements of six witnesses that were provided to Galloway. 162
Cassard, a former active duty police officer, states that he had just walked out of the District
Court in Franklinton, Louisiana when “a white male wearing short pants, pink colored long
sleeve shirt and a ball cap slapped [him] in the chest with a white envelope and stated ‘You been
served brother.’ 163 Another witness, Leigh Anne Wall, provided a written statement asserting
that upon exiting the courthouse after the trial of the State v. Logan Mills, a man wearing a
“peach/salmon shirt” approached Cassard. 164 Wall states that she couldn’t see what he did when
he approached him because of where she was standing, but she saw that the man walked off
toward an older model truck along with family members of the defendant in the case State v.

159

Id.

160

Miller v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 511 So. 2d 446, 453 (1987).

161

McMasters v. Dep’t of Police, 2013-0348 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/15/15); 172 So. 3d 105 (quoting Brown v.
City of Monroe, 48-675 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/14); 135 So. 3d 792).
162

Rec. Doc. 68-5.

163

Id. at p. 1.

164

Id. at p. 2.

27

Logan Mills. 165 Wall states that the man screamed something from the middle of the road about
serving him. 166
In addition, Pamela Jean Legendre provided a written statement that upon exiting the
courthouse, she observed a gentleman wearing a pink shirt and cap “slap[] a fat legal-sized
envelope directly on Chad [Cassard’s] sternum – it made such a noise [she] thought Chad had
been punched.” 167 Legendre stated:
It was clearly a battery on a police officer (Chad is a reserve officer and had just
testified in a trial due to his status as a former active Bogalusa P.O.). Also the
Judge had placed the defendant’s mother under a protective order to have no
contact with any witnesses under subpoena – the criminal matter is not over –
sentencing, post trial motions etc. remain. Logan’s mother handed the papers to
the guy in the pink shirt. It is also, to an observer, intimidating to a witness and to
all gathered there. 168
Another witness, Julie Knight, provided a written statement that a man in a peach-colored shirt
approached Cassard and “hit him with his hand on or about his chest area” with an envelope of
papers. 169 Kendall Bullen also provided a written statement in which he asserted that he observed
a white male wearing short pants with a peach colored long sleeve shirt and a ball cap “hit officer
Chad Cassard in the chest area with a packet of papers and stated you are served brother.” 170 Joe
Culpepper also provided a written statement that he observed an individual wearing a pink long

165

Id.

166

Id.

167

Id. at p. 3.

168

Id.

169

Id. at p. 4.

170

Id. at p. 5.

28

sleeve shirt “sl[a]p Chad Cassard in the chest w/an envelope.” 171 Finally, Moving Defendants
submit the statement of Scott Seals who asserted that he observed a “white male dressed in shorts
and what looked like a pink button up shirt hit Chad Cassard in the chest with a bundle of papers
and state ‘you’ve been served brother.’” 172
Moving Defendants have submitted Dendinger’s arrestee reports, which state charges of
“obstruction of justice” pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute § 14:130.1, “intimidating a
witness” pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute § 14:129.1, and “battery on a police officer –
simple” pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute § 14:34.2. 173 Louisiana Revised Statute § 14:34.2
provides that “[b]attery of a police officer is a battery committed without the consent of the
victim when the offender has reasonable grounds to believe the victim is a police officer acting
in the performance of his duty.” Battery is defined under Louisiana law as “the intentional use of
force upon the person of another” and simple battery is defined as “a battery committed without
the consent of the victim.” 174
Dendinger contends that there was no probable cause because the statements given by the
witnesses were “valueless” because they were provided by individuals with personal agendas and
therefore, were “per se suspect.” 175 Citing a Louisiana Supreme Court case, State v. Raheem,
Dendinger contends that “verification may be required to establish probable cause where the
source of the information seems unworthy or where further information about a serious charge

171

Id. at p. 6.

172

Id. at p. 7.

173

Rec. Doc. 68-4 at p. 1.

174

La. Rev. Stat. §§ 14:33, 14:35.

175

Rec. Doc. 71 at p. 9.

29

would be readily available.” 176 Dendinger contends that the witnesses Culpepper, Bullen, and
Seals were Moving Defendants in Mills’ excessive force case, the same case for which Cassard
was being served. 177 In addition, Dendinger contends that Chief Deputy Lyons’ brother was a
named defendant in the suit as well and “[e]very Bogalusa P.D. officer who gave a statement had
a personal agenda.” 178 Dendinger also asserts that Assistant District Attorneys Wall and Knight
had just completed Mills’ criminal trial. 179 In support of their contention that there was probable
cause for Dendinger’s arrest, Moving Defendants cite a Fifth Circuit case, Brown v. Hill, where
the court found that there was probable cause for an arrest of Brown based upon the statements
of his three accomplices. 180 The court in Brown found that probable cause existed for the arrest
because a reasonable person could have concluded, based on the information known to the
officers at the time of Brown’s arrest, that Brown had committed an offense. 181
However, although Dendinger contends that most of the witnesses had a personal agenda,
Dendinger does not contend that the final individual who provided a statement, Pamela Jean
Legendre, who asserts in her statement that she works for Judge August J. Hand at the Franklin
Courthouse, had any personal agenda or bias towards Mills.182 Even if Galloway considered only
Legendre’s statement, Legendre provided information to police that an individual in a pink shirt

176

Id. (citing 464 So. 2d 293 (La. 1985)).

177

Id.

178

Id.

179

Id.

180

Rec. Doc. 68-2 at p. 17 (citing 438 F. App’x 336, 337 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)).

181

438 F. App’x at 337.

182

Rec. Doc. 68-5 at p. 3.

30

and cap “slapped a fat legal-sized envelope directly on Chad’s sternum” and that it “made such a
noise [she] though Chad had been punched.” 183 She further stated that the individual’s actions
were “intimidating.” 184 Legendre also stated that Cassard was a reserve officer and had just
testified in a trial as a former active Bogalusa police officer. 185
In Raheem, the officers asserted that they had probable cause for an arrest based upon a
tip from a confidential informant. 186 The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the information
from the informant was insufficient to establish probable cause because the informant did not set
forth the basis of his knowledge. 187 Here, the witness identified herself and stated that she had
personally observed Dendinger’s conduct. Therefore, the Court is not persuaded by Dendinger’s
argument that further “verification” was required to establish probable cause to arrest Dendinger.
Dendinger also asserts that there was no probable cause because further information
about a serious charge was readily available and the police took no action to access it. 188
Dendinger contends that despite the fact that there were serious felony charges involved, nobody
from the Washington Parish Sheriff’s Office crossed the street to access the readily available
courthouse video. 189 In support, Dendinger cites Raheem; 190 however, the Court finds no

183

Id.

184

Id.

185

Id.

186

464 So. 2d 293, 296 (La. 1985)

187

Id. at 297.

188

Rec. Doc. 71 at p. 9.

189

Id.

190

Id. (citing 464 So. 2d 293 (La. 1985)).

31

language in Raheem to support Dendinger’s contention. Dendinger does not cite any other
authority for his contention that Galloway was required to access additional evidence prior to
arresting Dendinger.
Dendinger also contends that the need for prompt action is another factor to be
considered in determining whether unverified information supports probable cause. 191 In support,
Dendinger cites Hibernia National Bank v. Bolleter. 192 In Bolleter, the Louisiana Supreme Court
found that a bank lacked probable cause to institute an action against an individual who they
alleged had committed a forgery. 193 The court found that the bank had no reason to believe that
the individual had actually signed the note that they alleged had been forged. 194 In opposition,
Moving Defendants assert that they are unable to locate any language in Bolleter that support
this conclusion. 195 Like Moving Defendants, the Court cannot find any language in Bolleter
regarding the need for prompt action and probable cause. Nor has Dendinger cited any other
authority for this proposition.
The Court is unpersuaded by Dendinger’s assertions that the fact that there was no need
for prompt action and that Galloway did not obtain the courthouse video prior to arresting
Dendinger means that Galloway lacked probable cause to arrest him. Moving Defendants have
submitted the declaration of Galloway, who stated that he was advised by 22nd Judicial District

191

Id. at p. 10.

192

Id. (citing 390 So. 2d 842 (La. 1980)).

193

390 So. 2d at 843.

194

Id. at 844.

195

Rec. Doc. 79 at p. 4.

32

Court Assistant District Attorney Julie Knight, Bogalusa Police Department Captain Kendall
Bullen, Bogalusa Police Department Chief Joe Culpepper, 22nd Judicial District Judicial Law
Clerk Pamela Jean Legendre and former Bogalusa Police Department Officer Chad Cassard “that
Mr. Cassard had been battered by an individual identified by Mr. Douglas Dendinger.” 196
Galloway further asserts that he was advised that Dendinger had harassed and intimidated
Cassard in violation of a direct order from the Honorable A.J. Hand, District Judge for the 22nd
Judicial District.197 Galloway states that he carefully questioned each of these individuals and
reviewed their statements and the information he received verbally was consistent with the
written statements. 198 Moving Defendants have also submitted the written statements of each of
these witnesses and the Court finds that the statements are consistent with Galloway’s assertion
of the information he received from them.
Finally, Dendinger asserts in his declaration that, prior to his arrest, he gave Sergeant
Vallerie (“Vallerie”) a statement regarding what he claims happened at the courthouse, told him
that he had a cell phone video showing him what had happened, and told Vallerie that there were
witnesses that could support his version of the facts. 199 According to Dendinger, these facts show
that Dendinger did, in fact, offer Galloway evidence to question Galloway’s conclusion that
there was probable cause for his arrest. 200 Dendinger states in his declaration that during the time

196

Rec. Doc. 68-8 at p. 2.

197

Id.

198

Id.

199
Rec. Doc. 71-2 at pp. 5–6. Dendinger also asserts that his meeting with Vallerie was videotaped via cell
phone and has been submitted into the record. Id. at p. 5. The Court has been unable to access the video; however,
the Court takes as true for purposes of this motion Dendinger’s allegations regarding this meeting.
200

Id.

33

that Vallerie was in Dendinger’s home, Vallerie spoke to someone at WPSO by telephone. 201
However, Dendinger does not assert that Vallerie relayed the information he had received from
Dendinger to the person on the phone, or even that the person Vallerie was speaking to was
Galloway. Therefore, Dendinger cannot undermine Galloway’s finding that there was probable
cause based upon information that only Vallerie received, because the information must be
“within the knowledge of the arresting officer.” 202
Furthermore, even assuming that Vallerie did convey this information to Galloway,
probable cause is a low standard. The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that “[w]hile mere
suspicion is not sufficient to justify an arrest, the officer need not have sufficient proof to
convict.” 203 Dendinger does not assert specifically what he told Vallerie happened; however,
presumably, Dendinger told him the same thing he asserts in his declaration, that Dendinger
“placed the envelope onto the lapel of Mr. Cassard’s jacket and Cassard’s hands.” 204 On the
other hand, Galloway had statements from several individuals, who claimed to be eyewitnesses,
who all stated that Dendinger had slapped Cassard in the chest while giving him the envelope.
Therefore, Galloway had reasonable and trustworthy information “sufficient to justify a man of
average caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing an
offense.” 205 Accordingly, because absence of probable cause is an element of a claim for
malicious prosecution, and because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding probable

201

Id. at p. 6.

202

Miller v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 511 So. 2d 446, 453 (1987).

203

State v. Randolph, 337 So. 2d 498 (La. 1976).

204

Rec. Doc. 71-2 at p. 4.

205

Miller v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 511 So. 2d 446, 453 (1987).

34

cause, the Court grants Moving Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Dendinger’s
malicious prosecution claim against Galloway.
In his complaint, Dendinger alleges that Wall and/or District Attorney Walter Reed
contacted Seal about the plan to arrest Dendinger and that Seal authorized Haley to order
Galloway to place Dendinger under arrest. 206 However, Dendinger does not point to any
evidence in response to the motion for summary judgment regarding the involvement of Seal or
Haley in the decision to arrest Dendinger. Therefore, the Court grants Moving Defendants’
motion for summary judgment on Dendinger’s malicious prosecution claim against Seal and
Haley as well.
3.

Monell Liability

Moving Defendants also move for summary judgment on the claim against Seal in his
official capacity as Sheriff for the Washington Parish Sheriff’s Office on the grounds that
because there is no § 1983 liability against Galloway, Dendinger’s policy and training claims
against Seal are without merit. 207 In addition, Moving Defendants contend that although
Dendinger makes assertions regarding policies and practices in his complaint, his “bald and
general characterizations” are insufficient. 208

Furthermore, Moving Defendants assert that

Dendinger fails to explain how any specific policy or procedure “served as a moving force”
behind a particular alleged constitutional violation. 209

206

Dendinger v. City of Bogalusa, No. 14-1827, Rec. Doc. 1 at p. 10.

207

Rec. Doc. 68-2 at p. 21.

208

Id. at p. 22.

209

Id.

35

In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the United States Supreme Court held that
municipalities and municipal officials sued in an official capacity may be held liable under §
1983. 210 To maintain a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show that officials
acted in accordance with an official policy or custom. 211 Thus, municipalities are not vicariously
liable for rights violations committed by their employees, but they are liable whenever “their
official policies cause their employees to violate another person’s constitutional rights.” 212 The
Supreme Court has instructed that:
it is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly
attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through
its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury
alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the
requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between
the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights. 213
Therefore, Dendinger must show not only that his constitutional rights were violated, but that the
WPSO was the “moving force” behind his injury. 214 Dendinger bases his claim for Monell
liability on an alleged failure to train. 215 The Fifth Circuit has found that “a municipality’s policy

210

Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 689 (1978).

211

James v. Texas Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 375 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 658).

212
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 122 (1988); see also Beattie v. Madison Cty. Sch. Dist.,
254 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2001).
213

Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).

214

See Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Municipal liability
requires deliberate action attributable to the municipality that is the direct cause of the alleged constitutional
violation.”); see also Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[M]unicipal liability . . .
requires proof of . . . a policy maker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force
is the policy or custom.”); Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 1241, 1243 (5th Cir.1993) (describing several ways
to meet this burden).
215

Rec. Doc. 71 at p. 11.

36

of failure to train its police officers can give rise to § 1983 liability.” 216 The Fifth Circuit defines
an “official policy” for the purposes of § 1983 as:
1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially
adopted and promulgated by the government entity or by an official to
whom the entity has delegated policy-making authority; or
2. A persistent, widespread practice of officials or employees which although
not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy is so common
and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents the entity’s
policy. 217
In order to succeed on a failure to train claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the training
policies were inadequate; (2) there was deliberate indifference in adopting the training policy;
and (3) the inadequate training policy directly caused the alleged harm. 218 Dendinger asserts that
Seal admits to deficiencies in WPSO policies and procedures and concedes that it was lacking in
the development, adoption, and implementation of formal policies and procedures prior to when
his term as Sheriff began on July 1, 2012. 219 However, the harm that Dendinger alleges is that he
was arrested without probable cause. Municipalities are liable only when “their official policies
cause their employees to violate another person’s constitutional rights.” 220 Dendinger asserts that
WSPO ignored exculpatory evidence in the form of video and witness statements. 221 However,
as stated above, the Court has found that Galloway had probable cause to arrest Dendinger.

216
Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 380 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Brown v. Bryan Cty., 219
F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2000)).
217

Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council, 279 F.3d 273, 289 (5th Cir. 2002) (brackets and ellipses omitted).

218

Sanders-Burns, 594 F.3d at 381.

219

Rec. Doc. 71 at p. 11.

220

City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 122 (1988); see also Beattie v. Madison Cty. Sch. Dist.,
254 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2001).
221

Id.

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Therefore, Dendinger’s constitutional rights were not violated upon his arrest. Furthermore,
although Dendinger also asserts that “how the WPSO allowed Plaintiff to be treated at their Jail
evidences” deliberate indifference to adopting a training policy and that the inadequacy caused
the alleged harm, Dendinger has not alleged that he suffered any constitutional violation as a
result of his treatment at the jail. Accordingly, because Dendinger has not demonstrated a
violation of his constitutional rights, the Court grants Moving Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on Dendinger’s claim for municipal liability.
4.

Abuse of Process

Although Moving Defendants do not make any specific argument regarding Dendinger’s
abuse of process claim, Moving Defendants do move for summary judgment on all of
Dendinger’s claims against them on the basis of prescription. 222 Moving Defendants also assert
that because Dendinger has offered no evidence of an actionable § 1983 violation on the part of
any of the Moving Defendatns, the derivative state-law causes of actions are also without
merit. 223 In Dendinger’s complaint, he does allege that “all Moving Defendants, and each of
them, are liable for abuse of process.” 224 However, his specific allegations regarding abuse of
process pertain only to Wall, Knight, and Reed. 225 Furthermore, in his opposition, Dendinger
asserts that he has viable claims for only malicious prosecution and municipal liability, and

222

Rec. Doc. 71 at p. 11.

223

Id. at p. 23.

224

Dendinger v. City of Bogalusa, No. 14-1837, Rec. Doc. 1 at p. 26.

225

Id. at pp. 26–27.

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makes no argument regarding an abuse of process claim against Moving Defendants.226
Therefore, it appears that Dendinger has abandoned this claim against Galloway, Seal, and
Haley.
However, even assuming that Dendinger intends to proceed with this claim against
Moving Defendants, he has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that any of these
individuals committed an abuse of process. In order to demonstrate an abuse of process claim, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) the existence of an ulterior purpose and (2) a willful act in the use of
the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding.” 227 Dendinger has not
pointed to any evidence that any Defendant committed a willful act in the use of the process not
proper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding, nor has Dendinger even alleged such an act
committed by any Defendant. Accordingly, the Court grants Moving Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on Dendinger’s abuse of process claim against them.
5.

Request for Additional Discovery

Dendinger requests that, should the Court determine that he needs more evidence to
sustain his burden, he be given the opportunity to conduct additional discovery. 228 In support,
Dendinger attaches an affidavit of his counsel in which counsel asserts that Dendinger believes
that discovery will reveal facts “probative on plaintiff’s claims for malicious prosecution and for

226

Rec. Doc. 71 at p. 2.

227
No Drama, LLC v. Caluda, 15-211 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/14/15); 177 So. 3d 747, 751 (citing Waguespack,
Seago and Carmichael v. Lincoln, 99-2016 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/22/00); 768 So. 2d 287, 290–91).
228

Rec. Doc. 71 at p. 12.

39

municipal liability.” 229 Furthermore, counsel asserts that discovery would reveal information
regarding the failure of WPSO to properly train its employees. 230
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit
or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,
the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or
declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.” Here, Dendinger
asserts that the essential facts that discovery would provide pertain to WPSO’s failure to train.
However, Dendinger has not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of
probable cause for his arrest, nor has Dendinger pointed to any evidence that further discovery
would reveal evidence that would change this fact. The Court has already determined that a
finding of a lack of probable cause is essential to Dendinger’s claims for both malicious
prosecution and municipal liability. Accordingly, Dendinger has failed to show that there are
essential facts that could be revealed by additional discovery. Therefore, the Court denies
Dendinger’s request for additional discovery.

229

Rec. Doc. 71-10 at p. 4.

230

Id.

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IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Moving Defendants’ “Motion for Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 56(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” 231 is GRANTED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this ____ day of March, 2016.
15th
_________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

231

Rec. Doc. 68.

41