Hutchison v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Filing 22

ORDER & REASONS denying 6 Motion to Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 10/21/2013. (caa, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ELLEN BELCHIC HUTCHINSON

CIVIL ACTION

v.

13-5513

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.

SECTION "F"

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff's motion to remand.

For the

reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
Background
This case arises out of the foreclosure of the plaintiff's home
for nonpayment of a promissory note.

The plaintiff asserts the

following allegations in her complaint:
After her house was damaged by Hurricane Katrina, Ellen
Belchic Hutchinson took out a loan from Chase Bank, N.A. to fund
the necessary repairs.

In April 2007, Hutchinson executed a

promissory note payable to Chase in the principal amount of
$154,000, secured by a mortgage on the house. Hutchinson regularly
made payments on the note through January 2010.
In June 2010, Chase filed a Petition for Executory Process
against Hutchinson in the Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans, instituting foreclosure proceedings and alleging that
Hutchinson had failed to make payments on the promissory note since
January

2010.

After

receiving

notice

of

the

foreclosure

proceedings, Hutchinson began negotiating with Chase through her
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accountant, Bobby Matthews, in an attempt to bring her payments
current, reinstate the promissory note, and stop the foreclosure
proceedings.
In

September

"Reinstatement

2012,

Quote,"

Chase

which

provided

stated

reinstate the loan was $26,497.87.

that

Matthews
the

amount

with

a

due

to

That same day, Matthews wired

that full amount to Chase; however, Chase returned the funds to
Hutchinson's checking account.

A few days later, Matthews again

wired the full amount to Chase, and Chase again returned the
payment.
Throughout September, October, November, and December 2012,
Matthews

corresponded

with

Chase

attempting to resolve the matter.

on

behalf

of

Hutchinson,

However, on December 13, 2012,

without prior notice to Hutchinson, her house was sold at a
Sheriff's sale for $155,000. Upon discovering the sale, Hutchinson
immediately repurchased the house from the buyer for $185,000.
In January 2013, Hutchinson filed suit in state court against
Chase, asserting that she was entitled to damages including but not
limited to the repurchase price of the house.

Hutchinson alleged

various claims, including negligence, detrimental reliance, and
violations of various federal statutes including 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 45
and 1639(f), and 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. C.

In August 2013, Chase

removed the case to this Court, invoking both federal question and
diversity jurisdiction.

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In September 2013, Hutchinson filed this motion to remand,
conceding that she and Chase are of diverse citizenship but
contending that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000,
and also contending that no federal question jurisdiction exists
because she is withdrawing her federal claims.

Attached to the

motion to remand is a binding stipulation executed by Hutchinson in
which she expressly waives the right to recover any amount in
excess of $75,000.

Hutchinson also filed an ex parte motion to

dismiss her federal claims with prejudice, which the Court granted,
and a first amended complaint, which alleges state law claims only.
Chase opposes the motion to remand, contending that diversity
jurisdiction was clearly established as of the date of removal, and
alternatively,

that

the

Court

should

exercise

supplemental

jurisdiction over Hutchinson's state law claims even though her
federal claims have been dismissed.
I.
A defendant may generally remove a civil action filed in state
court if the federal court has original jurisdiction over the
case—that is, if the plaintiff could have brought the action in
federal court from the outset.
the

plaintiff

in

this

case

See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
challenges

removal,

the

Although
removing

defendant carries the burden of showing the propriety of this
Court's jurisdiction.
812,

815

(5th

Cir.

See Jernigan v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 989 F.2d
1993).

The

3

Court

has

federal

question

jurisdiction over "all civil actions under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States."

28 U.S.C. § 1331.

The Court

has diversity jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of
different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
To determine whether it has jurisdiction, the Court must
consider the allegations in the state court petition as they
existed at the time of removal.

See Manguno v. Prudential Prop. &

Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Cavallini v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 264 (5th Cir. 1995).
Louisiana

law

prohibits

a

plaintiff

specified amount of damages.

from

petitioning

for

a

La. Code Civ. P. art. 893(A)(1).

Plaintiff's petition, in conformity with Louisiana law, does not
explicitly state the amount of damages sought in this case.
When a plaintiff has alleged an indeterminate amount of
damages, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

Simon v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 193 F.3d 848, 850 (5th Cir. 1999); see also
De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1412 (5th Cir. 1995).

The

defendant satisfies this burden by: (1) showing that it is facially
apparent that the plaintiff's claims likely exceed $75,000, or (2)
setting forth the facts in controversy that support a finding of
the jurisdictional amount.

Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171

F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1999).

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If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff can defeat
removal only by establishing to a legal certainty that the amount
in controversy is less than $75,000.

De Aguilar, 47 F.3d at 1411.

The Fifth Circuit has instructed that this burden may be satisfied
where for example a state statute prohibits recovery in excess of
$75,000, or where the plaintiff has filed a binding affidavit or
stipulation with her original complaint affirming that she will not
accept damages in excess of $75,000.

Id. at 1412; see also St.

Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289-90 (1938)
("Events occurring subsequent to the institution of suit which
reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory limit do not oust
jurisdiction.").

Post-removal affidavits or stipulations may be

considered only if the amount in controversy was ambiguous at the
time of removal.

Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880,

883 (5th Cir. 2000).
Here,

Hutchinson

jurisdiction.

first

challenges

the

Court's

diversity

Because Hutchinson concedes that she and Chase are

diverse, the only dispute is whether the amount-in-controversy
requirement

is

met.

In

her

original

petition,

Hutchinson

specifically asked for damages "including but not limited to the
[re]purchase

price

of

the

Property

and

all

fees

associated

therewith," and she specifically alleged that purchase price was
$185,000. Because it is facially apparent that the claimed damages
at the time allegedly exceeded $75,000, Hutchinson's post-removal

5

stipulation

for

therefore,

irrelevant

jurisdiction.

damages

less
and

than

will

$75,000
not

is

divest

untimely
the

Court

and,
of

See Gebbia, 233 F.3d at 883.

This Court has diversity jurisdiction which cannot be divested
on the record facts.
federal

question

It therefore need not address the issues of

and

supplemental

jurisdiction

in

order

to

determine that removal was proper.
Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion to remand is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, October 21, 2013

____________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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