United States of America v. Currency

Filing 29

ORDER AND REASONS granting in part and denying in part 9 Motion to Strike Claim and Answer to Complaint; denying 8 16 Motions for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 12/4/2014. (ijg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 13-5566

$100,641.06 U.S. CURRENCY, ET AL.

SECTION "B"(4)

ORDER AND REASONS
Nature of the Motions and Relief Sought
There are several motions before the Court. The first, is a
Motion to Strike Claim and Answer to Complaint by the United
States. (Rec. Doc. No. 9). An opposition to this motion was
filed by Calvin Thibodaux and Darnay Thibodaux. (Rec. Doc. No.
14). The second, is a Motion for Summary Judgment of Claimant by
Darnay Thibodaux. (Rec. Doc. No. 8). The United States filed a
response in opposition. (Rec. Doc. No. 20). Claimants filed a
reply (Rec. Doc. No. 28) and the Government filed a surreply
(Rec. Doc. No. 26). The third, is a Motion for Summary Judgment
of Claimant by Calvin Thibodaux, adopting and incorporating all
arguments from the foregoing motion for summary judgment. (Rec.
Doc. No. 16). The United States did not file an opposition.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Strike (Rec. Doc. No. 9)
is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. IT IS ORDERED that the
Motions for Summary Judgment (Rec. Docs. No. 8, 16) are DENIED.
1

Claimants are hereby placed on notice of the Court’s intention
to enter summary judgment in favor of the United States sua
sponte unless they are able to show cause otherwise as directed
below.
Procedural History and Facts of the Case
This

in

rem

forfeiture

action

arises

out

of

an

investigation into elder exploitation. On March 26, 2013, law
enforcement became aware that a caretaker and her husband, via
power of attorney and other mechanisms, were defrauding their
neighbor,

a

hospitalized

elderly

man

named

Sidney

Dobronich

(“Mr. Dobronich” or “Dobronich”).
Law enforcement contacted Romano Investments and Insurance
(“Romano Investments”), with which Mr. Dobronich had a large
amount

of

money

invested

into

a

brokerage

account.

For

two

years, Romano Investments had been wiring a monthly electronic
deposit of $1,200 to Mr. Dobronich’s Capital One bank account.
On February 13, 2013, Romano Investments was contacted by Darnay
Thibodaux (“Darnay”), who identified herself as Mr. Dobronich’s
neighbor and caretaker, claimed to have power of attorney, and
requested $30,000 to settle his medical expenses.
On February 20, 2013, Darnay presented a power of attorney
and last will and testament to Romano Investments, showing that
she had full authority and that all of Mr. Dobronich’s assets

2

were being willed to her upon his death. Darnay requested an
additional

$30,000

transfer

to

the

Capital

One

account

for

medical bills.
On March 5, 2013, Darnay contacted Romano Investments and
requested a transfer of $179,000 to the Capital One account for
the purchase of a home. On March 11, 2013, Darnay called again,
requesting

an

additional

$95,000

for

closing

costs.

The

brokerage firm reached out to Mr. Dobronich’s family, prompting
an investigation.
On

March

13,

2013,

Darnay

deposited

$100,000

into

her

husband Calvin Thibodaux’s Resource Bank account. On March 19,
2013, Calvin wrote a check to draw from his account $17, 697.93
to finalize the purchase of a

Rockwood

travel trailer.

Cash

payments totaling more than $23,000 were also made to finalize
this purchase. When the check could not be deposited by the
retailer, Berryland Campers, a refund check in the amount of
$19,000 was issued payable to Calvin Thibodaux.
On March 18, 2013, law enforcement met with Mr. Dobronich,
who

denied

giving

permission

to

Darnay

to

borrow

money,

to

handle his finances, or to make any transactions on his behalf.
Mr. Dobronich did not recall making any large withdrawals from
the brokerage account other than the $30,000 to settle medical

3

bills. He did not recall granting power of attorney; however,
recalled that Darnay gave him “a bunch of paperwork.”
After adding herself to Mr. Dobronich’s bank account via
power of attorney, from February 15, 2013 to March 15, 2013,
Darnay

made

withdrawals

and

debits

from

the

bank

account,

amounting to more than $334,000. Law enforcement obtained Mr.
Dobronich’s Capital One bank account records and determined that
most of the money had been withdrawn in cash or used to purchase
large

items,

including

vehicles

(Nissan

Altima

sedan

and

Chevrolet Silverado truck), a tractor and real estate. None of
the money was used for the alleged medical expenses or were
purchases attributable to Mr. Dobronich.
On

March

27,

2013,

law

enforcement

seized

from

the

Thibodaux residence: the Nissan Altima registered to Darnay; the
Chevrolet truck registered to her husband Calvin; the tractor;
and, Mr. Dobronich’s wallet.
On June 5, 2013, Darnay and Calvin Thibodaux were charged
with Exploitation of the Infirmed in violation of La. Rev. Stat.
§ 14:93.4.1 The Thibodauxs were arraigned on felony charges and
entered pleas of not guilty on June 12, 2013.

1

nd

See State of Louisiana v. Thibodaux, 22 JDC, Docket No. 534840, Div. “C.” Complainants (family) also opened a
nd
civil suit regarding the underlying fraud and exploitation, Forrest Dobronich, et al. v. Darnay Thibodaux, et al. 22
JDC, Civ. No. 2013-11784.

4

On October 26, 2013, the United States filed the instant
Forfeiture

In

Rem

action

against:

$100,641.06

U.S.

Currency

seized from Resource Bank account, number: 1133164, in the name
of Calvin Thibodaux; $20,800 U.S. Currency seized from Berryland
Campers for the purchase of a 2013 Rockwood Trailer on the basis
of

the

refund

check;

2013

Nissan

Altima;

2001

Chevrolet

Silverado Pickup Truck; and, 2012 Kubota Tractor with Parker
Trailer.
The

Court

now

reviews

the

law,

contentions

and

alleged

facts concerning the Government’s Motion to Strike pursuant to
Supplemental Rule G and Claimants’ Motions for Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
Law and Analysis
I.

Motion to Strike

The procedures for forfeiture in this case are governed by
the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Title 18 U.S.C. §
983 (“CAFRA”). Under CAFRA, a person claiming an interest in
property named in a forfeiture complaint is directed to file a
verified claim and answer according to the procedures set forth
in the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and Maritime Claims and
Asset Forfeiture Actions (“the Supplemental Rules”). 18 U.S.C.
§983(4)(A).

5

The Government’s Motion to Strike was filed pursuant to
Supplemental

Rule

G(8)(c)(i)(A),

which

provides

that

such

a

motion is proper at “any time before trial” and may be based on
the fail[ure] to comply with Rule G(5) or for lack of standing.
Rule

G(8)(c)(i).

failed

to

The

establish

Government
standing

alleges:

with

(1)

regard

Claimants

to

the

have

Defendant

Property; (2) Claimants have failed to adhere to Supplemental
Rule G(5)(a) in submitting a claim; and, (3) that Claimants have
failed to timely file an answer in accordance with Rule G(5)(b).
A. Article III Standing
Article III standing is at issue as the Government contends
that Claimants have failed to sufficiently establish that they
have standing to challenge the Government’s In Rem Complaint.
The

claimant

forfeiture

has

must

U.S.

$1,000

Number

burden

proceedings.

claimant
v.

the

230277,

have
in
No.

To

of

establishing

properly

both

Article

U.S.

Currency

III

contest
and

seized

2:04-CV-1084JCM(LRL),

standing
forfeiture,

statutory
from
2014

a

standing.

Inmate
WL

in

Account

3928607

(D.

Nev. Aug. 12, 2014). A claimant establishes Article III standing
by demonstrating the existence of an injury through a showing of
“either

an

ownership

or

lesser

possessory

interest

in

the

property.” United States v. $114, 031.00 in U.S. Currency, 284
F. App’x 754, 755-56 (11th Cir. 2008). In the absence of Article
6

III

standing,

there

is

no

‘case

or

controversy’

in

the

constitutional sense.
Here, the “Claim” (Rec. Doc. No. 5 at 1-3) is sufficiently
specific

regarding

the

nature

of

Claimants’

interest

in

the

Defendant Property at issue here. With regard to the currency
seized from the bank account, Claimants state that Claimants are
entitled to possess the funds “until the checks came in from the
bank.”2 However, Claimants have disclaimed a possessory interest
over the seized funds: “the day of seizure the checks came in
from

the

bank.”3

Therefore,

they

have

failed

to

state

an

unequivocal and continuing interest in the funds and have failed
to carry the burden with regard to the same. Cf. United States
v. $133,420.00 in United States Currency, 672 F.3d 629, 640 (9th
Cir. 2012).
Claimants

claim

ownership

over

the

“car,

truck,

and

tractor,” which “Mr. Sidney Dobronich notarized us to have these
items.” (Rec. Doc. No. 5 at 1). Claimants sufficiently establish
how they came into ownership of the car, truck and tractor, and
claim continued ownership. Further, the vehicles are registered
in their names. Claimants have established Article III standing
to

challenge

the

forfeiture

of

the

Nissan

Altima,

Chevrolet

Silverado pickup truck and the Kubota Tractor and trailer.
2
3

Rec. Doc. No. 5 at 1.
Rec. Doc. No. 5 at 1.

7

B. Statutory Standing
Statutory

standing

is

also

at

issue

here

because

the

Government’s Motion to Strike is based on Claimants’ failure to
adhere to Supplement Rule G(5). A claimant perfects statutory
standing through compliance with the procedures set forth in
Supplemental Rule G(5)(a) and (b). See United States v. One 1985
Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 1989). A person
who asserts an interest in the defendant property may contest
the forfeiture by filing a claim in the court where the action
is pending. Rule G(5)(a)(i). The claim must: (a) identify the
specific property claimed; (b) identify the claimant and state
the claimant's interest in the property; and, (c) be signed by
the claimant under penalty of perjury. Rule G(5)(a)(i)(A)-(C). A
claimant must serve and file an answer to the complaint within
21 days after filing the claim. Rule G(5)(b).
Strict compliance with Supplemental Rule G(5) is required.
See e.g. U.S. v. 2006 Chevrolet Corvette, No. 12-2492, 2013 WL
3832690, at * 1 (E.D. La. July 23, 2013); U.S. v. $15, 701.97
U.S. Currency, No. 09-3437, 2010, WL 3418246, at *

(E.D. La.

Aug. 23, 2010); United States v. $21,044.000 U.S. Currency, No.
97-2994, 1988 WL 213762, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 1998); United
States

v.

$31,000.000

U.S.

Currency,

No.

90-1829,

1990

WL

163610, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 1990); United States v. $288,
914 in United States Currency, 722 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. La. 1989).
8

Failure

to

comply

with

the

foregoing

requirements

leaves

a

claimant without standing to challenge the forfeiture.
The Government’s Complaint was filed August 26, 2013.4 In
accordance

with

Fifth

G(4)(b)(ii)(A)-(D),

on

Amendment

August

30,

due
2013,

process
the

and

Government

Rule
sent

direct notice to Claimants, individually, via certified mail and
regular

mail.5

The

notice

contained

the

date

and

explicit

instructions on how Claimants were required to respond.6 Both
Claimants signed and confirmed receipt.7
Darnay

and

Calvin

Thibodaux

have

complied

with

Rule

G(5)(a). Claimants have submitted as a Claim the ‘Seized Asset
Claim Form’ from the administrative proceedings in this matter.8
The forms identify the specific property claimed and identify
both claimants and their interest in the property. The issue is
whether

the

‘Attestation

and

Oath’

and

Claimants

signatures

thereunder suffice under Rule G(5)(a)(i)(C).9 The Court finds
that the documents were signed by both Claimants under penalty
of

perjury,

consistent

with

the

simple

requirement,

and

4

Rec. Doc. No. 1.
Rec. Doc. No. 9-1 at 1-4.
6
Rec. Doc. No. 9-1 at 1-4.
7
Rec. Doc. No. 9-4 at 1, 2.
8
Rec. Doc. No. 5 at 2.
9
Attestation and Oath: I attest and declare under penalty of perjury that my claim to this property is not frivolous
and that the information provided in support of my claim is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and
belief.
5

A FALSE STATEMENT OR CLAIM MAY SUBJECT A PERSON TO PROSECUTION UNDER 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 AND/OR 1621
AND IS PUNISHABLE BY A FINE AND UP TO FIVE YEARS IMPRISONMENT.

9

constitutes

a

Claim

under

Rule

G(5)(a).

The

Rule

does

not

require that separate claims be submitted for administrative and
judicial proceedings.
However, Claimants have failed to comply with Rule G(5)(b)
and

this

is

standing.

fatal

to

their

ability

to

establish

statutory

Claimants timely submitted a claim on September 25,

201310; therefore, answers were due October 15, 2013. However,
Darnay Thibodaux did not file an Answer until August 18, 2014.11
After the filing of the Government’s Motion to Strike, Calvin
Thibodaux filed an Answer on August 19, 2014.12 Both answers were
filed nearly a year late, and as such are untimely under Rule
G(5)(b).
Claimants
judgment

or

entry

Government.13
contemplate
establish
claim

and

contend
of

However,
this

standing
answer.

that

the

default

had

been

Supplemental

prerequisite
to

answers

to

contest

Moreover,

timely,

entered

Rule

case

by

law

in

as

no

favor

the

does

G(5)

Claimants’

forfeiture
the

are

not

obligation
timely

to

filing

contravenes

a

this

argument. See e.g. U.S. v. Approximately $141, 932.00 in U.S.
Currency,

No.1:04-cv-6743LJOTAG,

2008

WL

190878,

at

*9

(E.D.

10

Rec. Doc. No. 5.
Rec. Doc. No. 7.
12
Rec. Doc. No. 10.
13
On August, 21, 2014, the Clerk of Courts granted the Government’s Motion for Entry of Default. (Rec. Doc. No.
12).
11

10

Cal. January 18, 2009)(granting motions to strike answer and
directing clerk of court to enter default judgment); U.S. v.
$5,277.00 U.S. Currency, No. 12-CV-6528, 2013 WL 2405733, at *2
(W.D. N.Y. June 5, 2013)(granting motion to strike but denying
without prejudice motion for default judgment).
Case law makes clear that the failure to file an answer
before

the

prescribed

deadline

precludes

the

claimant

from

attaining statutory standing. See e.g. U.S. v. 2006 Chevrolet
Corvette, 2013 WL 3832690, at * 2. Thus, in this case the Motion
to Strike must be granted, unless the court construes Claimants’
September 25, 2013 claim as both a claim and an answer. U.S. v.
Ninety

Six

Thousand

Three

Hundred

Seventy

Dollars

in

U.S.

Currency, No.3:14-cv-356-WHA, 2014 WL 4274352 at *2 (M.D. Ala.
Aug. 29, 2014).
A

court

has

discretion

in

appropriate

circumstances

to

depart from the strict construction required by Rule G. The
Court

may

excuse

a

claimant's

procedural

default

in

the

"appropriate circumstances" or where certain mitigating factors
are present. United States v. $15,701.97, 2010 WL 3418246, at *2
(E.D. La. 2010); U.S. v. $48,000 U.S. Currency, No. 06-10952,
2007

WL

Claimants

1467158,
fail

circumstances

at
to

that

*3

(E.D.

identify
warrant

La.
any

May

18,

special

relaxation

of

2007).
or
the

However,

extenuating
Supplemental
11

Rules. Moreover,

Rule

G(5)(a)

and

(b)

require

the

separate

filing of a claim and answer.
Additionally, Claimants’ “failure to present any evidence
demonstrating a good faith attempt to file an [answer] on time,
detrimental reliance on government misinformation, or expense of
considerable resources preparing this case for trial,” weighs
heavily in the Court’s decision to not exercise its discretion.
United States v. $2,857.00, 754 F.2d 208, at *4 (5th Cir. 1985).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Government’s Motion to Strike for
Lack of Standing (Rec. Doc. No. 9) is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part, without prejudice to reurge.
IT IS ORDERED that Government’s Motion to Strike Claim of
Darnay and Calvin Thibodaux (Rec. Doc. No. 5) is DENIED.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED

that

the

Government’s

Motion

to

Strike Answers of Darnay and Calvin Thibodaux (Rec. Docs. No. 7,
10) is GRANTED. Claimants lack standing to challenge the United
States’ forfeiture of the Defendant Property in this action. The
Court

separately

addresses

Claimants’

motions

for

summary

judgment.

12

II.

Motions for Summary Judgment
A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary

judgment

is

appropriate

only

if

“the

pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986); TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 749 (5th
Cir. 2002). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the
“evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for

the

nonmoving

party.’”

Royal

v.

CCC

&

R.

Tres

Arboles,

L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2013).
Summary judgment is also proper if the party opposing the
motion fails to establish an essential element of his case. See
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23. In this regard, the nonmoving
party must do more than simply deny the allegations raised by
the moving party. See Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration
Co., 974 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992). The mere argued existence
of

a

factual

dispute

does

not

defeat

an

otherwise

properly

supported motion. Contogouris v. Westpac Resources, 856 F.Supp.
2d 846, 850 (E.D. La. 2012)(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.,

477

U.S.

242,

248

(1986)).

The

“obligation

of

the

nonmoving party is particularly strong when the nonmoving party
13

bears the burden of proof.” Hughes, v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376,
1381 (4th Cir. 1995).
B. Civil Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 983
The United States claims that the Defendant Property are
traceable proceeds of wire fraud and bank fraud obtained in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1344, respectively, and 1349
(attempt or conspiracy); therefore, the property is subject to
civil

forfeiture

under

18

U.S.C.

§§

981(a)(1)(C)

and

981(a)(1)(D).
The

United

States

alleges

that,

in

addition

to

being

involved in transactions illicit wire and bank transactions, the
in rem Defendant Properties were involved in transactions or
attempted transactions of money laundering in violation of 18
U.S.C.

§§

1956(a)(1)(B)

and

1956(h),

as

well

as

§

1957

(prohibiting unlawful conduct as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1962,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), subject to
forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A).
Title 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(C), and (a)(1)(D),
respectively, provide that: “[a]ny property, real or personal”
is subject to forfeiture to the United States if,
transaction

in

violation

of

Section

1956;

involved in a

constitutes

or

is

derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of Section 1344;

14

or represents or is traceable to the gross receipts obtained,
directly

or

“Proceeds”

indirectly,
is

defined

from
as

a

violation

“property

of

of

any

Section
kind

1343.

obtained,

directly or indirectly, as the result of the commission of the
offense giving rise to forfeiture and any property traceable
thereto...” 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G)(2).
To be entitled to forfeiture under CAFRA, the Government
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “the
property

is

Government

subject
may

use

to

forfeiture....”

evidence

gathered

Id.

after

§

983(c)(1).

the

filing

The

of

a

complaint for forfeiture to establish that property is subject
to forfeiture. Id. § 983(c)(2). Further, if the Government’s
theory is that the property was involved in the commission of a
criminal offense, the Government must establish a “substantial
connection”

between

the

property

and

the

offense.

Id.

§

983(c)(3).
Whether the Defendant Property is Forfeitable
Fraud Element
According to Claimants: (1) Dobronich’s will reflects his
desire to ensure the financial security of the Thibodauxs in
return for Darnay continuing to perform care-giving services for
him; and (2) Dobronich granted access and authority over his

15

investment account as he was interested in the development and
management of rental property with the Thibodauxs.
Claimants contend that the United States cannot meet its
burden of proof that all property seized was transacted without
Mr. Dobronich’s full knowledge and authorization.14 Therefore,
they claim, the United States cannot prove any violation of
Title 18 §§ 1956, 1343 and 1344. Essentially, Claimants argue
that the Government cannot satisfy the fraud element of §§ 1344
(Bank Fraud) and 1343 (Wire Fraud), and based on the foregoing,
argue

that

therefore,

the

Government

cannot

satisfy

the

requirements under § 1956 (money laundering) or § 1957 (engaging
in

monetary

transactions

in

property

derived

from

specified

unlawful activity).
As Claimants acknowledge engaging in monetary transactions
that involved moving $334,000 from the Dobronich brokerage and
Capital

One

bank

accounts,

and

for

Chevrolet

Silverado

accounts
the

for

purchase

truck,

and

transfer
of
the

the

to

personal

Nissan

tractor,

as

Altima,
well

as

bank
the
the

attempted purchase of a trailer with these funds, it follows
that

a

substantial

connection

exists

between

the

Defendant

14

Claimants contend that Mr. Dobronich sought to secure their financial security in return for Darnay continuing to
perform care-giving services for him; that Mr. Dobronich decided to execute a will leaving his property to
Claimants; and, that he decided to execute a power of attorney to facilitate the acquisition and maintenance of
rental property to ultimately establish rental income for Claimants and Mr. Dobronich.

16

Property and the alleged offenses.15 Therefore, the analysis here
is a simple one-step analysis into the fraud element and whether
the Government can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that Claimants obtained the property through fraud.
The fraud element is somewhat defined by 18 U.S.C. §1341,
which provides, in relevant part: “[w]hoever, having devised or
intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of

false or fraudulent

pretenses....”
The issue is whether Dobronich had “full knowledge” of the
transactions at issue and knowingly gave Claimants authorization
to engage in the same. The Government and Claimants contrast
sharply on this issue. Claimants support their position with a
sworn and notarized affidavit, signed by Dobronich, attesting as
follows:
1) He does not want to press charges against Calvin and/or
Darnay Thibodaux for acting on his behalf with a Power of
Attorney he executed in the presents [sic] of a Notary
Public and two witness;
2) Anything purchased was with his
authorized with his full knowledge;

consent

and

were

3) Items such as, Kubota Tractor, a 4-wheeler, 2001 Chevy
Pk, a 2013 Nissan Altima and property(s) [sic] were
purchased with my knowledge; the money came from my
account.16

15
16

Rec. Doc. No. 8-1 at 4-5.
Rec. Doc. No. 8-1 at 7.

17

The

Government

alleges

that

the

affidavit

was

presented

to

Dobronich on March 27, 2013, while he was in the hospital, and
in a fragile and vulnerable condition.17 The Government supports
this with the judicial determination, during state court civil
proceedings that Dobronich was “incompetent to testify in these
proceedings by way of deposition or trial testimony.”18 Further,
during his interview with law enforcement on March 18, 2013,
Dobronich denied giving permission to Claimants to borrow money,
handle his finances, or make any transactions on his behalf.19
Thus, there is serious question as to Dobronich’s capacity to
make the attestations proffered by Claimants.
The

evidence

shows

that,

on

February

20,

2013,

Darnay

Thibodaux obtained a cashier’s check in the amount of $26,000
payable to Calvin Thibodaux with “doctor bills” listed in the
memo field; and, that the check was endorsed and deposited on
the same day for the purchase of the Nissan Altima, a purchase
Claimants contend Dobronich authorized.20
Further, on February 13, 2013, and again on February 20,
2013,

Darnay

contacted

Romano

Investments

for

$30,000

wire

transfers from Dobronich’s investment account to his Capital One

Rec. Doc. No. 1 at 8.
Rec. Doc. No. 26-1 at 1. Forrest Dobronich, et al. v. Darnay Thibodaux and Calvin Thibodaux, Case No. 201311784.
19
Rec. Doc. No. 1 at 11.
20
Rec. Doc. No. 1 at 9.
17
18

18

bank account, advising that the funds were needed in order to
settle “medical expenses.”21 However, Claimants admitted to law
enforcement that no funds were put to medical care or expenses
because “the bills hadn’t come in yet.”22
The

Claimants

contend

that

the

basis

for

Dobronich’s

granting of power of attorney over his affairs and finances, as
well as the bequest of all of his assets to the Thibodaux’s, is
the relationship that developed during Darnay’s nursing care of
Dobronich

over

the

course

of

two

years.

However,

there

is

evidence to the contrary and that Darnay only began caring for
Dobronich several months before the transactions at issue.
Although, not the subject of the instant action, there is
evidence to show that a $45,000 cashier’s check (relating to
Dobronich’s

funds)

was

obtained

by

Claimants

and

used

to

purchase real property from a third party. However, the sales
documentation from this transaction lists the transaction as an
Act of Donation, rather than a sales transaction. Further, there
is

no

record

of

this

transaction

in

the

public

record.

The

Government is prepared to show that the parties involved in this
transaction made inconsistent statements as to the nature of the
transaction for real property.

21
22

Rec. Doc. No. 1 at 7.
Rec. Doc. No. 1 at 11.

19

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Claimants have
failed

to

knowledge

settle
and

the

complete

issues

relating

understanding

of

to

Dobronich’s

the

full

transactions

at

issue, specifically, how the funds from the brokerage account
were

being

spent.

The

purported

authorization

proffered

by

Claimants to support their position is in serious question. For
these

reasons,

summary

judgment

in

favor

of

Claimants

that,

based

on

the

is

inappropriate.
Further,

the

Court

finds

evidence

adduced by the Government, the Government can bear the burden of
proof in establishing that the Defendant Property was obtained
through ‘false or fraudulent pretenses,’ thus, subjecting the
property to forfeiture proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 981.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motions for Summary Judgment (Rec.
Docs. No. 8, 16) are DENIED. There is no evidence that the funds
from

Dobronich’s

Dobronich’s
legitimate

medical

brokerage

purpose

bills,

account
or

purportedly

were

were
used

authorized

used
toward
by

to
any

settle
other

Dobronich,

as

opposed to the Government’s well-documented use of the funds for
Claimants’ personal designs.

20

III.

Notice of the Court’s Intention to Enter Summary Judgment
Sua Sponte in Favor of the United States

Based

on

the

above,

the

Court

is

considering

entry

of

summary judgment sua sponte in favor of the United States. It is
well-settled that a district court may, in denying the moving
party’s motion for summary judgment, grant summary judgment sua
sponte

in

favor

of

the

non-movant.

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

56(c);

Washington v. Resolution Trust Corp., 68 F.3d 935, 939 (5th Cir.
1995); Boudreaux v. Rice Palace, No. 04-541, 2006 WL 3345198, at
*7 (W.D. La. Nov. 15, 2006). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
requires the prompt disposition of cases in the absence of any
genuine issues of material fact for the court to consider.
As the Court is considering entering a sua sponte judgment,
Claimants as the moving parties are entitled to ten-days’ notice
of this intention so that Claimants have fair opportunity to
come forward with all of their evidence and make a response. St.
Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 435 (5th Cir.
2000).
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 4th day of December, 2014.

____________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

21