Hubbard v. Laborde Marine, L.L.C. et al
Filing
31
ORDER AND REASONS denying 6 Motion to Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (Reference: 13-5956)(ecm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MARCELL HUBBARD
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 13‐5956 c/w 14‐1015
LABORDE MARINE LLC
SECTION "H"(2)
(Applies to 13‐5956)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Remand (Doc. 6). For the following reasons, the Motion is
DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action in Louisiana state court asserting various claims for personal injury
resulting from an accident which occurred in the Gulf of Mexico. Plaintiff alleges that he was a
crew‐member on a vessel performing resupply and repair operations on an offshore platform
located on the Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS"). After Plaintiff completed his shift on the vessel,
he boarded a crewboat, the M/V RIG RUNNER, for transport back to shore. Plaintiff claims that the
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captain of the M/V RIG RUNNER suddenly changed course during transit, causing Plaintiff to be
thrown from his seat and sustain injury. Defendants own the M/V RIG RUNNER. After being served
with Plaintiff's suit, Defendants removed to this Court invoking, alternatively, this Court's admiralty
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 and federal question jurisdiction pursuant to the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"), 43 U.S.C. § 1349. Plaintiff subsequently filed the instant
Motion to Remand. Plaintiff, in addition to remand, moves the Court to impose attorney's fees and
costs in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
LEGAL STANDARD
Generally, a defendant may remove a civil state court action to federal court if the federal
court has original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The burden is on the removing
party to show "[t]hat federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper." Manguno v.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). When determining whether
federal jurisdiction exists, courts consider "[t]he claims in the state court petition as they existed
at the time of removal." Id. Removal statutes should be strictly construed, and any doubt should
be resolved in favor of remand. Id.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendants assert two independent grounds for removal jurisdiction. Because the Court
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finds that it may exercise jurisdiction pursuant to OCSLA, it is not necessary to consider Defendants'
arguments related to 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
Defendants' first argument relies on OCSLA's broad jurisdictional grant. Plaintiff concedes
that OCSLA provides removal jurisdiction, but argues that Defendants have not met their burden
to prove that this case falls within OCSLA's jurisdictional requirements. Specifically, Plaintiff
contends that Defendants must prove that the operative facts underlying Plaintiff's complaint
occurred on the OCS (referred to herein as a situs requirement).
OCSLA's jurisdictional grant is found in 43 U.S.C. § 1349. It provides that:
[T]he district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of
cases and controversies arising out of, or in connection with [] any
operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf which involves
exploration, development, or production of the minerals, of the
subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, or which involves
rights to such minerals.
This language has been interpreted as straightforward and very broad. Tennessee Gas
Pipeline v. Houston Cas. Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 150, 154 (5th Cir. 1996). Courts generally impose a two
part test for evaluating jurisdiction under OCSLA, asking whether "(1) the activities that caused the
injury constituted an operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf that involved the
exploration and production of minerals, and (2) the case arises out of, or in connection with the
operation." In re DEEPWATER HORIZON, 745 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 2014). With regard to the first
element, courts ask whether the injury would have occurred "but‐for" the operations on the OCS.
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Hufnagel v. Omega Serv. Indus., Inc., 182 F.3d 340, 350 (5th Cir. 1999); Recar v. CNG Producing Co.,
853 F.2d 367, 369 (5th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has held that the phrase "arising
out of or in connection with" should also be applied broadly. EP Operating Ltd. P'ship v. Placid Oil
Co., 26 F.3d 563, 569 (5th Cir. 1994); see also United Offshore Co. v. S. Deepwater Pipeline Co., 899
F.2d 405, 406–07 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a district court had jurisdiction over a dispute related
to a contract providing for the transportation of minerals to shore despite the fact that the contract
concerned operations "one step removed" from operations on the OCS). Additionally, the Fifth
Circuit has expressly rejected Plaintiff's assertion that § 1349 contains a situs requirement. See In
re DEEPWATER HORIZON, 745 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 2014) ("[Plaintiffs] contend that there is a
situs requirement for OCSLA jurisdiction under the language of Section 1349. We disagree.").1
Accordingly, consistent with the jurisprudence in the Fifth Circuit, the Court finds that Defendants
must only demonstrate that the instant matter arises out of an operation conducted on the OCS
involving the production of minerals.
Plaintiff alleges that he was a crewman on a vessel which was servicing a platform in the
Gulf of Mexico. Plaintiff does not dispute that the platform at issue was on the OCS, that it was
engaged in the extraction of minerals from the OCS, or that his employment supported the
1
There is a single published Fifth Circuit case which stated in passing that OCSLA's jurisdictional
grant contains a situs requirement. Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 213 (5th Cir. 2013).
However, the Court believes that the passing statement in Barker is inconsistent with the Fifth Circuit
jurisprudence on point and therefore declines to follow it. See e.g., Tennessee Gas Pipeline, 87 F.3d at
154; EP Operating, 26 F.3d at 569; Recar, 853 F.2d at 369.
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operations of the platform. Therefore, this Court has no difficulty finding that Plaintiff's
employment furthered the development of minerals from the OCS. Furthermore, Plaintiff's alleged
injury aboard the M/V RIG RUNNER was clearly related to the operations on the OCS. Plaintiff
would not have been aboard the M/V RIG RUNNER but‐for the extraction of minerals from the OCS.
Accordingly, his injuries are sufficiently related to the operations on the OCS for this Court to
exercise jurisdiction. See Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 692 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982)
(exercising OCSLA jurisdiction over a case involving the crash of a helicopter which was ferrying
individuals to work onboard a platform on the OCS).2
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Remand is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 2nd day of May, 2014.
____________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2
Plaintiff also seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Section
1447(c) provides that "[a]n order remanding [a] case may require payment of just costs and any actual
expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal." Given this Court's holding that
removal was proper, the statute is not applicable and Plaintiff's request is denied.
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