Guth v. Roedel Parsons Koch Blache Balhoff & McCollister et al

Filing 38

ORDER AND REASONS granting 13 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and dismissing Relator's claim. Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 12/18/14. (jjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex
rel. GREGORY GUTH

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 13-6000

ROEDEL PARSONS KOCH BLACHE
BALHOFF & McCOLLISTER

SECTION: R(3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Roedel Parsons' motion to
dismiss

plaintiff

Gregory

Guth's

Complaint

and

First

Amended

Complaint.1 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Roedel
Parsons' motion to dismiss.

I.

BACKGROUND
This is a qui tam action brought by Gregory Guth ("Relator")

on behalf of the United States Government under 31 U.S.C. § 3729,
et seq. The claim arises out of a dispute between Relator and the
State of Louisiana (through Louisiana State University ("LSU")),
and its counsel, Roedel Parsons Koch Blache Balhoff & McCollister.

1

Guth filed his First Amended Complaint after Roedel
Parsons filed its motion to dismiss, but the Court will construe
Roedel Parsons' motion to dismiss as applying to both Guth's
Complaint and First Amended Complaint as Roedel Parsons addresses
both in its memorandums in support of its motion to dismiss. See
R. Doc. 30 at 1 ("Counsel for Roedel Parsons notes that he has
already addressed the effect of the First Amended Complaint on
Roedel Parsons' pending Motion to Dismiss in Roedel Parsons'
Reply Memorandum (Rec. Doc. 28 at footnote 9).").

After Hurricane Katrina, the United States Department of
Housing and Development made available federal funds to the City of
New

Orleans

through

the

Community

Development

Block

Grants

program.2 The City designated a portion of these funds for the
expropriation of property and other expenses related to the design
and construction of a veterans association medical center in New
Orleans and a teaching hospital for LSU.3 On April 30, 2007, the
City entered into a Cooperative Endeavor Agreement with LSU, which
authorized LSU to expropriate property for the hospitals.4 LSU
hired Roedel Parsons as counsel to handle the expropriations and
other acquisitions of property for the project.5 At the time,
Relator owned property and a business within the relevant area
subject to expropriation.6
In his original complaint, Relator asserted claims against
both LSU and Roedel Parsons. Since the original filing, Relator
voluntarily dismissed LSU from this case.7 The following discussion
will focus on the claims asserted against Roedel Parsons as the
sole remaining defendant in this action.

2

R. Doc. 1 at 3.

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id. at 4.

6

Id. at 5.

7

R. Doc. 23.
2

Relator's Complaint and First Amended Complaint allege that
Roedel Parsons violated the False Claims Act by taking and acting
upon indefensible legal positions in order to generate additional
fees for which it could bill the government, and by engaging in
double-billing practices.8 According to Relator, both practices
constitute false claims under the FCA.
First, Relator alleges that despite legal requirements that
mandate negotiations with property owners before the government
files an expropriation suit, Roedel Parsons refused to engage in
good faith pre-suit negotiations with property owners in order to
generate additional fees from expropriation litigation and to shift
expropriation costs from LSU to the City, which would bear every
judgment.9

According to Relator, Roedel Parsons took the position

that a property owner could be reimbursed for only the greater of
the value of his property or the value of his business, but not
both.10 Relator argues this "had no legal basis or support in law
or fact."11

Relator further alleges that when property owners

counterclaimed for more money in expropriation proceedings, Roedel
Parsons forced them to go to trial. Accordingly, Relator alleges
that these facts mean that "legal bill(s), timesheet(s), memoranda,

8

R. Doc. 1 at 4-8.

9

Id. at 6.

10

Id. at 4-5.

11

Id.
3

and/or

other

necessitated

document(s)
by

this

submitted

legal

for

position

work

...

and/or

constituted

payment
a

false

claim."12
Second, Relator alleges that Roedel Parsons engaged in doublebilling for legal work in connection with the expropriation matters
by

unnecessarily

assigning

and

sending

multiple

attorneys

to

prepare for, travel to and from, and attend court hearings.13 Again,
Relator

argues

that

Roedel

Parsons'

submission

of

"bill(s),

timesheet(s), memoranda, and/or other document(s) submitted for
payment

and/or

reimbursement"

violation of the FCA.14

constituted

Third,

a

false

claim

in

Relator asserts that Roedel

Parsons' alleged double billings resulted in double payments to
Roedel Parsons, which created obligations on the firm to refund the
double payments, either as payments to which Roedel Parsons was not
entitled, or as Community Development Block Grant income, which was
required

to

be

returned,

all

in

3729(a)(1)(G).15

12

Id. at 6.

13

Id.

14

Id. at 7.

15

R. Doc. 32 at 3-4.
4

violation

of

31

U.S.C.

§

Fourth, Relator alleges that, by engaging in the foregoing
conduct, Roedel Parsons engaged in a conspiracy to defraud the
government in violation of the False Claims Act.16
Roedel Parsons filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard for
fraud.17 Roedel Parsons contends that Relator fails to allege that
it made any false communication or false statement.18 Roedel Parsons
also argues that Relator's complaint fails to meet the Rule 9(b)
pleading standard for allegations of fraud because it fails to
indicate what was communicated, when it was communicated, where it
was communicated, or how it was communicated.19

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff

must plead sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)).
A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that
allow

the

court

to

"draw

16

See R. Doc. 13.

18

Id. at 9.

19

reasonable

Id. at 2.

17

the

Id. at 11.
5

inference

that

the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. A court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand
v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2009). The
Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A legally sufficient complaint must establish more than a
"sheer possibility" that the plaintiff's claim is true. Id. It need
not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must go beyond
labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements
of a cause of action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In other words, the
face of the complaint must contain enough factual matter to raise
a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
each element of the plaintiff's claim. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 256. If
there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, or if
it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an
insuperable bar to relief, Jones v. Block, 549 U.S. 199, 215
(2007); Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2007),
the claim must be dismissed.
Claims

under

the

False

Claims

Act

must

also

meet

the

heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b). See United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180,
185 (5th Cir. 2009). Rule 9(b) requires a party alleging fraud or
6

mistake to "state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud

or

mistake."

This

standard

supplements

the

pleading

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and together
the two rules necessitate that a plaintiff supply "simple, concise,
and direct" allegations of the circumstances amounting to fraud.
Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 186. These allegations "must make relief
plausible, not merely conceivable, when taken as true." Id.; see
also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
In order to plead fraud with particularity, "a plaintiff must
state the factual basis for the fraudulent claim with particularity
and cannot rely on speculation or conclusional allegations." United
States ex rel. Rafizadeh v. Continental Common, Inc., 553 F.3d 869,
873 (5th Cir. 2008). In general, such a statement should include
the "time, place, and contents of the false representation[], as
well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and
what that person obtained thereby."

Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 186

(quoting United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare Mgmt.
Group., 193 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also United States
ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899,
903 (5th Cir. 1997).
In certain circumstances, the pleading requirements of Rule
9(b) may be relaxed slightly, and the plaintiff may plead on
information and belief, in particular when facts about the fraud
are "peculiarly within the perpetrator's knowledge." United States
7

ex rel. Doe v. Dow Chem. Co., 343 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Russell, 193 F.3d at 308); see also United States ex rel.
Williams v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 417 F.3d 450, 454 (5th
Cir. 2005). This latitude "must not be mistaken for license to base
claims

of

fraud

on

speculation

and

conclusory

allegations."

Thompson, 125 F.3d at 903 (quoting Tuchman v. DSC Commc'ns Corp.,
14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994)).

III. DISCUSSION
The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq., "permits, in
certain circumstances, suits by private parties on behalf of the
United States against anyone submitting a false claim to the
Government." Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer,
520 U.S. 939, 941 (1997). When non-governmental parties, called
"relators," file FCA claims, they prosecute the case on behalf of
the government and in turn receive a percentage of any recovery
that might result from a successful suit. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (d)(1)(4).
In his Complaint and First Amended Complaint, Relator alleges
violations of four different provisions of the FCA.20 The first
provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), imposes liability upon any

20

The subsections of § 3729 were reorganized by statute in
2009 as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009.
See Pub. L. No. 111–21, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621–22 (2009).
References will be to the current version of the statute.
8

person who "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false
or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" to the government. The
second provision, section 3729(a)(1)(B), imposes liability upon any
person who "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a
false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim."
The third provision, section 3729(a)(1)(G), imposes liability upon
any person who
knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a
false record or statement material to an obligation to
pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or
knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government.
The fourth provision, section 3729(a)(1)(C), imposes liability upon
any person who "conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph
(A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G)" of section 3729(a)(1).
The statute states that with respect to "information," the
words "knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person either "has
actual knowledge of the information," "acts in deliberate ignorance
of the truth or falsity of the information," or "acts in reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity of the information." 31 U.S.C. §
3729(b)(1)(A). The mental-state requirement of the FCA requires
nothing more. Id. § 3729(b)(1)(B).

A. Defendant's Alleged Over-Billing Strategy
Relator claims that Roedel Parsons refused to engage in good
faith pre-suit negotiations and then refused to settle counter9

claims

in

order

to

generate

additional

fees

and

to

shift

expropriation costs from LSU to the City of New Orleans. Relator
alleges that this conduct, "being contrary to law," "constituted
fraud."21 Relator alleges that all related legal bills, time sheets,
and other documents submitted by Roedel Parsons are false claims
under the FCA. Presumably, Relator makes this claim under sections
3729(a)(1)(A) and (B) of the FCA. To state a claim under sections
3729(a)(1)(A) and (B), Relator must allege that there was a false
statement or fraudulent course of conduct, made or carried out with
the requisite scienter, that was material, and that caused the
government to pay money or to forfeit moneys. United States ex rel.
Longhi v. Lithium Power Techs., 575 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2009).
The

Court

finds

that

Relator

fails

to

satisfy

the

pleading

standards of Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b).

i. Relator Fails to Allege Sufficient Facts to Support
the Existence of a False Claim or Fraudulent Course of
Conduct
Relator fails to plausibly allege the existence of a false
claim or fraudulent course of conduct as required under section
3729(a)(1)(A) and (B). Nowhere does Relator claim that Roedel
Parsons' bills were false because they were inaccurate, or that the
work was not actually performed. Instead, Relator conclusorily
alleges that these bills or records were false because they were
21

R. Doc. 1 at 6.
10

the product of a design to generate fees by taking an untenable
legal position. Standing alone, this is insufficient to allege a
false claim or fraudulent course of conduct.
The Court first considers Relator's allegation that Roedel
Parsons consistently refused to settle expropriation claims without
a legal basis for doing so. Relator provides no facts to support
his contention that this conduct was fraudulent. Instead, Relator
supports his allegations with legal conclusions and conclusory
statements. Relator's contention that the conduct "constituted
fraud" because it was "contrary to law" is a legal conclusion,
which the Court need not accept as true.22 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.

Moreover,

predicated

on

to
legal

the

extent

violations,

Relator

alleges

including

false

violations

claims
of

OMB

Circular A-87, the federal regulations of HUD and the Community
Development Block Grants program, and the Code of Professional
Conduct for attorneys, Relator's claim fails because he has not
alleged that Roedel Parsons falsely certified compliance or that a
certificate of compliance was a requirement for Roedel Parsons to
receive payment. See United States ex rel. Spicer v. Westbrook, 751
F.3d 354, 365 (5th Cir. 2014) ("The linchpin of an FCA claim
resting on a violation of a statute or regulation ... is the
requirement of a certificate of compliance.").

22

Id.
11

Relator's assertion that Roedel Parsons' legal strategy was
undertaken with the intent "to maximize the legal billings" is
likewise no more than a conclusion. Given that it is not selfevident

that

the

alleged

actions

were

taken

to

defraud

the

government, Relator's mere conclusory statements do not make his
allegations plausible. As such, it is unreasonable for the Court to
draw the inference from Relator's allegations that Roedel Parsons
produced a false claim or engaged in a fraudulent course of
conduct. Accordingly, Relator fails to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6).

ii. Relator Fails to Plead Fraud with Particularity under
Rule 9(b)
Relator's pleadings also fail to meet the heightened Rule 9(b)
pleading requirements for fraud. Under Rule 9(b), "a plaintiff must
state the factual basis for the fraudulent claim with particularity
and cannot rely on speculation or conclusional allegations." United
States ex rel. Rafizadeh v. Continental Common, Inc., 553 F.3d 869,
873 (5th Cir. 2008). In general, such a statement should include
"the time, place, and contents of the false representation[], as
well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and
what that person obtained thereby."

Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 186

(quoting Russell, 193 F.3d at 308). Here, Relator fails to identify
any specific false claims, statements, or records, and instead
alleges that "[e]ach, every, and any" of Roedel Parsons' legal
12

bills, time sheets, and other documents submitted within the scope
of its representation of LSU constituted a false claim.23 This
plainly

fails

to

meet

Rule

9(b)'s

particularity

requirement.

Relator fails to refer with particularity to any false claims,
statements, or records related to Roedel Parsons' refusal to settle
claims, or Roedel Parsons' later work on cases arising out of
denied claims. While Relator attached as exhibits several invoices
prepared by Roedel Parsons for its work on behalf of LSU,24 Relator
does not specify how these invoices are false, or otherwise provide
any

meaningful

discussion

of

their

contents.

Relator's

only

reference to the invoices states that they constitute "proof that
Roedel Parsons was submitting bills for and being paid for legal
work as said work was being done."25 Relator points to these
invoices

solely

for

the

purpose

of

showing

Roedel

Parsons'

knowledge that the government was paying for its services.26 In sum,
Relator fails to identify the "who, what, when, where, and how"
regarding a single false claim, statement, or record. Thompson, 125
F.3d at 903 (quoting Williams v. WMX Tech., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 179
(5th Cir. 1997)).

23

Id.

24

See R. Doc. 25-11 at 2-4.

25

R. Doc. 32 at 3.

26

Id.
13

In the context of a section 3729(a)(1)(A) claim, when a
showing of presentment of claims to the government is required,27
the Fifth Circuit provides Rule 9(b) can be satisfied, even in the
absence of allegations regarding details of submitted false claims,
when the complaint alleges "particular details of a scheme to
submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a
strong inference that claims were actually submitted." Grubbs, 565
F.3d at 190. Still, "[t]his does not absolve [the relator] of the
burden of otherwise sufficiently pleading the time, place, or
identity

details

of

the

traditional

standard,

in

order

to

effectuate Rule 9(b)'s function of fair notice and protection from
frivolous suits." United States ex rel. Nunnally v. West Calcasieu
Cameron Hosp., 519 Fed. Appx. 890, 895 (5th Cir. 2013). In Grubbs,
the Fifth Circuit held that the absence of identification of
specific bills was not fatal to a relator's claim when the relator
described in detail how two defendants solicited the relator to
participate in a scheme to defraud the government. Grubbs, 565 F.3d
at 191-92. Specifically, in Grubbs, the Fifth Circuit observed:
The complaint sets out the particular workings of a
scheme that was communicated directly to the relator by
those perpetrating the fraud. [Relator] describes in
detail, including the date, place, and participants, the
dinner meeting at which two doctors in his section

27

This discussion is relevant only to a section
3729(a)(1)(A) claim because section 3729(a)(1)(B) claims do not
require proof of presentment of a claim to the government. See
Allison Engine, Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S.
662, 671 (2008).
14

attempted to bring him into the fold of their on-going
fraudulent plot. He alleges his first-hand experience of
the scheme unfolding as it related to him, describing how
the weekend on-call nursing staff attempted to assist him
in recording face-to-face physician visits that had not
occurred. Also alleged are specific dates that each
doctor falsely claimed to have provided services to
patients and often the type of medical service or its
Current Procedural Terminology code that would have been
used in the bill.
Id. Here, by contrast, Relator's pleadings contain sweepingly
conclusory allegations that are devoid of factual details. Relator
provides no reliable indicia that a fraudulent scheme existed, and
therefore no basis to infer that Roedel Parsons submitted false
claims. Moreover, unlike in Grubbs, here, Relator already has
access to at least several of Roedel Parsons' invoices.28 Id. at
192. Accordingly, Relator's pleadings fail to meet Rule 9(b)'s
particularity requirement.

B. Defendant's Alleged Double-Billing Practices
Relator's second theory is that Roedel Parsons presented false
claims when it billed the government for the work of two attorneys
when only one was needed. In other words, Relator alleges that
Roedel Parsons billed the government for unnecessary services.
Relator's pleadings provide no factual basis to support a plausible
inference that the provision of two attorneys was unnecessary.
Relator

28

alleges

that,

because

"they

See R. Doc. 25-11 at 2-4.
15

were

not

reasonable

or

necessary despite [Roedel Parsons] representing said billings as
being necessary and proper,"29 the billings were knowingly false.
With the exception of Relator's conclusory statements that the
billings were "knowingly false," the only basis on which Relator
seems to support this claim is that "[a]s attorneys, being charged
with the knowledge of the law, rules and regulations, the Roedel
Parsons expropriation team members ... knew that their billings ...
were false and would result in payments to which they were not
entitled...."30 Relator also lists a number of filings by Roedel
Parsons that he conclusorily asserts reflect false billings.31 In
addition, Relator provides documentation showing joint appearances

29

R. Doc. 32 at 2.

30

Id. at 2-3.

31

In his First Amended Complaint, Guth provides the
following list of filings in Orleans Parish Civil District Court
related to case 2010-8897, which he purports evidence Roedel
Parsons' "intentional and purposeful knowing conspiracy to
defraud the government by generating false billings":
5/6/13 Response Memorandum to Recusal Motion Terry
Dunlevy
5/23/13 Recusal Hearing Terry Dunlevy and Shelley
McGlathery
6/28/13 LSU's Exceptions To Guth RICO Petition Luke
Piontek
7/29/13 Motion To Strike Guth Memorandum Luke Piontek
8/15/13 Exceptions to Guth RICO Petition Luke Piontek
9113113 Joint Motion to Quash Christian Rhodes
10/1/13 Motion For Contempt Christian Rhodes
10/28/13 Exceptions hearing Luke Piontek and Shelley
McGlathery
Id. at 1-2 (errors in original).
16

by two Roedel Parsons attorneys on three occasions.32 Relator
alleges no further facts to support this claim.
These allegations are woefully insufficient to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6). To be clear, Relator does not allege that the
bills contained inaccuracies or that Roedel Parsons billed for work
it did not perform. While billing for unnecessary services can form
the basis of a false claim under the FCA, see Grubbs, 565 F.3d at
190, Relator fails to allege facts that can support an inference
that

the

provision

of

two

attorneys

by

Roedel

Parsons

was

unnecessary or that the work itself was unnecessary. Instead,
Relator alleges conclusorily that the bills were false because the
services billed for were unnecessary. Having more than one lawyer
appear on behalf of a client is not uncommon, and it is not selfevident here that the provision of two attorneys was unnecessary.
Indeed, expropriation proceedings can be complex matters in which
the participation of more than one attorney for a party is entirely
reasonable. To conclude that it is plausible that Roedel Parsons'
provision of two attorneys was unnecessary based on the face of
Relator's pleadings would require the Court to draw an unreasonable
inference.
Accordingly, Relator fails to state a claim as to Roedel
Parsons' alleged double-billing practices.

32

R. Doc. 1-1 at 26-28.
17

C. Defendant's Alleged Failure to Reimburse the Government
under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G)
Relator alleges that Roedel Parsons violated the provision of
the FCA that prohibits "reverse false claims." This section makes
liable any person who
knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a
false record or statement material to an obligation to
pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or
knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). The forbidden conduct "is called a
reverse false claim because the action of the defendant results not
in improper payment to defendant from the Government, but rather no
payment to the Government when payment is otherwise obligated." Dow
Chem. Co., 343 F.3d at 329. A claim under section 3729(a)(1)(G)
requires (1) that the defendant had an obligation to pay money to
the government, (2) that the defendant used a false statement to
avoid or decrease that obligation, (3) that the false statement was
material, and (4) that the defendant made the false statement
knowingly. See United States ex rel. Ramadoss v. Caremark, Inc.,
586 F.Supp.2d 668, 685 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
Here, Relator fails to plead a violation of this section with
particularity because he has not identified an obligation that
would require Roedel Parsons to pay money to the government within
the meaning of this provision. Relator's First Amended Complaint
attempts to bootstrap a claim under this provision by alleging that

18

Roedel Parsons' double billings created an obligation to refund the
double payments. In United States ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos., the
Fifth Circuit noted that
[t]he reverse false claims act does not extend to
potential or contingent obligations to pay the government
fines or penalties which have not been levied or assessed
(and as to which no formal proceedings to do so have been
instituted) and which do not arise out of an economic
relationship between the government and the defendant
(such as a lease or a contract or the like) under which
the government provides some benefit to the defendant
wholly or partially in exchange for an agreed or expected
payment or transfer of property by (or on behalf of) the
defendant to (or for the economic benefit of) the
government.
520 F.3d 384, 391 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States ex rel.
Bain v. Ga. Gulf Corp., 386 F.3d 648, 657 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Relator's claim is foreclosed by the Fifth Circuit's reasoning
in Marcy. Relator's claim is predicated on "potential or contingent
obligations to pay the government [amounts] which have not been
levied or assessed (and to which no formal proceedings to do so
have been instituted)." Id. Further, Roedel Parsons does not have
a relationship with the government contemplated by this provision.
Roedel Parsons was to provide legal services to LSU and to be paid
by LSU from Community Development Block Grant funds awarded to the
City of New Orleans.

Roedel Parsons does not have a contractual

relationship with the government under which the government confers
benefits on the firm in exchange for an agreed payment of money.
Accordingly,

Relator

fails

to

plead

3729(a)(1)(G) by Roedel Parsons.
19

a

violation

of

section

E. Defendant's
3729(a)(1)(C)

Alleged

Conspiracy

under

31

U.S.C.

§

Finally, Relator alleges an FCA conspiracy violation. Section
3729(a)(1)(C) imposes liability on any person who "conspires to
commit a violation of subparagraph (A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G)"
of section 3729(a)(1). Given that Relator's pleadings purport to
allege violations only of section 3729(a)(1)(A), (B) and (G), a
violation of section 3729(a)(1)(C)'s conspiracy provision must stem
from one of these allegations. In order to prove a False Claim Act
conspiracy, the Fifth Circuit requires a relator to show "(1) the
existence of an unlawful agreement between defendants to get a
false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid by [the Government] and
(2) at least one act performed in furtherance of that agreement."
United States ex rel. Farmer v. City of Houston, 523 F.3d 333, 343
(5th Cir. 2008). Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirements apply to
claims brought under the FCA's conspiracy provision such that "a
plaintiff alleging a conspiracy to commit fraud must 'plead with
particularity the conspiracy as well as the overt acts ... taken in
furtherance of the conspiracy.'" Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 193 (quoting
FC Inv. Group LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1097 (D.C.
Cir. 2008)).
Relator's allegations are wholly insufficient to state a claim
under

section

3729(a)(1)(C).

Relator
20

points

to

several

acts

purportedly

taken

in

furtherance

of

a

conspiracy--e.g.,

duplicative, false billings, but these allegations fall short for
the reasons the Court has already identified in this opinion.
Furthermore, Relator fails to allege that an unlawful agreement
existed. Instead, Relator's argument is essentially that because
Roedel Parsons' attorneys knew of Relator's allegations of fraud,
Roedel Parsons' attorneys must have "discussed the allegations that
it was engaged in fraudulent conduct."33 In another example, Relator
merely alleges that a Roedel Parsons' "attorney consulted with
other attorneys from [its] expropriation team ... in an intentional
and purposeful and knowing conspiracy to defraud the government by
generating

false

billings...."34

These

allegations

are

purely

speculative and conclusory, and they fail to allege the existence
of an unlawful agreement. Roedel Parsons' attorneys' discussion of
the allegations against the firm, or consultation about ongoing
matters, does not support an inference of an unlawful agreement.
Accordingly, Relator fails to state a claim under section
3729(a)(1)(C).

33

R. Doc. 32 at 4.

34

Id. at 2.
21

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Roedel Parsons' motion to dismiss

is GRANTED and Relator's claim is DISMISSED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 18th day of December, 2014.
__

_________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

22