Ford v. Mentor Worldwide, L.L.C. et al

Filing 28

ORDER AND REASONS granting 18 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.. Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 2/20/14. (jjs, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ANITA FORD

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 13-6317

MENTOR WORLDWIDE, LLC, SOUTH
FLORIDA PLASTIC SURGERY
ASSOCIATES, AND DR. DON R.
REVIS, JR.

SECTION: R

ORDER AND REASONS
Defendants Donald Revis and South Florida Plastic Surgery
Associates move to dismiss this case on two grounds.1 First,
defendants argue that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
them. Second, defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted because she failed
to comply with the presuit notice and screening requirements of
the Florida Medical Malpractice Reform Act. Because the Court
finds that it does not have jurisdiction over Dr. Revis and
SFPSA, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion and dismisses
plaintiff's suit. The Court does not reach the parties' arguments
concerning defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.

I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises out of injuries plaintiff Anita Ford

1

R. Doc. 18.

allegedly suffered after a failed breast augmentation procedure.2
Plaintiff, a Louisiana resident, alleges that she learned about
Dr. Revis through the website www.justbreastimplants.com ("JBI"),
which Dr. Revis and SFPSA allegedly used "to solicit patients
from across the country to come to Florida for breast
augmentation surgery."3 According to plaintiff, she e-mailed Dr.
Revis on July 23, 2012, to "inquir[e] about breast augmentation,"
and the two exchanged approximately twenty-two e-mails over the
next several weeks.4 Dr. Revis allegedly knew that plaintiff was
a Louisiana resident while he was corresponding with her.5
Dr. Revis performed breast augmentation surgery on
plaintiff, using implants manufactured by Mentor Worldwide, LLC,
on September 28, 2012 at the Broward General Medical Center in
Fort Lauderdale, Florida.6 Plaintiff alleges that she began
feeling pain in her breast in mid-October, and that she
corresponded with Dr. Revis about that pain between November 2012
and January 2013.7 On June 5, 2013, Dr. Revis performed a

2

R. Doc. 1-1 at 28.

3

Id. at 29.

4

Id. at 28-29.

5

Id. at 29.

6

Id. at 30; R. Doc. 18-3 at 1.

7

R. Doc. 1-1 at 30.
2

bilateral breast implant exchange on plaintiff.8 Plaintiff
alleges that after Dr. Revis removed the Mentor implants from
plaintiff, he discovered that one of the implants was leaking
saline.9 According to plaintiff, the leaking saline in her breast
implant caused her to experience pain and to require another
surgery.10
Neither Dr. Revis nor SFPSA regularly does business in
Louisiana, and Dr. Revis has never lived or practiced medicine
there.11 While plaintiff alleges that "about 50% of Dr. Revis'
patients are out of state or international patients,"12 Dr.
Revis's uncontroverted affidavit reflects that less than 0.001%
of his patient base comes from Louisiana.13
On September 12, 2013, plaintiff filed suit against Mentor,
Dr. Revis, and SFPSA in Louisiana state court.14 She brought
claims against Mentor under the Louisiana Products Liability
Act15 and a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Revis and

8

Id. at 31; R. Doc. 18-3 at 2.

9

R. Doc. 1-1 at 31.

10

Id.

11

R. Doc. 18-3 at 2.

12

R. Doc. 1-1 at 29.

13

R. Doc. 18-3 at 2.

14

R. Doc. 1-1 at 28.

15

Id. at 32-35.
3

SFPSA.16 Defendants removed the case to this Court on November 1,
2013, citing diversity jurisdiction.17 On December 17, the Court
dismissed plaintiff's claims against Mentor on the ground that
they were preempted by federal law under Riegel v. Medtronic, 552
U.S. 312 (2008).18 Dr. Revis and SFPSA now move to dismiss
plaintiff's remaining claims for lack of personal jurisdiction
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Personal jurisdiction "is 'an essential element of the

jurisdiction of a district . . . court,' without which the court
is 'powerless to proceed to an adjudication.'" Ruhrgas AG v.
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (alteration in
original) (quoting Emp'rs Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S.
374, 382 (1937)). When a nonresident defendant moves the court to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears
the burden to show that personal jurisdiction exists. Revell v.
Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2002). When the court rules on
a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without
holding an evidentiary hearing, as in this case, the plaintiff
need only make a prima facie case that jurisdiction exists;

16

Id. at 35-36.

17

R. Doc. 1.

18

R. Doc. 17.
4

"[p]roof by a preponderance of the evidence is not required."
Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int'l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th
Cir. 2008). The allegations of the complaint, except as
controverted by opposing affidavits, are taken as true, and all
conflicts in the facts are resolved in favor of the plaintiff.
Id.; Revell, 317 F.3d at 469. In making its determination, the
Court may consider "affidavits, interrogatories, depositions,
oral testimony, or any combination of the recognized methods of
discovery." Revell, 317 F.3d at 469 (quoting Stuart v. Spademan,
772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985)).
A court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant if (1)
the forum state's long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, and (2) the forum state's exercise of
jurisdiction complies with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Because Louisiana's long-arm statute,
La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3201, et seq., extends jurisdiction to the
full limits of due process, the Court's inquiry collapses into a
single question: whether the exercise of its jurisdiction in this
case satisfies federal due process requirements. Dickson Mar.
Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citing La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3201(B)); Alonso v. Line, 846 So. 2d
745, 750 (La. 2003). The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant satisfies due process when (1) "that
defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and

5

protections of the forum state by establishing 'minimum contacts'
with the forum state; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction over
that defendant does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.'" Revell, 317 F.3d at 470 (quoting Mink
v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999)).
There are two ways to establish minimum contacts: specific
jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. See id. Specific
jurisdiction exists when a nonresident defendant "has
'purposefully directed its activities at the forum state and the
litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or
relate to those activities.'" Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac
Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco A.B., 205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir.
2000)); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). Minimum contacts may be
established by actions, or even just a single act, by the
nonresident defendant whereby it "purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). "The non-resident's
'purposeful availment' must be such that the defendant 'should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court' in the forum
state." Ruston Gas Turbines Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415,
6

419 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). Importantly, "[t]he
unilateral activity of [a plaintiff] who claim[s] some
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the
requirement of contact with the forum State." Pervasive Software
Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2012)
(second and third alterations in original) (quoting Hanson, 357
U.S. at 253).
The Fifth Circuit has synthesized the test for specific
jurisdiction into a three-step inquiry. The court must determine
(1) whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the
forum state, i.e., whether it purposely directed its
activities toward the forum state or purposefully availed
itself of the privileges of conducting activities there;
(2) whether the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of
or results from the defendant's forum-related contacts;
and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
fair and reasonable.
Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 271 (5th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Nuovo Pignone, SpA v. STORMAN ASIA M/V, 310
F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)). "If the plaintiff successfully
satisfies the first two prongs, the burden shifts to the
defendant to defeat jurisdiction by showing that its exercise
would be unfair or unreasonable." Id.
General jurisdiction will attach, even if the act or
transaction sued upon is unrelated to the defendant's contacts
with the forum state, if the defendant has engaged in "continuous
and systematic" activities in the forum state. Helicopteros, 466
7

U.S. at 414-416 & n.9 (1984); Revell, 317 F.3d at 470. The Fifth
Circuit has characterized the "continuous and systematic
contacts" test as a "difficult one to meet." Johnston, 523 F.3d
at 609. Contacts between a defendant and the forum state must be
"extensive" and "substantial" to give rise to general
jurisdiction. Id.; see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011) (“For an
individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual's domicile; for a corporation it
is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly
regarded as at home.”). "[E]ven repeated contacts with forum
residents by a foreign defendant may not constitute the requisite
substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts required for a
finding of general jurisdiction." Johnston, 523 F.3d at 609-10
(alteration in original) (quoting Revell, 317 F.3d at 471).

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Specific Jurisdiction
Plaintiff makes two primary arguments in contending that

this Court has jurisdiction over Dr. Revis and SFPSA. First, she
argues that defendants made contacts with Louisiana through JBI,
which she characterizes as an "interactive website."19 Second,
she contends that, by agreeing to perform breast augmentation on

19

R. Doc. 22 at 5.
8

plaintiff while plaintiff was living in Louisiana, Dr. Revis
"entered into a contract in the state of Louisiana" and thereby
availed himself of the benefits and protections of the state.20
The Court will address each argument in turn.
1.

Defendants' Online Presence

A court, in determining whether it can exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based on the
defendant's online presence, "look[s] to the 'nature and quality
of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the
Internet.'" Mink, 190 F.3d at 336 (quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
The Fifth Circuit has adopted the test set forth in Zippo, which
"categorized Internet use into a spectrum of three areas" as
follows:
At one end of the spectrum, there are situations where a
defendant clearly does business over the Internet by
entering into contracts with residents of other states
which "involve the knowing and repeated transmission of
computer files over the Internet . . . ." In this
situation, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the other
end of the spectrum, there are situations where a
defendant merely establishes a passive website that does
nothing more than advertise on the Internet. With passive
websites, personal jurisdiction is not appropriate. In
the middle of the spectrum, there are situations where a
defendant has a website that allows a user to exchange
information with a host computer. In this middle ground,
"the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by the level
of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of
information that occurs on the Website."

20

Id. at 7.
9

Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Plaintiff
contends that this case falls into the first Zippo category
because Dr. Revis and SFPSA do business through JBI, or,
alternatively, that it falls into the middle Zippo category
because users of the website can post questions on the website
and have them answered by physicians such as Dr. Revis.
Plaintiff's argument that the site belongs in the first
Zippo category is unavailing, because there is no indication that
physicians and patients actually "do business" (that is, enter
into contracts for medical services) through the websites. The
cases that plaintiff cites in support of her argument are
distinguishable, because they all involve sites that allowed
individuals to make purchases online. See Tempur-Pedic Int'l v.
Go Satellite, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 366, 373 (N.D. Tex. 2010)
(defendant's website "allow[ed] placement of online orders and
enabl[ed] communication between Texas-based customers and
[defendant's] sales staff via live chat and e-mail"); AdvanceMe,
Inc. v. Rapidpay, LLC, 450 F. Supp. 2d 669, 673 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(defendant's website allowed potential customers to "fill out an
online form and apply for [defendant's] services through its
website"); Crummy v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 504 (La. Ct. App.
2007) (defendant subject to personal jurisdiction in Louisiana
because he sold plaintiff, a Louisiana resident, an RV through
the website eBay); cf. Am. Eyewear, Inc. v. Peeper's Sunglasses &
10

Accessories, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 895, 901 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(finding that website fell "in the middle of the continuum" even
though it allowed customers to "submit product order forms that
contain credit card and shipping information"). Here, in
contrast, plaintiff has not alleged or shown that she or any
other user of JBI purchased breast augmentation services through
the website.
The difference between the second and third Zippo categories
is usefully illustrated by comparing a pair of Fifth Circuit
cases, Mink and Revell. In Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333
(5th Cir. 1999), defendant AAAA maintained a website that
"post[ed] information about [AAAA's] products and services" and
"provide[d] users with a printable mail-in order form, AAAA's
toll-free telephone number, a mailing address," and an e-mail
address. Id. at 336-337. The court observed that AAAA did not
take orders through its website; instead, the website allowed
AAAA only to "reply to e-mail initiated by website visitors." Id.
at 337. The Fifth Circuit accordingly held that the site was
nothing "more than passive advertisement which is not grounds for
the exercise of personal jurisdiction." Id. In contrast, in
Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit
held that an online bulletin board operated by the Columbia
University School of Journalism fell in the intermediate Zippo
category, because visitors were able to "participate in an open

11

forum hosted by the website." Id. at 472.
JBI has features of the sites at issue in both Mink and
Revell, but the Court finds this case more analogous to Revell.
Like the site considered in Mink, JBI contains information about
and contact information for a commercial enterprise, but it also
has an interactive bulletin board, like the site in Revell. The
Revell court considered the interactive bulletin board a key
distinction with the site in Mink. Accordingly, the Court finds
that JBI falls into the intermediate Zippo category, and could
potentially form the basis for specific jurisdiction.
But, even concluding that the site is to some extent
interactive under Zippo, the Court cannot find that specific
jurisdiction obtains here because plaintiff's alleged injury did
not arise out of her use of the website. Plaintiff alleges merely
that she found Dr. Revis's contact information on the site and
initiated an e-mail exchange with him to inquire about breast
augmentation. There is no indication that plaintiff ever used the
site in any other way, such as to contact Dr. Revis or another
physician through the bulletin board. Plaintiff's alleged injury
stemmed from Dr. Revis's alleged negligence in Florida, not
anything he did on the website. In contrast, in Mink, Revell, and
other cases applying Zippo, "the gravamen of parties' causes of
action result[ed] purely from activities conducted on websites."
Gatte v. Ready 4 A Change, LLC, Nos. 2:11-CV-2083, 2:12-CV-0991,
12

2013 WL 123613, at *11 (W.D. La. Jan. 9, 2013).
This would be a different case if, say, Dr. Revis had given
plaintiff erroneous medical advice through the website while she
was in Louisiana, and she had suffered injury as a result of
following that advice. But plaintiff used the site merely to
obtain Dr. Revis's e-mail address and initiate contact with him.
Under such circumstances, Dr. Revis's presence on a website, even
one with interactive features, does not constitute purposeful
availment. Cf. Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 213
(5th Cir. 1999) ("[W]hen a lawyer chooses to represent a client
in another forum, that in itself does not confer personal
jurisdiction [in a legal malpractice case] if the claim does not
arise from the lawyer's contacts with the forum."); DMG Holdings,
LLC v. AM. World Pictures, Inc., Civil Action No. 11-1572, 2011
WL 4899949, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 14, 2011) (defendant's
communications with the forum state did not constitute purposeful
availment because plaintiff's claim arose out defendant's
performance of a contract, not the communications themselves).

2.

Dr. Revis's Agreement to Perform Breast Augmentation on
Plaintiff

It is well-settled that "entering into a contract with an
out-of-state party, without more, is not sufficient to establish
minimum contacts." Latshaw v. Johnson, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th
Cir. 1999) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478–79). "Rather, in
13

a breach of contract case, to determine whether a party
purposefully availed itself of a forum, a court must evaluate
'prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along
with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of
dealing . . . .'" Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479).
True, plaintiff allegedly engaged with Dr. Revis by e-mail
several times in the weeks leading up to her surgery, and entered
into a contract with him regarding that surgery while she was
located in Louisiana. But the Fifth Circuit has made clear that
actions of this kind, without more, do not constitute sufficient
minimum contacts that will subject the nonresident defendant to
the jurisdiction of the forum state's courts. In Freudensprung v.
Offshore Technical Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2004),
the Fifth Circuit noted that it had
repeatedly held that the combination of mailing payments
to the forum state, engaging in communications related to
the execution and performance of the contract, and the
existence of a contract between the nonresident defendant
and a resident of the forum are insufficient to establish
the minimum contacts necessary to support the exercise of
specific personal jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant.
Id. at 344; accord Renoir v. Hantman's Assocs., 230 F. App'x 357,
360 (5th Cir. 2007) ("An exchange of communications in the course
of developing and carrying out a contract . . . does not, by
itself, constitute the required purposeful availment of the
benefits and protections of [the forum state's laws].").
"Otherwise, jurisdiction could be exercised based only on the
14

fortuity that one of the parties happens to reside in the forum
state." Renoir, 230 F. App'x at 360.
Applications of this principle abound. In Holt Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1986), the court found
that Texas courts did not have specific jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant who had entered into a contract with a
Texas corporation, sent a joint operating agreement and three
payments to Texas, and engaged with extensive communication with
the Texas corporation. Id. at 777-78. Similarly, in Stuart v.
Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1985), the court found no
specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who had
contracted with Texas residents, directed letters and phone calls
to Texas, sent products to Texas, negotiated a contract with
plaintiffs that was to be governed by Texas law, and marketed his
product in Texas. Id. at 1192. And in Freundensprung, the court
found no specific jurisdiction over a defendant who had
"contracted with Texas-based [company] OTSI, initiated and
contemplated a long-term business relationship with OTSI,
communicated with OTSI concerning the development and execution
of the contract, and wired money to OTSI in Texas." 379 F.3d at
345.
Here, the case for specific jurisdiction is even weaker than
it was in the foregoing cases. Unlike in Freundensprung, Dr.
Revis did not "contemplate[] a long-term business relationship"

15

with plaintiff; he merely agreed to perform a one-time surgery on
plaintiff in Florida. Unlike in Stuart, there is no indication
that the parties intended that Louisiana law would govern their
contract. Finally, although plaintiff contends in her opposition
to the motion to dismiss that she sent money to Dr. Revis while
she was still in Louisiana, she does not allege that in her
complaint, and there is no evidence in the record to that
effect.21 This fact further distinguishes this case from
Freundensprung, Holt, and Stuart.
Moreover, that the contract was performed in Florida, not
Louisiana, significantly weakens the case for specific
jurisdiction. See Freudensprung, 379 F.3d at 345 (any
significance of defendant's contacts with Texas diminished when
"material portions of the contract . . .

were to be performed in

West Africa, not Texas"); Holt, 801 F.2d at 778 (when material
performance occurred outside the forum state, fact that defendant
mailed payments to forum state did not weigh heavily in court's
determination). Any contact that Dr. Revis directed to plaintiff
in Louisiana "rested on nothing but 'the mere fortuity that
[plaintiff] happens to be a resident of the forum.'" Holt, 801
F.2d at 778 (quoting Patterson v. Dietze, Inc., 764 F.2d 1145,
1147 (5th Cir. 1985); cf. Level 10 Promotions, LLC v. Wilkes-

21

"It is axiomatic that assertions in legal briefs are
not evidence." Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 526 n.26
(M.D. La. 2003).
16

Barre Motors, Inc., Civil Action No. 07-6480, 2008 WL 2781534, at
*4 (E.D. La. July 14, 2008) (finding no personal jurisdiction
over a Pennsylvania car dealership that had entered into a
contract with a term of less than one year that "anticipated one
to two sales events to take place in Pennsylvania, involved no
performance by the defendant in Louisiana, and contained no
choice of law provision").
It is true, of course, that "[w]hen the actual content of
communications with a forum gives rise to intentional tort causes
of action, this alone constitutes purposeful availment." Wien Air
Alaska, 195 F.3d at 213. But that is not the case here.
Plaintiff's claims are based on defendants' allegedly negligent
performance of the contract, not on the communications that led
up to the agreement. Cf. DMG Holdings, 2011 WL 4899949, at *4
(communications with the forum cannot give rise to specific
jurisdiction when the cause of action is based, not on the
communications, but on performance of a contract formed after the
communications took place). Accordingly, Dr. Revis's
communications with plaintiff while she was in Louisiana do not
constitute purposeful availment.
Taken together, the foregoing considerations compel the
conclusion that this court may not exercise specific jurisdiction
over Dr. Revis and SFPSA based on their agreement to perform
plaintiff's breast augmentation surgery.
17

3.

Summary

The Court finds, based on the analysis above, that Dr. Revis
and SFPSA have not purposefully availed themselves of the
benefits and protections of Louisiana law such that they would
reasonably expect to be haled into court there.
The vast majority of courts to consider whether a court can
assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state healthcare
provider that negligently treats a forum resident in a foreign
state have reached similar results, reasoning, in the words of
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, that "[t]he residence of a
recipient of personal services rendered elsewhere is irrelevant
and totally incidental to the benefits provided by the defendant
at his own location." Almeida v. Radovsky, 506 A.2d 1373, 1376
(R.I. 1986). For example, in Mendel v. Williams, 53 A.3d 810 (Pa.
Sup. Ct. 2012), the court held that it did not have jurisdiction
over a New Jersey physician who had allegedly caused plaintiff to
suffer paralysis by failing to treat her spinal abscess while she
was a patient at defendant's New Jersey facility. Id. at 823-28.
It noted that "[t]he majority of other jurisdictions have applied
a similar approach to personal jurisdiction over out-of-state
doctors in medical malpractice actions." Id. at 824 (collecting
cases). Similarly, in Kennedy v. Ziesman, 526 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D.
Ky. 1981), the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over an
Ohio physician who had treated a Kentucky resident in Ohio, even
18

though the physician maintained a telephone listing in Kentucky.
It concluded that "the mere carrying of a telephone listing" in a
Kentucky phonebook could not "amount in and of itself to regular
solicitation of business" such as to make the physician subject
to suit in Kentucky. Id. at 1331-32; accord Estate of Poole v.
Grosser, 731 N.E.2d 226, 230 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
So it is here. Dr. Revis's presence on JBI is similar to the
telephone listings at issue in Kennedy and Estate of Poole, in
that it serves as a passive advertisement that allows the
potential customer to contact the advertiser if he or she is
interested in the service offered. (As noted above, to the extent
the site has interactive features, there is no indication that
plaintiff used those features to communicate with Dr. Revis.) In
fact, the Court finds that Dr. Revis's online listing is an even
weaker basis for personal jurisdictions than would be a telephone
listing in the forum state. Whereas the defendants in Kennedy and
Estate of Poole decided to list their contact information in the
forum state in particular, here Dr. Revis put his information on
a website and thus established "in a sense, a continuous presence
everywhere in the world," Revell, 317 F.3d at 471. "[O]ne cannot
purposefully avail oneself of 'some forum someplace'; rather, as
the Supreme Court has stated, due process requires that 'the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court

19

there.'" Id. at 475 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474). Dr.
Revis and SFPSA did not direct their advertising toward Louisiana
in particular, and the services they rendered were directed to
plaintiff herself, not to any particular place, cf. Almeida, 506
A.2d at 1376 (noting that, when one travels to a physician for
medical services, "he must realize that the services are not
directed to impact on any particular place, but are directed to
the needy person himself"). Accordingly, this Court may not
exercise specific jurisdiction over Dr. Revis and SFPSA.

B.

General Jurisdiction
Plaintiff also argues that the court has general

jurisdiction over Dr. Revis and SFPSA. The question here is
whether the defendants have engaged in "continuous and
systematic" activities in Louisiana. As stated, general
jurisdiction requires extensive contacts with the forum, such
that the defendant is fairly regarded as at home in the forum
state. See Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S.Ct. at 2853–54.
In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
447–49 (1952), the Supreme Court held that exercise of general
jurisdiction was proper when the defendant had temporarily
relocated its headquarters to the forum state during World War
II. By contrast, in Helicopteros, the Supreme Court held that the
defendant's contacts with Texas were insufficient to support

20

jurisdiction when it sent its chief executive officer to Texas
for contract negotiations, accepted checks drawn on a Texas bank,
purchased helicopters, equipment and training services in Texas
for substantial sums, and sent personnel to Texas for training.
466 U.S. at 415, 418-19. Similarly, in

Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d

865 (6th Cir. 2002), cited approvingly by the Fifth Circuit in
Revell, the Sixth Circuit held that Ohio courts lacked general
jurisdiction over a foreign business, even though the business
maintained a website that was accessible to Ohio residents and
over 4000 Ohio residents had used defendant's website. See
Revell, 317 F.3d at 471.
The Court finds that defendants' contacts with Louisiana are
not sufficiently substantial to serve as a basis for general
jurisdiction. There is no indication in the record that Dr. Revis
or SFPSA do or ever have done business in Louisiana; indeed, Dr.
Revis avers that he has never lived or practiced medicine
there.22 Less than 0.001% of Dr. Revis's patient base comes from
Louisiana. Even viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
these minimal contacts with Louisiana are not sufficient for
general jurisdiction. Cf. Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S.Ct. at 2852,
2857 (defendant tire manufacturer not subject to general
jurisdiction of North Carolina based on the fact that some of its
tires were distributed in North Carolina; such "attenuated
22

R. Doc. 18-3 at 2.
21

connections to the State . . . fall far short of 'the continuous
and systematic general business contacts' necessary to empower
North Carolina to entertain suit against [defendant] on claims
unrelated to anything that connects them to the State").
The court in Gatte v. Ready 4 A Change, LLC, a wrongful
death suit, reached the same result on similar facts. There, the
decedent, a Louisiana resident, had contacted R4C, a Minnesotabased company that "specialize[d] in connecting people who desire
affordable weight loss surgery with hospitals and doctors in
Mexico who provide this surgery," after coming across R4C's
website. Gatte, 2013 WL 123613, at *1. The defendant then
arranged for the decedent to travel to Mexico for weight loss
surgery. Id. The surgery allegedly resulted in the decedent's
death. Id. at *2. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument
that it had general jurisdiction over R4C, finding that "[w]hile
some Louisiana residents may have used the site to contact R4C
for their services, there is no indication that [R4C] conversely
affirmatively reached out and specifically contacted Louisiana
residents through the website on a sufficiently continuous,
systematic basis in order for general jurisdiction to attach."
Id. at *9. The court also noted that "only sixteen out of over a
thousand of R4C's clients have been from Louisiana, thus
accounting for a very small percentage of their total clientele."
Id. A similar conclusion is appropriate here.

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C.

Summary
The Court finds that defendants do not have minimum contacts

with Louisiana such that this Court can exercise personal
jurisdiction over them consistent with the Due Process Clause.
Consequently, the Court need not consider whether exercising
personal jurisdiction over defendants would offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants'

motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without
prejudice.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 20th day of February, 2014.
__

_________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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