In re the Matter of Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, LLC

Filing 69

ORDER granting 18 Motion to Bifurcate. The Court will decide Marquettes limitation of liability claims to the extent that Marquette is entitled to try these claims to the Court under controlling law, and a jury will decide Evans Jones Act and General Maritime Law claims to the extent that Evans is entitled to try these claims to a jury under controlling law. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown on 11/13/14. (jrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CIVIL ACTION
In re THE MATTER OF MARQUETTE
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY GULF-INLAND,
LLC.

NO. 13-6351

SECTION: “G”(4)

ORDER
This litigation arises from an accident that allegedly occurred aboard the Jeremy, a towing
vessel.1 Before the Court is Claimant Christopher Evans’s “Motion to Reset Case as a Bifurcated
Jury Trial.”2 Having considered the motion, the memorandum in support, the memorandum in
opposition, the memorandum in response, and the applicable law, the Court will grant the pending
motion.
I. Background
A.

Factual Background
In his claim, Christopher Evans alleges that he was struck in the face by a mooring cable

and thrown into the Mississippi River while he was employed as a deckhand aboard the Jeremy.3
The accident, according to Evans, severely injured him, and necessitated a water rescue by a coemployee.4 Evans maintains that his injuries were caused solely by the negligence of Limitation

1

Rec. Doc. 1 at pp. 2–3; Rec. Doc. 6 at pp. 6–12.

2

Rec. Doc. 18.

3

Rec. Doc. 6 at pp. 6–7.

4

Id.

Plaintiff Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, LLC and the unseaworthiness of the
Jeremy and its equipment.5
B.

Procedural Background
On October 7, 2013, Evans filed a Jones Act and General Maritime action against Marquette

in the 25th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Plaquemines.6 On November 7, 2013, Marquette
initiated this action for exoneration from or limitation of liability under 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq.
and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules of Certain Admiralty & Maritime Claims of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.7 Marquette filed an amended complaint on November 20,2013.8 On November
21, 2013, the Court imposed a limitation injunction and order restraining Evans from pursuing his
state court lawsuit while the limitation action was pending.9
Evans filed an “Answer and Claim” against Marquette on December 26, 2013.10 On
December 30, 2013, United Bulk Terminals Davant, LLC (“UBT”) filed an “Answer and Claim”
denying liability and seeking defense, contribution, and indemnity from Marquette for costs,
attorney’s fees, and for any amount to which UBT is held liable if “UBT is named a defendant or
Marquette tenders Evans’ Claim to UBT pursuant to Federal Rules [sic] of Civil Procedure 14(c).”11

5

Id. at p. 7.

6

Rec. Doc. 18-1 at p. 1.

7

Rec. Doc. 1.

8

Rec. Doc. 4.

9

Rec. Doc. 5.

10

Rec. Doc. 6.

11

Rec. Doc. 8 at p. 6.

2

On July 1, 2014, Evans filed the instant motion to bifurcate.12 On July 3, 2014, Evans filed
a “Motion to Dissolve Limitation Injunction, Motion to Enter Stipulations, and Motion to Stay
Limitation Action,” in which Evans urges the Court to permit him to proceed against Marquette in
state court.13 On July 15, 2014, UBT filed a “Response” to Evans’s motion to bifurcate,14 and
Marquette filed an opposition to that same motion.15
II. Parties’ Arguments
A.

Evans’s “Motion to Reset Case as a Bifurcated Jury Trial”
In support of his “Motion to Reset Case as a Bifurcated Jury Trial,”Evans notes that on

October 7, 2013, he filed a Jones Act and General Maritime complaint against Marquette, with jury
trial demanded, in the 25th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Plaquemines.16 One month later,
Marquette filed the instant action.17 Evans notes that when he filed an Answer and Claim in this
proceeding on December 26, 2013, he requested a jury trial “on all counts alleged.”18 Nonetheless,

12

Rec. Doc. 18.

13

Rec. Doc 19 at p. 1.

14

Rec. Doc. 28.

15

Rec. Doc. 29. Additionally, on July 8, 2014, Marquette filed its “Answer and Defenses” to Evans’s
claims and a third-party complaint against UBT, in which Marquette “tender[ed] UBT to Evans as if Evans had sued
UBT himself, and must prove [his] allegations against UBT as UBT and not Marquette was responsible for operating
the cable at issue.” Rec. Doc. 20 at p. 6. On July 10, 2014, Evans moved to strike Marquette’s “Answer and
Defenses.” Rec. Doc. 21. On July 30, 2014, with leave of Court, Evans filed a “Supplemental and Amended
Limitation of Liability Claim” in which Evans specifically excluded UBT from his claims. Rec. Doc. 33. UBT filed
a motion for partial summary judgment on August 13, 2014. Rec. Doc. 45. Neither Evans nor Marquette opposed
the motion. The Court granted UBT’s motion on September 29, 2014, finding that Evans’s representations to the
Court precluded him from asserting that UBT is liable for his injuries, and granting UBT’s request that the Court
reserve its rights to Marquette for attorney’s fees. Rec. Doc. 61.
16

Rec. Doc. 18-1 at pp. 1–2.

17

Id. at p. 2.

18

Id.

3

Evens maintains, when the case manager from the Clerk’s Office held a telephone conference with
the parties on January 17, 2014 with the purpose of setting a trial date, “this matter was erroneously
set as a non-jury trial.”19
Evans argues that this Court should “reset this matter as a bifurcated jury trial in accordance
with the jurisprudence contained in Brister v. AWI, Inc.”20 In Brister, Evans contends, although the
plaintiff initiated his action in federal court rather than state court, as here, the plaintiff made Jones
Act and General Maritime law claims that were “identical” to those at issue here.21 There, the district
judge “followed well-settled Fifth Circuit jurisprudence” and bifurcated the action, allowing the
Jones Act and General Maritime causes of action to be tried before the jury, and the limitation
claims to be tried before the judge sitting in admiralty.22
Evans notes that while the Seventh Amendment does not grant the right to a jury trial in civil
admiralty cases, “there are clear exceptions when admiralty issues may be tried to a jury.”23 Such
exceptions, according to Evans, include claims under the Jones Act, which confers a statutory right
to trial by jury, and claims brought under General Maritime law when those claims are “joined” to
a Jones Act claim.24

19

Id.

20

Id. (citing 749 F.Supp. 749 (E.D. La. 1990)). Specifically, Evans moves the Court to reset this case “as a
bifurcated trial with the jury adjudicating plaintiff’s Jones Act and General Maritime Law claims while the Hon.
Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown sits as an admiralty judge and adjudicates Marquette’s limitation of liaibility
claims.” Rec. Doc. 18 at p. 2.
21

Id. at pp. 2–3.

22

Id. at p. 3.

23

Id. at pp. 3–4.

24

Id. at p. 4.

4

B.

UBT’s Response
In its “Response” to Evans’s motion, UBT states that it has “no opposition or objection to

Claimant’s Jones Act claim or unseaworthiness claims being tried as a jury trial reserving to this
Honorable Court all issues attended to Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, L.L.C.’s
Limitation of Liability Action.”25
C.

Marquette’s Opposition
In opposition, Marquette argues that the Court should not grant Evans’s request to bifurcate

trial on the present action, because Evans previously filed suit in state court asserting “identical”
claims, there are multiple claimants before the Court in the present action, and Evans has filed a
motion to dissolve the Court’s order staying all other proceedings “so that he may litigate his claims
in state court before a jury.”26
Marquette notes that two Fifth Circuit cases, Pershing Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Gaffney27 and
Magnolia Marine Transport v. LaPlace Towing Corp.,28 set forth considerations relevant to the
present motion.29 In Pershing, Marquette contends, the Fifth Circuit “vacated the district court’s
modification of its injunction prohibiting some claimants in a multiple claim-inadequate fund case
to try their negligence claims in state court,” based on a concern that “allowing the claimants to try
their negligence claims in state court would destroy the concursus in admiralty that is the heart of

25

Rec. Doc. 28.

26

Rec. Doc. 29 at pp. 4–5.

27

279 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1960).

28

964 F.2d 1571 (5th Cir. 1997).

29

Rec. Doc. 29 at pp. 4–5.

5

the limitation system.”30 In Magnolia Marine, Marquette avers, “the Fifth Circuit was concerned
with the conflict between state court claims for negligence and concurrent limitation of liability
proceedings in a federal court forum,” and “denied the limitation plaintiffs’ motion to strike the jury,
because the claimants had not filed their claims in state court nor in any way threatened the federal
court’s adjudication of the limitation issue.”31 Marquette argues that Evans’s actions “constitute the
exact concerns” discussed in these two cases, and “threaten the concursus in admiralty,”making
denial of his motion appropriate.32
III. Law and Analysis
Evans urges this Court to set this matter for bifurcated trial, with Marquette’s limitation
claims tried before the Court and his Jones Act and General Maritime claims tried before the jury.
Marquette opposes this request because Evans continues to seek a jury trial on these claims in state
court, “threatening the concursus in admiralty.” Pursuant to the Court’s November 21, 2013 order,
Evans’s state court action is stayed pending the determination of the present action,33 and Evans has
brought his Jones Act and General Maritime claims against Marquette in this Court.34
A.

The Parties’ Chosen Trial Procedures
Since both parties’ claims are presently set for trial before this Court, it is necessary to

determine in the first instance whether rights to a jury trial or a bench trial are implicated at all.

30

Id. at p. 4.

31

Id. at pp. 4–5.

32

Id. at p. 5.

33

Rec. Doc. 5. at p. 4.

34

Rec. Doc. 6 at pp. 6–12.

6

Marquette initiated the present action under 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501 et seq., the federal statutory scheme
governing actions for exoneration and limitation of liability. Evans, on the other hand, seeks relief
under the Jones Act and the General Maritime law, and has demanded a jury trial.35
1.

Jury Trial Under the Jones Act and General Maritime Law

Evans seeks relief under the Jones Act. That statute, as codified at 46 U.S.C. § 30104,
provides that “[a] seaman injured in the course of employment . . . may elect to bring a civil action
at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the employer.” The Supreme Court has held that the
Jones Act’s jury trial right also applies to General Maritime law claims deriving from the same
“transaction or accident” as an underlying Jones Act claim.36 Evans’s jury trial demand is therefore
proper.
2.

Bench Trial in the Limitation Action

Marquette initiated the present action as an action for exoneration from, or limitation of,
liability. Limitation actions employ a “special nonjury procedure” in which “the amount of the
claims exceed[] the value of the ship and its cargo,” and the shipowner seeks to limit liability to the
value of the ship and its cargo.37 In a limitation proceeding, the district court, “sitting without a jury,
determines the liability of the shipowner and distributes the limitation fund among the claimants in

35

Evans also notes that he has not elected to designate his claim against Marquette as one in admiralty
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h)(1) provides that “[i]f a claim for
relief is within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction and also within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction on some
other ground, the pleading may designate the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim for purposes of Rules 14(c),
38(e), and 82 and the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions.”
36

Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 18–21 (1963) (“Only one trier of fact should be used for the
trial of what is essentially one lawsuit to settle one claim split conceptually into separate parts because of historical
developments.”).
37

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, ET AL. 14A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3672
(4th Ed. 2014).

7

a proceeding called concursus.”38 The Supreme Court, in Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc.,
described the procedure in this way:
The district court secures the value of the vessel or owner's interest, marshals claims,
and enjoins the prosecution of other actions with respect to the claims. In these
proceedings, the court, sitting without a jury, adjudicates the claims. The court
determines whether the vessel owner is liable and whether the owner may limit
liability. The court then determines the validity of the claims, and if liability is
limited, distributes the limited fund among the claimants.39
On the basis of these authorities, Marquette is entitled to a bench trial on the issue of limitation.
B.

Bifurcation
As established above, the Court anticipates a non-jury proceeding on limitation and is also

faced with a proper jury demand related to claims that will arise during this proceeding. It is
therefore confronted with a procedural conflict. Evans proposes to remedy the conflict by resetting
“this matter” as a “bifurcated trial with the jury adjudicating Plaintiff’s Jones Act and General
Maritime Law claims while the [Court sits in admiralty] . . . and adjudicates Marquette’s limitation
of liability claims.”40 Marquette contends that bifurcation in this federal limitation action will
“threaten the concursus in admiralty.”
Other Courts, and multiple treatises, have recognized the conflict that arises when jurytriable claims are asserted in limitation proceedings, especially in situations where claimants invoke
the so-called “saving-to-suitors” clause of 28 U.S.C. § 133341 and seek to litigate their jury-eligible

38

Id.

39

531 U.S. 438, 448 (2001).

40

Rec. Doc. 18 at p. 2.

41

That clause provides that “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of
the States, of . . . [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”

8

claims in state court.42 Although the propriety of litigation in state court is a contested issue in this
case,43 it is not before the Court on the present motion.
The Fifth Circuit does not appear to have directly addressed whether bifurcation is
appropriate when faced with jury-triable claims in a limitation action. However, the parties’ cited
authorities, including Matter of Complaint of L.L.P. v. D44 cited by Marquette, and Brister v. A.W.I.,
Inc.,45 cited by Evans, demonstrate that the Fifth Circuit has addressed cases tried in this way, and
has not found the procedure erroneous. In Brister, the Fifth Circuit reviewed a district court’s
judgment following a bifurcated bench trial on limitation and jury trial on Jones Act claims, finding
no error in the Court’s birfurcation of the proceedings per se.46 In Complaint of L.L.P., the district
court correctly noted that Brister was not the only instance in which the Fifth Circuit left district
courts’ decisions to bifurcate “undisturbed.”47 In that case, the district court denied the limitation

42

See e.g. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 448 (2001) (“Some tension exists between
the saving to suitors clause and the Limitation Act.”); In re Mississippi Limestone Corp., No. 9-36, 2010
WL 4174631 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 7, 2010) (Some tension exists between the Limitation Act and the saving to suitors
clause[.] . . . Specifically, the requirement of the Limitation Act that the federal district court adjudicate (for multiple
claimants) both the question of liability and whether limitation is appropriate—referred to as the concursus1
requirement—deprives claimants of their right to pursue their actions in state court, and importantly, deprives them
of the right to a jury trial”); Matter of Cooper / T. Smith Stevedoring Co., Inc.,735 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. La. 1990)
(Sear, J.) (“This motion presents the recurring conflict between the exclusive federal jurisdiction vested by the
Limitation of Liability Act . . . and the presumption in favor of jury trials and common law remedies embodied in the
saving to suitors clause”); THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, 2 ADMIRALTY & MARITIME LAW § 15-5 (5th Ed. 2013)
(discussing courts’ decisions balancing claimants’ rights under the saving-to-suitors clause with shipowners’ rights
under the Limitation Act); ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, 1 THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL
INJURIES § 15:10 (5th Ed. 2013) (same).
43

See Rec. Doc. 19; Rec. Doc. 25

44

No. 97-1667, 1997 WL 563999 (E.D. La. Sep. 8, 1997) (Clement, J.)

45

946 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1991).

46

946 F.2d at 353; 362.

47

Id. at *2 (citing Cupit v. McClanahan Contractors, Inc., 1 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 1993)(reversing district
court’s denial of limitation of liability, but not its bifurcation); Seals v. AWI, Inc., No. 89-4739, 1992 WL 28064

9

plaintiff’s motion to strike the jury as to the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims, reasoning that
the Fifth Circuit’s approval of this procedure and the lack of competing state-court actions capable
of threatening the “concursus” supported its decision.48
Wright and Miller suggest that bifurcation may be appropriate where jury-triable personal
injury claims are presented in a limitation action, stating that:
Limitation actions and personal injury or wrongful death actions may be tried
simultaneously if the court decides to proceed in that fashion. When that occurs, the
limitation issues are kept from the jury in the spirit of the concursus procedure and
the traditional admiralty claims also will be heard without a jury trial.49
Courts in other circuits have used this procedure to preserve claimants’ rights to a jury trial while
maintaining the “concursus” established by the limitation proceeding.50
Marquette’s other cited authorities appear to address whether pending state-court actions
might threaten the “concursus” established by a federal limitation action.51 In Pershing, the Fifth
Circuit held that where multiple claimants assert rights to recover against a fund that is insufficient
to satisfy each claim, all of the rival claims must be tried in the limitation proceeding.52 In Magnolia
(E.D. La. Feb. 4, 1992) (Heebe, J.) aff’d 579 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1992); and Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., No.
94-879, 1995 WL 10828 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 1995) (Clement, J.) rev’d on other grounds by 84 F.3d 776 (5th
Cir. 1996) (affirming order denying limitation as a matter of law following jury trial on Jones Act and General
Maritime claims) vacated on other grounds on rehearing en banc by 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997)).
48

1997 WL 563999 at *2–*3.

49

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, ET AL. 14A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3672 (4th Ed. 2014).
50

See, e,g. Complaint of Poling Transp. Corp., 776 F.Supp. 779, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The proper
approach here is to empanel a jury at the outset and allow trial to proceed on issues pertaining both to limitation and
the common law claims. At the close of the evidence, the court will determine the admiralty issues, including any
preclusive effect to be given to that resolution. The remaining issues on the state law claims, if any, will be
submitted to the jury.”).
51

See Magnolia Marine, 964 F.2d at 1575–76; Pershing, 279 F.2d at 551–52..

52

279 F.2d at 551–52.

10

Marine, also cited by Marquette, the Fifth Circuit held that multiple claimants may proceed in state
court while preserving the “concursus” in a federal limitation action as long as these claimants
“agree[] and stipulat[e] as to the priority in which claimants will receive satisfaction against the
shipowner from the limited fund.”53In the present motion, however, Evans has only urged the Court
to bifurcate the trial in this federal limitation action. Whether he may litigate in state court
notwithstanding the pending limitation action is a separate issue.
Given that the only issue presented by this motion is whether the Court should bifurcate the
federal trial, Marquette’s argument that bifurcation would “threaten the concursus”54 is unfounded.
Mindful of Evans’s statutory right to try his Jones Act and General Maritime claims to a jury, this
Court will follow the procedure adopted by other district courts and bifurcate trial here. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Evans’s “Motion to Reset Case as a Bifurcated Jury Trial”55 is
GRANTED. The Court will decide Marquette’s limitation of liability claims to the extent that
Marquette is entitled to try these claims to the Court under controlling law, and a jury will decide
Evans’s Jones Act and General Maritime Law claims to the extent that Evans is entitled to try these
claims to a jury under controlling law.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this ________ day of November, 2014.

_________________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

53

964 F.2d at 1575–76.

54

Rec. Doc. 29 at p. 5.

55

Rec. Doc. 18.

11