Webster v. Board of Supervisors of the University of Louisiana System et al

Filing 103

ORDER AND REASONS denying plaintiff Dr. Michael G. Webster's MOTION 101 to review and reverse the Courts taxation of costs. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 8/24/16. (jjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DR. MICHAEL G. WEBSTER
VERSUS

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-6613

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA
SYSTEM, ET AL.

SECTION “R” (3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff Dr. Michael G. Webster’s motion to review
and reverse the Court’s taxation of costs. In his motion, Webster argues that
Section 12205 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 displaces Rule
54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, with it, the presumption that
prevailing parties are entitled to costs. Because the Court finds that Section
12205 is not “contrary” to Rule 54, Webster’s motion is denied.

I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Dr. Michael G. Webster filed this action alleging violations of

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008. Webster sued (1) the Board of Supervisors of the
University of Louisiana System; (2) Eric Johnson, in his personal capacity

and official capacity as Sims Library Director at Southeastern Louisiana
University (SLU); (3) Lynette Ralph, in her personal capacity and official
capacity as Assistant Sims Library Director at SLU; and (4) Victor Pregeant,
in his personal capacity and official capacity as Compliance Officer for Equal
Employment Opportunity / Americans with Disabilities Act at SLU. 1 In his
complaint, Webster alleged that he suffers from manic and major
depression, and that he experienced discrimination, harassment, and
termination following depression-induced actions. 2
On August 8, 2014, the Court dismissed Webster’s claims for money
damages against SLU and against Johnson, Ralph, and Pregeant in their
official capacities, and Webster’s claims against Johnson, Ralph, and
Pregeant in their personal capacities. 3 The Court permitted Webster to
proceed with his claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief
against Johnson, Ralph, and Pregeant in their official capacities. 4
On March 16, 2015, Webster filed a motion for leave to amend his
complaint to add a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., and to add or clarify a claim under Louisiana state

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R. Doc. 1.
Id. at 5-11.
R. Doc. 26.
Id.
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obligations law.5 The Magistrate Judge granted Webster’s motion to add a
Section 504 claim as to the Board of Supervisors, but denied the motion in
all other respects. 6 On review of the Magistrate Judge’s order, this Court
reversed the Magistrate Judge’s decision in part and denied Webster’s
motion for leave to amend his complaint to add a claim under Section 504.7
On July 21, 2015 the Court granted summary judgment on all of
Webster’s

remaining

claims

and

entered

judgment

in

favor

of

defendants.8 Following entry of judgment, defendants submitted a Bill of
Costs seeking reimbursement for $1,222.80 in court reporter and service of
process fees.9 Webster opposed the Bill of Costs, arguing that under the
ADA’s attorney’s fees and costs provision, defendants are entitled to costs
only if Webster’s suit was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.10 The
Clerk of Court rejected Webster’s argument and granted costs to
defendants.11 Webster now moves for review and reversal of the Bill of
Costs, 12 and Defendants oppose the motion. 13

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R. Doc. 63.
R. Doc. 73.
R. Doc. 90.
R. Doc. 96; R. Doc. 97.
R. Doc. 98.
R. Doc. 99.
R. Doc. 100.
R. Doc. 101.
R. Doc. 102.
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II.

DISCUSSION
A district court reviews the Clerk of Court’s award of costs by exercising

its own discretion to “decide the cost question [it]self.” Farmer v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 233 (1964). Under Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, costs, “other than attorney’s fees,” should be
allowed to a prevailing party “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court
order provides otherwise . . . .” In Marx v. General Revenue Corp., the
Supreme Court offered comprehensive guidance for determining whether a
statute “provides otherwise” and therefore displaces Rule 54:
A statute “provides otherwise” than Rule 54(d)(1) if it is
“contrary” to the Rule. See 10 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 54.101[1][c], p. 54–159 (3d ed. 2012) (hereinafter 10 Moore’s).
Because the Rule grants district courts discretion to award costs,
a statute is contrary to the Rule if it limits that discretion. A
statute may limit a court’s discretion in several ways, and it need
not expressly state that it is displacing Rule 54(d)(1) to do so.
...
Importantly, not all statutes that provide for costs are
contrary to Rule 54(d)(1). A statute providing that “the court
may award costs to the prevailing party,” for example, is not
contrary to the Rule because it does not limit a court’s discretion.
See 10 Moore’s § 54.101[1][c], at 54–159 (“A number of statutes
state simply that the court may award costs in its discretion.
Such a provision is not contrary to Rule 54(d)(1) and does not
displace the court’s discretion under the Rule”).
133 S. Ct. 1166, 1173 (2013). The Court then applied this standard and held
that The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §
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1692k(a)(3)—which states that “the court may award to the defendant
attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs”—does
not displace Rule 54. Id. at 1175.
Section 12205 of the ADA, the costs provision at issue in this case,
provides in pertinent part: “In any action or administrative proceeding
commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee, including
litigation expenses, and costs . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Under the so-called
Christiansburg test, attorney’s fees should be awarded to a prevailing
defendant under this section only if “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.”

Christiansburg Garment Co. v.

EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978); see also Dutton v. Univ. Healthcare Sys.,
L.L.C., 136 F. App’x 596, 604 (5th Cir. 2005). Webster argues that the
Christiansburg test extends to costs, and that a prevailing defendant in an
ADA suit is therefore entitled to costs only when plaintiff’s action was
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Webster cites several

opinions that have held accordingly. See, e.g., Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,
246 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Because § 12205 makes fees and costs
parallel, we hold that the Christiansburg test also applies to an award of costs
to a prevailing defendant under the ADA”). Webster’s cases, however,
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predate Marx.14 The parties do not cite, and the Court has not found, any
cases construing the interplay between Rule 54(d)(1) and Section 12205 in
light of Marx.
The Court finds that, applying Marx, the permissive, “may” language
of Section 12205 plainly does not limit the Court’s discretion and is therefore
not contrary to Rule 54(d)(1).

This conclusion is supported by the

similarities between Section 12205 and the FDCPA provision considered by
the Supreme Court.

Both statutes provide that the court “may” grant

attorney’s fees and costs to a party, but do not preclude the Court from taking
any particular action with respect to costs.
Because Section 12205 is not contrary, it does not “provide otherwise,”
and Rule 54(d)(1) governs the allocation of costs in this case. Accordingly,
the Clerk’s order is consistent with the “strong presumption” contained in
the Rule that the prevailing party will be awarded costs. Pacheco v. Mineta,
448 F.3d 783, 793 (5th Cir. 2006). The mere fact that Webster’s suit was not
frivolous is insufficient to overcome the presumption. Id. at 795 (“The
district court abused its discretion in denying costs to the prevailing party on

Even discounting Marx, the Court is skeptical that Christiansburg’s
holding could be extended to costs. The “American Rule” that the prevailing
litigant may not collect attorney’s fees has long distinguished between
attorney’s fees and other costs. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-262 (1975).
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the basis of plaintiff’s good faith alone.”). Defendants are therefore entitled
to costs.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, plaintiff Dr. Michael G. Webster’s motion to
review and reverse the Court’s taxation of costs is DENIED.

24th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of August, 2016.

_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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