Lumpkins v. Office of Community Development/Louisiana Economic Development & Disaster Recovery Unit et al

Filing 25

ORDER AND REASONS granting in part and denying in part 9 Motion to Dismiss; all claims against the City of New Orleans are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, denying as moot 16 Motion to Dismiss; denying as moot 21 Motion to Strike; denying as moo t 14 Motion for Leave to File Amended and Supplemental Petition/Response to Court's Order; denying as moot 19 Motion for Leave to File Opposition to Defendant's Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Helen G. Berrigan on 9/24/2014. (kac)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BARBARA B. LUMPKINS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 13-6646

OFFICE OF COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT, ET AL.

SECTION: "C" (1)

ORDER AND REASONS
The following motions are before the Court: Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 9) filed
by defendants Louisiana Economic Development, Disaster Recovery Unit, Small Rental
Property, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Paul D. Rainwater, the former Commissioner of
Administration, Matthew Thomey,1 Ray Rodriguez, Jonathan Shensky,2 and Kristie Jones3
(collectively "the State Defendants"); Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 16) filed by the City of
New Orleans ("the City"); Motion for Leave to File Amended and Supplemental
Petition/Response to Court's Order (Rec. Doc. 14) and Motion for Leave to File
Opposition to Defendant's Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss Filed by Office of
Community Development (Rec. Doc. 19) filed by pro se plaintiff Barbara Lumpkins;
Motion to Strike (Rec. Doc. 21) filed by the State Defendants. The motions are before the
Court on the briefs without oral argument.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Barbara Lumpkins filed this action pro se alleging that the defendants

engaged in "a concerted scheme" to defraud her in connection with her participation in the

1

This defendant's last name is spelled "Tomey" in the Court's record.

2

This defendant's last name is spelled "Sensky" in the Court's record.

According to Defendants, incorrectly identified as "Crystal Jones" in Plaintiff's
Complaint.
3

Small Rental Property and Hazardous Mitigation Grant Programs. Plaintiff asserts claims
under federal and state law and she seeks to recover a panoply of damages from the
defendants.
The following factual allegations, which are accepted as true, are taken from Plaintiff's
complaint. Plaintiff owned three properties (residential and rental) in New Orleans that
sustained damage when Hurricane Katrina struck: Urville, N. Rampart, and Tulsa Streets.
(Rec. Doc. 1; Comp. at 1 ¶2). Plaintiff applied for disaster assistance funds through the State of
Louisiana's Small Rental Property and Hazard Mitigation Grant programs. (Id. at 2 ¶3).
Plaintiff was awarded $210,000 for the Urville property, $116,000 for the N. Rampart
property, and $190,000 for the Tulsa Street property. (Id. at 2 ¶6). Of those awarded amounts
Plaintiff received $150,000, $94,000, and $66,000. (Id.).
Plaintiff contracted with JCJ Industries, Inc. to perform new construction, demolition,
and elevation work on her properties. (Id.). A power of attorney was provided to JCJ
Industries to act on Plaintiff's behalf in performing the work on the properties.4 (Id. at 3 ¶7).
The proceeds from the programs were turned over to JCJ Industries via its president James A.
Littles by the granting authorities. (Id.).
Plaintiff chose JCJ Industries in lieu of using the Shaw Group because JCJ was a statelicensed contractor eligible to participate in the grant programs. (Rec. Doc. 1; Comp. at 5 ¶¶89). According to Plaintiff, JCJ Industries and Littles defrauded her of the entirety of the grant
proceeds which has resulted in the State of Louisiana assigning culpability for a theft to her
and demanding that she repay the money. (Rec. Doc. 1; Comp. at 3 ¶9). Moreover, the State
has refused to replace the "defrauded" funds or to give Plaintiff the remainder of her awards.

Notwithstanding the factual minutia contained elsewhere in the complaint, Plaintiff does
not mention who executed the power attorney to authorize JCJ Industries to receive funds on her
behalf or to act on her behalf. Given that Plaintiff is the one who selected JCJ Industries to
perform the work on her properties, the Court assumes that she executed the power of attorney.
4

2

(Id. at 3 ¶10).
The crux of Plaintiff's claim against the State Defendants is that they are liable for
failing to properly screen and investigate JCJ Industries, which turned out to be a nonlicensed company. (Rec. Doc. 1; Comp. at 6 ¶¶12, 16). Plaintiff asserts that the State
Defendants concocted a scheme to blame Plaintiff for their own negligence and culpability in
awarding her grant funds to a non-licensed and fraudulent entity. (Id. at 7 ¶20).
Plaintiff has also joined the City of New Orleans as a defendant although the City was
not involved in the disbursement of grant funds. Plaintiff has sued the City because it issued
permits to JCJ Industries without properly screening the company, assessed erroneous liens
against her property, and failed to monitor JCJ Industries' substandard work. (Id. at 8 ¶ 26).
Plaintiff filed the instant complaint pro se and in forma pauperis on December 16,
2013. No trial date is set at this time. Via the instant motions the moving defendants seek to
dismiss Plaintiff's complaint in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Their specific arguments
are discussed below.
II.

DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Before the Court can entertain Defendants' challenges under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court

must confirm that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
is one on the merits and with prejudice. See Cox, Cox, Camel & Wilson, LLC v. Sasol N. Am.,
Inc., 544 Fed. Appx. 455 (5th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). Therefore, a federal court must have
subject matter jurisdiction over an action before it can dispose of any claims under Rule
12(b)(6).
Plaintiff alleges original subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which is
federal question jurisdiction, and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Plaintiff has brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and regardless of their merit, they are not
3

so "wholly insubstantial or frivolous" so as to fail to provide a basis for original federal
question jurisdiction.5 See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006) (quoting Bell
v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)). Therefore, original jurisdiction for the federal claims is
present under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.6
Regarding the state law claims, diversity jurisdiction is not alleged. Plaintiff is
domiciled in Georgia but the citizenship of the individual defendants is not stated in the
complaint, and the Court cannot base subject matter jurisdiction on the negative inference
that the defendants are probably not Georgia citizens. See Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 841 F.f2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that subject matter cannot be established by
inference). Plaintiff therefore correctly invoked the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1367, for her state law claims. But § 1367(c)(3) gives the Court discretion to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims if it dismisses all of the claims
over which it had original jurisdiction. Given that this case is in its earliest stages, the Court
will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims if all of the federal
claims that trigger original jurisdiction fail. Therefore, regardless of the various arguments

The State Defendants contend that Plaintiff's federal claims are so legally frivolous as to
fail to provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. (Rec. Doc. 9-2; State Defendants' Memo at 21). The
Court recognizes that reasonable minds could differ as to whether Plaintiff's attempt to
characterize her dispute with the State Defendants as a violation of her federal rights amounts to a
legally frivolous claim.
Plaintiff also listed 28 U.S.C. § 1343 as a jurisdictional basis but invocation of this civil
rights statute is superfluous in light of the applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
5

Section 1331, entitled Federal Question, provides that "[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (2006).
The Court is persuaded that the fact that the state entities at issue receive and award
federal funds does not alone suggest that Plaintiff's claims arise under federal law for purposes of
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Highland Hills Hosp. v. State, Dept. of Health & Hosp.,
926 F. Supp. 83, 86 n.12 (M.D. La.1996) (citing City of New Orleans v. A Portion of Square 205,
866 F. Supp. 969, 973 (E.D. La. 1994);Gingerich v. White Pigeon Comm. Schs., 736 F. Supp. 147,
150 (W.D. Mich. 1990);Banco de Ponce v. Hinsdale Supermkt. Corp., 663 F. Supp. 813, 819
(E.D.N.Y.1987)).
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raised in the motions to dismiss, the Court will focus its attention on the viability of the federal
claims.
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Standards
In the context of a motion to dismiss the Court must accept all factual allegations in the
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Lormand v. US
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Lovick v.
Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004)). However, the foregoing tenet is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Thread-bare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550, U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
The central issue in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is whether, in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief. Gentilello v. Rege, 627
F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir.
2008)). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court
does not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal
conclusions.” Id. (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)). Legal
conclusions must be supported by factual allegations. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
C. The State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss7

The Court will only address those arguments that are properly raised via a motion to
dismiss. The State Defendants raise numerous arguments in their motion to dismiss many of
which are not cognizable in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The most glaring
example is the State Defendants' arguments about Plaintiff's own allegedly culpable conduct
7

5

In order to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish 1) that she was
deprived of a federally protected right, and 2) that the deprivation occurred under color of
state law. Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc., 75 F.3d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Flagg Bros.,
Inc. v. Brooks, 436 149, 155 (1978)). A federal right is crucial to the claim because violations of
state law are not cognizable under § 1983 even when committed by state actors. See Williams
v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892, 900 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir.
1980)). For purposes of § 1983 the state and the arms of the state are not "persons," so those
entities and their officials acting in their official capacities cannot be sued under the statute.8
Adams v. Recov. Sch. Dist., 463 Fed. Appx. 297, 298 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (citing
Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989)).
The Office of Community Development/Louisiana Economic Development & Disaster
Recovery Unit, and the Small Rental Property and Hazard Mitigation Program are

regarding the events at issue. (Rec. Doc. 9-2; State Defendants' Memo at 9, 22). The Court cannot
grant a motion to dismiss simply because the movant makes a persuasive argument impugning the
merits of the plaintiff's claim. See United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 355
F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir.
1986)). Moreover, none of the State Defendants' exhibits are part of the complaint in this case and
therefore fall "outside the pleadings" and cannot be considered by the Court in evaluating a
motion to dismiss. See Brand Coupon Network, LLC v. Catalina Market. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635
(5th Cir. 2014). Consequently, the Court cannot consider the arguments regarding prescription and
right of action because they rely upon those exhibits for evidentiary support.
8

Section 1983, entitled Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2012) (emphasis added).

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departments and agencies of the State of Louisiana. These defendants are not amenable to suit
under§ 1983 because they do not qualify as "persons." Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff
has attempted to plead any other claim against these entities under federal law, they are
immune from suit in federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.9 See Oliver v. Univ.
of Tex. Sys., 988 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished) (citing United Carolina Bank v. Bd.
of Regents of Stephen F. Austin Univ., 665 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1982); Clay v. Tex. Women's
Univ., 728 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1984)). The motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED as to any
federal claims against these defendants.
The remainder of the State Defendants are individuals. The motion to dismiss is
GRANTED as to any claims against these individuals in their official capacities.10 But contrary
to the State Defendants' assertion, these individual state employees are not being sued solely
in their official capacities.11 (Rec. Doc. 1; Comp. at 5 ¶3). Rather, Plaintiff also has sued the
individual State Defendants in their personal capacities and the law is clear in that the
Eleventh Amendment presents no bar to suing state officials in their personal capacities. Hays

As the district judge explained in Blanchard v. Newton, 865 F. Supp. 2d 709, 716 (M.D.
La. 2012), the state does not waive any immunities simply by accepting federal funds for
disbursement.
9

An official capacity suit is generally only another way of pleading a claim against the
entity of which the officer-defendants is an agent. Kentucy v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)
(quoting Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55)). Thus, the claims
against the individual State Defendants in their official capacities will be subject to the same
defenses and immunities as the State entities being sued. See id. at 166-67.
10

The State Defendants suggest that when the conduct at issue is taken in the course and
scope of employment then the claims are official capacity claims. (Rec. Doc. 9-2; Memo at 24).
This is of course legally incorrect under § 1983 because by definition a personal-capacity suit seeks
to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state
law. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165. Moreover, the State is not the real party in interest with respect to
all aspects of the personal capacity claims brought against the individual defendants. The State
Defendants read Plaintiff's complaint far too narrowly when they suggest that she is merely
seeking the grant funds to which she claims entitlement. (Id.). Plaintiff also seeks consequential
damages that she claims to have sustained as a result of the funding problem and these damages
are in addition to the grant funds.
11

7

County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 125 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974); Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 512-13 (6th Cir. 1985)).
In this case, it is beyond dispute that the "color of state law" or state action prong of a §
1983 claim is satisfied because all of the State Defendants are state actors. The issue then is
whether Plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a federally protected right. In conducting this
inquiry the Court's analysis is guided by the principle that pro se pleadings must be given the
benefit of liberal construction. Cooper v. Sheriff of Lubbock Cnty., 929 F.2d 1078, 1081 (5th
Cir. 1991). On the other hand, pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirement that they
plead sufficient facts to allege a plausible claim for relief or from the principle that mere legal
conclusions do not suffice to prevent dismissal. Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376,
378 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Christian Leader. Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir.
2001)).
The Court surmises from Plaintiff's citation to the Fourteenth Amendment as a
jurisdictional basis for her complaint (Rec. Doc. 1; Comp. at 3), and her allegation that she has
been "denied and deprived of her property" in violation of her rights (id. at 8 ¶31), that the
specific "federally protected right" that she relies upon for her § 1983 claim is due process. In a
§ 1983 cause of action asserting a due process violation, a plaintiff must first identify a life,
liberty, or property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Blackburn v. City of
Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 935 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing San Jacinto Sav. & Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d
697, 700 (5th Cir. 1991)). Assuming that a protected property interest does exist, due process
claims will typically fit into one of three categories. First, because the Due Process Clause
incorporates many of the specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights, a plaintiff may bring
suit under § 1983 to redress a violation of rights such as those guaranteed by the First
Amendment or the Fourth Amendment. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). Second,
the Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful
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government actions "regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." Id.
(quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). Finally, the Due Process Clause
encompasses a guarantee of fair procedure. Id. In procedural due process claims, the
deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected property interest is not in itself
unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due
process of law. Id. (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981); Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 259 (1978)).
The Court will assume without deciding that Plaintiff has a protected property interest
in the funds that she has already been awarded. The Court will further assume that the type of
due process claim that Plaintiff seeks to pursue is of the second type, substantive due process,
because the conduct that forms the basis of the complaint does not suggest any other type of
due process claim. Plaintiff's substantive due process claim fails for several reasons.
First, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to have the State replace the funds that JCJ
Industries allegedly misappropriated, or to issue the remainder of the awarded funds that the
State is holding, those damage claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment because the
State is the real party in interest. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Henley v.
Simpson, 527 Fed. Appx. 303 (5th Cir. 2013) (unpublished); Warncock v. Pecos Cnty., 88 F.3d
341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101
(1984)).
Second, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to recover consequential damages from the
individual defendants, she fails to allege specific conduct on the part of any individual
defendant that constitutes a violation of her substantive due process rights. The cornerstone of
personal capacity liability under § 1983 is accountability for one's own personal conduct, not
the conduct of subordinates, coworkers, or others. See James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365,
373 (5th Cir. 2008). The facts alleged as to each of the individual defendants must establish a
9

causal connection between the defendant's own specific unconstitutional conduct and the
deprivation being claimed. Id. (citing Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439,
443 (5th Cir. 1999)).
In this case, the facts alleged as to the individual defendants fail as a matter of law to
state a claim for a violation of any federal right, including a violation of due process. To the
extent that Plaintiff relies upon a conspiracy theory to try to overcome the factual deficiencies
regarding individual conduct, the complaint fails to allege any facts so as to make that claim a
plausible one under Iqbal and Twombly, supra.
Finally, even if Plaintiff has stated a claim for a due process violation, the Court is
persuaded that the individual defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity because no
reasonable employee of the State would have understood that his or her conduct was unlawful
"in the situation confronted." Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Jones v. Lowndes Cnty., 678 F.3d 344, 351 (5th Cir. 2012)).
In sum, the State Defendants' motion to dismiss the federal claims against them is
GRANTED. Plaintiff's federal claims against the State Defendants will be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. The state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. See 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). The State Defendants' motion to strike will be DENIED AS MOOT.
D. The City's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's complaints against the City of New Orleans, e.g., that the City issued permits
to her contractor and put erroneous liens on her property, have no basis in federal law
whatsoever. If the complaints are actionable then they arise under state law. All claims against
the City of New Orleans will therefore be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and the City's
motion to dismiss will be DENIED AS MOOT.
D.

Plaintiff's Motions

Judging from its title and content, Plaintiff apparently filed her Motion for Leave to File
10

Amended and Supplemental Petition/Response to Court's Order in response to the Show Cause
Order issued on March 20, 2014, which was triggered by Plaintiff's failure to effect service on all
defendants. (Rec. Doc. 5). The service issue is now moot.
The Court recognizes that a pro se litigant generally should be offered an opportunity to
amend her complaint before it is dismissed for Rule 12(6)(b) deficiencies. Brewster v. Dretke, 587
F.3d 764, 767–68 (5th Cir. 2009). But leave to amend is not required where the plaintiff has
already pleaded her "best case." Id. at 768 (citing Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir.
1998)). In this case the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff has pleaded her best case because an
amendment could not cure the problems from which her due process claims suffer.
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Opposition to Defendant's Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss
Filed by Office of Community Development is somewhat perplexing because it was filed over three
months ago yet Plaintiff never filed her opposition memoranda. Nonetheless, in compliance with
the law of this circuit, the Court did not penalize Plaintiff for failing to formally oppose the State
Defendants' motion to dismiss, but rather considered the merits of Plaintiff's complaint. Webb
v. Morella, 457 Fed. Appx. 448, 452 n.4 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).
Plaintiff's motions will be DENIED AS MOOT.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 9) filed by defendants
Louisiana Economic Development, Disaster Recovery Unit, Small Rental Property, Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program, Paul D. Rainwater, the former Commissioner of Administration,
Matthew Thomey, Ray Rodriguez, Jonathan Shensky, and Kristie Jones12 is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED insofar as all federal claims
against these defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All state law claims are

12

Incorrectly identified as "Crystal Jones" in Plaintiff's Complaint.

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DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The motion is DENIED in all other respects;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims against the City of New Orleans are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and the City's Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc.
16) is DENIED AS MOOT;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Strike (Rec. Doc. 21) filed by
filed by defendants Louisiana Economic Development, Disaster Recovery Unit, Small Rental
Property, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Paul D. Rainwater, the former Commissioner of
Administration, Matthew Thomey, Ray Rodriguez, Jonathan Shensky, and Kristie Jones is
DENIED AS MOOT;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to File Amended and
Supplemental Petition/Response to Court's Order (Rec. Doc. 14) and Motion for
Leave to File Opposition to Defendant's Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss Filed by Office
of Community Development (Rec. Doc. 19) filed by pro se plaintiff Barbara Lumpkins
are DENIED AS MOOT.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 24th day of September, 2014.

_______________________________
HELEN G. BERRIGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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