Phelps v. Daimler Trucks North America

Filing 278

ORDER and REASONS granting in part and denying in part 147 Motion for Summary Judgment, as stated within document. Signed by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt on 6/15/2015. (Reference: 13-6685, 13-6686)(cbs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MEGAN D. PHELPS,
ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 13-6685 c/w 13-6686

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, LLC
D/B/A FREIGHTLINER, LLC

SECTION “N” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS
Presently before the Court is intervenor Defendant CRST International Inc.'s motion for
summary judgment on the issue of liability (Rec. Doc. 147). Plaintiff David Sarty ("Sarty"), alone,
opposed the motion. (Rec. Doc. 172). CRST International filed a reply. (Rec. Doc. 191). Sarty
filed a surreply. (Rec. Doc. 210). For the reasons stated herein, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's
motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs do not challenge CRST
International's motion for summary judgment on vicarious liability and corporate veil piercing
grounds; therefore, summary judgment is GRANTED as unopposed on those grounds only. CRST
International's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART
as to Sarty's claim for negligent undertaking.
Pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall be
granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The materiality of facts is
determined by the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and which facts are
irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed.2d
202 (1986). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law."
Id.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof
at trial, the moving party may satisfy its summary judgment burden by merely pointing out that the
evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct.
2548, 2554, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); see also Lavespere v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 167, 178
(5th Cir. 1990). Once the moving party carries its burden pursuant to Rule 56(a), the nonmoving
party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2553; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed.2d 538 (1986); Auguster
v. Vermillion Parish School Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 2001).
Defendant CRST International argues in its motion that CRST International is not a proper
defendant in this matter because it did not employ co-Plaintiff Ronald Phelps for vicarious liability
purposes and it did not control the day-to-day operations of CRST Expedited Inc. as a requisite to
pierce the corporate veil. Therefore, CRST International argues it cannot be held liable under these
theories. (Rec. Doc. 147-1 at p. 5). Neither Phelps nor the Slaughter plaintiffs have opposed the
motion. Furthermore, in his response in opposition, Plaintiff Sarty does not contest CRST
International's arguments in favor of summary judgement on the issues of vicarious liability or
corporate veil piercing. Sarty does, however, contend that CRST International is liable under the
alternative grounds of negligent undertaking. (Rec. Doc. 172).
Pursuant to the theory of negligent undertaking, a defendant is liable for physical harm to
a plaintiff resulting from: (1) the assumption of a duty; (2) failure to exercise reasonable care in

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performing that duty; and (3) either (a) failure to exercise reasonable care increased the risk of harm,
or (b) the defendant undertook to perform a duty owed by the employer to the injured party, or (c)
harm is suffered because of reliance of the employer or injured employee upon the undertaking.
Bujol v. Entergy Services, Inc., 922 So. 2d 1113, 1128 (2004). In determining whether a parent
corporation has assumed a duty, specifically a duty to control safety, courts look at the scope of the
parent's involvement, the extent of the parent's authority, and intent of the parent. Id. at 1131.
In support of the first element, Plaintiff Sarty alleges that there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether CRST International assumed a duty to control safety within CRST Expedited, Inc.
based on the following: deposition testimony from CRST International's Vice President of Safety,
Charles Haffenden indicating substantial authority over CRST Expedited's safety operations, CRST
International's logo appearing on numerous safety presentations conducted at CRST Expedited, and
Sarty's belief that he was being trained by CRST International. (Rec. Doc. 172 at p. 8). The Court
notes, while not referenced in the pleadings at issue here, the record indicates that CRST
International conducted the initial training of Sarty and, presumably, other drivers. (Rec. Doc. 237
at p. 8). CRST International argues in response that (1) Mike Gannon, not Charles Haffenden,
testified as CRST International's corporate representative, and he indicated that CRST International
in no way affirmatively assumed a duty to provide and/or control the safe working environment at
CRST Expedited and (2) merely producing and including CRST International's logo on safety
training materials that were provided to CRST Expedited is insufficient to assume the duty to control
safety. Based on the circumstances and the facts in evidence, the Court finds that there exists a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether CRST International assumed a duty to control
safety at CRST Expedited.

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Sarty next claims that CRST International failed to exercise reasonable care when
performing its assumed duty to control safety by (1) failing to control and enforce CRST Expedited's
safety policies, (2) failing to properly train Mr. Phelps, (3) failing to hire safe and fire unsafe
employees, like Mr. Phelps, and (4) failing to provide managerial oversight, which all together
culminated in Mr. Phelps driving while he had "intoxicating amounts of marijuana in his system."
(Rec. Doc. 204 at p.4). CRST International contends in opposition that Sarty is unable to identify
any breach whatsoever, i.e. a failure to exercise reasonable care when performing the alleged duty.
(Rec. Doc. 191). Moreover, CRST International avers that Sarty has failed to show an increased risk
of harm, CRST International's undertaking of a duty owed to Sarty, or that harm was suffered
because of reliance on the undertaken duty. (Id. at p. 4).
With regard to the breach element, Sarty has not pointed to any evidence demonstrating a
failure to use reasonable care with regard to CRST International's hiring, training, or managerial
practices within CRST Expedited. Nor has Sarty alleged any connection between these alleged
failures to use reasonable care and the harm suffered by Sarty. Sarty's allegations are conclusory,
at best, and are not supported by any facts in evidence. As stated above, if the dispositive issue is
one on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its
summary judgment burden by merely showing that the evidence in the record contains insufficient
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of CRST International is
appropriate in the context of hiring, training, and providing managerial oversight within CRST
Expedited's safety operations.
Significantly, neither party has offered any evidence relating to the CRST Expedited's drug

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testing policies or if Mr. Phelps was ever drug tested. However, viewing all facts and inferences in
the non-moving party's favor and considering the fact that Mr. Phelps' blood contained traces
indicative of drug use, the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether CRST
International failed to use reasonable care in controlling and/or enforcing Expedited's safety
policies, namely and specifically drug testing its drivers. In addition, at this stage of the proceeding,
the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether CRST International failed to act
reasonably when permitting CRST Expedited to purchase the 18-wheeler tractor that was involved
in the accident without a sleeper door emergency exit. The Court also finds a genuine issue of
material fact exists concerning whether these failures contributed to Sarty's physical harm.
Therefore, summary judgment is GRANTED as unopposed on vicarious liability and
corporate veil piercing grounds, and GRANTED IN PART in so far as CRST International
negligently undertook to control the hiring, training, and managerial oversight of safety at CRST
Expedited, and DENIED IN PART to the extent that CRST International failed to exercise
reasonable care in enforcing CRST Expedited's safety policies.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 15th day of June 2015.

________________________________
KURT D. ENGELHARDT
United States District Judge

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