Becnel v. Mercedes-Benz, USA, LLC
Filing
36
ORDER & REASONS: granting 12 Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC's Motion to Strike and that Plaintiff's class allegations are hereby STRICKEN from the complaint. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 6/3/14. (sek)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DANIEL E. BECNEL, JR.,
individually and on behalf
of all others similarly
situated
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 14-0003
MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC
SECTION: “J” (5)
ORDER & REASONS
Before
the
Court
is
Defendant
Mercedes-Benz
USA,
LLC
("MBUSA")'s Motion to Strike Class Allegations (Rec. Doc. 12),
Plaintiff Daniel Becnel's opposition (Rec. Doc. 18), and MBUSA's
reply memorandum. (Rec. Doc. 27) The motion was set for hearing on
April 23, 2014, on the briefs. Having considered the motion and
memoranda of counsel, the record, and the applicable law, the Court
finds that the motion should be GRANTED for the reasons set forth
more fully below.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This matter arises from Plaintiff's claims for negligence,
strict product liability, breach of implied warranty, fraud, and
violations of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice Act, Louisiana
Revised Statute §§ 51:1401, et seq ("LUTPA") and the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq.. Plaintiff's claims arise
from his purchase of a 2008 Mercedes-Benz GL320 from Mercedes-Benz
of New Orleans ("Dealer") on February 26, 2008. (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 4,
1
¶ 14) On November 31, 2011, after noticing that his vehicle was
leaning to one side, thereby making it unreliable and undriveable,
Becnel brought the vehicle to the Dealer for service. (Rec. Doc. 1,
p. 4, ¶ 15). The problem recurred, and Becnel returned the vehicle
to the Dealer for service on March 5, 2012, June 28, 2012, and
August 31, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 5, ¶¶ 16-18) Each time that
Becnel tendered the vehicle to the Dealer, the Airmatic Suspension
System ("the Suspension System") was cited as the problem and was
repaired. Becnel alleges that MBUSA knew that the Suspension System
was defective but concealed that fact from current, future, and
past owners and/or lessors of GL model vehicles.
Based on these facts, Becnel filed a class action complaint on
January 2, 2014 against MBUSA on behalf of "[a]ll current and past
owners or people who leased Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC GL model of
vehicles since 2007." (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 6, ¶ 22) MBUSA filed the
instant motion and a motion to dismiss on February 28, 2014. (Rec.
Docs. 10 & 12).
The Court granted the motion to dismiss in part,
granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, and deferred ruling
on the motion to strike until after the filing of the amended
complaint. (Rec. Doc. 30) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on
May 23, 2014. (Rec. Doc. 31)
PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
MBUSA advances several arguments in support of its motion to
strike; however, the Court will only address those most pertinent
2
to the instant order and reasons. MBUSA argues that Plaintiff's
nationwide class allegations present predominance and manageability
challenges that cannot be overcome. MBUSA contends that due process
bars the Court from applying Louisiana law to the claims of absent
class members from other states, and that the application of every
other applicable state's laws would be unmanageable. Therefore,
because
Plaintiff's
claims
cannot
meet
the
requirements
of
23(b)(3), his class allegations should be stricken. Plaintiff, on
the other hand, notes that this argument is premature. He argues
that despite the potential for uncommon issues of law, it cannot be
denied
that
there
are
common
issues
of
fact,
and
that
is
sufficient. Further, the fact that multiple states' laws may apply
is not a bar in and of itself. Rather, after discovery and after it
is determined which states' laws are implicated, the Court will
have to engage in a conflicts analysis to determine if the laws are
incompatible. So, even though class certification may be improper
further along in litigation, it is not improper now.
LEGAL STANDARD & DISCUSSION
"To survive a motion to strike class allegations, plaintiffs
must plead the minimum requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a) and (b)." Grant v. Houser, No. 10-805, 2010 WL
3303853 (E.D. La. Aug. 17, 2010). The four 23(a) prerequisites
include:
(1) numerosity (a class so large that joinder of all
members is impracticable); (2) commonality (questions of
3
law or fact common to the class); (3) typicality (named
parties' claims or defenses are typical of the class);
and (4) adequacy of representation (representatives will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class).
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997). Once
the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied, a plaintiff
must show that one of the subdivisions of Rule 23(b) has also been
satisfied in order to obtain class certification. Id. at 614. In
the instant matter, Plaintiff seeks certification under 23(b)(3),1
so he must prove that: (1) common questions of law or fact
predominate over questions affecting only individual class members,
and (2) class treatment is superior to other methods available for
adjudicating
the
controversy.
FED. R. CIV. PRO.
23(b)(3).
The
relevant considerations to these findings include:
(A) the class
controlling the
actions;
members’ interests in
prosecution or defense
individually
of separate
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already begun by or against class
members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3). Further, because multi-state class
actions can cause considerable difficulty in the predominance and
1
Plaintiff specifically states in his opposition that he only seeks to
certify a class under this provision; therefore, MBUSA's arguments concerning
the remaining provisions of Rule 23(b) will not be addressed.
4
superiority elements of Rule 23(b)(3), "a district court must
consider how variations in state law affect predominance and
superiority." Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th
Cir. 1996) ("[V]ariations in state law may swamp any common issues
and defeat predominance.") The burden of proof lies with the
plaintiff who seeks to certify a class. Ziedman v. Ray McDermott &
Co., 651 F.2d 1030, 1038 (5th Cir.1981).2
In
the
instant
motion,
Defendant
challenges
the
appropriateness of the nationwide class. Neither party to the
instant matter, most notably Plaintiff, has provided the Court with
any kind of survey of the various state laws that will apply.
Without such information, the Court simply cannot engage in the
rigorous inquiry contemplated under Castano, meaning that Plaintiff
has failed to meet his burden of proving that the minimal class
requirements have been met. Ziedman, 651 F.2d at 1038; Castano, 84
F.3d at 741. Therefore, the instant motion must be granted.
Further, even without more extensive evidence, the Court
cannot accept Plaintiff's meritless assertion that he "cannot
foresee any manageability problems." (Rec. Doc. 18, p. 8) Based on
the pleadings alone, the Court can point to several issues.
2
Most
The standard applied to the motion to strike is essentially identical
to the standard applied in class certification motions. See Grant, 2010 WL
3303853; see also Markey v. Louisiana Citizens Fair Plan, No. 06-5473, 2008 WL
5427708 (E.D. La. Dec. 30, 2008)(Vance, J.); Truxillo v. Johnson & Johnson, et
al., No. 07-2883, 2007 WL 4365439 *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 2007)(Barbier, J.)
(noting that the issues raised in a motion for judgment on the pleadings
regarding class allegations overlap with the issues raised in a motion to
certify the class.)
5
notably, it is reasonable to assume that this matter will require
the application of laws from fifty-one different jurisdictions, as
it is readily apparent that at least one person from every state
and the District of Columbia will be found to have purchased or
leased a 2007 GL Class Mercedes.
manageability
issues
in
The Court anticipates serious
applying
these
differing
laws
to
Plaintiff's numerous state law causes of action, including claims
for: negligence; products liability based on manufacturing defects,
design defects, warning defects, and breach of express warranty;
redhibition; fraudulent concealment; and unfair trade practices.
(Rec. Doc. 31) Additionally, as was discussed in the Court's Order
and Reasons concerning MBUSA's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff, and
presumably other class members, face serious prescription issues
that will ultimately hinge on their ability to show that the
discovery doctrine tolled the prescriptive period. (Rec. Doc. 30,
p. 8-13) The use of the discovery doctrine will necessarily involve
the task of determining at what time it became unreasonable for
each class member to ignore the problems with the vehicles at
issue. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Aker Mar., Inc., 604 F.3d 888, 89394 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that in such cases, “the prescriptive
period [does] not begin to run until [a plaintiff has] a reasonable
basis to pursue a claim against a specific defendant.”) The same
issue will present itself with regard to the fraud claims, in that
the Court will have to determine the element of reliance for each
6
and every class member. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 745 ("fraud class
action cannot be certified when individual reliance will be an
issue.")
These serious manageability problems far outweigh any benefit
that a class action would create. Plaintiff conclusorily points to
the usual benefits highlighted in class certification motions,
including: (1) that a class action will expedite and streamline the
claims
at
issue,
and
(2)
will
help
the
court
avoid
holding
duplicative hearings on identical issues. Plaintiff does not,
however, propose any concrete strategy for achieving these goals.
In light of the manageability issues outlined above, the Court
cannot imagine that this will truly be the case, and, even to the
extent that some issues may be streamlined, it appears that many
issues will require individual treatment for each class member and
will outweigh or at least balance out any benefit conferred by
class treatment.
In light of these considerations, the Court finds that the
basic requirements to certify the class have not been met, and,
therefore, Defendant's motion should be granted.3
3
The Court recognizes that MBUSA effected a sort of "preemptive strike"
on the class certification issue by filing the instant motion and thereby
limiting the time in which Plaintiff had to gather extensive evidence to
combat the motion. Plaintiff never requested an extension of time in which to
gather such evidence, however. Moreover, Plaintiff recently filed his own
certification motion, which is set for hearing in July, and this motion,
prepared on the Plaintiff's own schedule, is equally as conclusory and
unhelpful as the opposition to the instant motion. Therefore, it is clear
that even upon consideration of that motion, Plaintiff would fail to meet his
burden. (Rec. Doc. 33)
7
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that MBUSA's Motion to Strike (Rec. Doc. 12) is
GRANTED and that Plaintiff's class allegations are hereby STRICKEN
from the complaint.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 3rd day of June, 2014.
____________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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