Evans v. Edwards et al

Filing 39

ORDER granting 31 Motion to Amend Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles, III on 5/28/15. (plh) Modified doc type on 5/29/2015 (plh).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
STEVEN B. EVANS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 14-41

DANIEL H. EDWARDS, ET AL.

SECTION "C" (3)
ORDER

On May 20, 2015, the Opposed Motion to Supplement and Amend Original Complaint [Doc.
#31] came on for oral hearing before the undersigned. Present were Gary Bizal and Jacques Bezou,
Jr. on behalf of plaintiff and Brooke Dufour on behalf of defendants. After the oral hearing, the
Court took the motion under advisement. Having reviewed the motion, the opposition, and the case
law, the Court rules as follows.
I.

Background
The complaint alleges as follows. This lawsuit involves the severe beating and resulting

injuries to plaintiff, Steven B. Evans, by inmates at the Tangipahoa Parish Jail on January 26, 2013.
As a result of that incident, on January 8, 2014, plaintiff filed this federal civil rights action. The
named defendants in the original suit were Daniel Edwards, in his official capacity as Sheriff of
Tangipahoa Parish, Joyce Jackson, individually and in her official capacity as Warden of the
Tangipahoa Parish Jail, Stewart Murphy, individually and in his official capacity as Jail

Administrator of the Tangipahoa Parish Jail and Brandon Pinion and other unknown deputies in their
individual capacity.
Evans alleges that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and equal protection of the
laws. He also alleges that various defendants encouraged customs, policies, and practices that
deprived him of his safety and civil and constitutional rights. He contends that defendants acted
with deliberate indifference to his safety. He also asserts accompanying state-law claims of
spoliation of evidence, assault, battery, criminal conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and negligence.
II.

The Parties' Contentions
A.

The Motion to Amend

Evans contends that through discovery, he has learned the identity of additional codefendants and of information that clarify the specific actions of numerous defendants. Evans thus
seeks to amend his complaint to add Sergeant Chad Hickey, Deputy Marshall Ray Hayes, Sr., and
Sergeant Pamela Ricard and to add the additional allegations. Evans maintains that the amended
complaint raises no new cause of action.
B.

Defendants' Opposition

Defendants note that Evans sued “Unknown Deputies in their individual capacities as
Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff’s Deputies.” Defendants also note that Evans does not assert that there
was any mistake related to the identity of the new individuals in his failure to name them in the
original complaint. They further note that Evans only seeks to name them now, over two full years
after the alleged incident.

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They argue that Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1998), is controlling under
these factual circumstances. There, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s attempt to name the
formerly unnamed John Doe defendant was time-barred as the amendment can only relate back if
there was a mistake in naming that defendant. See id. at 321-22. The Jacobseb court held that a
mere lack of knowledge – i.e., naming a John Doe defendant – does not constitute a mistake for
purposes of relation back under Rule 15(c). See id. Defendants cite other Fifth Circuit cases that
support the same proposition.
C.

Plaintiff's Reply

Evans notes that the incident occurred on January 26, 2013. Evans propounded his first set
of discovery requests on defendants on April 28, 2014, in which he sought the identities of the joint
tortfeasor deputy sheriffs. Defendants responded that the interrogatory was premature because they
had not completed their investigation.
Citing Sanchez v. Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff’s Office, Civ. A. No. 08-1227, 2010 WL
1729381 (E.D. La. Apr. 22, 2010), Evans argues that defendants’ reliance on Jacobsen and other
cases is misplaced. In Sanchez, the District Court – affirming the magistrate judge – held that courts
apply state statutes of limitation and state tolling principles to Section 1983 claims. See id. at *2.
Thus, the timely filing of an original complaint against joint tortfeasors interrupts prescription as to
all joint tortfeasors. See id. Noting that the prescription period is one year under Louisiana law,
Evans thus maintains that the timely filing of his complaint here interrupted prescription as to all
joint tortfeasors.
III.

Law and Analysis
In Sanchez, the plaintiffs sought to add Tangipahoa Sheriff's Deputy Schwebel and City of

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Hammond Police Officer Banquer as the previously unidentified officers in the original complaint.
See id. at *1. The magistrate judge granted the motion, and, upholding the magistrate judge, the
District Court held:
In Jacobsen v. Osborn, 133 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1998), the plaintiff filed suit against a police
officer whom he mistakenly thought arrested him. The plaintiff later discovered that he
named the wrong officer and sought to amend his complaint. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that “the proposed amendment is exactly the situation at
which Rule 15(c)(3) is aimed: the misidentification of a defendant,” and permitted the
amendment to relate back to the plaintiff's original filing. Id. at 320. The court also held that
an amendment to substitute a named party for a John Doe does not relate back under Rule
15(c). Id.
In Whitt v. Stephens County, 529 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2008), the plaintiff sought to
amend his complaint to name five “John Doe” defendants. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied Jacobsen, and held that the plaintiff's amendment
would not relate back under Rule 15(c) because the statute of limitations barred actions
against the proposed named defendants.
The case at bar is distinguishable from Jacobsen and Whitt. As noted by the
magistrate judge, federal courts apply the state statutes of limitation and tolling provisions
to § 1983 claims. See Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 996 F.2d 786, 788 (5th Cir. 1993).
Under Louisiana law, plaintiffs' claims are subject to a liberative prescription period of one
year. See Jacobsen, 133 F.3d at 319 (citing Elzy v. Roberson, 868 F.2d 793, 794 (5th Cir.
1989)). Pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 2324(c), “[i]nterruption of prescription
against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all joint tortfeasors.” Plaintiffs allege in their
original complaint and first amended complaint that the “defendants are liable individually,
jointly and in solido for their actions alleged herein.” Thus, plaintiffs' timely filing their
complaint against Sheriff Daniel Edwards and the City of Hammond interrupted prescription
of plaintiffs' claims against Schwebel and Banquer. Therefore, plaintiffs do not need to rely
upon relation back under Rule 15(c) for their claims against Schwebel and Banquer to be
timely. Further, the magistrate judge correctly noted that “should it be determined that the
defendants are not solidary obligors or joint tortfeasors, prescription will not be interrupted
as to the other joint tortfeasors/solidary obligors not timely sued since no joint or solidary
obligation exists,” and that “if it is later determined that the defendants timely sued have no
liability, prescription of the plaintiffs' claims against Deputy Schwebel and Officer Banquer
will not be interrupted.” Doc. #52 (citing Pastor v. Foti, 2002 WL 550982, *1-2 (E.D. La.
4/1/02)). Therefore, the magistrate judge did not err in granting plaintiffs leave to file their
amended complaint.
See id. at *2.
The Sanchez defendants then moved for an interlocutory appeal of the District Court's order.

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Civ. A. No. 08-1227, 2010 WL 2464748 (E.D. La. June 4, 2010). In the order denying the motion
to certify its ruling for interlocutory appeal, the District Court noted:
Schwebel and Banquer argue that this matter should be certified for interlocutory
appeal because there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion of whether state
procedural law can be used instead of Rule 15(c) for relation back. They contend that
the potential for differences of opinion is highlighted by the Supreme Court of the
United States' recent granting of certiorari in Krupski v. Costa Cruise Lines, 330 Fed.
Appx. 892 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S.Ct. 1133 (2010).
The issue before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
in Krupski, was whether a misnamed party could be brought into the litigation after
the statute of limitations had run. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that
the amendment did not relate back under Rule 15(c), and did not permit plaintiff to
pursue her claims against this misnamed party.
Krupski is distinguishable from this case. In this case, the court did not find
that plaintiffs' amended complaint adding Schwebel and Banquer related back to the
filing of the original complaint under Rule 15(c), but rather that prescription of
plaintiffs' claims against Schwebel and Banquer had not run because it was
interrupted by plaintiffs' filing a timely action against joint tortfeasors. Therefore,
Krupski does not demonstrate that there is a substantial grounds for difference of
opinion, and Schwebel and Banquer have not satisfied the elements required for the
district court to certify an interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b).
Civ. A. No. 08-1227, 2010 WL 2464748, at *2 (E.D. La. June 4, 2010).
In Krupski v. Costa Cociere S. p. A., the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and
held that under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), “relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depends on what the
party to be added knew or should have known, not on the amending party’s knowledge or its
timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading.” 560 U.S. 538, 541 (2010). The Krupski plaintiff
sought to amend her complaint to name the proper defendant, Costa Crociere S. p. A., for the
previously misidentified defendant, Costa Cruise Lines, L.L.C. See id. at 543-44. Because the
Eleventh Circuit had concentrated on the plaintiff's knowledge of the identity of the proper
defendant, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that it should have analyzed the issue from the
defendants' perspective. See id. at 548. The Court thus allowed the amendment and held that it

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related back. Since the Supreme Court decided Krupski, the district courts have struggled as to its
application, and this Court's search of the case law reveals that no court of appeals has explicitly
ruled on it under these factual circumstances (i.e., moving to amend to name a previously
unidentified John Doe defendant).
The Krupski holding has thrown the district courts into confusion as to relation back under
Rule 15. Some courts distinguish Krupski on the ground that it did not involve a John Doe
defendant, and that a plaintiff must still make a mistake in order for Rule 15(c) to apply. Trigo v.
TDCJ-CID Officials, Civ. A. No. H-05-2012, at *17-18 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2010). Under this line
of reasoning, the lack of knowledge of the identity of a defendant is just that, a lack of knowledge,
and not a mistake. Thus, Jacobsen and Whitt are still good law, and this would require denial of the
amendment here.
Other courts find an exception under Krupski when a plaintiff seeks to determine the identity
of the defendant before the discovery deadline – as plaintiff did here – and the defendant fails to
provide it. Archibald v. City of Hartford, 274 F.R.D. 371, 377 (D. Conn. 2011). Under this line of
reasoning, courts do not give the benefit of a statute-of-limitations defense to the defendant, and they
excuse the untimeliness of the amendment. This would require the Court to grant the motion here.
Still other courts hold that Krupski has overruled to some extent their courts of appeals’
opinions that hold in line with Jacobsen and Whitt (the majority of the courts of appeals agree with
Jacobsen and Whitt when John Doe defendants are first named). Smith v. City of New York, 1 F.
Supp. 3d 114, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). These courts thus allow amendments to correctly identify
a John Doe defendant.
Rather than wading into the morass of case law under Rule 15(c)'s relation-back clause, the

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undersigned agrees with the two Sanchez opinions from this Court. It is well-settled case law that
federal courts apply a state's statute of limitations and its equitable-tolling principles to Section 1983
actions. See Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 996 F.2d 780, 788 (5th Cir. 1993.). Louisiana Civil
Code article 2324(c), which provides that "[i]nterruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor
is effective against all joint tortfeasors," is just such an equitable-tolling principle. La. Civ. Code
art. 2324(c). Evans does not need to rely on Rule 15(c), then, to correctly name the joint tortfeasors.
As in Sanchez, Evans alleges in his original complaint that "[a]ll of the defendants are liable jointly,
severally, and in solido for plaintiff's injuries." [Doc. #1 at ¶ 38]. Because he timely filed his
lawsuit against the named joint tortfeasors, prescription was interrupted as to the unnamed joint
tortfeasors.
Moreover, as in Sanchez, should it be determined that defendants are not solidary obligors
or joint tortfeasors, prescription will not be interrupted as to the other joint tortfeasors/solidary
obligors not timely sued since no joint or solidary obligation exists. Thus, if it is later determined
that the defendants timely sued have no liability, prescription of the plaintiffs' claims against
Sergeant Chad Hickey, Deputy Marshall Ray Hayes, Sr., and Sergeant Pamela Ricard will not be
interrupted. See Pastor v. Foti, 2002 WL 550982, *1-2 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2002).
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons and for those outlined in the two Sanchez opinions cited above,
IT IS ORDERED that the Opposed Motion to Supplement and Amend Original Complaint

[Doc. #31] is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 28th day of May, 2015.

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DANIEL E. KNOWLES, III
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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