Shoemaker v. Estis Well Service, LLC

Filing 81

ORDER denying 51 Motion to Set Aside Judgment. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown. (jrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALBERT PURCELL SHOEMAKER

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 14-163

ESTIS WELL SERVICES, L.L.C.

SECTION: “G”(1)

ORDER
In this action, Plaintiff Marilyn Shoemaker (“Plaintiff”), suing as curatrix on behalf of her
son and interdict Albert Purcell Shoemaker (“Shoemaker”), seeks compensation for injuries suffered
by Shoemaker aboard an inland drill barge owned and operated by Defendant Estis Well Service,
LLC (“Estis”). Pending before the Court is “Plaintiff’s Motion Under Rule 60 for Relief from an
Order of Dismissal and to Set Aside a Compromise.”1 Having considered the motion, the
memoranda in support, the memorandum in opposition, the parties’ evidence, and the applicable
law, the Court will deny the pending motion.
I. Background
A.

Factual Background
In her complaint, Plaintiff contends that Shoemaker was injured on September 28, 2011

while he was employed as a seaman aboard an inland drill barge operated by Estis.2 Plaintiff alleges
that while Shoemaker was “attempting to perform assigned chores” aboard Estis’s vessel, he
suffered “severe and permanently disabling burn injuries” to numerous parts of his body, plus brain,
bone, muscle, tissue, and nerve injuries.3 Plaintiff asserts that these injuries resulted from Estis’s
negligence and from the unseaworthiness of the inland drill barge on which Shoemaker was

1

Rec. Doc. 51.

2

Rec. Doc. 1 at 1.

3

Id.

working.4 She maintains that Shoemaker’s injuries have “greatly impaired his wage earning
capacity,” entitling him to damages.5
B.

Procedural Background
This is the second time that claims arising from Shoemaker’s September 28, 2011 accident

have been before this Court. Shoemaker himself filed an action in this Court against Estis on
October 12, 2011, making essentially identical allegations to those present here.6 Shoemaker and
Estis settled that action on March 8, 2012,7 and this Court dismissed the case on May 16, 2012.8
On November 5, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Interdiction against Shoemaker in the 21st
Judicial District Court in Tangipahoa Parish.9 The 21st Judicial District Court granted the Petition
for Interdiction on December 10, 2013, decreeing that Shoemaker was “incapable of taking care of
his person and administering his affairs” and appointing Plaintiff as his curatrix.10
In her capacity as curatrix of Shoemaker, Plaintiff filed the present action against Estis in this
Court on January 21, 2014.11 Estis filed an Answer on February 13, 2014.12 On February 18, 2014,
Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Declaratory Judgment.”13 The Court denied Plaintiff’s “Motion for

4

Id. at 1–2.

5

Id. at 2.

6

Compare Shoemaker v. Estis Well Serv., LLC, No. 11-2562, Rec. Doc. 1with Shoemaker v. Estis Well
Serv., LLC., No. 14-163, Rec. Doc. 1.
7

No. 11-2562, Rec. Doc. 47.

8

No. 11-2562, Rec. Doc. 50.

9

See Rec. Doc. 11-1 at 1.

10

See Id. at p. 8.

11

Rec. Doc. 1.

12

Rec. Doc. 4.

13

Rec. Doc. 8.

2

Declaratory Judgment” on August 19, 2014, reasoning that a party must file an action for a
declaratory judgment, and cannot obtain one by filing a motion.14
On March 6, 2014, Estis filed a “Motion to Dismiss and Alternatively for Summary Judgment
Due to Res Judicata.”15 The Court denied Estis’s “Motion to Dismiss and Alternatively for Summary
Judgment Due to Res Judicata” on December 9, 2014.16 In its Order denying that motion, the Court
concluded that Estis had not carried its burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact
existed regarding whether Shoemaker’s claims were barred by res judicata because Plaintiff had
called into question the validity of the settlement agreement upon which the prior judgment was
based, and so the Court denied the motion.17
Specifically, the Court first observed that “[w]hen a seaman plaintiff challenges the validity
of a settlement agreement in a post-judgment motion . . . the district court ‘must hold a hearing on
the disputed issues of the validity and scope of the agreement.’”18 Noting, however, that no postjudgment motion had been filed in this case, the Court considered whether a plaintiff could attack the
validity of a settlement agreement in a subsequent action, irrespective of whether a post-judgment
motion had been filed.19 On this point, the Court concluded that several decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals from the Fifth Circuit “illustrate that a plaintiff may attack the validity of a
settlement agreement in a subsequent action,” and that “such an attack may present factual issues that

14

Rec. Doc. 35 at 2.

15

Rec. Doc. 10, 13.

16

Rec. Doc. 42.

17

Id. at 10.

18

Id. (quoting Stipelcovich v. Sand Dollar Marine, Inc., 805 F.2d 599, 606 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations

omitted)).
19

Id. at 13–16.

3

preclude summary judgment based upon res judicata.”20 Applying these rules to the present case,
the Court held that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the validity of the settlement
agreement, precluding the Court from granting summary judgment to Estis.21
On January 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant motion.22 Estis filed an opposition on February
13, 2015.23 On March 11, 2015, with leave of Court, Plaintiff filed a reply in further support of the
motion.24 On May 1, 2015, the Court held an evidentiary hearing during which Plaintiff, Dr. Roberta
Bell (“Dr. Bell”), Shoemaker, Jack Hoyle (“Hoyle”) and Harry Morse (“Morse”) testified.25
Plaintiff’s witness, Ronna Steele (“Steele”), who represented Shoemaker in the prior litigation and
was terminated before Shoemaker settled his claims, was unable to appear during this hearing.
Therefore, the hearing was continued to May 13, 2015, to allow Steele to testify.26 Following the
hearing, Plaintiff filed a post-hearing brief on June 11, 2015.27 Defendant’s brief followed on June
22, 2015.28 A summary of the hearing testimony follows.

20

Id. at 16 (citing Wink v. Rowan Drilling Co., 611 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1980), Gueho v. Diamond M Drilling
Co., 524 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1975); Gauthier v. Continental Diving Services, 831 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1987)).
21

Id. at 17.

22

Rec. Doc. 51.

23

Rec. Doc. 54.

24

Rec. Doc. 61.

25

Rec. Doc. 71.

26

Rec. Docs. 75 and 76.

27

Rec. Doc. 78.

28

Rec. Doc. 79.

4

C. Testimony Adduced at the May 1, 2015 and May 13, 2015 Hearings
1. Testimony of Plaintiff Marilyn Shoemaker
Plaintiff testified that Albert Shoemaker is her son.29 Following the September 2011 accident,
Plaintiff visited Shoemaker at the hospital.30 Shoemaker was conscious, but at times he acted like he
did not recognize Plaintiff.31 Shoemaker hired an attorney while he was in the hospital.32
Following his release from the hospital, Shoemaker went to live with Plaintiff.33 Plaintiff
testified that Shoemaker would get upset and act “out of control.”34 She stated that she “couldn’t
control [Shoemaker] because . . . he would get violent.”35 According to Plaintiff, she was unable to
stop Shoemaker from firing his attorney.36 After firing his first attorney, Shoemaker hired Steele.37
Plaintiff testified that she and Shoemaker moved into a house provided by Steele.38 Plaintiff testified
that Shoemaker could not take care of himself, but she did not have him interdicted at that time
because “[t]ough love is hard.”39 Plaintiff stated that Shoemaker applied for Social Security disability
benefits, which were denied because he was found to be malingering.40
29

Transcript at 22.

30

Id. at 22–23.

31

Id. at 23.

32

Id. at 63.

33

Id. at 25.

34

Id.

35

Id. at 26.

36

Id. at 34.

37

Id. at 70.

38

Id. at 71–72.

39

Id. at 73.

40

Id. at 74.

5

Plaintiff testified that when Shoemaker began talking about wanting to settle his case she told
him to let his attorney, Steele, handle it.41 Plaintiff and Shoemaker later called Hoyle, who was Estis’s
claims adjuster, to let him know that Shoemaker wanted to settle his case.42 Hoyle told them that
Shoemaker would have to fire Steele before he could speak to them.43 Plaintiff testified that she did
not ask Hoyle to help her get Shoemaker mental health treatment because Shoemaker “was sitting
right there” and she had to be careful not to upset him.44 Plaintiff stated that Steele was trying to get
Shoemaker mental health treatment.45
Plaintiff testified that Shoemaker fired Steele the morning of his scheduled deposition.46 The
deposition never occurred.47 Hoyle met Plaintiff and Shoemaker at their home later that day, and they
made an agreement to settle Shoemaker’s case.48 Plaintiff testified that she told Hoyle that she
believed Shoemaker had a head injury and needed medical attention.49 According to Plaintiff, Hoyle
told Shoemaker not to tell the judge that he was still under a doctor’s care and taking medication
because then the judge may not let them “resolve” the case.50

41

Id. at 37.

42

Id. at 38.

43

Id. at 39–40, 77.

44

Id. at 77.

45

Id. at 78.

46

Id. at 41–42, 44.

47

Id. at 46.

48

Id. at 77, 87–88.

49

Id. at 47.

50

Id. at 48, 90.

6

Plaintiff attended the settlement conference with Shoemaker.51 Shoemaker did not have an
attorney representing him at that time.52 She testified that she understood that Shoemaker was settling
his case.53 She stated that she did not speak up at the settlement conference because she had “to live
with [her] son.”54 According to Plaintiff, she could not control Shoemaker.55 She testified that
Shoemaker told the judge he was not taking any medications, which was false.56
Plaintiff also accompanied Shoemaker to the conference where he signed the Receipt and
Release.57 Plaintiff opined that Shoemaker was incapable of answering the questions posed to him
at that time because of the pain medication he was taking.58 However, during the conference Plaintiff
testified that she believed Shoemaker understood the proceedings.59 Plaintiff was not with Shoemaker
when he received the settlement check, but she testified that he returned home with the money in the
form of 20-dollar bills.60 According to Plaintiff, Shoemaker spent all of the settlement funds within
a one-month period.61 Plaintiff testified that she did not get Shoemaker mental health treatment
because she could not afford it.62
51

Id. at 52.

52

Id. at 56.

53

Id. at 53.

54

Id. at 53, 82.

55

Id. at 54.

56

Id. at 55.

57

Id. at 55–56.

58

Id. at 93.

59

Id. at 91.

60

Id. at 69.

61

Id. at 101.

62

Id. at 107.

7

According to Plaintiff, Shoemaker does not control his own affairs or his money.63 Plaintiff
has called the police to report Shoemaker’s violent outbursts, and she had him placed in a treatment
center for threatening to hurt her.64 Plaintiff acknowledged that prior to his accident in 2011,
Shoemaker was convicted of theft-by-fraud and was arrested for DWIs.65
Plaintiff stated that she believed Shoemaker was taken advantage of in settling his case “from
the get-go.”66 Immediately following the settlement, Plaintiff felt that it never should have occurred.67
Following the settlement, Plaintiff testified that she called Steele’s office to ask her to continue
working on the case because she believed Shoemaker needed medical treatment.68
2. Testimony of Dr. Roberta Bell
Dr. Bell is a neuropsychologist and clinical psychologist who has been licensed since 1987.69
The Court accepted her testimony as an expert in neuropsychology and clinical psychology.70 She
performed a neuropsychological evaluation of Shoemaker on September 3, 2013.71 She testified that
Shoemaker “performed within the mildly mentally handicapped or mentally retarded range . . .
demonstrating very significant intellectual difficulties,” with an IQ of 65.72 Dr. Bell did not have prior

63

Id. at 58.

64

Id. at 59–60.

65

Id. at 65–67.

66

Id. at 108.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 111–12.

69

Id. at 115–16.

70

Id. at 118.

71

Id. at 118–19.

72

Id. at 124, 128.

8

test results to compare to the results she obtained on September 3, 2013.73 She testified that
Shoemaker also had very significant deficits in memory, scoring worse than 99 out of 100 people in
his age group in both visual and auditory memory.74 According to Dr. Bell, Shoemaker also had
problems with visual motor integration, reasoning, problem solving, shifting from one idea to another
efficiently and scanning the environment.75 Dr. Bell testified that Shoemaker had severe depression,
moderate anxiety, hallucinations and delusions.76 Shoemaker reported a suicide attempt by motor
vehicle in the year following the settlement of his case.77 Dr. Bell did not know if Shoemaker
sustained a head injury during the suicide attempt, but she opined that it was “very possible” that he
could have sustained a head injury, which could explain a decline in his cognitive skills prior to her
evaluation of him.78
Dr. Bell reviewed a list of medications that Shoemaker was reportedly taking at the time of
the settlement conference.79 She noted that Shoemaker was reportedly taking several different opiate
medications, which can cause somnolence or sleepiness, “decreased centration,” decreased reasoning
and slowed processing.80 She also noted that Shoemaker was reportedly taking Valium, Lunesta and
benzodiazapine, which impact memory.81 According to Dr. Bell, Shoemaker was reportedly taking

73

Id.

74

Id. at 126–27.

75

Id. at 127.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 118, 147.

78

Id. at 147.

79

Id. at 133–34.

80

Id. at 134–35.

81

Id. at 135.

9

Seroquel, an antipsychotic, Voltaren, an anti-inflammatory, and Robaxin, a muscle relaxer.82 Dr. Bell
testified that she does not prescribe medications.83 Her testimony regarding the effects of medications
was based on her reading of articles regarding the neuropsychological effects of certain
medications.84
At the time of her evaluation of Shoemaker, Dr. Bell opined that he “was not mentally
competent to make good decisions.”85 She testified that Shoemaker would have difficulty making
financial decisions due to his mathematic skills being at a fifth grade level and his difficulty
concentrating.86 She opined that she would expect an injury “to improve initially at a rapid pace and
then plateau.”87 She testified that she would not expect Shoemaker’s mental condition to continue to
deteriorate following the settlement and her evaluation of him.88
Dr. Bell noted that Shoemaker was diagnosed with a concussion following his September
2011 work accident, but an MRI revealed no brain damage.89 She noted that alcohol abuse can affect
an individual’s cognitive skills.90

82

Id.

83

Id. at 141–42.

84

Id. at 144–45

85

Id. at 146.

86

Id. at 137–38.

87

Id. at 138.

88

Id.

89

Id. at 145.

90

Id. at 146–47.

10

3. Testimony of Albert Shoemaker
Shoemaker testified that he remembered going to court following his September 2011 work
injury.91 He could not recall speaking to the judge, but he remembered speaking to Hoyle regarding
the settlement.92 He testified that Hoyle told him not to tell the judge that he was taking medication.93
He could not recall any other details regarding the settlement.94 Shoemaker denied ever smoking
marijuana, but he admitted to drinking six beers a day.95 He stated that it had “been a while”since he
took any medication.96
Shoemaker could not recall what he bought with the settlement money.97 He testified that
someone from Estis offered to settle his case on the day of his injury for $40,000.98 Shoemaker stated
that Hoyle contacted him about settling his case.99
4. Testimony of Jack Hoyle
Hoyle testified that he provides “maritime claims consulting services to maritime employers
and maritime underwriters.”100 Estis hired him to work on a claim involving Shoemaker on the date
of the accident.101

91

Id. at 152.

92

Id.

93

Id. at 153.

94

Id. at 153–54.

95

Id. at 154.

96

Id. at 155.

97

Id. at 156.

98

Id. at 159.

99

Id. at 165–66.

100

Id. at 171.

101

Id.

11

According to Hoyle, Plaintiff called him at some point in January 2012.102 Hoyle returned her
call on January 12, 2012.103 He recorded the phone call because Plaintiff had indicated that
Shoemaker was interested in settling his claims.104 Hoyle advised Plaintiff that he was not allowed
to discuss or negotiate a settlement with either Plaintiff or Shoemaker while they were represented
by counsel.105 Hoyle testified that he is not allowed to contact a plaintiff who is represented by
counsel.106 He suggested that Plaintiff contact Steele about settling the case.107 Hoyle stated that he
contacted Steele to inform her that Plaintiff and Shoemaker wanted to negotiate a settlement directly
with Estis.108
On February 16, 2012, Hoyle went to Shoemaker’s home to discuss settlement.109 Hoyle
testified that Steele arrived at Shoemaker’s home with three uniformed policemen.110 Hoyle left the
home after Steele arrived, and he did not return until after she left.111 When Hoyle returned, he and
Shoemaker reached an agreement to settle Shoemaker’s claims.112 Plaintiff was present during these
negotiations, and Hoyle testified that “[e]veryone in the room was highly motivated to resolve this

102

Id. at 172.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id. at 173, 188.

106

Id. at 187.

107

Id. at 175.

108

Id. at 175–76, 189.

109

Id. at 175, 177.

110

Id. at 178.

111

Id. at 179. In a status conference after the initial day of the hearing, the parties informed the Court that
Ronna Steele was at the home with the sheriff to evict the Shoemakers because she had been fired.
112

Id.

12

claim including Mr. Shoemaker.”113
Hoyle was present at the settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Knowles on March
8, 2012.114 Hoyle denied telling Shoemaker to tell the Magistrate Judge that he was not taking
medication.115
Hoyle stated that he retained Morse, an attorney, to explain Shoemaker’s rights to him.116
Both Shoemaker and Plaintiff were present when Morse explained the settlement.117 Hoyle testified
that Morse gave Shoemaker the settlement check.118 Hoyle did not accompany Shoemaker to the bank
to cash the check.119 According to Hoyle, Plaintiff and Shoemaker did not contact him after the
settlement was consummated.120 Hoyle testified that he never observed Shoemaker acting in a way
that would cause him to question his competence.121 Hoyle stated that Steele never advised him that
she believed Shoemaker had a brain injury.122 He believed that Shoemaker’s settlement was fair and
equitable.123
5. Testimony of Harry Morse
Morse testified that he is an attorney retained by Hoyle and Estis to put Shoemaker’s “release

113

Id.

114

Id. at 181. Magistrate Judge Shushan was originally assigned to the case. Magistrate Judge Knowles
conducted the settlement conference because Magistrate Judge Shushan was not available.
115

Id.

116

Id. at 183.

117

Id.

118

Id. at 184.

119

Id.

120

Id. at 185.

121

Id.

122

Id. at 192.

123

Id. at 193.

13

on the record.”124 According to Morse, Shoemaker did not hesitate in responses to questions or
exhibit any unusual behavior during the conference.125 Morse testified that Plaintiff was also present
during the conference.126 During the conference, Morse advised Shoemaker that he could hire an
attorney to explain his rights.127
According to Morse, Shoemaker represented that he had not consumed alcohol or taken any
medication that would affect his judgment in the 24 hours preceding the conference.128 Plaintiff also
represented that she believed Shoemaker understood the release.129 During the conference, Shoemaker
indicated that he was not experiencing any pain and was ready to go back to work.130 Morse also
explained to Shoemaker that he was not entitled to continued employment with Estis but he was
welcome to reapply.131
6. Testimony of Ronna Steele
Steele testified that she represented Shoemaker for a few months.132 According to Steele,
Shoemaker terminated her representation on the date of his scheduled deposition because he refused
to be deposed.133 Steele stated that Shoemaker never told her why he did not want to be deposed.134

124

Id. at 199, 209.

125

Id. at 200.

126

Id. at 201.

127

Id.

128

Id. at 202.

129

Id. at 203–04.

130

Id. at 204–05.

131

Id. at 206, 211–12.

132

Id. at 223.

133

Id. at 223–26.

134

Id. at 243.

14

Steele testified that she sent a letter to Magistrate Judge Shushan regarding Shoemaker’s case
because she believed that Shoemaker “may have settled his case for less than it was worth.”135 The
letter stated: “Mr. Shoemaker, as a seaman, is a ward of the court and has exhibited behavior which
calls into question both his understanding and capacity.”136 Steele testified that she was referencing
the fact that Shoemaker is not well educated and was choosing to settle his case without
representation.137 She did not believe there was anything more the Court or she could do to prevent
Shoemaker from entering the settlement agreement.138
Steele attended the March 8, 2012 settlement conference because she had filed an intervention
claim to recover her attorney’s fees.139 According to Steele, the Magistrate Judge interviewed both
Shoemaker and Plaintiff.140
Steele testified that Plaintiff was with Shoemaker during almost all of their meetings.141 Steele
could not recall Plaintiff ever telling her that she was concerned that Shoemaker was confused.142
Steele testified that Plaintiff and Shoemaker were a “united front” on the issue of settling the case.143

135

Id. at 226, 228.

136

Id. at 230.

137

Id.

138

Id. at 244.

139

Id. at 231.

140

Id. at 232.

141

Id. at 238–39.

142

Id. at 242.

143

Id. at 223.

15

II. Parties’ Arguments
A.

Plaintiff’s “Rule 60 Motion for Relief from an Order of Dismissal and to Set Aside a
Compromise”144
In the instant motion, Plaintiff argues that Shoemaker “showed erratic behavior in hiring and

firing several attorneys” during his first case, and that he did not understand the settlement agreement
he entered into “due to his head injury, reliance on narcotic pain medication, and his injuries.”145
Plaintiff further contends that the amount of consideration he received for the settlement “is woefully
inadequate to compensate him for the damages he sustained[,] which are serious, debilitating, life
threatening, and permanent.”146
In a memorandum in support of the instant motion, Plaintiff relies on 46 U.S.C. §10313(e),
which provides: “Notwithstanding a release signed by a seaman under section 10312 of this title, a
court having jurisdiction may set aside, for good cause shown, the release and take action that justice
requires.”147 She asserts that a seaman’s settlement or release is to be carefully scrutinized.148
Plaintiff points to several factors relevant to the Court’s inquiry on this point: (1) “the nature of the
legal advice available to the seaman at the time of signing the release;” (2) “the adequacy of the
consideration;” (3) “whether the parties negotiated at arm’s length and in good faith;” and (4)
“whether there was the appearance of fraud or coercion.”149 She additionally contends that Louisiana

144

Rec. Doc. 51.

145

Id. at 1–2.

146

Id. at 2.

147

Rec. Doc. 51-1 at 1.

148

Id. at 2 (citing Wink v. Rowan Drilling Co., 611F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1980)).

149

Id. (citing Simpson v. Lykes Bros. Inc., 22 f.3d 601, 602 (5th Cir. 1994)).

16

courts, citing federal decisions on point, have considered “the nature of the medical and legal advice
available to the seaman at the time of signing the release.”150 Plaintiff does not explain how these
factors apply to the facts presented here. Plaintiff argues that Estis bears the burden of proving the
validity of the settlement.151
B.

Estis’s Opposition
Estis asserts that during the settlement conference, Shoemaker “testified [under oath] directly

to Magistrate Judge Knowles that he understood the terms and effect of the settlement and that he was
not impaired.”152 It contends that Plaintiff also participated in the settlement conference, and “[i]f the
truth is as [Plaintiff] now alleges, she participated in a fraud on the Court to obtain payment of
$115,000.00 from Estis.”153 Estis also asserts that the Receipt, Release and Indemnity Agreement was
explained to Shoemaker by Estis’s attorney while Plaintiff was present.154 “Estis avers that it is
unlikely that [Plaintiff and Shoemaker] lied and perjured themselves in 2012.”155 Instead, Estis asserts
that “the more likely conclusion is that [Plaintiff] is attempting to perpetrate a fraud at this time.156

150

Id. at 3.

151

Id. at 3–4 (citing Halliburton v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 620 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1980);
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248 (1942); Castillo v. Spiliada Mar. Corp., 937 F.2d 240 (5th
Cir. 1991)).
152

Rec. Doc. 54 at 7.

153

Id.

154

Id. at 13.

155

Id. at 15.

156

Id.

17

1.

Timeliness

First, Estis contends that the present motion is untimely.157 It asserts that Plaintiff is
attempting to set aside the settlement due to alleged “misconduct or fraud,” and due to “mistake as
to the terms of the settlement or alleged information about Shoemaker’s mental state discovered after
the judgment.”158 According to Estis, these allegations fall within the grounds for relief set forth in
Rule 60(b)(3), and are therefore untimely under the one-year time limit established by Rule
60(c)(1).159
Estis further argues that even if Plaintiff’s motion is construed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6),
under which a motion may be filed “within a reasonable time” after the entry of the judgment or order
at issue, she has offered “absolutely no justification” for filing the present motion nearly three years
after the prior action was dismissed.160 Indeed, Estis argues, Plaintiff was present with Shoemaker
during the negotiation, settlement, and related judicial proceedings in the prior action, and would
have been aware of any impairment affecting Shoemaker at that time.161 According to Estis, Plaintiff
and Shoemaker both testified under oath that Shoemaker “fully understood the terms and effect of
the settlement agreement.”162 Estis contends that if Plaintiff was aware that Shoemaker was impaired
during this time, she “should have brought this to the attention of Magistrate [Judge] Knowles

157

Id. at 16.

158

Id.

159

Id. at 16–17 (citing Lyles v. Seacor Marine, Inc., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3025 (5th Cir. 2014); Wilson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 873 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1989)).
160

Id. at 17–18.

161

Id. at 18.

162

Id.

18

immediately during the settlement conference or to the attention of the Court immediately
thereafter.”163
2.

Entitlement to Relief Under Rule 60(b)(6)

Estis next argues that a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) “will be granted only if
extraordinary circumstances are present.”164 According to Estis, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is not
warranted “where the parties to a settlement agreement have concealed the facts and circumstances
to obtain the settlement,” and “raise the concealed conditions years later to obtain relief.”165
Estis contends that the evidence shows that Shoemaker “was completely competent and fully
understood the nature and effect of the settlement agreement” at the time it was completed.166 Estis
avers that Plaintiff knew Shoemaker’s “state of mind better than anyone,” and repeatedly “certified
that Albert was competent at the time of the settlement.”167 Further, Estis contends, Shoemaker
demonstrated his competence.168 In support of these assertions, Estis points to the transcripts of the
settlement proceedings before Magistrate Judge Knowles and of the conference at which the parties
completed the settlement agreement.169 These proceedings, Estis contends, were “sufficient to satisfy

163

Id. at 19.

164

Id. at 20 (citing Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2002)).

165

Id.

166

Id.

167

Id. at 21.

168

Id.

169

Id.

19

a United States Magistrate Judge and several members of the Bar of this Court that he was making
a knowing, informed and competent decision.”170
Estis notes that Plaintiff “has not filed or referenced any evidence in connection with her rule
60 motion.”171 Nonetheless, Estis acknowledges that Plaintiff previously filed into the record a
neuropsychiatric report dated September 13, 2013.172 Estis contends that this report does not opine
on Shoemaker’s competency during the settlement of the prior action, which occurred more than a
year before the report was prepared.173 According to Estis, “[t]here has never been any evidence filed
in this proceeding which even remotely proves that Shoemaker was anything other than fully aware
and informed at the time he settled his claim.”174 Estis contends that the alleged interdiction
proceedings do not suggest otherwise, because Louisiana law “presumes that all acts executed by a
person during a time when they possess full legal capacity are valid and enforceable.”175 Therefore,
Estis argues, none of Plaintiff’s evidence calls into question its own “significant evidence” that
Shoemaker was competent at the time the prior action was settled.176
3.

Fraud

Finally, Estis argues that Plaintiff is “attempting to perpetrate a fraud,” because she repeatedly
certified that Shoemaker was not impaired at the time the settlement was completed, and now

170

Id. at 22.

171

Id.

172

Id.

173

Id.

174

Id.

175

Id. (citing La. Civ. Code art. 394).

176

Id. at 23.

20

“asserts that all of the certifications were false,” in order to “get more money than what she agreed
was a valid settlement three years ago.”177 Estis maintains that Plaintiff’s current assertions regarding
the settlement of the prior action are “irreconcilable with the record of events on March 8, 2012.”178
Thus, Estis contends, “[e]ither Plaintiff engaged in fraudulent acts on March 8, 2012 to get Estis to
pay the settlement money, or she is engaged in fraudulent acts now to try to get more money.”179
C.

Plaintiff’s Reply
In further support of the instant motion, Plaintiff again summarizes the law governing the

validity of seaman’s settlements and releases.180 Plaintiff asserts that the motion is timely pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(6) because it was filed within a “reasonable time.”181 Plaintiff also reavers that
Shoemaker “lacked the mental capacity to fully comprehend the significance of the rights he was
giving up and the numerous provisions of the agreement,” and negotiated the agreement without
counsel.182 According to Plaintiff, Shoemaker “did not possess full knowledge of his legal rights at
the time the release was perfected.”183
D.

Plaintiff’s Post-Hearing Brief
In her post-hearing brief in further support of the instant motion, Plaintiff initially contends

that the present case is analogous to Halliburton v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., wherein the

177

Id. at 23–24.

178

Id. at 25.

179

Id.

180

Rec. Doc. 61 at 1–5.

181

Id. at 5 (citing Wink v. Rowan Drilling Co., 611 F.2d 98, n.3 (5th Cir. 1980)).

182

Id. at 4.

183

Id.

21

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a summary judgment ruling due to
evidence that the plaintiff was unrepresented and taking medication at the time he settled his case.184
Plaintiff contends that there, as here, the seaman, “stated that he was aware of what he was doing”
when he signed his release.185 Plaintiff argues that Shoemaker’s traumatic brain injury and treatment
with prescription medications “negates his statements at the Settlement Conference and the signing
of the Release.”186 Plaintiff further points out that Shoemaker behaved erratically and fired his
attorney before agreeing to settle his claims.187 According to Plaintiff, a “remarkably small amount
of time” passed between when Shoemaker fired his attorney and when, in the evening on that same
day, he accepted an offer to compromise his case.188 Further, Plaintiff maintains, Shoemaker lacked
legal representation at the time he settled his case and perfected a receipt, release, and indemnity
agreement.189 Plaintiff contends that the presence of Shoemaker’s family during this process is “no
substitut[e] for a qualified and competent attorney,” and the advice of his family “cannot be
considered as validating in any way his settlement of this matter.”190
Plaintiff also compares the present case to Petty v. Odyssea Vessels, Inc., a case in which a
district court in the Southern District of Texas “overturned a seaman’s signed release for lack of
mental capacity at the time of signing,” on the basis that plaintiff was “taking several prescription

184

Rec. Doc. 78 at 6–7 (citing Halliburton v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 620 F.2d 444 (5th Cir.

185

Id. at 7.

186

Id.

187

Id. at 9.

188

Id.

189

Id.

190

Id.

1980)).

22

medications” when he signed the release, and his current psychiatrist indicated that “any of the
seaman’s prescriptions would have been sufficient to impair the seaman’s mental capacity.”191 Here,
Plaintiff contends, the testimony of Dr. Roberta Bell likewise indicates that the medication
Shoemaker had been prescribed at the time he signed the lease “would have likely lessened his
mental capacity.”192 Plaintiff also notes that Bell indicated that Shoemaker has suffered from
problems with cognition, concentration, and memory, and has experienced a “probable substantial
decline” in his abilities following the accident giving rise to the instant case.193 Plaintiff argues that
this testimony demonstrates that Shoemaker lacked sufficient mental capacity to compromise his
claims.194
Plaintiff next points to the deposition testimony of Magistrate Judge Knowles.195 Plaintiff
indicates that Magistrate Judge Knowles viewed three documents in the deposition: (1) a letter from
Ronna Steele, Shoemaker’s former attorney, indicating her concern about Shoemaker’s mental
capacity; (2) records from Dr. Bradley J. Bartholomew, in which Bartholomew recommended that
Shoemaker receive neuropsychiatric testing, “perhaps a 3T MRI scan,” and treatment for pain
management and his head injury; and (3) pharmacy records showing the medication that Shoemaker

191

Id. at 9–10 (citing 115 F.Supp.2d 768, 771–72 (S.D. Tex. 2000)).

192

Id. at 10.

193

Id.

194

Id. Plaintiff also argues that, consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, Dr. Bell included
“several concrete opinions . . . regarding Shoemaker’s mental condition at the time of the settlement of the case,”
and advised in the report and in her testimony that she “was qualified and could give an opinion as to his mental
condition” on the date Shoemaker settled his claims. Id. at 11.
195

Id. at 11.

23

was taking at the time he signed the release.196 According to Plaintiff, the following colloquy then
ensued:
Question:

Judge Knowles, if you had had [sic] the benefit of the information
which I called your attention to today . . . do you think that you would
have been able to approve this settlement?

Answer:

I really don’t know. I can tell you that if I had had all of that
information, I would have certainly questioned him closely. And I’m
not sure that I didn’t, but, certainly, the information would cause me
to—would give me pause and would cause me to question him a lot
more carefully than I would a normal personal injury plaintiff. That’s
about the best I can say. And if—but I would make a judgment at that
point as to whether I felt like he understood it or not. That is the best
I can do.197

Finally, Plaintiff indicates that Shoemaker received $110,000 to compromise his claim, an amount
she claims is “woefully inadequate” for a claim including an element of brain damage, and does not
meet the test for a “valid, fair and complete settlement.”198
E.

Estis’s Post-Hearing Brief
1.

Timeliness

In a post-hearing brief filed in further opposition to the instant motion, Estis first reavers that
the motion is untimely, because it seeks relief on the implicit basis that Estis procured the settlement
by fraud or misconduct, and is therefore subject to the one-year limitations period set forth in Rule
60(c)(1).199 Estis further reavers that even if Plaintiff’s motion is construed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6),
the motion is still untimely, because Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence addressing why she did

196

Id. at 10–11.

197

Id. at 12.

198

Id.

199

Rec. Doc. 79 at 2–4.

24

not file the instant motion until January 22, 2015, nearly three years after Shoemaker settled with
Estis.200 Indeed, Estis contends, Plaintiff’s “primary argument” on the instant motion—that
Shoemaker lacked capacity to compromise his claims due to the medication he had been
prescribed—rests upon facts known to Plaintiff, to Shoemaker’s family and friends, and to
Shoemaker’s attorney at the time Shoemaker settled his claims.201 Estis further indicates that Plaintiff
testified in the evidentiary hearing that “she was unaware of any impediment to her or her son filing
pleadings to void the settlement within a year from the entry of the final Order of Dismissal.”202
Therefore, Estis argues, if Plaintiff knew that Shoemaker was incompetent at the time of settlement,
then “there was absolutely no reason whatsoever for her not to have filed a Rule 60 motion within
the one year limitation [period]” set forth in Rule 60(c)(1).203
2.

Discussion of Evidence Adduced at the Rule 60 Hearing

Addressing testimony given at the Rule 60 hearing, Estis first indicates that, despite
Shoemaker’s “attempt to put on an act of incompetence,”and despite his “feigned lack of memory”
during the Rule 60 hearing, Shoemaker nonetheless agreed that his sworn statements made in
connection with the settlement of his claims on March 8, 2012 were true.204 Estis notes that transcripts
of the proceedings on March 8, 2012 indicate that Shoemaker “answered the questions asked and how
he interacted with the Court and counsel.”205 Estis maintains that Shoemaker showed “no hesitation

200

Id. at 4–5.

201

Id. at 5.

202

Id.

203

Id.

204

Id. at 6.

205

Id. at 7.

25

in [his] responses, no responses that could be considered inappropriate, and definitely no indication
that he was incompetent or incoherent.”206 Estis further contends that Plaintiff did not adduce any
evidence indicating that Shoemaker “had seen any healthcare provider for any physical complaints
after March 8, 2012,”and also failed to adduce evidence suggesting that Shoemaker “had not fully
recovered from his injuries,” or that he “could not have returned to work,”as he had represented on
March 8, 2012.207
Additionally, Estis notes, Shoemaker confirmed that he had discharged his attorney, Ronna
Steele, on February 16, 2012, the day he was scheduled to give a court-ordered deposition in
Lafayette, Louisiana.208 Estis argues that the sequence of events beginning on February 16, 2012 and
culminating with the March 8, 2012 settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Knowles “calls
into question certain testimony of the Shoemakers.”209 Estis notes that Shoemaker, accompanied by
Plaintiff and several other individuals, reached a tentative settlement agreement on February 16,
2012, although the actual settlement conference occurred later, on March 8, 2012. 210 Estis contends
that if Plaintiff was concerned that Shoemaker was incapable of understanding the settlement, she
should have sought to interdict him before the settlement conference.211
Estis further argues that the evidence pertaining to events between March 8, 2012 and
September 3, 2013, the date on which Shoemaker was referred to Dr. Bell for evaluation, “shows a

206

Id.

207

Id. at 10.

208

Id.

209

Id. at 11.

210

Id.

211

Id. at 12.

26

noticeable gap.212 According to Estis, Plaintiff “could not, or would not” describe what occurred
during the intervening period of time.213 Nonetheless, Estis argues, records show that Shoemaker
applied for Social Security Disability benefits on August 1, 2013, and had retained Dr. Bell to support
that claim.214 Estis notes that Dr. Durdin in turn examined him on behalf of the Social Security
Administration, and observed that he was “malingering on testing,” and concluded that he was not
impaired, showed no signs of cognitive decline, and could “sustain productivity over a forty hour
work week,” whereupon the Social Security Administration denied his claim for benefits.215
Estis contends that Plaintiff did not adduce any evidence showing that Shoemaker was
“incompetent or in some altered state of mind” on February 16, 2012 or March 8, 2012.216 Rather,
Estis contends, Plaintiff has only suggested “through innuendo, supposition, and interpretation” that
she and Shoemaker could meet privately with Magistrate Judge Knowles, and that Shoemaker “could
appear before Magistrate Judge Knowles under oath, fool him, and thereafter answer questions in two
separate settlement proceedings as directly and candidly as he did without anyone noticing that he
was incoherent.”217 Nonetheless, Estis contends, Plaintiff “claims that she knew” that Shoemaker was
incompetent “all along and just waited for over two years to bring it to the Court’s attention.”218

212

Id.

213

Id.

214

Id.

215

Id. at 12–13 (citing Defense Exhibit 12).

216

Id. at 13.

217

Id. at 14.

218

Id.

27

Estis further contends that records of pharmaceutical prescriptions submitted by Plaintiff do
not cast doubt upon Shoemaker’s competency during the settlement proceeding, because “there is
no evidence of the effect of the medications prescribed [or] their possible side effects.”219
Additionally, Estis argues, the medical records of Dr. Bradley Bartholomew, also submitted by
Plaintiff, do not provide any support for her claim that Shoemaker was “seriously impaired at the time
of the conference and was also under the influence of several prescription narcotics,” because “the
mere fact that a healthcare provider prescribed medication in the past is no[t] evidence” that the
medication affected Shoemaker so strongly that he “did not understand what he was doing on March
8, 2012.”220
3.

Adequacy of Consideration

Estis next addresses the adequacy of consideration given to Shoemaker in order to settle his
claims. On this point, Estis indicates that it adduced evidence of: (1) the canceled checks made
payable to Shoemaker;221 (2) the releases executed with Shoemaker’s former attorneys;222 (3) the
maintenance checks paid to Shoemaker;223 and (4) a register of medical payments made on
Shoemaker’s behalf, totaling $42,068.70.224 Estis argues that the $57,500 paid to Shoemaker’s
attorneys was considerably less than those attorney’s would have received under their contracts with
Shoemaker, and that Shoemaker and Plaintiff knew this when they terminated Ms. Steele and

219

Id. at 14–15 (citing Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 and Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4).

220

Id. at 15.

221

Id. (citing Defense’s Ex. 1, Defense’s Ex. 3).

222

Id. at 15–16 (citing Defense’s Ex. 7; Defense’s Ex. 8).

223

Id. at 16 (citing Defense’s Ex. 10).

224

Id. (citing Defense’s Ex. 11).

28

commenced direct negotiations with Estis.225 According to Estis, Plaintiff and Shoemaker fired Ms.
Steele in order to avoid paying her 40% of the settlement amount.226 Estis maintains that the adequacy
and fairness of the settlement “is apparent,” because, in total, it paid $172,500 to Shoemaker and his
attorneys, and because Shoemaker “testified, under oath, that as of March 8, 2012 he had recovered
from his injuries and was ready to return to work.”227
III. Law and Analysis
A. Standard on a Rule 60 Motion
The instant motion is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. That Rule states, in
pertinent part:
(b)

Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion
and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
the judgment is void;
the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on
an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
any other reason that justifies relief.

In considering which of Rule 60(b)’s enumerated grounds for relief might apply, the Fifth
Circuit instructs that “[t]he first five clauses of Rule 60(b) and the sixth are mutually exclusive.”228

225

Id.

226

Id.

227

Id.

228

Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 2002).

29

In other words, if relief is available on the grounds set forth in clauses (b)(1) to (b)(5), relief is not
available pursuant to clause (b)(6).229 Therefore, Rule 60(b)(6) has been described as a “residual
clause used to cover unforeseen contingencies,” and as “a means for accomplishing justice in
exceptional circumstances.”230
In general, Rule 60(b) is a “grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular
case.”231 Rule 60(b) “attempts to strike a balance between two conflicting goals, the finality of
judgments and the command of courts to do justice.”232 The Fifth Circuit has set forth the following
eight factors that guide the Court’s discretion on a Rule 60 motion:
(1) That final judgments should not lightly be disturbed; (2) that the Rule 60(b)
motion is not to be used as a substitute for appeal; (3) that the rule should be liberally
construed in order to achieve substantial justice; (4) whether the motion was made
within a reasonable time; (5) whether—if the judgment was a default or a dismissal
in which there was no consideration of the merits—the interest in deciding cases on
the merits outweighs, in the particular case, the interest in the finality of judgments,
and there is merit in the movant’s claim or defense; (6) whether—if the judgment was
rendered after a trial on the merits—the movant had a fair opportunity to present his
claim or defense; (7) whether there are intervening equities that would make it
inequitable to grant relief; and (8) any other factors relevant to the justice of the
judgment under attack.233
B.

Timeliness of the Rule 60 Motion
Here, the parties initially dispute whether the instant motion is timely. Estis contends that

Plaintiff’s arguments “thus far” have sounded in fraud, mistake, or newly discovered evidence, and

229

Gulf Coast Bldg. & Supply Co. v. Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 480, AFL-CIO, 460 F.2d
105, 108 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting that “[w]here either Clauses (b)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) provide coverage for the
movant’s claim, relief may not be obtained pursuant to Clause (b)(6).”).
230

Steverson v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., 508 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Stipelcovich v. Sand
Dollar Marine, Inc., 805 F.2d 599, 604–05 (5th Cir. 1986)).
231

Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981).

232

Stipelcovich, 805 F.2d at 604.

233

Seven Elves, 635 F.2d at 402 (citations omitted).

30

contends that the motion is time-barred to the extent that it seeks relief on these bases.234 According
to Estis, these allegations fall within the grounds for relief set forth in Rule 60(b)(3), and are therefore
untimely under the one-year time limit established by Rule 60(c)(1).235 Plaintiff, however, contends
that the motion is governed by Rule 60(b)(6), and is therefore timely because it was filed within a
“reasonable time.”236
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) provides that “A motion under Rule 60(b) must be
made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry
of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” If the motion is governed by Rule 60(b)(1),
(2), or (3) as Defendant contends, it would be untimely, because Plaintiff filed the motion on January
22, 2015, which is more than one year after the Court dismissed Shoemaker’s claims in the prior
action on May 16, 2012.237 On the other hand, if the motion is governed by Rule 60(b)(6), as Plaintiff
contends, then the motion must have been filed “within a reasonable time” after the Court dismissed
the prior action. Accordingly, the Court must first determine whether Rule 60(b)(3) or Rule 60(b)(6)
governs the instant motion.
1. Whether Rule 60(b)(3) or Rule 60(b)(6) Governs the Instant Motion
Estis asserts that the motion was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) because Plaintiff is
attempting to set aside the settlement due to alleged “misconduct or fraud,” and due to “mistake as
to the terms of the settlement or alleged information about Shoemaker’s mental state discovered after

234

Rec. Doc. 54 at 16.

235

Id. at 16–17 (citing Lyles v. Seacor Marine, Inc., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3025 (5th Cir. 2014); Wilson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 873 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1989)).
236

Rec. Doc. 61 at 5 (citing Wink v. Rowan Drilling Co., 611 F.2d 98, n.3 (5th Cir. 1980)).

237

See No. 11-2562, Rec. Doc. 50.

31

the judgment.” Estis relies on Lyles v. Seacor Marine in support of its argument.238 There, the plaintiff
asserted claims for negligence and unseaworthiness, the district court dismissed those claims, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.239 Nearly ten years later, the plaintiff filed a “Motion for Relief
from Judgment Pursuant to FRCVP [sic] 60(b)(3) Insurance Fraud” reasserting the dismissed
claims.240 The district court denied the motion, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that: (1) the
motion was untimely; (2) the plaintiff “did not present clear and convincing evidence of fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct . . . that prevented him from fully and fairly presenting his case;”241
(3) the plaintiff did not present evidence that the district court had bias against him; and (4) the
plaintiff could not appropriately use a Rule 60(b) motion to reargue matters raised in his complaint
or matters that could have been raised on direct appeal.242
Estis also cites Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., an asbestos products liability case in
which the plaintiffs filed a Rule 60(b) motion seeking relief from a judgment on the basis that “the
defendants fraudulently concealed and misrepresented the fact that they knew of the hazards of
asbestos as far back as the 1930’s.”243 The district court denied the motion, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, reasoning that the district court properly analyzed the motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3),
and correctly found the motion untimely.244

238

555 Fed. App’x 411 (5th Cir. 2014).

239

Id. at 411–12.

240

Id. at 412.

241

Id.

242

Id.

243

873 F.2d 869, 870–71 (5th Cir. 1989).

244

Id. at 871–73.

32

Here, the Court finds the cases cited by Estis for the proposition that Plaintiff’s motion should
be governed by Rule 60(b)(3) distinguishable from the present case. In Wilson, the plaintiff’s Rule
60(b) motion expressly alleged fraud. In Lyles, the plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion was expressly
designated as a Rule 60(b)(3) motion seeking relief on the basis of “insurance fraud.” In the instant
case, by contrast, Plaintiff does not allege fraud or expressly rely on Rule 60(b)(3). Plaintiff contends
that the settlement and dismissal of Shoemaker’s case should be set aside because Shoemaker “did
not receive adequate compensation for his injuries, the settlement was entered into very hastily while
[Shoemaker] was exhibiting erratic behavior, and [Shoemaker] did not have legal counsel at the time
of the settlement.”245
Plaintiff relies on cases where seamen plaintiffs challenged the validity of their settlement
agreements, and the Fifth Circuit applied Rule 60(b)(6).246 In Stipelcovich v. Sand Dollar Marine,
Inc., the plaintiff filed suit on August 26, 1982, alleging causes of action under the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. § 688, and general maritime for the wrongful death of her husband.247 The various defendants
in the case became aligned into two general groups: (1) the “rig interests;” and (2) and the “vessel
interests.”248 Prior to the scheduled trial, the plaintiff entered two separate settlement agreements: (1)
an agreement with defendants comprising the rig interests to settle their portion of the case for
$50,000; and (2) an agreement with the defendants comprising the vessel interests to settle their
portion of the case for $150,000.249 On April 12, 1985, the plaintiff filed a “Motion to Reinstate

245

Rec. Doc. 78 at 13.

246

See, Stipelcovich, 805 F.2d at 604–5; Wink, 611 F.2d at 102 n. 3.

247

805 F.2d at 602.

248

Id.

249

Id.

33

Case,” asserting that the defendants had not complied with the settlement agreement.250 The district
court denied the motion.251 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying relief to the plaintiff pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), because: (1) the $200,000
she received in consideration for settlement did not “support a finding that [the plaintiff] was illinformed of her rights and the consequences of agreeing to settle;” and (2) the plaintiff was “acting
upon independent advice by counsel, who explained the agreement and release to her.”252 The Fifth
Circuit’s opinion did not specifically address whether the motion was timely pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6).
In Wink v. Rowan Drilling, the seaman plaintiff filed two successive actions against the
defendant.253 In the first action, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which the district court
approved, resulting in dismissal.254 Two years later, the plaintiff filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief
from the judgment in the first action, and also filed a new complaint seeking to recover additional
damages.255 The plaintiff alleged that the employer defendant had misled the court as to the extent
of his injuries and his mental competency.256 The district court denied the Rule 60(b) motion and
dismissed the action based on res judicata.257 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court

250

Id. at 603. The Fifth Circuit opinion does not indicate how much time passed between the dismissal of
the case and the filing of the “Motion to Reinstate Case.” Id.
251

Id.

252

Id. at 606.

253

611 F.2d at 100.

254

Id.

255

Id.

256

Id.

257

Id.

34

erred in requiring the plaintiff, rather than the employer defendant, to bear the burden of proof.258 The
Fifth Circuit also noted that the plaintiff had filed his Rule 60(b)(6) motion within a “reasonable
time.”259
In the instant motion, Plaintiff contends that the settlement and dismissal of Shoemaker’s
prior case should be set aside because: (1) Shoemaker did not receive adequate compensation for his
injuries; (2) the settlement was entered into very hastily while Shoemaker was exhibiting erratic
behavior; and (3) Shoemaker was not represented by counsel at the time of the settlement.260 These
arguments are very similar to the arguments advanced—and addressed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)—in
Wink and Stipelcovich. Accordingly, the Court finds that Rule 60(b)(6) governs here, and it will
consider whether the instant motion was filed “within a reasonable time,” as Rule 60(b)(6) requires.
2. Whether the Motion Was Filed “Within a Reasonable Time” Pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6)
Plaintiff asserts that the motion was filed within a reasonable time. Estis argues that Plaintiff’s
motion was not filed “within a reasonable time,” as she has offered “absolutely no justification” for
filing the present motion nearly three years after the prior action was dismissed. Estis notes that
Plaintiff was present with Shoemaker during the negotiation, settlement, and related judicial
proceedings in the prior action, and would have been aware of any impairment affecting Shoemaker
at that time.

258

Id. at 101.

259

Id. at n.3.

260

Rec. Doc. 78 at 13.

35

The Fifth Circuit instructs that “[a] district court is provided wide discretion in determining
whether a Rule 60(b) motion is filed within a reasonable time.”261 In this inquiry, the “particular facts
of the case in question” determine whether a motion has been timely filed.262 Further, in determining
whether a motion has been filed within a reasonable time, the Fifth Circuit instructs that district
courts should consider: (1) “the interest in finality;” (2) “the reason for delay;” (3) “the practical
ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon;” and (4) “prejudice to other
parties.”263
The Fifth Circuit has affirmed denials of Rule 60 motions based upon timeliness grounds.264
In First RepublicBank Fort Worth v. Norglass, Inc., a matter proceeded to trial and final judgment
in state court.265 Following the judgment in state court, two parties filed pleas of intervention, alleging
that they had been appointed receiver of the plaintiff, and petitions for removal of the case to federal
court.266 Following removal of the case to federal court, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and
a motion to remand, both of which were denied by the federal district court.267 Two years later, the
intervening parties filed a Rule 60 motion seeking relief from the state court judgment, in which they
asserted defenses that had not been previously raised in the litigation.268 The district court denied the
261

McKay v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp., 751 F.3d 694, 701 n. 5 (5th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

262

Id. (citations omitted).

263

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
264

See Travelers Inc. Co., 38 F.3d at 1411; First RepublicBank Fort Worth v. Norglass, Inc., 958 F.2d 117

265

958 F.2d at 118.

266

Id.

267

Id.

268

Id. at 118–19.

(1992).

36

motion,269 and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the moving parties offered “no excuse for
their twenty-four month delay other than to suggest that the motion required extensive research,” and
concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the delay was “beyond
the bounds of reasonableness” in the absence of a “valid justification.”270
Conversely, in Wink v. Rowan Drilling, discussed above, the Fifth Circuit found that a Rule
60(b)(6) motion was filed within a “reasonable time” where the seaman plaintiff filed the motion two
years after settling his case.271 There, the Fifth Circuit did not point to any facts in support of its
finding that the motion was filed within a “reasonable time.”272
Here, the Court dismissed the prior case on May 16, 2012. Plaintiff filed the instant case on
January 21, 2014,273 20 months after the dismissal of the prior case, and she filed the Rule 60 motion
on January 22, 2015, 32 months after the dismissal of the prior case.274 As noted above, in
determining whether a motion has been filed within a reasonable time, the Court must consider: (1)
“the interest in finality;” (2) “the reason for delay;” (3) “the practical ability of the litigant to learn
earlier of the grounds relied upon;” and (4) “prejudice to other parties.”275 Turning first to the reason
for the delay, the Court finds that the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing does not provide
any compelling reason why Plaintiff delayed in filing the Rule 60 motion.

269

Id. at 119.

270

Id. at 121–22.

271

611 F.2d at n.3.

272

Id.

273

Rec. Doc. 1.

274

Rec. Doc. 51.

275

Travelers Ins. Co., 38 F.3d at 1410.

37

Plaintiff’s testimony indicates that she was aware of Shoemaker’s mental condition prior to
the settlement and dismissal of the prior case. She testified that following his release from the hospital
in 2011, Shoemaker would get upset and act “out of control.”276 Plaintiff also testified that Shoemaker
could not take care of himself following his September 2011 accident, but she did not have him
interdicted at that time because “tough love is hard.”277 According to Plaintiff, Steele was trying to
get Shoemaker mental health treatment prior to the settlement.278
Plaintiff was present when Shoemaker negotiated the settlement agreement with Hoyle,279
attended the settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Knowles,280 and attended the signing of the
Receipt and Release.281 Even though Plaintiff was present during all of these events, she never raised
any objection to the settlement. She testified that she understood that Shoemaker was settling his
case.282 She stated that she did not speak up at the settlement conference because she had “to live with
[her] son.”283 At the evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff opined that Shoemaker was incapable of answering
the questions posed to him at that time because of the pain medication he was taking.284 However,

276

Transcript at 25.

277

Id. at 73.

278

Id. at 78.

279

Id. at 77, 87–88.

280

Id. at 52.

281

Id. at 55–56.

282

Id. at 53.

283

Id. at 53, 82.

284

Id. at 93.

38

during the signing of the Receipt and Release, Plaintiff testified that she believed Shoemaker
understood the proceedings.285
Hoyle’s testimony also supports a finding that Plaintiff was actively involved in the settlement
of the prior case. According to Hoyle, Plaintiff called him at some point in January 2012, and left a
message indicating that Shoemaker was interested in settling his case.286 Hoyle testified that on
February 16, 2012, he went to Shoemaker’s home to discuss settlement.287 Plaintiff was present
during these negotiations, and Hoyle stated that “[e]veryone in the room was highly motivated to
resolve this claim including Mr. Shoemaker.”288 Moreover, Steele, Shoemaker’s former attorney,
testified that Plaintiff and Shoemaker were a “united front” on the issue of settling the case.289
Notwithstanding the evidence of Plaintiff’s participation in the settlement negotiations and
proceedings, Plaintiff testified that she believed Shoemaker was taken advantage of in settling his
case “from the get-go.”290 According to Plaintiff, immediately following the settlement, she felt that
it never should have occurred.291 However, Plaintiff did not file the instant case until 20 months after
the dismissal of the prior case, and she waited an additional year to file this Rule 60 motion.
Addressing her failure to express this apprehension during the settlement negotiations and

285

Id. at 91.

286

Id. at 172.

287

Id. at 175, 177.

288

Id. at 179.

289

Id. at 223.

290

Id. at 108.

291

Id.

39

proceedings, Plaintiff indicated that she feared provoking Shoemaker, who was motivated to settle
and was behaving in a volatile manner.292
Even if Plaintiff harbored doubts about the settlement at the time it was finalized, and even
if she feared the consequences of expressing these doubts at that time, her testimony indicates that
she was extensively involved in Shoemaker’s life and affairs after the settlement, and took numerous
actions on his behalf during the period between the first lawsuit and the present one. Specifically,
Plaintiff testified that she: (1) contacted Ronna Steele, Shoemaker’s former attorney, to request that
she take the case again;293 (2) was involved in Shoemaker’s admission to an inpatient treatment
program;294 (3) sought, and obtained, his interdiction in state court;295 (4) pursued Social Security
Disability benefits on his behalf;296 and (5) involved law enforcement when necessary to keep
Shoemaker’s behavior under control.297
Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her involvement in these activities—and especially her
testimony that she contacted Ms. Steele and requested her assistance in seeking to reopen the
case—indicates that any apprehension she may have initially felt about acting on Shoemaker’s behalf
and about expressing her misgivings about the settlement abated at some point prior to the instant
litigation. Nonetheless, Plaintiff adduced no evidence indicating that she took any further action to
attack the validity of the settlement until filing the instant case nearly two years after settlement was

292

Id. at 53–54, 82.

293

Id. at 111–12.

294

Id. at 60.

295

Rec. Doc. 11-1.

296

Transcript at 74.

297

Id. at 59–60.

40

completed. Further, Plaintiff has provided no evidence explaining her failure to do so. Accordingly,
the Court finds that the reasons for delay are not particularly compelling in the instant case.
Turning to the remaining factors the Court must consider in determining whether the motion
was filed within a reasonable time—the interest in finality, the prejudice to other parties, and the
practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon—the Court finds that these
factors weigh in favor of denying the motion. The Fifth Circuit has observed that “the desirability of
finality in judgments” categorically weighs against granting Rule 60(b) motions, particularly when
“reopening . . . a judgment could unfairly prejudice the opposing party.”298 Here, the interest in
finality clearly weighs against reopening Shoemaker’s case, which was dismissed nearly two years
before Plaintiff filed the instant case, and nearly three years before Plaintiff filed the instant motion.
Additionally, as to “the practical ability of [Plaintiff] to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon,”
Plaintiff herself indicated that she harbored doubts about the settlement from the “get go,” and even
contacted Ronna Steele to request her assistance in voiding it, but then took no further action until
the present time. Thus, according to Plaintiff’s own testimony, she was aware of the basis for the
instant motion at the time the prior action was settled and dismissed.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds, even when construing the rule liberally, that the
timing of the instant motion exceeds the bounds of reasonableness, warranting its denial on timeliness
grounds alone. However, as discussed above, in Wink v. Rowan Drilling, the Fifth Circuit found that
a Rule 60(b)(6) motion was filed within a “reasonable time” where the seaman plaintiff filed the
motion two years after settling his case.299 Because Plaintiff filed the instant case two years after the
settlement of the prior case and because seamen are wards of the Court and any release or settlement
298

Fackleman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 1977).

299

611 F.2d at n.3.

41

involving their rights is subject to careful scrutiny,”300 the Court will consider whether the Receipt
and Release entered into by Shoemaker was valid.
C.

Validity of the Receipt and Release
Plaintiff asserts that this Court should set aside the settlement and vacate the judgment of

dismissal in the prior litigation because: (1) Shoemaker did not have the mental capacity to
understand the release due to his injuries and use of narcotic pain medications; (2) Shoemaker
negotiated the settlement agreement without legal counsel and was not fully aware of his legal rights
at the time he signed the release; and (3) Shoemaker received a “woefully inadequate” sum from
Estis.301 Defendant counters that it has met its burden of proving that Shoemaker understood the
nature and effect of the settlement by pointing to “transcripts of the settlement conference and sworn
statements made contemporaneously with the settlement on March 8, 2012.”302
“Seamen are wards of admiralty and any release or settlement involving their rights is subject
to careful scrutiny.”303 The shipowner bears the burden of proving that a seaman’s release is valid,
and “[t]he ultimate concern . . . [is] whether the seaman relinquished his rights with an informed
understanding of his rights and a full appreciation of the consequences when he executed a
release.”304 “Factors relevant to an appraisal of a seaman’s understanding of his rights include the
nature of the legal advice available to the seaman at the time of signing the release, the adequacy of
the consideration, whether the parties negotiated at arm’s length and in good faith, and whether there

300

Stipelcovich, 805 F.2d at 606 (citing Wink, 611 F.2d at 100).

301

Rec. Doc. 51 at 2; Rec. Doc. 61 at 5.

302

Rec. Doc. 54 at 23.

303

Stipelcovich, 805 F.2d at 606 (citing Wink, 611 F.2d at 100).

304

Steverson, 508 F.3d at 304 (citing Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248 (1942)).

42

was the appearance of fraud or coercion.”305 Mental capacity is also a factor in the analysis.306 After
conducting an evidentiary hearing and considering these factors, if the Court finds that the seaman
plaintiff was well-informed of his rights and the consequences of the settlement agreement, it is
appropriate to deny a Rule 60(b) motion and decline to reinstate the original lawsuit.307
1.

Mental Capacity

Plaintiff asserts that “due to his head injury, reliance on narcotic pain medication, and his
injuries, Shoemaker did not understand the Release which he entered into.”308 Estis contends that at
the time Shoemaker settled his prior case, he was competent and fully understood the nature of the
settlement agreement.309
In Borne v. A&P Boat Rentals No. 4, Inc., after reaching a settlement the plaintiff refused to
consummate it, and the defendant moved to enforce the settlement.310 The district court entered
judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of the settlement, and the plaintiff appealed, contending that
he lacked the requisite mental capacity to enter into the agreement.311 The Fifth Circuit rejected this
argument, noting that: (1) “there is no evidence” that the plaintiff was mentally incapacitated or had
been adjudicated incompetent; (2) “the court was never asked to appoint a guardian” for the plaintiff;
(3) the plaintiff “had held a job for nine years,” (4) was able to write his name, (5) “knew when to

305

Simpson v. Lykes Bros. Inc., 22 F.3d 601, 602 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Borne v. A&P Boat Rentals No. 4,
Inc., 780 F.2d 1254, 1256–57 (5th Cir. 1986)).
306

Borne, 780 F.2d at 1257.

307

See, e.g., Stipelcovich, 805 F.2d at 606–07.

308

Rec. Doc. 51 at 2.

309

Rec. Doc. 54 at 20.

310

780 F.2d at 1255.

311

Id. at 1255, 1257.

43

seek help from others,” and (6) “had been able to discharge his first attorney and retain new counsel
eleven months after initiating the action.”312 Therefore, the Court concluded that mental capacity was
not a controlling factor in determining the validity of the settlement.313 Considering that the plaintiff
was represented by counsel, the settlement was reached after full investigation into the case, and
safeguards were in place to protect the plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court did not
err in enforcing the settlement.314
Plaintiff relies on Halliburton v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co.315 There, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that there was no genuine issue of
material fact as to the validity of the release executed by the plaintiff.316 In opposition to the motion,
the plaintiff had filed an affidavit of a pharmacologist, which stated that the medications the plaintiff
was taking at the time of the settlement effected his “mental faculties.”317 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the “plaintiff’s submission
created genuine issues of material fact.”318 This case is distinguishable from Halliburton because,
here, this Court is not considering a motion for summary judgment, where there may be a dispute
as to whether a release was validly executed, preventing judgment at that stage of the litigation before
live testimony can be heard. Here, the Court denied summary judgment in an earlier order because

312

Id. at 1257.

313

Id.

314

Id. at 1258.

315

620 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1980)).

316

Id. at 445.

317

Id.

318

Id.

44

there was a dispute as to the validity of the prior release,319 and now, after a hearing on Plaintiff’s
Rule 60 motion, where live testimony was heard and evidence was presented, the Court is actually
deciding the single issue regarding the validity of the prior release. Therefore, Halliburton is not
applicable here for the purpose Plaintiff advances.
Plaintiff testified that Shoemaker behaved erratically in the period leading up to his
settlement, and was prone to violent outbursts that she could not control.320 Plaintiff also testified that
Shoemaker terminated his attorney, Ronna Steele, shortly before commencing direct settlement
negotiations with Estis,321 and was taking prescription medication that diminished his mental capacity
at that time.322 Plaintiff introduced into evidence records from two pharmacies listing certain
medications prescribed to Shoemaker after his injury.323
Plaintiff also introduced records of Shoemaker’s post-injury medical treatment.324 Those
records indicate that on October 28, 2011, Dr. Bradley Bartholomew, a neurological surgeon, ordered
an MRI of Shoemaker’s brain because he was concerned that Shoemaker complained of memory
problems.325 Dr. Bartholomew opined that Shoemaker appeared to have “a concussive-type
syndrome.”326 On January 5, 2012, Dr. Bartholomew reviewed the MRI of Shoemaker’s brain, finding

319

Rec. Doc. 42.

320

Transcript at 26, 34.

321

Id. at 41–42, 77.

322

Id. at 93.

323

P’s Ex. 2; P’s Ex. 4.

324

P’s Ex. 3.

325

Id. at p. 3 of October 28, 2011 Clinic Note.

326

Id.

45

“no intracranial pathology.”327 Dr. Bartholomew recommended that Shoemaker undergo
neuropsychological testing.328 Dr. Bartholomew also noted that Shoemaker became upset when he
declined to prescribe him any narcotics, which could interfere with brain function.329
Plaintiff introduced a letter from Steele to Magistrate Judge Shushan, dated February 17,
2012, the day after Mr. Shoemaker fired Steele, in which Steele raises concerns about Mr.
Shoemaker’s behavior.330 Magistrate Judge Knowles, who was deposed by the parties on April 13,
2014, considered these records and stated that the information would “give [him] pause and would
cause [him] to question [Shoemaker] a lot more carefully than [he] would a normal personal injury
plaintiff.”331
Plaintiff also adduced testimony and a report from Dr. Roberta Bell, who examined
Shoemaker on September 3, 2013, over a year after the settlement.332 The Court accepted Dr. Bell as
an expert in clinical psychology and neuropsychology.333 Dr. Bell’s report states that “[t]he purpose
of the present evaluation is to document Shoemaker’s current neuropsychological status.”334 The
report also states that Shoemaker “is judged to have a significant cognitive and emotional disability,

327

Id. at p. 1 of January 5, 2012 Office Note.

328

Id.

329

Id.

330

P’s Ex. 1-a.

331

D’s Ex. 14 at 6–7.

332

P’s Ex. 5.

333

See FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b)
the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”).
334

P’s Ex. 5 at 5 (emphasis added).

46

consistent with expectations based upon his history of a head injury on [September 28, 2011].”335
Estis objected to Dr. Bell testifying about Shoemaker’s condition at the time of the settlement.336 Over
Estis’s objection, Dr. Bell opined that she would expect a brain injury “to improve initially at a rapid
pace and then plateau.”337 She testified that she would not expect Shoemaker’s mental condition to
continue to deteriorate following the settlement and her evaluation of him.338
The Court admitted Bell’s testimony regarding Shoemaker’s mental capacity at the time of
settlement. However, the Court accords little weight to the testimony.339 Dr. Bell’s report does not
assess Shoemaker’s mental capacity at the time he settled his case. No evidence indicates that Dr.
Bell had any involvement with Shoemaker’s treatment until she evaluated him in September 2013,
over one year after Shoemaker settled his case. Further, Dr. Bell testified that she did not have any
prior test results to compare with the results she obtained during her evaluation of Shoemaker.340 Dr.
Bell also stated that Shoemaker reported a suicide attempt by motor vehicle in the year following
the settlement of his case.341 Dr. Bell did not know if Shoemaker sustained a head injury during the

335

Id. at 10.

336

At the hearing, Estis asserted that testimony from Bell regarding Shoemaker’s condition at the time of
settlement would exceed the scope of her expert report. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (“Unless otherwise stipulated or
ordered by the court, this disclosure must be accompanied by a written report--prepared and signed by the witness--if
the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the
party's employee regularly involve giving expert testimony. The report must contain: (i) a complete statement of all
opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them; (ii) the facts or data considered by the witness
in forming them . . .”).
337

Transcript at 138.

338

Id.

339

See Fair v. Allen, 669 F.3d 601, 607 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The basis of an expert’s opinion usually goes to
the weight, not the admissibility of the testimony.”).
340

Transcript at 124, 128.

341

Id. at 118, 147.

47

suicide attempt, but she opined that it was “very possible” that he could have sustained a head injury,
which could explain a decline in his cognitive skills prior to her evaluation of him.342 Finally,
although Dr. Bell’s report notes that Shoemaker’s treating physicians observed that he exhibited
“poor short-term memory and loss of concentration” and had “at least a concussive type syndrome”343
following the accident, several portions of the report addressing Shoemaker’s condition after the
accident appear to derive from subjective information provided by Plaintiff and Shoemaker without
the benefit of outside corroboration.344 Thus, Bell’s opinions regarding Shoemaker’s mental capacity
at the time of the settlement, over one year before she actually examined him, are of limited use to
the Court in its current inquiry.
Also over Estis’s objection,345 Dr. Bell testified regarding the effects of various medications
that Plaintiff claims Shoemaker was taking at the time he settled his case.346 The Court allowed Dr.
Bell to testify regarding medications allegedly taken by Shoemaker, but informed the parties that it
might strike the testimony pending further briefing from the parties. After the hearing, neither party
briefed this specific issue, despite being given the opportunity to do so. Regardless, it is undisputed
that Dr. Bell did not observe Shoemaker until long after Shoemaker settled his case. Moreover,

342

Id. at 147.

343

P’s Ex. 5 at 4.

344

See Id. at 1–3 (“This patient states that, since the . . . explosion, he has experienced problems with
reasoning, expressive and receptive language, motor coordination, speech, concentration, and memory . . . since the
injury, he reports that he has experienced feelings of frustration, indecisiveness, irritability, anxiety, depression,
hallucinations, and delusions . . . In order to obtain additional information regarding Shoemaker’s status before
versus after his injury, his mother . . . was asked to produce a brief narrative and complete a checklist. Ms.
Shoemaker indicates that her son’s behavior has changed since the injury . . . In addition, she find that her son
experiences problems with concentration, confusion, and understanding conversation, expressive language, motor
coordination, reasoning, and at times, speech.”).
345

On this point, Estis objected that Bell’s report did not address medication prescribed to Shoemaker.

346

Transcript at 133-45.

48

Plaintiff’s counsel provided Dr. Bell with the list of medications that Shoemaker was allegedly taking
at the time of the settlement,347 but Plaintiff presented no corroborating evidence to show that
Shoemaker had actually taken any of those medications on the day he entered into the settlement
agreement. Consequently, her testimony regarding the possible effects of certain medication allegedly
prescribed to, and taken by, Shoemaker is worth little weight.
Testimony from individuals who actually observed Shoemaker at the time he settled his case
demonstrates that Shoemaker was competent to settle his case. Jack Hoyle, a claims adjuster hired
by Estis, testified that he never observed Shoemaker acting in a way that would cause him to question
his competence.348 Harry Morse, an attorney hired by Estis to explain the Receipt and Release to
Shoemaker, testified that Shoemaker did not hesitate in responses to questions or exhibit any unusual
behavior during the conference.349 According to Morse, Shoemaker represented that he had not
consumed alcohol or taken any medication that would affect his judgment in the 24 hours preceding
the conference.350 During the conference, Plaintiff also represented that she believed Shoemaker
understood the release.351
Further, Estis introduced into evidence a transcript of the settlement conference before
Magistrate Judge Knowles in which Magistrate Judge Knowles questioned Shoemaker about the
settlement, his understanding of its terms, and whether he had the opportunity to discuss it with

347

Transcript at 133.

348

Id. at 185.

349

Id. at 200.

350

Id. at 202.

351

Id. at 203–04.

49

Plaintiff, who was present during those proceedings.352 Shoemaker answered these inquiries in the
affirmative.353
Estis also introduced into evidence a transcript of the conference where Morse placed the
Receipt and Release on the record. During the colloquy, Morse twice questioned Shoemaker
regarding whether he had taken any drugs, medication, or alcohol that would have affected his
judgment, and whether he understood the colloquy.354 Both times, Shoemaker denied having taken
any such substances, and confirmed that he understood the colloquy.355 During the colloquy, Plaintiff
also told Morse that she believed Shoemaker understood the colloquy and was of sound mind.356
At the hearing on the instant motion, Shoemaker testified that he responded in this way
because Hoyle, Estis’s claims adjuster, coached him to do so.357 Plaintiff also testified that Hoyle
instructed Shoemaker not to tell the Magistrate Judge that he was taking medication.358 The Court
finds Plaintiff and Shoemaker’s testimony self-serving. Shoemaker could not recall any other details
about the settlement conference. Further, both Plaintiff and Shoemaker’s testimony at the evidentiary
hearing directly conflicts with the statements they made to Magistrate Judge Knowles and to Morse
regarding Shoemaker’s ability to understand the proceedings. Moreover, the Court had the
opportunity to observe both Plaintiff and Shoemaker during their testimony. Further, Hoyle denied

352

D’s Ex. 6.

353

Id.

354

D’s Ex. 5 at 5–6; 40–41.

355

Id.

356

Id. at 6.

357

Transcript at 153.

358

Id. at 48, 90.

50

telling Shoemaker not to report his medication use to Magistrate Judge Knowles,359 and the Court
finds Hoyle’s testimony credible. Taking all of this into consideration, the Court gives Plaintiff and
Shoemaker’s testimony on this issue little weight.360
Plaintiff relies on the letter Steele sent to Magistrate Judge Shushan on February 17, 2012,
raising concerns about Shoemaker’s behavior.361 The letter urges Magistrate Judge Shushan to
“carefully scrutinize” the proposed settlement agreement because Shoemaker had “exhibited behavior
which calls into question both his understanding and capacity.”362 At the evidentiary hearing, Steele
testified that she sent a letter to Magistrate Judge Shushan regarding Shoemaker’s case because she
believed that Shoemaker “may have settled his case for less than it was worth.”363 Steele testified that
she was referencing the fact that Shoemaker is not well educated and was choosing to settle his case
without representation.364 However, she also testified that she did not believe there was anything more
the Court or she could do to prevent Shoemaker from entering the settlement agreement.365
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Estis has presented sufficient evidence to show
that Shoemaker had the mental capacity to understand the settlement at the time he settled his case.

359

Id. at 181.

360

Estis argues that Plaintiff is “attempting to perpetrate a fraud,” because she repeatedly certified that
Shoemaker was not impaired at the time the settlement was completed, and now “asserts that all of the certifications
were false,” in order to “get more money than what she agreed was a valid settlement three years ago.” Rec. Doc. 54
at 23–24. This assertion goes to the credibility of Plaintiff’s testimony. Here, the Court gives Plaintiff’s testimony
little weight.
361

P’s Ex. 1-a. Magistrate Judge Shushan was originally assigned to the case. Magistrate Judge Knowles
conducted the settlement conference because Magistrate Judge Shushan was not available.
362

Id.

363

Transcript at 226, 228.

364

Id.

365

Id. at 244.

51

Plaintiff relies on her testimony that Shoemaker behaved erratically in the period leading up to his
settlement, and her testimony that Shoemaker was taking prescription medication that diminished his
mental capacity at that time. She also relies on pharmacy records and records of Shoemaker’s postinjury medical treatment, which show that Dr. Bartholomew believed Shoemaker had “a concussivetype syndrome.” Finally, Plaintiff relies on the testimony and report of Dr. Bell, which the Court
accords little weight because Dr. Bell did not assess Shoemaker’s mental capacity at the time he
settled his case and relied on uncorroborated information when assessing his current mental state.
Estis relies on the testimony of Morse and Hoyle, individuals who actually observed Shoemaker at
the time he settled his case, and testified that Shoemaker did not act in a way that caused them to
question his competency. Further, Estis presented transcripts of the settlement conference before
Magistrate Judge Knowles and the signing of the Receipt and Release, wherein Plaintiff directly
contradicted the testimony she gave at the evidentiary hearing regarding Shoemaker’s mental
capacity. Finally, Steele testified that Plaintiff and Shoemaker both wanted to settle the case, and she
did not believe there was anything else the Court could have done to prevent Shoemaker from
entering the settlement. Moreover, the Court was in the unique position of actually hearing the
testimony live and able to observe and listen to the testimony firsthand. Accordingly, the Court finds
that the weight of the evidence shows that Shoemaker had the mental capacity to understand the
settlement at the time he entered into the Receipt and Release.
2.

Advice and Negotiations

Plaintiff also argues that Shoemaker negotiated his release without counsel, and did not
possess full knowledge of his legal rights at the time he perfected the release.366 Defendant counters

366

Rec. Doc. 61 at 5.

52

that it has met its burden of proving Shoemaker’s understanding of the nature and effect of the
settlement by pointing to “transcripts of the settlement conference and sworn statements made
contemporaneously with the settlement on March 8, 2012.”367
As a general matter, “[w]hen a seaman is acting upon independent advice and that advice is
disinterested and based on a reasonable investigation, there being no question of competence, a
settlement agreement will not be set aside.”368 On the other hand, where the seaman is not represented
by counsel, and evidence shows that the seaman did not fully appreciate his rights and the
consequences of settlement, it is appropriate to vacate the settlement.369 In Gueho v. Diamond M.
Drilling Co., the plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement without counsel, and later moved to
vacate the settlement.370 In support of this motion, the plaintiff adduced evidence demonstrating that
he was “led to believe that he would maintain his employment” after settlement.371 In light of this
evidence, the district court vacated the settlement.372 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that “the
defendant did not bear its burden of demonstrating that the seaman fully appreciated the
consequences of the settlement.”373
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit instructs that courts may “uphold a release even when the
seaman is not represented by his attorney.”374 For example, in Charpentier v. Fluor Ocean Services,
367

Rec. Doc. 54 at 23.

368

Borne, 780 F.2d at 1258.

369

Gueho v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 524 F.2d 986, 987 (5th Cir. 1975).

370

Id.

371

Id.

372

Id.

373

Id.

374

Castillo v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 937 F.2d 240, 246 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1991).

53

Inc., an unrepresented seaman signed a release, and subsequently filed a lawsuit seeking to recover
for his injuries.375 The district court ultimately tried the issue of the validity of the release, and found
the release to be valid.376 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that although the plaintiff was
unrepresented at the time of settlement,
[T]he insurance company’s attorney[] advised [the plaintiff and his wife] of his rights
as a seaman . . . distinguished the Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Act, the
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act and the Jones Act for the
plaintiff and detailed his rights under each Act . . . [and] also discussed thoroughly
comparative negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, the various elements
of damages, and the right to counsel with the plaintiff and his wife. Finally, [the
attorney] ascertained that plaintiff understood the release and the binding effect it
would have on any claim plaintiff might want to bring.377
Based on these facts, the Fifth Circuit found that “the record does not establish that the trial court was
clearly erroneous in concluding that plaintiff was informed of his legal rights.”378
Here, it is undisputed that Shoemaker terminated his attorney before agreeing to settle his
case. However, like in Charpentier, Estis retained Harry Morse, an attorney, to advise Shoemaker
of his rights as a seaman. Estis has presented a transcript of the conference where Morse explained
the Receipt and Release to Shoemaker.379 During that conference, Morse informed Shoemaker that
he had the right to retain independent counsel.380 Morse also advised Shoemaker that settlement
would preclude him from bringing any other claims in connection with the underlying accident, and

375

613 F.2d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1980).

376

Id. at 83–84.

377

Id. at 84.

378

Id.

379

D’s Ex 5.

380

Id. at 8, 37.

54

that he would be precluded from seeking any other medical treatment.381 Morse explained the law to
Shoemaker, advising him of his rights as a Jones Act seaman.382 Morse also advised Shoemaker that
future employment with Estis was not guaranteed.383
Unlike in Gueho, nothing in the record indicates that Estis or its representatives made false
representations to Shoemaker in return for his agreement to settle his case. Accordingly, here, as in
Charpentier, the Court finds that Estis has met its burden of showing that, although Shoemaker was
unrepresented at the time of the settlement, he was fully advised of and appreciated his rights and the
consequences of the settlement.
3.

Adequacy of Consideration

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the consideration Shoemaker received for settlement was
“woefully inadequate to compensate him for the damages he sustained which are serious, debilitating,
life threatening and permanent.”384 Estis counters that “[d]uring the almost three years since the
settlement was perfected, the Shoemakers had no objection to negotiating and spending the Estis’
settlement payment of $115,000.00.”385 According to Estis, Plaintiff is merely “seeking more money
by exploiting false testimony” in the present case.386
The Fifth Circuit instructs that “adequacy of the settlement consideration” is relevant “only
insofar as it indicates ‘whether the seaman had a full understanding of his rights and of the

381

Id. at 17–20.

382

Id. at 20–25.

383

Id. at 36.

384

Rec. Doc. 51 at 2.

385

Rec. Doc. 54 at 20.

386

Id.

55

consequences of the settlement agreement.’”387 The parties do not point to any case in which the Fifth
Circuit addressed how adequacy of consideration should be measured, and the Court has not found
any Fifth Circuit authority addressing the point. However, district courts have set aside settlement
agreements based in part on findings that seamen received inadequate consideration for the
settlement. These courts have analyzed the amount of consideration in light of the circumstances
surrounding the settlement and the gravity of the plaintiff’s injuries.388 This approach appears to be
consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s instruction that adequacy of consideration is relevant to the extent
that it indicates a seaman’s understanding of his rights and the consequences of the settlement
agreement.389
On this point, Jack Hoyle testified that the parties reached an agreement through negotiation,
during which all present—including Plaintiff and Shoemaker—were motivated to settle.390 Ronna
Steele testified that on the date Shoemaker fired her and began negotiating directly with Estis,

387

Borne, 780 F.2d at 1257 (quoting Bass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78, Ltd., 749 F.2d 1154, 1161 (5th Cir.

1985)).
388

See, e.g. Durley v. Offshore Drilling Co., No. 06-5681, 2009 WL 799977 at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 29,
2009) (Barbier, J.) (noting that “the settlement amount of $3,000 is not adequate compensation considering Durley's
serious knee and back injuries,” and concluding that the release was invalid because the plaintiff (1) received no
legal advice in accepting the settlement; (2) the settlement was not “based on any negotiations” with the defendant;
and (3) the plaintiff “consistently expressed” that he needed money and needed to get back to work.”); Morris v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 321 F.Supp.320 (E.D. La. 1970) (holding that $350 worker’s compensation
settlement was “woefully inadequate” in light of the plaintiff’s “severe[ly] fracture[d]” jaw, “loss of four teeth,” and
“loss of about seven weeks’ wages at $180 per week.”). See also Double J Marine, LLC v. Nuber, No. 13-5825,
2013 WL 6502866 at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 11, 2013) (Feldman, J.) (finding a genuine issue of material fact regarding
the validity of a settlement agreement in light of evidence that (1) the plaintiff swore that he did not fully understand
the consequences of settlement; (2) the plaintiff received only $350 in consideration; (3) the plaintiff’s physician
subsequently recommended that the plaintiff undergo surgery for herniated discs; and (4) the plaintiff, uncounseled,
signed the release at a gas station on the same day he was initially treated for his injury; and (5) the plaintiff had a
10th grade education.”).
389

Borne, 780 F.2d at 1257.

390

Transcript at 179.

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Shoemaker refused to be deposed.391 Steele testified that she was concerned that Shoemaker might
settle his case for less than it was worth, and communicated her concern to Shoemaker and
Plaintiff.392 However, Steele testified that both Shoemaker and Plaintiff appeared highly motivated
to settle.393 Further, it is undisputed that in the settlement proceedings before Magistrate Judge
Knowles, neither Plaintiff nor Shoemaker expressed any reservation about settlement terms or about
Shoemaker’s ability to understand them. Finally, as noted above, a transcript of the colloquy with
Harry Morse indicates that Morse thoroughly discussed the terms of the settlement with Shoemaker
before Shoemaker executed the release, and also questioned Plaintiff regarding whether Shoemaker
understood the colloquy.394
Therefore, the Court finds that this evidence shows that Shoemaker was competent when he
settled his claims. Moreover, he received sufficient information about the terms of the settlement and
its consequences, and had several opportunities to express any doubts he may have had about it. The
evidence also shows that Plaintiff was intimately involved in the settlement process and made no
attempt to interrupt that process on Shoemaker’s behalf, if indeed she believed that Shoemaker did
not understand what he was doing or that the amount of consideration offered to Shoemaker was
inadequate. Accordingly, the Court finds that the settlement was adequate because Estis has
demonstrated that Shoemaker had a full understanding of his rights and of the consequences of the
settlement agreement.

391

Id. at 223–26.

392

Id. at 226, 228.

393

Id. at 223.

394

D’s Ex. 5.

57

4.

Conclusion: Validity of the Settlement

Based upon the evidence presented, the Court finds that Estis has carried its burden of proving
the validity of the settlement. First, Estis has presented sufficient evidence that Shoemaker was
capable of understanding the release at the time he entered into it. Second, although Shoemaker was
not represented at the time he settled his claims, Estis has shown that Shoemaker was carefully
questioned before he signed his release, and the record is devoid of any credible evidence of
overreaching on Estis’s part. Rather, it appears that Shoemaker and Plaintiff aggressively pursued
settlement, and Estis, in turn, acted appropriately in responding to their inquiries. Finally, in the
circumstances present here, the consideration given to Shoemaker does not suggest that Shoemaker
lacked a “full understanding of his rights and of the consequences of the settlement agreement.”395
Rather, the testimony given at the hearing by all of the witnesses indicates that Shoemaker was
motivated to settle his claims. Furthermore, Morse’s testimony, and the settlement transcripts
adduced by Estis, show that Plaintiff and Shoemaker were informed of Shoemaker’s rights before
finalizing the settlement agreement.
The Court notes that Plaintiff and Shoemaker acted in unity when deciding to settle
Shoemaker’s claims, and rather than take the advice of counsel, Ronna Steele, fired her and pursued
negotiations with Estis without an attorney to maximize what they would ultimately receive. It
appears in hindsight, they believe that they should have taken their lawyer’s advice and not settle at
that time. However, they presented no evidence indicating that they did not understand the
consequences of their decision to settle Shoemaker’s claims at the time. The fact that now they think
that Shoemaker could have received more money does not mean that the recovery he did in fact

395

Borne, 780 F.2d at 1257.

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receive was somehow inadequate or negotiated in bad faith. Thus, assuming that Plaintiff’s motion
was filed within a reasonable time pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), the Court finds that Estis has carried
its burden of proving the validity of the settlement and therefore the Court will deny a Rule 60(b)
motion and decline to reinstate the original lawsuit.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Shoemaker’s “Motion Under Rule 60 for Relief from an Order of
Dismissal and to Set Aside a Compromise”396 is DENIED.

12th
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this ______ day of August, 2015.
_________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

396

Rec. Doc. 51.

59