James v. Woods et al
Filing
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ORDER granting in part and denying in part 20 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Jay C. Zainey on 5/9/14. (jrc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MARK C. JAMES
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 14-216
SAM WOODS, STEPHANIE
WELBORN, ET AL.
SECTION: "A" (2)
ORDER
The following motion is before the Court: Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 20) filed
by defendants Sam Woods and Stephanie Welborn. Plaintiff Mark C. James opposes the
motion. The motion, noticed for submission on April 23, 2014, is before the Court on the
briefs without oral argument.
The movants seek dismissal of all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) on the ground that Plaintiff does not state a "plausible" claim for relief. For the
reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Mark C. James alleges that defendants Sam Woods and Stephanie Welborn
instigated his eventual prosecution for aggravated incest solely for the purpose of gaining
leverage in an ongoing custody dispute. (Rec. Doc. 9, FAC ¶¶ 1 & 2). James is suing
defendants Woods and Welborn for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of
emotional distress under Louisiana law. James is also asserting a claim for alienation of
affection under Mississippi law. James is a citizen of Louisiana. Woods and Welborn are
citizens of Mississippi.1
Sam Woods and Ms. Tracy James divorced in 2005, and the two are the parents of JW
James has also brought a negligence claim against the therapist (and her employer) who
suggested that the matter be reported to law enforcement for prosecution and later testified
against James. (Rec. Doc. 9, FAC ¶ 3). Those claims are not at issue in the instant motion.
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and AGW. Woods and Tracy shared custody but the children lived with Tracy. (FAC ¶ 38).
Mark James met and began to date Tracy in 2006 when she was going through a custody
dispute with Woods. (Id. ¶ 36). James and Tracy married in May 2007. Woods later married
Stephanie Welborn.
According to Mark James, when Woods learned that Tracy would move the children
from Hattiesburg to Slidell, he immediately and unsuccessfully moved the court for
modification of the extant custody agreement. (FAC ¶¶ 39, 41, 44 ). After the trial, Sam was
overheard saying "I am going to get that son of a [expletive] Mark James if it's the last thing I
do." (Id. 42).
In May or June 2008 Woods started taking AGW to the Office of Child Protective
Services in St. Tammany Parish. (FAC ¶ 45). According to the eventual allegations, James
either looked under or put his fingers under AGW's diapers, which the eight-year old wore
because of a bedwetting problem. (Id. ¶ 47). Woods and Welborn allegedly contacted
numerous other agencies and experts when they could not get the cooperation that they
sought. James contends that Woods and Welborn never mentioned anything about abuse
during the summer of 2008 and never objected when AGW stayed at James' home. (FAC ¶¶
54-59). AGW's allegations were at various times changed or recanted completely. (Id. ¶ 69).
Woods nonetheless met with a detective of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office on
October 14, 2008, to initiate a criminal complaint against James for his touching AGW. (FAC
¶ 86). James contends that Woods and Welborn repeatedly contacted the Sherrif's Office in
order to point them to the various counselors to which they had been sending AGW. (Id. ¶
87). James alleges that Woods and Welborn "painted a picture of the onset of bedwetting and
'yeast infections' for the Sheriff's Office as coinciding with AGW's move to Slidell and time
with [him]." (FAC ¶ 88). James contends that in doing so Woods and Welborn "purposefully
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withheld clear medical documentation which showed AGW's history of bedwetting and
urinary tract infections, a history which far predated Mark's ever even meeting Tracy or her
children." (Id. ¶ 89) (emphasis in original).
On November 18, 2008, the New Orleans Police Department Fugitive Division
arrested James at his place of employment. (FAC ¶ 96). Nearly five years later James was
tried for two days in St. Tammany Parish on a single count of aggravated incest. He was
found not guilty in February 2013, after the jury had deliberated for one hour. (Id. ¶¶ 99, 110,
111). Between the time of his arrest in 2008 and his trial in 2013, James lost his job of 27
years and he alleges that he was virtually unemployable notwithstanding his previously
spotless criminal record. (FAC ¶ 102). Woods ultimately prevailed in his custody battle. (Id. ¶
113). Tracy divorced James in September 2013. (Id. ¶ 117).
James filed the instant action against Woods, Welborn, and other defendants on
January 28, 2014. Vis à vis Woods and Welborn, James asserts claims for malicious
prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Louisiana law, and a claim
for alienation of affection under Mississippi law. James seeks to recover punitive damages
and attorney's fees under Mississippi law.
II.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Woods and Welborn argue that James does not state a claim for malicious
prosecution because he cannot establish causation, i.e., that their conduct was the sole cause
of his criminal prosecution. Defendants point out that they had no involvement in the
prosecutorial decision-making process, and that James was prosecuted following a criminal
investigation. Defendants argue that the independent investigation broke the causal chain of
events.
Woods and Welborn also argue that they are entitled to immunity under article 611 of
the Louisiana Children's Code.
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Defendants argue that issues of causation and immunity also bar James' intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim. Further, they contend that the conduct alleged is not of
the extreme and outrageous nature required to support a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Woods and Welborn argue that Erie and the appropriate application of conflict-oflaws preclude application of the Mississippi alienation of affection law to a Louisiana
marriage.
Finally, Defendants argue that dismissal of the substantive causes of action on the
foregoing bases negates the possibility of applying the Mississippi remedies of punitive
damages and attorney fees to James' Louisiana causes of action.
III.
DISCUSSION
In the context of a motion to dismiss the Court must accept all factual allegations in
the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Lormand v.
US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Lovick v.
Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004)). However, the foregoing tenet is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550, U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
The central issue in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is whether, in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief. Gentilello v. Rege, 627
F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir.
2008)). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court
does not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal
conclusions.” Id. (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)). Legal
conclusions must be supported by factual allegations. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
Malicious Prosecution
A claim for malicious prosecution comprises the following elements: 1) the
commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding; 2) its legal
causation by the present defendant in the original proceeding; 3) its bona fide termination in
favor of the present plaintiff; 4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; 5) the
presence of malice therein; and 6) damage conforming to legal standards resulting to the
plaintiff. Jones v. Soileau, 448 So. 2d 1268, 1271 (La. 1984) (citing Eusant v. Unity Indus.
Life Ins., 196 So. 554, 556 (La. 1940); Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Bolleter, 390 So. 2d 842, 843
(La. 1980)). The crucial determination regarding the probable cause element is whether the
defendant had an honest and reasonable belief in the guilt of the plaintiff at the time he
pressed charges. Jones, 448 So. 2d at 1272.
Defendants' arguments regarding causation lack merit in the context of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. If Defendants' arguments regarding intervening cause were correct as a
matter of law, then there would be no cause of action under Louisiana law for malicious
prosecution. In the criminal context, a malicious prosecution claim requires the initiation of
criminal proceedings, which may or may not include a full trial, that terminated favorably for
the plaintiff. Investigations by law enforcement and findings of probable cause by grand
juries are typically part of that process. Thus, the mere fact that law enforcement investigated
Woods' and Welborn's allegations, and that a district attorney obtained a grand jury
indictment, is not sufficient in and of itself to deprive James of a cause of action.
What Defendants' arguments fail to recognize is the concept of fault upon which
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liability for malicious prosecution must be based. Thus, when the defendant had an honest
and reasonable belief in the plaintiff's guilt at the time that he pressed charges, the plaintiff
may very well have a problem demonstrating a lack of probable cause and under some
circumstances that point may even be clear on the face of the complaint. But the allegations
in James' complaint, which the Court accepts as true, do not support the inference that
Woods and Welborn had an honest and reasonable belief that James was abusing AGW when
they reported James to law enforcement. In fact, the crux of James' well-pleaded complaint
is that the Defendants pursued criminal charges against him solely for the purpose of
retribution and for obtaining leverage in an ongoing custody battle. The allegations outline
significant circumstantial evidence that suggests that Defendants knew that James was not
abusing AGW. And most significantly, James alleges that Defendants presented misleading
medical evidence to the authorities in order to make James look guilty.
To be sure, when the facts come to light, James may not be able to prove that
Defendants lacked probable cause. Likewise, James might not be able to prove that
Defendants' fault, if any, permeated the entire criminal process from inception to trial. In
other words, when the facts come to light, it might be clear that at some point during the five
year ordeal the discretionary actions of law enforcement or the district attorney, untainted by
any fault on Defendants' part, constituted an intervening cause. But even if that is the case,
the result is not that James has no cause of action whatsoever because Louisiana law does
not require sole causation. Rather the issue becomes one of the reach of damages—whether
some fault on Defendants' part caused all of James' damages, in whole or in part, or whether
some intervening cause served to truncate the tabulation of damages that are attributable to
Defendants' fault. None of these issues are appropriate for a Rule 12(b)(6) disposition in this
case.
Similarly, Woods' and Welborn's claim to immunity under Children's Code article 611
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cannot be analyzed under Rule 12(b)(6). The statute immunizes "good faith" reports of abuse
and does not apply to persons who make a report "known to be false" or "with reckless
disregard for the truth of the report." La. Ch. Code art. 611(A)(1)(a), (B)(2). But in this case
the allegation is not that Defendants simply made a good faith mistake when they reported a
claim of sexual abuse that turned out to be unfounded. Rather, the claim is essentially that
Woods and Welborn invented a claim for ill motives.
In sum, Defendants' arguments are not cognizable in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss is therefore DENIED as to the malicious
prosecution claim.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The basis for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") in
Louisiana is Civil Code article 2315. Nicholas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 So. 2d 1017, 1021 (La.
2000). The essential elements of the claim are: 1) intent to cause, 2) severe emotional
distress by, 3) extreme and outrageous conduct. Groff v. Southwest Beverage Co., 997 So .2d
782, 786 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2008) (citing White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205 (La. 1991)).
It is not enough that the defendant has acted with intent which is tortuous, or that he
maliciously intended to inflict emotional distress. Nicholas, 765 So. 2d at 1022. Rather,
liability requires conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community. Id.
Essentially the claim in this case is that Defendants ruined James' life by falsely
accusing him of aggravated incest, a horrible and despicable crime, for the sole purpose of
retribution and leverage in a custody battle. Plaintiff's opposition states the point rhetorically
yet well: If this does not state a claim for IIED in Louisiana then how much more egregious
would the facts have to be? (Rec. Doc. 37, Opposition at 12).
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In sum, Defendants' arguments are not cognizable in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss is therefore DENIED as to the IIED claim.
Alienation of Affection
It is undisputed that Louisiana law does not recognize a cause of action for alienation
of affection. Mississippi does recognize such a cause of action. Plaintiff contends that for
purposes of this cause of action Mississippi law should be applied to the Defendants because
they reside in Mississippi and because some of their ill conduct occurred in that state.
Cases having contacts with other states are governed by Book IV of the Civil Code
entitled Conflict of Laws. La. Civ. Code art. 14 (Multistate cases). Article 3515 of Book IV
provides that an issue in a case having contacts with other states is governed by the state
whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue.
Civil claims for alienation of a spouse's affection have been soundly rejected and
recognized as against the public policy of this state since the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision in Moulin v. Monteleone, 115 So. 447 (1927).2 Although cited by neither party, the
most relevant decision available is Gaines v. Poindexter, 155 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. La. 1957),
which dealt with a Texas alienation of affection claim being pursued in a Louisiana federal
court. The district judge in that case authored a scholarly Louisiana choice of law analysis
that ultimately addressed the role of Erie when a federal court sitting in diversity adjudicates
a state-created cause of action. Id. at 641 (citing Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)). Simply, a federal court sitting in diversity should not entertain a non-federal cause
Part of the reasoning supporting the decision in Moulin was that Louisiana did not
recognize interference with a civil contract and marriage is at its base a civil contract. Of course
several years later the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized a limited cause of action for
interference with a contract in 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
Attempts to retract Moulin based on 9 to 5 Fashions have been soundly rejected. See, e.g.,
Greene v. Roy, 604 So. 2d 1359, 1362 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1992); Butler v. Reeder, 573 So. 2d 1159
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1991).
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of action that the state courts of the forum would find unenforceable as a matter of public
policy. Id. at 644.
James has not identified and the Court's own research has likewise failed to uncover a
single decision in which a Louisiana court has allowed a claim for alienation of affection.
Such a claim continues to be recognized by the courts of this state as against public policy
and therefore unenforceable. And as Gaines implicitly recognizes, the enforceability vel non
of the claim in a Louisiana court does not necessarily turn on how much of the tortuous
conduct underlying the claim occurred in the foreign state.
In sum, the Court is persuaded that James' claim for alienation of affection under
Mississippi law must be dismissed. Woods' and Welborn's motion is GRANTED as to this
claim.
Punitive Damages/Attorney's Fees
Defendants argue that dismissal of the substantive causes of action on the grounds of
intervening causation and Children's Code article 611 negate the claim for punitive damages
and attorney's fees under Mississippi law. The Court has already rejected, however,
Defendants' motion as to these grounds.
Moreover, unlike a claim for alienation of affection, the remedy of punitive damages is
not against Louisiana public policy. Civil Code article 3546 expressly authorizes Louisiana
courts to award punitive damages when certain criteria are met such as when the place where
the conduct occurred and the tortfeasor's domicile authorize an award of punitive damages.
La. Civ. Code art. 3546(1). The domicile of the victim is not a pertinent factor under this
article because punitive damages have more to do with the tortfeasor than with the victim.
Id. cmt. b.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants are domiciled in Mississippi and that some of the
injurious conduct occurred in that state. The Court cannot reject Plaintiff's contentions at
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this stage of the proceeding.
In sum, Defendants' arguments are not cognizable in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss is therefore DENIED as to the punitive damages
claim.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 20) filed by defendants
Sam Woods and Stephanie Welborn is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as
explained above.
May 9, 2014
_______________________________
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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