Knudsen v. Board of Supervisors of the University of Louisiana System

Filing 27

ORDER AND REASONS ON MOTION. For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and that plaintiff's retaliation claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The motion is otherwise DENIED. Trial will proceed on May 26, 2015 at 8:30 a.m. as to Knudsen's remaining claim of hostile work environment racial discrimination, with the final pretrial conference scheduled for May 12, 2015 at 2:00 p.m. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr on 4/16/2015. (tbl)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KEVIN KNUDSEN

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 14-382

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA SYSTEM

MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JOSEPH C. WILKINSON, JR.

ORDER AND REASONS ON MOTION
Plaintiff, Kevin Knudsen, alleges that his employer, the Board of Supervisors of
the University of Louisiana System (“the Board”), discriminated against him based on
his race by allowing his subordinate to foster a racially hostile work environment and that
the Board retaliated against him for having complained about the actions of his
subordinate by transferring him to a less desirable position, all in violation of Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), “and corresponding [but unspecified] state law.” Complaint,
Record Doc. No. 1 at p. 7. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge
for all proceedings and entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) upon
written consent of all parties. Record Doc. No. 10.
The Board filed a motion for summary judgment addressing plaintiff’s claims
under Title VII and alleging in a footnote that it enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity
from any state law claims. Record Doc. No. 22, at p.1 n.1. Knudsen filed a timely
memorandum in opposition, in which he fails to respond to defendant’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity argument or to argue that any “corresponding state law” applies

to his claims. Record Doc. No. 25. A party’s failure to brief an argument in response to
a summary judgment motion waives that argument. Accordingly, Knudsen is deemed
to have abandoned any contention either that he has state law claims or that defendant
is not immune under the Eleventh Amendment from being sued in this court for such
claims. McDaniel v. Shell Oil Co., 350 F. App’x 924, 927 (5th Cir. 2009); Blackwell v.
Laque, 275 F. App’x 363, 366 n.3 (5th Cir. 2008); Ledet v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 245
F.3d 791, 2000 WL 1910173, at *3 (5th Cir. 2000).
The Board filed a timely reply memorandum in support of its summary judgment
motion.

Record Doc. No. 26.

The memorandum contained two new exhibits,

Defendant’s Exhibits J and K, which the court did not consider because plaintiff had no
opportunity to respond to those exhibits. Even if the court had considered the exhibits,
they would not have changed the outcome of this decision.
Having considered the complaint, the record, the arguments of the parties and the
applicable law, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED IN PART as to
plaintiff’s retaliation claim and DENIED IN PART as to his hostile work environment
claim, for the following reasons.

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ANALYSIS
A.

Standards of Review

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense–or
the part of each claim or defense–on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). Rule 56, as revised effective December 1, 2010, establishes new procedures for
supporting factual positions:
(1) A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must
support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence. A
party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot
be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.
(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only the cited materials,
but it may consider other materials in the record.
(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support
or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that
would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is
competent to testify on the matters stated.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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Thus, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those materials in
the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuinely disputed material fact,
but it is not required to negate elements of the nonmoving party’s case. Capitol Indem.
Corp. v. United States, 452 F.3d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “[A] party who does not have the trial burden of production
may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot produce
admissible evidence to carry its burden as to [a particular material] fact.” Advisory
Committee Notes, at 261.
A fact is “material” if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome
of the action under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). No genuine dispute of material fact exists if a rational trier of fact could not find
for the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented. Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t
Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1994).
To withstand a properly supported motion, the nonmoving party who bears the
burden of proof at trial must cite to particular evidence in the record to support the
essential elements of its claim. Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321-23); accord U.S. ex
rel. Patton v. Shaw Servs., L.L.C., 418 F. App’x 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2011). “[A] complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case renders
all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; accord U.S. ex rel. Patton, 418 F.
App’x at 371.
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“Factual controversies are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,
but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that an actual controversy
exists.” Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 1998); accord Murray
v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 2005). “We do not, however, in the absence of any
proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.”
Badon v. R J R Nabisco Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted)
(emphasis in original). “Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts . . . will
not prevent the award of summary judgment; ‘the plaintiff [can]not rest on his allegations
. . . to get to a jury without any “significant probative evidence tending to support the
complaint.”’” Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees, 40 F.3d at 713 (quoting Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249).
“Moreover, the nonmoving party’s burden is not affected by the type of case;
summary judgment is appropriate in any case where critical evidence is so weak or
tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of the
nonmovant.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (quotation
omitted) (emphasis in original); accord Duron v. Albertson’s LLC, 560 F.3d 288, 291
(5th Cir. 2009).
B.

Material Fact Issues Are in Dispute Regarding Plaintiff’s Hostile Work
Environment Claim

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“The creation of a hostile work environment through harassment . . . is a form of
proscribed discrimination” under Title VII. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434,
2455 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998); Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986)).
The Board argues that Knudsen cannot establish a prima facie case of a racially hostile
work environment because he cannot prove either that the alleged harassment was based
on his race or that it was severe or pervasive enough to affect a term, condition or
privilege of his employment. I find that Knudsen’s evidence is sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact that requires trial of his hostile work environment claim.
This case does not fit the usual pattern of allegations by an employee that either
his supervisor or a co-worker created a hostile work environment. The legal standards
for those usual fact patterns are well established. To establish a prima facie case of
hostile work environment under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that
(1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subjected to
unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of
was based on [a prohibited ground]; (4) the harassment
complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of
employment; [and] (5) the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment in question and failed to take
prompt remedial action.
Mitchell v. Snow, 326 F. App’x 852, 856-57 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ramsey v.
Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002)). For purposes of the pending motion for

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summary judgment only, defendant does not contest that Knudsen could establish the
first two prongs of the test.
“‘[W]here the harassment is allegedly committed by a supervisor with immediate
or successively higher authority, the plaintiff employee needs to satisfy only the first four
of the elements listed above.’” Parker v. La. Dep’t of Special Educ., 323 F. App’x 321,
325 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 353
(5th Cir. 2001)); accord Equal Emp’mt Opportunity Comm’n v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co.,
731 F.3d 444, 452-53 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citing Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439). “If
the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, the employer
is strictly liable.” Id. at 452. However, if no tangible employment action is taken, the
employer will have the opportunity to prove its affirmative Ellerth/Faragher defense. Id.
(citing Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439).
“An employee is a supervisor if ‘he or she is empowered by the employer to take
tangible employment actions against the victim.’” Id. (quoting Vance, 133 S. Ct. at
2439). If the employer has not “empowered that employee to take tangible employment
actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a ‘significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits,’” Vance, 133 S.
Ct. at 2443, plaintiff must establish the fifth prong of a prima facie case. This means that
a plaintiff who sues his employer for the hostile conduct of a co-worker must prove that
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defendant was negligent in failing to prevent and remedy the alleged harassment. Id. at
2439, 2448; Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d at 452.
Knudsen, a Caucasian male with the rank of Sergeant in the Parking Division of
the Southeastern Louisiana University (the “University”) Police Department, was the
supervisor of Angela Jones, an African-American police officer in the Parking Division.
Knudsen accuses Jones, his subordinate, of race-based actions toward him that created
a hostile work environment. He also complains that Dr. Marvin Yates, the Vice
President for Student Affairs and an African-American, refused to respond to Knudsen’s
repeated complaints about Jones as they were passed up the chain of authority from
Knudsen to his immediate supervisor, the Director of the University Police Department,
and from there to Dr. Yates, who was the supervisor of the Police Department Director.
The established four-prong test for supervisory liability applies to plaintiff’s allegations
that Dr. Yates abetted the hostile work environment allegedly created by Jones.
However, that test cannot apply to Jones’s actions because she was not plaintiff’s
supervisor. The unusual fact pattern of a supervisor alleging that a subordinate created
a hostile work environment does not appear in any Fifth Circuit case. The Board cites
one decision from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in which
a supervisor sought to hold her employer liable for alleged sexual harassment by her
subordinate employee. Lyles v. Dist. of Columbia, 17 F. Supp. 3d 59 (D.D.C. 2014),
reconsideration denied, 2014 WL 421614 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2014). “No court has ever
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held that, as a matter of law, an employer cannot be liable for a subordinate’s harassment
of his or her supervisor.” Id. at 70 n.7 (citing Parada v. Great Plains Int’l of Sioux City,
Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 777, 796 n.6 (N.D. Iowa 2007)).
This “unique factual twist” presented a matter of first impression that neither the
United States Supreme Court nor the District of Columbia Circuit had addressed and that
“very few courts have ever . . . faced.” Id. at 70 & n.6 (citing Ann Carey Juliano,
Harassing Women with Power: The Case of Including Contra-Power Harassment Within
Title VII, 87 B.U.L. Rev. 491, 516-23 (2007) (finding only 24 federal cases or agency
actions where the issue arose)). Therefore, the Lyles court applied a modified version
of the fifth factor of the hostile work environment prima facie case, as follows.
An employer may be held liable for the harassment of a supervisor by a
subordinate if the employer knew or should have known of the harassment
and failed to implement prompt and appropriate action; but an employer
will not be liable for the sexual harassment of a supervisor by a subordinate
where the supervisor-plaintiff had the ability to stop the harassmentFN8
and failed to do so. The Court finds this standard to be the most
appropriate because it empowers the supervisor to remove or reprimand the
subordinate-harasser, while ensuring that if the supervisor is unable to
address the harassment and reports the subordinate-harasser to her
supervisors, i.e., takes action to stop the harassment, and it is unsuccessful
or the employer resists such actions, the employer will still be liable for
allowing the hostile work environment to persist despite being on notice of
the problem. Other courts confronting this issue have developed a similar
standard, albeit less explicitly.
FN8. This could include reporting the harassment to the
supervisor’s own supervisor, but it could also include doing
something to effect a “significant change in employment
status,” see Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443, of the harasser, such as
firing, or reprimanding the employee.
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Id. at 70-71 (citing Mingo v. Roadway Express, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 884, 891, 898
(N.D. Ill. 2001); Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 930-31 (M.D.
Ala. 1992); Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1497-98 (W.D. Mo. 1989);
Lewis v. Sugar Creek Stores, Inc., No. 96-CV-0100E(H), 1996 WL 685730, at *2
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1996); Hanlon v. Chambers, 195 W. Va. 99, 108-09, 464 S.E.2d 741
(1995)) (emphasis added).
There is evidence in the instant case that Knudsen lacked authority to discipline
Jones, who was a classified Civil Service employee. He could only recommend to his
immediate supervisor, the Director of the University Police Department, that disciplinary
action be taken against Jones, and the Director himself could only recommend such
action to his own supervisor, Dr. Yates, or the director of human resources. Viewed in
the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is evidence that Knudsen repeatedly
complained about Jones orally and in writing to his supervisors, the human resources
department and the University’s EEOC officer, and that upper level management did
little to respond until Jones was finally terminated in April 2014. Thus, whether this
court applies the Fifth Circuit’s established co-worker to co-worker harassment standard,
i.e., that the Board knew or should have known of Jones’s harassment and failed to take
prompt remedial action, or the subordinate-to-supervisor standard used by the Lyles
court, i.e., that the supervisor-plaintiff had the ability to stop the harassment and failed

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to do so, material fact issues are in dispute as to the fifth prong of Knudsen’s hostile work
environment prima facie case.
Material disputed fact issues also remain as to the third prong of Knudsen’s prima
facie case, whether Jones’s conduct of which plaintiff complains was “based on race” and
“had a racial character or purpose.” Watkins v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 269 F.
App’x 457, 464 (5th Cir. 2008). Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that at least some of Jones’s
conduct towards Knudsen was racially based.
Material fact issues are also in dispute as to the fourth prong of Knudsen’s prima
facie case, whether the conduct of Jones and the alleged non-responsiveness of plaintiff’s
superiors to his complaints was so “severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
[Knudsen’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). To determine whether harassment meets this standard,
the court considers a number of factors: “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct,
its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating (or whether it is a mere
offensive utterance), and whether it unreasonably interferes with the victim’s work
performance.” Id. Material fact questions are in dispute as to each of these factors.
“Finally, the conduct must be both objectively offensive, meaning that a
reasonable person would find it hostile and abusive, and subjectively offensive, meaning
that the victim perceived it to be so.” Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321,
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330 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). There is ample subjective testimony of the
havoc that Jones’s conduct created in the University Police Department and its effect on
Knudsen, and there is sufficient evidence to create a fact question whether her actions
and the actions and/or inactions of Dr. Yates and other higher management officials
fostered an objectively hostile or abusive work environment for plaintiff.
Summary judgment on Knudsen’s hostile work environment discrimination claim
is therefore denied.
C.

No Material Facts Are in Dispute as to Plaintiff’s Claim of Retaliation

To meet his summary judgment burden to demonstrate a material fact issue
regarding his retaliation claim, Knudsen must provide evidence to
establish that: (1) he participated in an activity protected by Title VII;
(2) his employer took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) a
causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. . . . If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to state a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason
for its decision. After the employer states its reason, the burden shifts back
to the employee to demonstrate that the employer’s reason is actually a
pretext for retaliation.
An employee establishes pretext by showing that the adverse action
would not have occurred “but for” the employer’s retaliatory reason for the
action. In order to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must show a
conflict in substantial evidence on the question of whether the employer
would not have taken the action “but for” the protected activity.
Coleman v. Jason Pharm., 540 F. App’x 302, 303-04 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted)
(citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533-34 (2013);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); McCoy v. City of
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Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. 2007); LeMaire v. Louisiana, 480 F.3d 383,
388-89 (5th Cir. 2007); Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 308 (5th Cir. 1996)); accord
Feist v. La. Dep’t of Justice, 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013). “The employer’s burden
is only one of production, not persuasion, and involves no credibility assessment.”
McCoy, 492 F.3d at 557 (citation omitted).
Solely for the purposes of the Board’s pending summary judgment motion, it is
undisputed that Knudsen was transferred from his position as the Sergeant in charge of
the Parking Division to a vacant position as a supervisory patrol officer on the night shift
after he had repeatedly complained to his superiors about Jones’s conduct for many
months. Although plaintiff’s title, rank and salary were not affected by the transfer, he
contends that the transfer was actually a demotion because it afforded him decreased
supervisory responsibilities, fewer opportunities to earn overtime or special detail pay
and less desirable hours. For purposes of the pending motion only, the Board does not
argue that Knudsen cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation, and the court
therefore assumes without deciding that plaintiff can do so. See Wooten v. McDonald
Transit Assocs., Inc., 775 F.3d 689, 696 (5th Cir. 2015) (“a variety of concrete actions
(changes in hours, reduced responsibilities, demotion, preclusion from job-related
certification) . . . together might amount to an adverse employment action”); Amanduron
v. Am. Airlines, 416 F. App’x 421, 424 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted) (citing Casna
v. City of Loves Park, 574 F.3d 420, 427 (7th Cir. 2009); Hagan v. Echostar Satellite,
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L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008); Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir.
2002)) (“[A]n informal complaint may constitute protected activity for purposes of
retaliation claims.”).
The Board has produced evidence of its legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its
action. The uncontradicted, competent evidence shows that Dr. John Crain, the
University’s President and a Caucasian, decided to hire a consultant, Willie Bell of the
Bell Consulting Group, to perform a comprehensive evaluation of the entire University
Police Department, not just the Parking Division. Defendant’s Exh. F, deposition of Dr.
John Crain, at pp. 86-90. Bell, an African-American, was on campus to review the police
department for five days in September 2013. Bell Consulting Group’s report, Record
Doc. No. 22-8, Defendant’s Exh. G, at p. 1.
On October 28, 2013, the Bell Consulting Group issued its report, which included
37 recommendations for restructuring and improving the University police department
as a whole. Part of the report recommended that parking be separated from law
enforcement functions because parking is a civilian function that “should not be managed
by a sworn law enforcement officer (Police Sergeant),” but “by a single parking
professional.” Id. at p. 7. Therefore, Bell recommended that the Board “[m]ove the
Sergeant out of Parking Division management, . . .” and “return the position to sworn law
enforcement responsibilities.” Id. at p. 8, Recommendation #6. Knudsen was the
sergeant in charge of the Parking Division.
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The report is clear that the recommendation was made for legitimate nonretaliatory and non-discriminatory reasons, including: “Police officers [in the Parking
Division and elsewhere] perform several non-law enforcement functions that would more
efficiently and cost-effectively be provided by others, an important consideration since
the number of officers has been reduced. . . . . [P]arking enforcement is not a law
enforcement function and there should not be police officers performing parking
enforcement. . . . [The University] is a large campus and it is growing larger, (sic) the
Parking manager needs to be an experienced parking professional who knows how to
configure and reconfigure parking operations to adjust to the increasing complexities that
accompany growth.” Id. at pp. 1, 7, 9.
Knudsen filed an EEOC charge alleging hostile work environment race
discrimination and retaliation on November 14, 2013. EEOC charge, Record Doc. No.
22-9, Defendant’s Exh. H. More than five months later, on April 23, 2014, Dr. Yates
advised the Interim Director of the University Police Department that the Administration
had decided to separate parking from the police, which required that Knudsen be
transferred laterally. Dr. Yates assigned a civilian employee as interim supervisor of
parking and transferred Knudsen to a vacant position as a supervisor in the patrol
division of the police department, effective May 7, 2014. Letter from Dr. Yates to
Carmen Bray, Record Doc. No. 22-10, Defendant’s Exh. I; Plaintiff’s deposition, Record
Doc. No. 22-4, Defendant’s Exh. C at p. 247. This is the allegedly retaliatory action of
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which Knudsen complains in this matter. Plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition to
motion for summary judgment, Record Doc. No. 25 at pp. 7, 16, 19.
Defendant’s evidence, if believed by the trier of fact, establishes legitimate nonretaliatory reasons for the Board’s actions. The burden therefore shifts back to Knudsen
to produce competent evidence that demonstrates a material fact issue that the Board’s
reasons were actually a pretext for retaliation against him because he had engaged in
activity protected by Title VII or, stated another way, that retaliation was the “but for”
cause of his transfer. Plaintiff has produced- nothing but conclusory statements and
subjective beliefs to support his allegations.
There is no evidence that Dr. Yates decided to hire Bell, much less that Bell was
chosen, because he was an African-American or for the purpose of retaliating against
Knudsen, as plaintiff suggests in his memorandum. Dr. Crain testified that he – not Dr.
Yates – decided to have a consultant review the police department as a whole and to hire
Bell. Dr. Crain stated that Bell was highly recommended to him by the president of
another university that had used Bell’s services for a similar review. Dr. Crain neither
inquired about nor knew Bell’s race until Bell came to campus. Dr. Crain testified
without contradiction that Dr. Yates did not recommend Bell to him, but Dr. Yates
merely concurred in Dr. Crain’s recommendation that a review be conducted and in the
choice of Bell after they learned more about his qualifications. Dr. Crain deposition,
Record Doc. No. 22-7, Defendant’s Exh. F at pp. 86-91. There is no evidence that Dr.
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Yates or anyone else retaliated against Knudsen by causing him to be reassigned or that
his transfer was for any purpose other than that recommended by Bell’s comprehensive
report to improve the overall functioning of the police department by separating the
essentially civilian function of the parking division from the police department and
returning the sergeant’s position to law enforcement responsibilities only. Plaintiff’s
mere subjective belief that Dr. Yates had a retaliatory motive fails to rebut the competent
evidence or to establish a disputed issue of material fact as to the retaliation claim.
Chambers v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 428 F. App’x 400, 419 n.54 (5th Cir. 2011); Strong
v. Univ. Health Care Sys., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 802, 807 (5th Cir. 2007); Roberson v. Alltel
Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 654 (5th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, defendant’s motion for
summary judgment is granted as to plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and that plaintiff’s retaliation claim is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The motion is otherwise DENIED. Trial will proceed
on May 26, 2015 at 8:30 a.m. as to Knudsen’s remaining claim of hostile work

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environment racial discrimination, with the final pretrial conference scheduled for
May 12, 2015 at 2:00 p.m.

16th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _________ day of April, 2015.

JOSEPH C. WILKINSON, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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