Garnett v. Pugh et al

Filing 58

ORDER & REASONS: granting 48 plaintiff's Motion in Limine Regarding Evidence of Prior Arrest for Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated, First Offense. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 4/10/15. (sek)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

GARNETT

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 14-479

PUGH ET AL.

SECTION: “J” (4)
ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is Plaintiff Paulette Garnett’s Motion In
Limine

Regarding

Evidence

of

Prior

Arrest

for

Operating

a

Vehicle While Intoxicated, First Offense (Rec. Doc. 48) as well
as

Defendants

(Waggoners),

Christopher

and

Protective

Pugh,

The

Insurance

Waggoners

Company

Trucking

(Protective)’s

opposition thereto. (Rec. Doc. 57) Having considered the motion
and memoranda of the parties, the record, and the applicable
law, the Court finds that the motion should be GRANTED for the
reasons set forth more fully below.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This action arises out of a rear-end collision involving
Garnett

and

a

tractor-trailer

combination

owned

by

Defendant

Waggoners on February 5, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 27-30, p. 1-2) The
facts surrounding the rear-end collision are in dispute. At or
around

the

time

of

the

collision,

Garnett

alleges

she

was

driving in the left lane of US 90B, also known as the “Westbank
Expressway,”
Jefferson

near

Parish,

its

intersection

Louisiana.

(Rec.

with
Doc.

Westwood
27-30,

p.

Drive

in

2)

or

At

around that same time, Garnett alleges that a Waggoners 2012
Kenworth

tractor

with

employee

Christopher

flatbed

Pugh,

trailer,

was

operated

traveling

behind

by

Waggoners

her

vehicle.

Jeremy Davis (Davis), Pugh’s son and also a Waggoners’ employee,
rode with Pugh as the alleged co-driver on the trip. Id. Garnett
asserts that she observed the traffic signal change from green
to yellow as she approached the intersection of Westwood Drive
and slowed her vehicle to a stop accordingly. Id. The tractortrailer operated by Pugh then collided with the rear of her
vehicle.

Id.

testimony

Although

that

she

Garnett

changed

admitted

lanes

before

in

her

deposition

the

collision,

the

parties dispute the specific time this occurred. (Rec. Doc. 35,
p. 2) Although Garnett asserts that her lane change did not
contribute
changed

to

lanes

the
and

accident,
stopped

Waggoners

abruptly

in

alleges
a

way

that

that

Garnett

left

Pugh

without enough time and distance to stop the tractor-trailer.
(Rec. Doc. 27-30, p. 2-4)
Subsequently,

Garnett

filed

suit

in

the

24th

Judicial

District of Louisiana against Pugh, Waggoners, and Protective on
January

9,

2014.

(Rec.

Doc.

1,

p.

1)

Thereafter,

Protective

removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332
and 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on February 28, 2014. (Rec. Doc. 1) Garnett
filed the instant motion on March 18, 2015, seeking to exclude
any

and

all

evidence,

including

2

witness

testimony,

regarding

Garnett’s prior arrest for a first offense operating a vehicle
while intoxicated charge that occurred several years prior to
the rear-end collision at issue in this case. (Rec. Doc. 48)
Defendants timely opposed the motion on March 31, 2015. (Rec.
Doc. 57)
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Garnett moves the Court to exclude any and all evidence of
a prior arrest for “Operating a Vehicle while Intoxicated, First
Offense,”

because

Garnett

was

acquitted

of

the

charge

in

accordance with the provisions of Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 894. Garnett first argues that because she was
acquitted, she was not convicted of the charge. Alternatively,
Garnett argues that even if she was not “technically acquitted
of

the

charge,”

any

and

all

evidence

regarding

the

charge,

including witness testimony, is still inadmissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 609(c)(1). Specifically, Garnett argues that
because

the

court

set

aside

her

conviction,

dismissed

the

prosecution, and granted a judgment of acquittal under Louisiana
Code

of

Criminal

inadmissible
certificate

Procedure

because
of

the

article

conviction

rehabilitation,

or

894,
was

other

the

“the

evidence
subject

equivalent

of

is
a

procedure

based on a finding that the person has been rehabilitated as
defined by Federal Rule of Evidence 609(c)(1).”

3

Defendants argue that although they have not yet raised
this particular issue in any pleading or hearing before this
Court, Garnett’s allegations lack merit and the instant Motion
in

Limine

should

be

denied.

First,

Defendants

assert

that

Garnett has incorrectly stated that evidence of her prior arrest
and guilty plea is inadmissible in this case based on Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894. Specifically, they argue
that

(1)

this

article

does

not

necessarily

apply

to

civil

lawsuits, (2) Garnett has failed to cite to any civil case that
excludes

evidence

of

a

prior

arrest

or

criminal

conviction

pursuant to Article 894, and (3) under Article 894, a dismissal
still “may be considered as a prior offense and provide the
basis

for

challenge

subsequent
Garnett’s

prosecution.”
allegation

that

Furthermore,
because

she

Defendants
was

not

“convicted” of a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment
for more than one year, her arrest and guilty plea are not
admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 609. In so doing, they
suggest that Garnett’s conviction is one involving a dishonest
act or false statement.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal

Rule

of

Evidence

609

governs

the

use

of

prior

criminal convictions for impeaching witnesses. When impeaching a
witness’s character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal
conviction, evidence of a crime that was punishable by death or

4

by

imprisonment

for

more

than

one

year

in

the

convicting

jurisdiction must be admitted in a civil case, subject to Rule
403

of

the

Federal

Rules

Evidence. 1

of

FED.

R.

EVID.

609.

Furthermore, regardless of the punishment, evidence of any crime
in which “the court can readily determine that that establishing
the elements of the crime required proving--or the witness's
admitting--a

dishonest

act

or

false

statement,”

must

be

admitted. FED. R. EVID. 609.
DISCUSSION
Federal

Rule

of

Evidence

609

admits

evidence

of

crimes

punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year, or
crimes, regardless of punishment, involving dishonesty or false
statements. See FED. R. EVID. 609. The Court finds that Garnett’s
arrest and guilty plea to Louisiana Revised Statute 14:48, or to

1

The pertinent part of Federal Rule of Evidence 609 reads,
a) In General. The following rules apply to attacking a witness's
character
for
truthfulness
by
evidence
of
a
criminal
conviction:
(1)

for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was
punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one
year, the evidence:
(A)

(2)

must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a
civil case or in a criminal case in which the
witness is not a defendant…

for any crime regardless of the punishment, the
evidence must be admitted if the court can readily
determine that establishing the elements of the crime
required
proving--or
the
witness's
admitting--a
dishonest act or false statement.

FED. R. EVID. 609.

5

a first offense driving while intoxicated charge (“DWI”), does
not fall within the crimes that must be admitted into evidence
under Federal Rule of Evidence 609. (Rec. Doc. 48-3) Garnett’s
first offense DWI charge carries a possible sentence of no more
than

six

months

in

Louisiana

and

does

not

require

proof

of

dishonest acts or false statements. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:98.1 (2015). Therefore, any evidence regarding Garnett’s DWI
is

not

subject

to

the

requirements

of

Rule

609.

See

United

States v. Nichols, 808 F.2d 660, 664 (8th Cir. 1987)(affirming
the

district

conviction
purposes

court’s

for

under

refusal

driving
Rule

609

to

while
because

admit

a

witness’

intoxicated
the

crime

for

previous

impeachment

neither

carried

a

sentence of death or imprisonment for more than one year nor
involved dishonesty or false statement); see also United States
v. Entrekin, 624 F.2d 597, 598-99 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that
the district court properly excluded evidence of “the witness'
prior conviction for shoplifting because the crime neither was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year nor
involved dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of
Fed.

R. Evid.

609(a)(2)”);

United

States

v.

Houston,

481

F.

App'x 188, 193 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding that the district court
committed
shoplifting

error

in

conviction

allowing
and

evidence

revocation

of

of

a

misdemeanor

Houston's

probation

based on that conviction on cross-examination, over objection).

6

Because the Court finds that Garnett’s prior conviction is not
admissible

under

Rule

609(a),

the

Court

will

exclude

such

evidence. 2 See Entrekin, 624 F.2d at 598-99. Accordingly,
IT

IS

HEREBY

ORDERED

that

Garnett’s

Motion

In

Limine

Regarding Evidence of Prior Arrest for Operating a Vehicle While
Intoxicated, First Offense (Rec. Doc. 48) is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 10th day of April, 2015.

CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2

Both parties spend a considerable amount of time within their briefs
discussing whether Garnett’s completion of probation, conviction being set
aside, prosecution dismissal, and judgment of acquittal pursuant to Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894 constitute a “certificate of
rehabilitation” under Federal Rule of Evidence 609. However, the Court does
not find it necessary to reach this issue, because the Court excludes
evidence of Garnett’s first offense DWI on other grounds.

7