Cheshire v. Jefferson Parish et al
Filing
45
ORDER AND REASONS granting in part 33 Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's federal and state law claims for false arrest against Defendant Ordoyne and his Monell and state law negligence claims against Defendant Sheriff Normand are DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm)
.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
STREET BENJAMIN CHESHIRE
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 14-578
JEFFERSON PARISH, ET AL
SECTION: “H”(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 33). Plaintiff opposes this Motion in part. For the
following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
On March 13, 2013, Plaintiff was arrested for disturbing the peace in the
Walmart parking lot in Harahan, Louisiana. He was handcuffed and placed
in Defendant Deputy Daniel Ordoyne’s police cruiser and transported to
Jefferson Parish Correctional Center (“JPPC”) for processing. What occurred
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in the police cruiser during that transport is significantly in dispute and forms
the basis of this lawsuit.
According to Plaintiff, while in transport, he asked the Defendant on
multiple occasions, “why he was being arrested.” After initially ignoring the
questions, Defendant told the Plaintiff to “shut the ‘F’ up” and slammed on the
brakes several times. This braking caused Plaintiff’s face to slam into the
divider separating him from the officer. In an effort to protect his face, Plaintiff
contends that he moved his handcuffed hands from behind his back. Plaintiff
then began to swear at the Defendant and ridicule him about his weight.
Eventually, Defendant pulled the cruiser onto the shoulder and ordered
Plaintiff to “get the ‘F’ out.” Initially Plaintiff refused and moved to the other
side of the seat. Defendant then threatened Plaintiff that if he refused to exit
the vehicle “it would be twice as bad.” Plaintiff eventually complied and exited
the vehicle.
Upon exiting, Defendant immediately placed Plaintiff in a
headlock and began beating him. In his Complaint, Plaintiff contends that at
no time did he resist arrest.
Defendants, in stark contrast, contend that while in transport, Plaintiff
became belligerent, removed his hands from behind his back, banged his hands
against the glass partition. Defendant alleges that he was concerned that
Plaintiff could breach the glass partition and harm him.
As a result of this
concern, Defendant pulled the cruiser onto the shoulder in an effort to resecure Plaintiff. Defendant alleges that when he opened the rear passenger
door, Plaintiff emerged from the vehicle and grabbed him. As part of the
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ensuing struggle, Plaintiff struck his head on the door locking mechanism.
Defendant struck Plaintiff two times on the right side of the face. Eventually,
Plaintiff was subdued and transported to JPCC with the assistance of other
deputies.
Plaintiff was charged in state court with disturbing the peace, escape,
and felony resisting arrest by force of violence. The Court stayed this matter
pending adjudication of the criminal charges.
Plaintiff was ultimately
convicted of misdemeanor resisting arrest in violation of La. Rev. Stat. 14:108
and disturbing the peace in violation of La. Rev Stat. 14:103, and his appeal
has been exhausted. Accordingly, the Court lifted the stay and allowed the
matter to proceed. This Motion follows.
LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants have styled their Motion as a Motion to Dismiss or,
Alternatively, a Motion for Summary Judgement. Because the parties have
submitted to the Court matters outside the pleadings, such as affidavits, the
Court will treat the Motion as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”1 A genuine issue of fact exists
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2012).
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only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.”2
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,
the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws
all reasonable inferences in his favor.3 “If the moving party meets the initial
burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts
showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.”4 Summary judgment is
appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.”5 “In response to a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must
identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that
evidence supports that party’s claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to
sustain a finding in favor of the non-movant on all issues as to which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial.”6 “We do not . . . in the absence
of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 1997).
4 Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).
5 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
6 John v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th
Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
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necessary facts.”7
Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a factual
dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.”8
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are precluded by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey because he was found guilty of resisting
arrest.9
Defendants also argue that the claims against them should be
dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity. The Court will address these
arguments in turn
I. Dismissal Based on the Heck Doctrine
Plaintiff concedes and this Court agrees that his federal and state law
claims for false arrest against Ordoyne and his Monell and state law negligence
claims against Sheriff Normand should be dismissed. He argues, however,
that his §1983 excessive force claim and his state law battery claim against
Defendant Ordoyne and his related respondeat superior claim against the
sheriff should be maintained.10
Pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey,
Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
8 Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).
9 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)
10 Louisiana applies the Heck doctrine to claims arising under state law that would
impugn a criminal conviction. Williams v. Harding, 117 So. 3d 187, 191 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2013)
(collecting cases). Accordingly, the analysis as to preclusion of the section 1983 excessive
force claim and the related state law battery claim is identical.
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a plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime cannot recover
damages for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights if the
alleged violation arose from the same facts attendant to the charge
for which he was convicted, unless he proves “that the conviction
or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”11
When a district court confronts a § 1983 claim for damages that
implicates a conviction or sentence, “Heck requires the district court to consider
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”12 If that is the case, “the complaint
must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or
sentence has already been invalidated.”13 Put another way, if it is possible
both for Plaintiff to have resisted arrest and for Defendant’s use of force to be
objectively unreasonable, then Heck does not bar Plaintiff’s claim.14
In arguing that his claims for excessive force should be maintained,
Plaintiff relies on Bush v. Strain.15 There, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim
to recover for alleged violations of her Fourth Amendment rights in connection
with the use of force to affect her arrest.16 Though she initially denied ever
Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 486–87, (1994)).
12 Ballard, 444 F.3d at 396 (citations omitted).
13 Id.
14 See id. at 398.
15 513 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2008)
16 Id. at 496.
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resisting arrest, she ultimately admitted in her deposition that she pulled
away from the officer when he tried to arrest her.17 The district court granted
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Heck precluded her
action for excessive use of force because of her conviction for resisting arrest.18
The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether plaintiff had ended her efforts to resist and submitted to the
officer’s authority prior to the officer’s alleged excessive force.19 The court
noted that the state court judge in the criminal matter issued very narrow
factual findings and made no finding regarding how long the plaintiff’s
resistance lasted. The court held that “a § 1983 claim [does] not necessarily
imply the invalidity of a resisting arrest conviction, and therefore would not be
barred by Heck, if the factual basis for the conviction is temporally and
conceptually distinct from the excessive force claim.”20 “[T]he determination of
whether such claims are barred is analytical and fact-intensive, requiring [a
court] to focus on whether success on the excessive force claim requires
negation of an element of the criminal offense or proof of a fact that is
inherently inconsistent with one underlying the criminal conviction.”21
Accordingly, “the court must review the sequence of events as alleged by the
Id.
Id.
19 Id. at 499.
20 Id. at 498.
21 Id.
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plaintiff and determine whether that sequence of events is inconsistent with
the underlying criminal conviction.”22
In this case, the state court judge did not specify the conduct upon which
she based Plaintiff’s conviction. Plaintiff argues that his version of events as
testified to at trial and in his affidavit in support of his Opposition could
support both a conviction for resisting arrest and a claim for excessive use of
force. This Court agrees. Plaintiff was convicted of resisting arrest under La.
Rev. Stat. 14:108, which, in pertinent part, provides:
A. Resisting an officer is the intentional interference with,
opposition or resistance to, or obstruction of an individual acting
in his official capacity and authorized by law to make a lawful
arrest, lawful detention, or seizure of property or to serve any
lawful process or court order when the offender knows or has
reason to know that the person arresting, detaining, seizing
property, or serving process is acting in his official capacity.
B. (1) The phrase “obstruction of” as used herein shall, in addition
to its common meaning, signification, and connotation mean the
following:
(a) Flight by one sought to be arrested before the arresting officer
can restrain him and after notice is given that he is under arrest.
(b) Any violence toward or any resistance or opposition to the
arresting officer after the arrested party is actually placed under
arrest and before he is incarcerated in jail.
(c) Refusal by the arrested or detained party to give his name and
make his identity known to the arresting or detaining officer or
providing false information regarding the identity of such party to
the officer.
Payton v. Normand, No. 13-310, Doc. 18 (quoting Stephens v. Scott, 244 F. App’x
603 (5th Cir. 2007)).
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(d) Congregation with others on a public street and refusal to move
on when ordered by the officer.
Plaintiff’s description of his conduct in the back seat of the police cruiser is
sufficient to support a conviction for resisting arrest under La. Rev. Stat.
14:108 (B)(1)(b), as he admits to yelling, cursing, and switching the position of
his cuffed hands. He also initially refused to comply with an order to exit the
vehicle and actually slid to other side of the seat away from the officer. He
avers, however, that he ceased this behavior prior to the beating allegedly
inflicted by Defendant. A finding that his resistance continued through the
encounter outside of the police cruiser was not necessary to sustain Plaintiff’s
conviction for resisting arrest. Indeed, a review of the record indicates that the
judge viewed the conduct in the back seat of the car as relevant to the
resistance charge.23
Accordingly, as in Bush, summary judgment in this
matter is precluded by this unresolved question of fact: whether plaintiff had
ceased to resist arrest prior to the infliction of the alleged excessive force.24 To
prevail on an excessive force claim, Plaintiff must show: “(1) an injury that (2)
resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need
and that (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable.”25 The Court finds
that Plaintiff could make this showing without impugning his state court
Doc. 36-1.
Defendants argue the Plaintiff cannot create a genuine issue of material fact
because he alleged in his complaint that he never resisted arrest. The court in Bush
considered and rejected a similar argument. 513 F.3d at 499.
25 Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2004).
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conviction. Likewise, Plaintiff could prove up his state law battery claim and
the related respondeat superior claim without impugning his conviction.
II. Qualified Immunity
Having determined that Heck does not bar Plaintiff’s excessive force
claims, the Court now turns to whether Defendants are immune from suit on
the basis of qualified immunity.
In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court
promulgated a two-step analysis to determine if an official has stepped outside
the bounds of qualified immunity.26 Under that test, the initial inquiry is
whether the Plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation.27 If established,
the next inquiry is whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable
in light of clearly established law at the time the conduct occurred. 28 In
Pearson v. Callahan, the Court retreated somewhat from this rigid two-step
inquiry, giving courts leave to decide which prong to consider first.29
A. Allegation of a Constitutional Violation
Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant used excessive force in violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights. In order to prevail on such a claim, he must
allege “(1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force
that was excessive to the need and that (3) the force used was objectively
unreasonable.”30 “[A]n injury is generally legally cognizable when it results
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
Id.
28 Id.
29 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2008).
30 Flores, 381 F.3d at 396.
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from a degree of force that is constitutionally impermissible—that is,
objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.”31
In determining the
objective reasonableness of the force, a court should consider “the severity of
the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety
of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.”32
The Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged a constitutional
violation under his version of events. He alleges that Defendant placed him in
a headlock and beat him after he had already submitted to Defendant’s
authority. There is record evidence that Plaintiff sustained injuries. Though
Defendant avers that these injuries occurred as a result of Plaintiff attacking
him when he pulled over to re-secure him, this conflicting testimony creates a
genuine issue of material fact.
B. “Clearly Established” Constitutional Right
In the next step of a qualified immunity analysis, the Court must
consider whether the officer’s use of force ran afoul of a clearly established
constitutional right.
The Fifth Circuit, citing applicable Supreme Court
precedent, has stated:
To be “clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity,
“[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right.” “In practice, this means that whether an official
protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for
31
32
Bush, 513 F.3d at 501.
Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
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an allegedly unlawful action generally turns on the ‘objective legal
reasonableness’ of the official’s action, assessed in light of the legal
rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.” This
court has repeatedly held that objective reasonableness in a
qualified immunity context is a question of law for the court to
decide, not an issue of fact. For a plaintiff to establish objective
unreasonableness and overcome a qualified immunity defense, he
must satisfy two inquiries. First, a plaintiff must show “the
allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established” at
the time of the alleged violation. Second, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that “the conduct of the defendants was objectively
unreasonable in the light of that then clearly established law.”33
At the time of the incident, the law was clearly established that the permissible
degree of force in affecting an arrest depends on the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect posed a threat to the officer’s safety, and whether
the suspect was resisting arrest or attempting to flee.34 Under Plaintiff’s
version of events, he had ceased to resist arrest at the time Defendant placed
him in a headlock and beat him. The reasonableness test for the use of force
is sufficiently clear such that Defendant should have known that he could not
use the level of force that Plaintiff alleges was applied when he had ceased to
resist. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
33
Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal citations
omitted).
34
Bush, 513 F. 3d at 502 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 369).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff’s federal and state law claims for false
arrest against Defendant Ordoyne and his Monell and state law negligence
claims against Defendant Sheriff Normand are DISMISSED.
The sole
remaining claims are his § 1983 claim for excessive force, his state law battery
claim against Ordoyne, and the related respondeat superior claim against
Sheriff Normand.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 26th day of May, 2016.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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