Fernandez v. Becnel et al

Filing 53

ORDER granting 50 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 50 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting 51 Motion to Dismiss Case; granting 52 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown. (jrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ANTHONY FERNANDEZ

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

CASE NO. 14-701

DANIEL E. BECNEL, JR. ET AL.

SECTION: “G”(1)

ORDER
In this litigation, pro se Plaintiff Anthony Fernandez (“Fernandez”) seeks damages from
Defendants Daniel Becnel, Jr., Darryl Becnel, Camilo Salas, and Judge Ralph Tureau (collectively
“Defendants”) under an array of theories, allegedly in connection with a state court distribution of
settlement funds. Presently pending before the Court are three motions: (1) Judge Tureau’s “Motion
to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint;”1 (2) Camilo Salas’ (“Salas”) “Motion to Dismiss”2 and
(3) Daniel and Darrell Becnel’s (“the Becnels”) “Motion to Dismiss.”3 These motions were filed on
August 14, 2015, August 18, 2015, and August 19, 2015, respectively. Judge Tureau and Salas’
motions to dismiss were set for submission on September 2, 2015 and the Becnels’ motion to
dismiss was set for submission on September 16, 2015. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.5, opposition to
a motion must be filed eight days before the noticed submission date. Fernandez has not filed an
opposition to any of the pending motions, and therefore the motions are deemed to be unopposed.
This Court has authority to grant a motion as unopposed, although it is not required to do so.4 This
Order addresses all three motions. Having reviewed the motions, the memoranda in support, the

1

Rec. Doc. 50.

2

Rec. Doc. 51.

3

Rec. Doc. 52.

4

Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1993).

record, and the applicable law, the Court will grant the motions.
I. Background
A.

Factual Background
In Fernandez’s amended complaint, he alleges that on April 3, 2001, he was injured as a

result of a chemical explosion and chemical spill that occurred at “VULCAN facility” which was
located next to the Shell plant where he worked.5 Fernandez alleges that he was not offered medical
services, nor did he receive compensation equal to white workers in the same job situation.6
Fernandez alleges that “the claim form was mail [sic] by Attorney Darryl J. Becnel Jr. and Daniel
E. Becnel April 2007 but he could not go unto [sic] the Becnel’s office (called every day for an
appointment) until June 20, 2007 which was two day before the dead line [sic] was set to file a
claim.”7 Fernandez alleges that Judge Ralph Tureau donated $12,866.81 of the “Vulcan April 2001
Settlement Funds” to “friends during a Parish Council Meeting on May 19.”8 Fernandez alleges that
as Special Master, Camilo Salas did not perform his duty to Fernandez by allowing Judge Tureau
to claim and donate the money, which he alleges was designated for the victims of the chemical
explosion at the Vulcan Chemical Plaint.9
B.

Procedural Background
Fernandez filed a complaint on March 27, 2014, alleging that he is entitled to recover “$300

5

Rec. Doc. 43 at p. 2.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id.

2

million dollars to 1.6 billions” from the defendants.10 Daniel and Darryl Becnel filed a “Motion to
Dismiss Case as Frivolous”11 on April 17, 2014. Fernandez filed an opposition on May 5, 2014,12
and, with leave of Court, filed two supplemental memoranda in opposition May 13, 201413 and May
15, 2014.14 Tureau filed a “Motion to Dismiss” on May 8, 2014.15 Salas filed a “Motion to Dismiss”
on July 10, 2014.16 Fernandez filed an opposition to both motions on July 16, 2014.17 Fernandez filed
a “Motion for Summary Judgment” on July 15, 2014.18 Tureau, Salas, and the Becnels filed
oppositions to that motion on July 29, 2014.19
On November 10, 2014, the Court granted all three motions to dismiss on the grounds that
Fernandez had not met his burden of establishing the basis of federal jurisdiction.20 The Court found
that Fernandez’s complaint did not distinctly and affirmatively allege the citizenship of the Becnels,
Judge Tureau, or Salas, nor had Fernandez identified a federal cause of action.21 The Court entered

10

Rec. Doc. 1 at pp. 2–3.

11

Rec. Doc. 5.

12

Rec. Doc. 11.

13

Rec. Doc. 17.

14

Rec. Doc. 20.

15

Rec. Doc. 15.

16

Rec. Doc. 24.

17

Rec. Doc. 27.

18

Rec. Doc. 26.

19

Rec. Doc. 28; Rec. Doc. 29; Rec. Doc. 30.

20

Rec. Doc. 31.

21

Id. at p. 12.

3

judgment on November 12, 2014, dismissing Fernandez’s claims without prejudice.22
Fernandez subsequently filed a “Motion for Reconsideration,”23 a “Motion to Submit
Evidence Omitted from Motion for Reconsideration,”24 and a “Motion for Leave to File a Second
Amended Complaint,”25 on December 10, 2014, December 23, 2014, and April 13, 2015,
respectively. After reviewing Fernandez’s motions, the Court found that reconsideration was
warranted in the interests of justice.26 On July 10, 2015, the Court granted Fernandez’s motions and
vacated the Court’s prior Order and Judgment dismissing Fernandez’s claims without prejudice.27
Fernandez’s second amended complaint was filed into the record on July 10, 2015.28
On August 14, 2015, Judge Tureau filed a “Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint.”29 On August 18, 2015, Salas filed a “Motion to Dismiss.”30 Daniel Becnel, Jr. and
Darryl Becnel filed their “Motion to Dismiss”31 on August 19, 2015. Fernandez has not filed an
opposition to any of the three motions to dismiss.

22

Rec. Doc. 32.

23

Rec. Doc. 33.

24

Rec. Doc. 35.

25

Rec. Doc. 39.

26

Rec. Doc. 42 at p. 6.

27

Id. at pp. 6–7.

28

Rec. Doc. 43.

29

Rec. Doc. 50.

30

Rec. Doc. 51.

31

Rec. Doc. 52.

4

II. Parties’ Arguments
A.

Judge Tureau’s Motion to Dismiss
In his “Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint,”32 Judge Tureau urges the Court to

dismiss Fernandez’s complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
because: “(1) this Court lacks jurisdiction over suits, like this one, that are appeals from state court
judgments; (2) judicial immunity bars all purported claims asserted against Judge Tureau; and (3)
the Second Amended Complaint fails to allege facts giving rise to a cause of action against Judge
Tureau.”33 Judge Tureau asserts that because Fernandez has attempted, but failed to correct the
jurisdictional defects identified by this Court, the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed
with prejudice.34
First, Judge Tureau asserts that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which Judge Tureau contends “directs that federal courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction to review final state court decisions arising out of judicial proceedings unless a
federal statute specifically authorizes such review.”35 Judge Tureau avers that it is unclear what
causes of action Fernandez seeks to assert against him but assuming the Second Amended Complaint
is intended to assert a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, or both, such claims must be
dismissed under Rooker-Feldman because it is either a collateral attack on the state court judgment
or because it is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment.36
32

Rec. Doc. 50.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Rec. Doc. 50-1 at p. 3 (citing Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994)).

36

Id. at p. 4.

5

Judge Tureau also avers that Rooker-Feldman prevents this Court from exercising
jurisdiction to the extent that the Second Amended Complaint is intended to challenge the cy pres
donation of funds from the Vulcan April 2001 Settlement Fund.37 Citing Adams v. CSX Railroads38
and Cavalier v. Mobil Oil Corp.,39 Judge Tureau asserts that a review of a cy pres donation, as with
any other state court judgment, must be done through the state court appellate process, not through
collateral attack in federal court.
Second, Judge Tureau contends that judicial immunity bars the claims alleged against him.40
Quoting Hill v. McClellan,41 Judge Tureau asserts that “[j]udges acting within their jurisdiction and
authority are immune from suit under [42 U.S.C.] §§ 1983 and 1985.”42 Judge Tureau avers that
“[b]ecause this cy pres donation is within the scope of Judge Tureau’s jurisdiction and authority, he
is entitled to judicial immunity for this act and the claims against him must be dismissed.”43
Judge Tureau also asserts that the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed for
failure to allege facts giving rise to a cause of action against him.44 He contends that the only
allegation against him is that he “violated Fernandez’s rights by donating 12,866.81 dollars to
friends during a Parish Council Meeting on May 19 from the Vulcan April 2001 Settlement
37

Id.

38

2012-0319 (La. 4/13/12); 84 So. 3d 1289, 1290.

39

2004-1543 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/2/05); 898 So. 2d 584, 587.

40

Rec. Doc. 50-1 at p. 5.

41

490 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds by Sparks v. Duval Cnty. Ranch Co., 604 F.2d
976 (1979).
42

Rec. Doc. 50-1 at p. 5.

43

Id. at p. 6.

44

Id.

6

Funds.”45 Judge Tureau contends that although the Second Amended Complaint purports to allege
a claim against him under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, no factual allegations support this claim.46 Furthermore,
he avers that the conspiracy element is essential to causes of action for conspiracy to interfere with
civil rights and courts have consistently rejected claims of federal conspiracy where there are only
conclusory allegations of conspiracy.47 Judge Tureau asserts that because the Second Amended
Complaint does not plead specific facts giving rise to a cause of action against him, his Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted.48
B.

Salas’ Motion to Dismiss
In his “Motion to Dismiss,”49 Salas moves to dismiss the claims against him because “(1)

Fernandez has not demonstrated that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this suit; (2)
Fernandez has not properly served Salas with the suit and thus the Court has not acquired
jurisdiction over Salas; and (3) the Complaint does not contain well-pleaded allegations of fact,
which are required to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”50
Salas contends that Fernandez’s suit stems from a class-action lawsuit, Vercher v. Vulcan
Chemicals, in the 23rd Judicial District Court for the Parish of Ascension, in which Fernandez was
a claimant.51 Salas contends that Darryl Becnel and Daniel Becnel, Jr. were appointed class counsel,
45

Id. at pp. 6–7 (quoting Rec. Doc. 43).

46

Id. at p. 7.

47

Id. (citing Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1986); U.S. ex rel. Simmons v. Zibilich, 542 F.2d
259, 262 (5th Cir. 1976)).
48

Id.

49

Rec. Doc. 51.

50

Id.

51

Rec. Doc. 51-1 at p. 2.

7

Salas was appointed Special Master and Judge Tureau was the presiding judge.52 Salas asserts that
his responsibilities as Special Master included reviewing the records provided by the claimants and
making recommendations to the court regarding allocations to be made for each claimant.53 He
contends that based on the records presented by Fernandez, Salas recommended that Fernandez
receive $4,317.16 from the settlement funds.54 According to Salas, Fernandez objected to that
amount and the court held a hearing, during which Fernandez presented evidence.55 Salas contends
that the court overruled Fernandez’s objection, entered a judgment awarding the recommended
amounts to all class members, and that Fernandez did not appeal the court’s judgment.56
Salas first contends that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case pursuant
to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.57 Salas incorporates by reference the arguments made in Judge
Tureau’s motion to dismiss.58 Salas states that “[b]ecause [Fernandez’s] claims arise from the
Louisiana court’s judgment in the Vercher case, which judgment is now final, under the RookerFeldman doctrine this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Fernandez’s claims.”59
Salas also moves to dismiss the claims against him based upon improper service of

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id. at p. 3.

58

Id.

59

Id. (citing Riley v. La. State Bar Ass’n, 214 F. App’x 456, 458 (5th Cir. 2007)).

8

process.60 He contends that without valid service, the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over him.61
According to Salas, he was not served personally or in the manner required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4.62 Salas asserts that he previously filed a motion to dismiss objecting to the improper
service through certified mail but because the Court dismissed the original complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, Salas’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was never
resolved.63
Finally, Salas asserts that the Second Amended Complaint does not contain sufficient facts
to give rise to a cause of action against him.64 Salas contends that Fernandez does not assert how he
was treated differently from the other members of the class, explain what “trickery” was committed
by the defendants, or assert what duty Salas owed to him.65 Salas contends that the conclusory
allegations do not suffice to prevent the Rule 12(b)(6) motion from being granted.66
C.

The Becnels’ Motion to Dismiss
Darryl and Daniel Becnel (“the Becnels”) contend that Fernandez filed a petition in the 23rd

Judicial District Court of Louisiana that “sets forth the same allegations as the instant complaint”
and therefore is barred by collateral estoppel and lis pendens.67 They contend that Fernandez filed

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id. at p. 4.

63

Id. at p. 3.

64

Id. at p. 4.

65

Id. at p. 5.

66

Id.

67

Rec. Doc. 52 at p. 1.

9

a petition in the 23rd Judicial District Court on April 10, 2013.68 The Becnels contend that they
brought exceptions in state court to which Fernandez did not reply and Fernandez failed to attend
the hearing.69 The Becnels aver that the exceptions were granted on June 3, 2013 and Fernandez did
not appeal.70
The Becnels also assert that the complaint does not state a cause of action and the action is
barred by the statutes of limitations, but the Becnels do not elaborate on these arguments.71 Finally,
the Becnels contend that there is no diversity in this court and “no federal causes of action stated in
the complaint against these defendants who are no [sic] government actors.”72 The Becnels move
for dismissal of the complaint at Fernandez’s cost.73
III. Law and Analysis
A.

Legal Standard on a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Both Judge Tureau and Salas move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant

to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.74 The Becnels also assert that the Court lacks jurisdiction because
there is no diversity between the parties and there are no federal causes of action stated in the
complaint “against these defendants who are no [sic] governmental actors.”75

68

Rec. Doc. 52-1 at p. 1.

69

Id.

70

Id. at p. 2.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

See Rec. Doc. 50-1 at p. 2; Rec. Doc. 51-1 at p. 3.

75

Rec. Doc. 52-1 at p. 2.

10

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and “possess only that power authorized
by the Constitution and statute,”76 and it is a “first principle of federal jurisdiction” that a federal
court must dismiss an action “whenever it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.”77 Lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue,78 and the Fifth Circuit directs that when a motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions,
the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the
merits.”79 This practice “prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case
with prejudice.”80 When opposing a 12(b)(1) motion, as at all other times, the party asserting federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of proof.81 Since Fernandez is pro se, the Court will construe his
complaint liberally.82 Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional, the Court must address
this issue first.83
B.

Analysis
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine denies federal courts subject matter jurisdiction to review or

modify the final decisions of state courts unless there is a federal statute that specifically permits

76

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

77

Stockman v. Fed. Election Com’n, 5th Cir. 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998).

78

See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER ET AL. 5B FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1350 (3d

Ed. 2014).
79

Ramming v. U.S., 281 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2001).

80

In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig. (Mississippi Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 286–87 (5th

Cir. 2012).
81

Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.

82

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

83

Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 7171 F.3d 377, 381–82 (5th Cir. 2013).

11

such a review.84 In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,85 the plaintiff filed suit in federal district court,
claiming that the state court, in a case in which the plaintiff was a party, had given effect to a state
statute alleged to be in conflict with the contract clause of the Constitution and the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.86 The Supreme Court held that “[i]f the
constitutional questions stated in the bill actually arose in the cause, it was the province and duty
of the state courts to decide them; and their decision, whether right to wrong, was an exercise of
jurisdiction.”87 The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction because “no court
of the United States other than [the Supreme Court] could entertain a proceeding to reverse or
modify the judgment for errors of that character.”88
In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,89 two plaintiffs brought suit in federal
court challenging the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ refusal to waive a court rule requiring
District of Columbia bar applicants to have graduated from an accredited law school.90 The Supreme
Court held that the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were judicial in
nature and the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their claims.91 The Supreme
Court found that district courts do not have jurisdiction “over challenges to state court decisions in

84

Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 369 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2004).

85

Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

86

Id. at 414–15.

87

Id. at 415.

88

Id. at 416.

89

460 U.S. 462 (1983).

90

Id. at 464–65.

91

Id. at 482.

12

particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings, even if those challenges allege that the state
court’s action was unconstitutional.”92
Although the Supreme Court has cautioned that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is “confined
to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name,” it is fully applicable in such cases.93
The doctrine prevents federal courts from entertaining “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the federal district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”94
Furthermore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not circumvented by a party raising claims that
were absent in the original proceeding or claims framed as original claims for relief if such claims
are “inextricably intertwined” with the state judgment because inextricably intertwined claims
require the federal court “in essence” to review the state court decision.95 Although courts have had
difficulty in the past in determining whether a state adjudication and a later federal action were
sufficiently intertwined such that the federal action would amount to a review of the state action,96
the Fifth Circuit has recently clarified that the phrase “‘inextricably intertwined’ does not enlarge
the core holding of Rooker or Feldman.”97
In Truong v. Bank of America, N.A., the Fifth Circuit explained that the two hallmarks of the

92

Id. at 486.

93

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).

94

Id.

95

United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994).

96

In re Erlewine, 349 F.3d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 2003).

97

717 F.3d 377, 385 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280

(2005)).

13

Rooker-Feldman inquiry are: (1) “what the federal court is being asked to review and reject;” and
(2) “the source of the federal plaintiff’s alleged injury.”98 In this case, although not perfectly clear
from Fernandez’s amended complaint, it appears that Fernandez is asserting a claim pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1985, which provides:
[i]f two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . if
one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance
of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived
of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
Fernandez alleges that he was not compensated equally with white workers in the same position and
that Judge Tureau violated his rights by donating $12,866.81 from the “Vulcan April 2001
Settlement Funds” to “friends during a Parish Council meeting on May 19.”99 In essence, Fernandez
alleges that: (1) the judge, who presided over a case in which he was a claimant, violated his rights
in a court ruling; (2) the special master appointed by the state court contributed to the violation of
Fernandez’s rights by allowing the judge to rule in this way; and (3) the attorneys involved in the
case also allowed the money to be distributed erroneously.100 Broadly construing Fernandez’s
complaint, Fernandez is asking this Court to review and reject the state court’s award of settlement
funds to Fernandez on the grounds that he was not compensated equally with white workers and to

98

Id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284).

99

100

Rec. Doc. 43 at p. 2.
Id.

14

also reject Judge Tureau’s cy pres donation of settlement funds.101 As the Supreme Court of
Louisiana has explained, “[c]y pres funds typically result from class action lawsuits when it is either
impossible or impractical to distribute the funds directly to the individuals who were injured. In
those situations the court may order that the funds be used for grants to benefit the class members
indirectly or as near as possible in order to remedy or compensate for the harm to the class
members.”102 Under either view, Fernandez is asking the Court to review and reject a state court
decision. As noted above, the Court lacks jurisdiction “over challenges to state court decisions in
particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state
court’s action was unconstitutional.”103
The second hallmark of the Rooker-Feldman inquiry is the source of the federal plaintiff’s
alleged injury.104 The Fifth Circuit has found that
[i]f a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a
state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision,
Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court. If, on the
other hand, a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or
omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.105
Here, Fernandez appears to allege that he was harmed as a result of the erroneous state court
distribution of funds. Therefore, the source of the alleged injury is the state court judgment itself.
101

In Fernandez’s opposition to Judge Tureau and Salas’ first motions to dismiss, Fernandez asserted that
Salas had refused to review and examine medical records “before Judge Tureau made a False Judgment in case No:
69,418 Division A, of $2.85000.00 [sic] Aug 31, 2007 Fri. “Salas” said that in a month he will review and examine
all medical record that is fraud, no documentation shows ‘no.’ [sic] proof of medical record, Judge Tureau said he
will hold pro/se case as long he want to.” Rec. Doc. 27 at p. 1. It therefore appears that Fernandez is asserting that
the court’s judgment was made in error.
102

Adams v. CSX R.Rs., 2012-0139 (La. 4/13/12); 84 So. 3d 1289, 1290 n.1

103

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983).

104

Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377 382–83 (5th Cir. 2013).

105

Id. at 383 (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)).

15

Although the Court construes pro so complaints liberally, Fernandez bears the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction. Fernandez has not filed any opposition asserting why the relief he
seeks is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, the Court finds that because
Fernandez appears to seek review and relief from the state court judgment, pursuant to the RookerFeldman doctrine, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Fernandez’s claims. Therefore,
the Court may not reach Defendants’ other arguments in favor of dismissal.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judge Tureau’s “Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint,”106 Salas’ “Motion to Dismiss,”107 and the Becnel’s “Motion to Dismiss”108 are
GRANTED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this ______ day of October, 2015.
27th
________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

106

Rec. Doc. 50.

107

Rec. Doc. 51.

108

Rec. Doc. 52.

16