Allen v. Bartholomew et al

Filing 55

ORDER & REASONS: ORDERED that all remaining claims in the above-captioned action be and hereby are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 1/26/16.(sek)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

OTIS ALLEN

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 14-877

KARL BARTHOLOMEW ET AL.

SECTION: “J”(2)

ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a Memorandum in Opposition to Federal
Court’s Continuing Jurisdiction (Rec. Doc. 52) filed by Defendant,
R & S Towing, Inc. of Chalmette, and a Memorandum in Support of
Federal Court’s Continued Supplemental Jurisdiction (Rec. Doc. 53)
filed by Plaintiff, Otis Allen. The parties’ memoranda address the
issue of whether the Court should continue to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims, which are now the
only

remaining

claims

in

this

case.

Having

considered

the

memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds
that all remaining claims in this action should be DISMISSED
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initially brought this action on April 15, 2014,
seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against James Pohlmann,
Sheriff of the St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Office, and Karl
Bartholomew, individually and in their official capacities. (Rec.
Doc. 1.) Plaintiff also seeks relief under state law against R &
S Towing, Inc. of Chalmette (“R & S Towing”). Following a May 2015

pre-trial conference, the Court continued the trial dates noting
that R & S Towing had only recently made an appearance in the case.
(Rec. Doc. 35.) Soon after, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion
to

voluntarily

dismiss

Defendants

Karl

Bartholomew

and

James

Pohlmann in light of a settlement between Plaintiff and those
Defendants. (Rec. Doc. 40.)
In early October 2015, Plaintiff moved for leave to file an
amended complaint. 1 (Rec. Doc. 47.) Plaintiff’s proposed amendment
named both state actors and R & S Towing as Defendants. (Rec. Doc.
47-2.) On October 26, 2015, the magistrate judge granted in part
and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended
complaint. (Rec. Doc. 50.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an
amendment, but only as to R & S Towing, because all claims against
the named state actors had been settled. Id. In pertinent part,
Plaintiff alleges that R & S Towing towed Plaintiff’s vehicle on
April 14, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 47-4 at 2.) At some point thereafter
and while Plaintiff was incarcerated, Plaintiff’s family attempted
to pay R & S Towing the fees necessary to recover the vehicle;
however, R & S Towing rejected the family members’ offer and
instead sold Plaintiff’s vehicle without providing proper notice
under the Louisiana Towing and Storage Act, La. Rev. Stat. §
32:1711 et seq. See id. at 4.

1 Plaintiff attempted to amend his complaint as early as July 2015, but failed
to present a procedurally adequate motion to amend until October 2015. (See
Rec. Docs. 41, 42, & 45.)

2

On November 24, 2015, with no remaining federal claims and
noting that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction after all federal claims have been dismissed or
settled, the Court ordered the parties to brief the issue of
whether the Court should continue to exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction. (Rec. Doc. 51.)
On December 9, 2015, R & S Towing filed its memorandum in
opposition to the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims in this case. (Rec. Doc. 52.) Plaintiff
filed

his

memorandum

in

support

of

continued

supplemental

jurisdiction on December 11, 2015. (Rec. Doc. 53.) On January 5,
2016, the case was reassigned to this section of the Court. (Rec.
Doc. 54).
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff concedes that only state law claims remain and does
not

argue

that

the

Court

has

any

type

of

subject

matter

jurisdiction over his remaining claims other than supplemental
jurisdiction. (Rec. Doc. 53, at 4.) Plaintiff notes that R & S
Towing has not participated in discovery, any negotiations, and
“did not even participate in conference calls through this court
and other counsels in this matter.” Id. Plaintiff’s brief concludes
with an unsupported assertion that “Plaintiff would be prejudice
[sic] by State law prescription to address his state claim in this
matter.” Id. at 5.
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The essence of R & S Towing’s argument is that the Court
should allow a state court to decide the matter because the Court
has not yet become familiar with the facts of the case or reached
the merits of any argument in the case. (Rec. Doc. 52, at 5.).
LEGAL STANDARD AND DISCUSSION
In

determining

whether

to

relinquish

jurisdiction

over

pendent state law claims, district courts look to the statutory
factors set forth by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and to the common law
factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.
Enochs v. Lampass Cty., 641 F.3d 155, 158-59 (5th Cir. 2011); see
also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)
(setting forth the common law factors). The statutory factors are:
“(1) whether the state claims raise novel or complex issues of
state law; (2) whether the state claims substantially predominate
over the federal claims; (3) whether the federal claims have been
dismissed; and (4) whether there are exceptional circumstances or
other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” Id. at 159
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)). The “general rule” is to decline to
exercise jurisdiction when all federal claims are dismissed or
otherwise eliminated from a case prior to trial; however, this
rule is neither mandatory nor absolute. Smith v. Amedisys Inc.,
298 F.3d 434, 446-47 (5th Cir. 2002).
In its current posture, it is clear that this case currently
falls within § 1367(c)(3), as the Court has dismissed all of
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Plaintiff’s

claims

that

initially

gave

the

Court

original

jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court notes that there appears to
be a dearth of state court case law regarding Plaintiffs’ claim.
Cf. Johnson v. Hardy, 756 So. 2d 328, 333-34 (La. App. 1 Cir.
1999); see also Wilson v. T & T Auto Repair & Towing, LLC, No.
50,095-CA, 2015 WL 5715454, at *2-4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2015).
Before

following

the

general

rule

that

would

support

declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on Plaintiff’s
remaining claims, the Court turns to the common law factors of
judicial

economy,

convenience,

fairness,

and

comity.

Judicial

economy weighs in favor of declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction, as the Plaintiff concedes that he and R & S Towing
have not engaged in discovery, nor has the Court ruled on any
motions regarding the merits of Plaintiff’s claim against R & S
Towing. The same goes for convenience, given that both Plaintiff
and R & S Towing are apparently located in the same city and
parish. (Rec. Doc. 47-4 at 2-3.) As to comity and again because of
the apparent lack of state court case law on the issue, there is
at

least

some

reason

for

the

Court

to

decline

to

exercise

supplemental jurisdiction in favor of having a state court settle
the dispute.
Similarly, fairness does not weigh in favor of continued
supplemental

jurisdiction.

Plaintiff

has

made

the

unsupported

contention that he will be prejudiced by prescription in state
5

court

should

the

Court

decline

to

exercise

supplemental

jurisdiction at this point and dismiss the remaining state law
claims. The Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff would necessarily
be barred on prescription grounds from pursuing his remaining
claims in state court, should the Court now dismiss his claims
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
A federal court exercising its supplemental jurisdiction over
a state law claim must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum
state to determine which state’s substantive law applies. Janvey
v. Brown, 767 F.3d 430, 434 & n.10 (5th Cir. 2014). Louisiana has
a

specific

choice-of-law

rule

for

liberative

prescription.

Louisiana law of prescription should generally be applied to all
civil suits brought in Louisiana. See La. Civ. Code art. 3549.
Therefore, Louisiana law of prescription will apply to Plaintiff’s
claims regardless of whether the Court exercises supplemental
jurisdiction.
In addition, Court’s involuntary dismissal of Plaintiff’s
claims without prejudice will afford the Plaintiff an additional
period within which to file his claims in state court. Under
articles 3462 and 3463, prescription is interrupted when suit is
filed in a court of proper jurisdiction and venue. La. Civ. Code
art. 3462. This interruption of prescription continues as long as
the suit is pending. Id. art. 3463. Here, the prescriptive period
was interrupted because Plaintiff properly brought this action
6

before the Court and no party or the Court—until now—challenged
venue or subject matter jurisdiction. See Burns v. City of Kenner,
824 So. 2d 512, 513 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2002). Should the case now be
involuntarily dismissed without prejudice, “the whole prescriptive
period begins to run anew from the date of that dismissal.” See
id. (citing Batson v. Cherokee Beach & Campgrounds, Inc., 530 So.
2d 1128 (La. 1988)). In sum, if Plaintiff timely filed his suit
against R & S Towing in this Court, then the prescriptive period
was

interrupted

and

will

begin

to

run

anew

if

the

suit

is

involuntarily dismissed. The Court therefore concludes that it is
appropriate to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s remaining claims.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all remaining claims in the abovecaptioned action be and hereby are DISMISSED without prejudice for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 26th day of January, 2016.

CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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