Crawford et al v. Louisiana State et al

Filing 80

ORDER & REASONS granting as unopposed #62 Motion for Summary Judgment. The plaintiffs' Title VI claims are dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 2/23/2015. (caa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TONY CRAWFORD, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

v.

NO. 14-1190

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.

SECTION "F"

ORDER AND REASONS
Local Rule 7.5 of the Eastern District of Louisiana requires
that memoranda in opposition to a motion be filed eight days prior
to the noticed submission date.

No memoranda in opposition to the

motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, noticed for
submission on February 25, 2015, has been submitted.
Accordingly,

the

motion

is

deemed

to

be

unopposed,

and

further, it appearing to the Court that the motion has merit,1 IT
1

Plaintiffs allege that they are certified Medicaid
providers (non-emergency medical transport, or NEMT, providers)
that transport Medicaid patients to medical appointments.
Plaintiffs allege that NEMT providers are primarily owned by
African Americans and that they are treated and paid differently by
the State administrator defendants than the primarily Caucasianowned non-emergency ambulance providers (NEA), even though NEMT and
NEA provide identical transportation services. (The plaintiffs'
Title VII claims were voluntarily dismissed on October 20, 2014).
Among other claims, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants'
preferential treatment of NEA in administration of the medical
transportation programs violates 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d).
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(d) states:
No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.
1

To prevail on a claim under Title VI, a plaintiff must prove that
the defendant received federal financial assistance and that the
defendant engaged in intentional discrimination based on race,
color, or national origin. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275, 280 (2001); Pathria v. Univ. of Texas Health Science Cetner at
San Antonio, 531 Fed.Appx. 454, 455 (5th Cir. 2013)(unpublished, per
curiam). Defendants concede that Title VI applies to these
programs: NEMT and NEA are Medicaid providers that receive federal
money.
However, defendants contend that they are entitled to
summary judgment dismissing the Title VI claims because the
plaintiffs cannot prove intentional racial (or other illegal)
discrimination. Given the record, the Court agrees.
The record reveals that the State administrators have
reasons for treating NEMT and NEA differently.
That is, the
primary reason for any fee disparity between NEMT and NEA relates
to the rendition of health care by licensed professional health
care providers and the use of specialized medical equipment by
ambulance providers.
Whereas the NEMT providers simply drive
Medicaid recipients to medical appointments (with schedules set by
an outside dispatching firm based on state law), NEA providers are
required to obtain proof of medical necessity before undertaking
transport and the services NEA provides goes beyond transportation
and includes providing medical care.
More specifically, the
programs have separate and distinct goals such that NEA providers
are subject to more stringent specialized qualifications and
equipment requirements compared to NEMT providers. The defendants
categorically deny illegal discrimination and submit that the
plaintiffs cannot prove their case of intentional discrimination in
light of the presence of legitimate reasons for the fee disparity
between NEMT and NEA providers; disparity is insufficient to
prevail on a Title VI claim.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs that summary
judgment is proper if the record discloses no genuine issue as to
any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. No genuine issue of fact exists if
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Summary judgment is
also proper if the party opposing the motion fails to establish an
essential element of his case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In this regard, the non-moving party must
do more than simply deny the allegations raised by the moving
party. See Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 974 F.2d
646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992).
Rather, he must come forward with
competent evidence, such as affidavits or depositions, to buttress
his claims. Id. The plaintiffs, who bear the burden of proving
intentional discrimination to succeed on their Title VI claim, have
failed even to respond to the defendants' motion for summary
2

IS ORDERED: that the defendants' motion for summary judgment is
hereby GRANTED as unopposed.

The plaintiffs' Title VI claims are

dismissed with prejudice.

New Orleans, Louisiana, February 23, 2015

______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

judgment. The plaintiffs have failed to establish an essential
element of their Title VI case: intentional discrimination. Thus,
the defendants have shown entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law on the plaintiffs' Title VI claim.
3