Billizone v. Jefferson Parish Correctional Center et al
Filing
65
ORDER AND REASONS. It is ORDERED that the claims against the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and/or for failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the u nopposed 60 Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's federal civil rights claims against Sheriff Newell Normand, Edward Olsen, Howard Lavin, Martha Ennis, John Cotton , Carl Preyer, Gary Cook, and Sue Ellen Monfra are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. It is FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's state law claims, if any, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their being asserted in the state courts. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sally Shushan. (gec)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ERNEST BILLIZONE. SR.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 14-1263-SS
JEFFERSON PARISH CORRECTIONAL
CENTER, ET AL.
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff, Ernest Billizone, Sr., a frequent litigant in this Court, filed the instant civil action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center and a number of
individual jail officials asserting a variety of claims. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.1
On December 15, 2014, the Court dismissed plaintiff's claims against defendant Jean Llovet
concerning the jail's medical care.2 The remaining individual defendants, Sheriff Newell Normand,
Edward Olsen, Howard Lavin, Martha Ennis, John Cotton, Carl Preyer, Gary Cook, and Sue Ellen
Monfra, have now filed a motion seeking dismissal of the claims against them.3 Plaintiff was
ordered to respond to that motion on or before April 22, 2015;4 however, no response has been filed.
1
Rec. Doc. 53.
2
Rec. Doc. 56.
3
Rec. Doc. 60; see also Rec. Docs. 63 and 64.
4
Rec. Doc. 62.
I. Jefferson Parish Correctional Center
Before turning to the pending motion, the Court first notes that plaintiff has also named the
Jefferson Parish Correctional Center as a defendant. However, it is clear that a correctional center
may not be sued because it is merely a building, not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Jefferson Parish Correctional Center, Civ. Action No. 13-4963, 2013
WL 6002770, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2013); Stamps v. Jefferson Parish Correctional Center, Civ.
Action No. 12-1767, 2012 WL 3026808, at *2 (E.D. La. July 12, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 3027945
(E.D. La. July 24, 2012). Accordingly, pursuant to its authority to act sua sponte under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b),5 the Court hereby dismisses the claim against the Jefferson Parish
5
With respect to actions filed in forma pauperis, such as the instant lawsuit, federal law
provides:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the
court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action or
appeal –
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary damages against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Moreover, federal law further mandates that federal courts "review, before docketing, if
feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Regarding such lawsuits, federal law requires:
On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint, if the complaint –
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
2
Correctional Center as frivolous and/or for failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
See, e.g., Castellanos v. Jefferson Parish Correctional Center, Civ. Action No. 07-7796, 2008 WL
3975606, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2008).
II. Individual Defendants
The remaining individual defendants have filed a "Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(c) or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56."6 The
standards to be used in analyzing such motions are clear.
"A motion under Rule 12(c) for failure to state a claim is subject to the same standards as a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201,
209-10 (5th Cir. 2010). The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:
To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. To be
plausible, the complaint's factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level. In deciding whether the complaint states a valid claim
for relief, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Id. at 210 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
On the other hand, when reviewing a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, the Court
may grant the motion when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the mover is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). There is no "genuine issue" when the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmovant. Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
6
Rec. Doc. 60; see also Rec. Docs. 63 and 64.
3
"Procedurally, the party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Taita Chemical Co., Ltd. v.
Westlake Styrene Corp., 246 F.3d 377, 385 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
The party opposing summary judgment must then "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own
affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate
'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 324 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56); see also Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel,
274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). The Court has no duty to search the record for evidence to
support a party's opposition to summary judgment; rather, "[t]he party opposing summary judgment
is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which
the evidence supports his or her claim." Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458
(5th Cir. 1998). Conclusory statements, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are not
competent summary judgment evidence and will not suffice to defeat a properly supported motion
for summary judgment. Id.; Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir.
1996).
Applying the foregoing standards, the Court hereby grants the pending motion and dismisses
the remaining claims against the individual defendants for the following reasons.
A. General Conditions of Confinement Claims
In this lawsuit, plaintiff challenges numerous conditions of his confinement at the Jefferson
Parish Correctional Center. In his original complaint, he indicated that he is a pretrial detainee.7
7
Rec. Doc. 1, p. 3.
4
It is clear that "the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of conditions of confinement
on pretrial detainees that constitute punishment." Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 540 (5th Cir.
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, the jurisprudence recognizes that the
judiciary is ill equipped to micro-manage a jail's day-to-day operations, and federal courts are
therefore loath to intervene when detainees complain of mere inconveniences. Further, such judicial
restraint is appropriate because the federal constitution simply is not concerned with a de minimis
level of imposition on pretrial detainees. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.21 (1979); Ruiz v.
El Paso Processing Center, 299 Fed. App'x 369, 371 (5th Cir. 2008). As explained below, it is
apparent that plaintiff's complaints regarding the conditions of his confinement concern
inconveniences which do not constitute "punishment" or otherwise rise to the level of constitutional
violations.
In his rambling complaint, plaintiff provides a laundry list of grievances; however, the bulk
of them center around his contention that the jail is "filthy," full of mold and rust, and infested with
pests.
Concerning the generally unsanitary conditions, plaintiff's allegations fall far short of what
is required to state a nonfrivolous claim. Obviously, there is a point beyond which a prison's
conditions are so unsanitary as to render them unconstitutional. See, e.g., Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d
323, 338 (5th Cir. 2004) (confinement in "'extremely filthy' [cells] with crusted fecal matter, urine,
dried ejaculate, peeling and chipping paint, and old food particles on the walls" was
unconstitutional). That said, it must be remembered that, although prisons should be reasonably
clean, "[t]he Constitution does not require that prisons be completely sanitized or as clean or free
5
from potential hazards as one's home might be." McAllister v. Strain, Civ. Action No. 09-2823,
2009 WL 5178316, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 23, 2009); accord Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 215 (5th
Cir. 1998) ("[T]he Constitution does not mandate prisons with comfortable surroundings or
commodious conditions."). While the conditions described by plaintiff be unpleasant, they are not
so egregious as to be unconstitutional.
Plaintiff's claim concerning the presence of mold fares no better. The jurisprudence has
repeatedly held that the mere fact that mold is present does not render an inmate's confinement
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Eaton v. Magee, Civ. Action No. 2:10-cv-112, 2012 WL 2459398, at *5
(S.D. Miss. June 27, 2012) ("Plaintiff's claim that the bathroom and shower area are unsanitary and
contain black mold fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation."); Barnett v. Shaw, No.
3:11-CV-0399, 2011 WL 2200610, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 2011) (allegation of "excessive amount
of black mold in the showers and sinks" was insufficient to raise a claim for constitutional violation),
adopted, 2011 WL 2214383 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2011); Reynolds v. Newcomer, Civ. Action No. 091077, 2010 WL 234896, at *10 (W.D. La. Jan. 19, 2010) (plaintiff's complaints of "the presence of
black mold in living areas, eating areas, and shower areas" were found to "rise to no more than a de
minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned" (quotation marks
omitted)); McCarty v. McGee, No. 2:06cv113, 2008 WL 341643, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 5, 2008)
("Plaintiff's claim that the shower he was forced to share with other inmates is polluted and covered
in mold and fungus, causing him to catch athlete's foot and ringworm, fails to rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.").
6
Similarly, plaintiff's allegation that rust is present also fails. The presence of rust in a jail
does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation or otherwise warrant relief in a federal civil
rights action. See, e.g., Maddox v. Gusman, Civ. Action No. 14-2435, 2015 WL 1274081, at *3
(E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2015); Simmons v. Gusman, Civ. Action No. 14-1907, 2015 WL 151113, at *4
(E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2015); Penn v. Jones, Civ. Action No. 13-0830, 2014 WL 31351, at *2 (W.D. La.
Jan. 2, 2014).
Likewise, the mere presence of pests, such as gnats, does not amount to a constitutional
violation. See, e.g., Simmons, 2015 WL 151113, at *4; Clark v. Gusman, Civ. Action No. 11-2673,
2012 WL 1825306, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 1825302 (E.D. La. May 18,
2012); Murray v. Edwards County Sheriff's Department, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1292 (D. Kan.
2006), aff'd, 248 Fed. App'x 993 (10th Cir. 2007); Smith v. Barber, 316 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1028-29
(D. Kan. 2004).
In summary, the Court notes that it is not unsympathetic to plaintiff's various complaints
concerning the conditions of his confinement. However, for the reasons explained herein, the issue
before the Court is not whether the conditions of plaintiff's confinement are unpleasant or
uncomfortable – rather, it is only whether the conditions are unconstitutional. The conditions
alleged in this case may be lamentable but they are not unconstitutional. Accordingly, these claims
must be dismissed.
B. Fire Hazard Claim
Plaintiff also complains that the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center is "not up to code."8
Even if that allegation is true, it does not necessarily follow that his constitutional rights have been
8
Rec. Doc. 7, p. 7.
7
violated. While fire and electrical codes "can be helpful in determining whether a lack of fire safety"
rise to the level of a constitutional violation, such codes "are not determinative." Johnson v. Texas
Board of Criminal Justice, 281 Fed. App'x 319, 322 (5th Cir. 2008). Moreover, where, as here, an
inmate does not "allege that anyone had been injured by any type of fire or that [the jail] was built
from flammable materials or was particularly susceptible to fires, his allegations do not state a viable
claim." Id.; accord Hunnewell v. Warden, Main State Prison, No. 93-1917, 1994 WL 52643, at *4
(1st Cir. Feb. 23, 1994) ("[N]ot every deviation from ideally safe conditions constitutes a violation
of the constitution. Moreover, even liberally construed, plaintiff's complaint that his cell is unsafe
due to fire hazards is conclusory and fails to state a claim under § 1983." (citation omitted));
Sampson v. King, 693 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1982) ("In operating a prison, however, the state is
not constitutionally required to observe all the safety and health standards applicable to private
industry. Nor is it bound by the standards set by the safety codes of private organizations.
Standards suggested by experts are merely advisory. A federal court required to gauge the conduct
of state officials must use minimum constitutional standards as the measure." (citations omitted));
Patin v. LeBlanc, Civ. Action No. 11-3071, 2012 WL 3109402, at *17 (E.D. La. May 18, 2012),
adopted, 2012 WL 3109398 (E.D. La. July 31, 2012); Davis v. St. Charles Parish Corr. Center, Civ.
Action No. 10-98, 2010 WL 890980, at *7 (E.D. La. Mar. 8, 2010); Jernigan v. Dretke, Civ. Action
No. H-04-4672, 2005 WL 1185627, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2005) ("At the most, Jernigan has
alleged a condition that may violate local fire codes. The prison does not violate the Constitution
if it fails to comply with all health and safety standards. Although the situation Jernigan describes
is far from ideal, it is not so patently egregious or clearly dangerous that the prison officials could
8
be found to be deliberately indifferent if they allowed it to continue. No actual harm has been
alleged, and Jernigan's speculative worries do not establish a claim." (citations omitted)).
Accordingly, this claim must also be dismissed.
C. Food and Food Service Claims
Plaintiff next complains about the food served at the jail. However, as was previously
explained to plaintiff in another lawsuit in which he challenged the jail's food, the constitutionality
of prison food is not judged by its gastronomic appeal. Billizone v. Jefferson Parish Correctional
Center, Civ. Action No. 14-2594, 2015 WL 966149, at *9 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2015); accord
Cummings v. Gusman, Civ. Action No. 09-144, 2009 WL 1649737, at *3 n. 11 (E.D. La. June 9,
2009). Rather, the Constitution requires only that jail meals prove "reasonably adequate food" with
"sufficient nutritional value to preserve health." Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1327 (5th Cir. 1996)
("To comply with the Constitution, inmates must receive 'reasonably adequate' food."); Smith v.
Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 1977) ("A well-balanced meal, containing sufficient nutritional
value to preserve health, is all that is required."). Moreover, the United States Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals has noted that "[e]ven on a regular, permanent basis, two meals a day may be adequate."
Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999). Nothing in plaintiffs' complaint suggests that
the meals fail to meet these minimal standards.
Plaintiff also complains about the manner in which the food is served. It is clear that jail
food must be "prepared and served under conditions which do not present an immediate danger to
the health and well being of the inmates who consume it." Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 571 (10th
Cir. 1980). That said, it is also clear that "[i]nmates cannot expect the amenities, conveniences and
9
services of a good hotel." Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988). Although
plaintiff speculates that the manner in which the food is served at the jail could cause serious harm,
there is no indication that it has in fact done so. "[W]ithout an allegation of resulting harm,
complaints regarding food service practices simply are not of constitutional dimension." Gabriel
v. Gusman, Civ. Action No. 10-1688, 2010 WL 3169840, at *6 (E.D. La. July 16, 2010), adopted,
2010 WL 3175045 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2010); accord Billizone, 2015 WL 966149, at *8; Hawkins
v. Gusman, Civ. Action No. 10-1178, 2011 WL 1527218, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2011), adopted,
2011 WL 1527021 (E.D. La. Apr. 20, 2011); Spurlock v. Gusman, Civ. Action No. 10-991, 2010
WL 2102829, *7 (E.D. La. May 5, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 2102825 (E.D. La. May 25, 2010).
Further, plaintiff's complaints about the condition of the food trays and the food temperature are,
without more, insufficient to state a cognizable claim. See, e.g., Billizone, 2015 WL 966149, at *8;
Wilkerson v. Champagne, No. 03-1754, 2003 WL 22872106, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 28, 2003) (no
constitutional claim when meals served from "old, cracked, dirty food trays" were not always hot);
Sardon v. Peters, No. 94 C 7505, 1995 WL 609147, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 1995) (allegation that
cold food was served fails to state a constitutional claim); Jackson v. Griffith, No. 1:93-CV-424,
1995 WL 21939, at *4-5 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 1995) (claim regarding unsanitary food trays resulting
from overcrowded conditions dismissed as frivolous), adopted, 1995 WL 313655 (E.D. Tex. Feb.
8, 1995).
For these reasons, plaintiff's claims concerning the jail's food and the manner in which it is
served must be dismissed.
10
D. Law Library/Legal Services Program Claims
Plaintiff also claims that the jail's law library and legal services program are inadequate.
Obviously, inmates have a right of access to the courts which includes a right of access to adequate
law libraries or assistance from legally trained personnel needed to file nonfrivolous legal claims
challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828
(1977); Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1999). However, the Supreme Court in
Bounds "did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance" in the
prison. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).
Further, in any event, the Court notes that an inmate's claim that he has been denied access
to the courts is not cognizable unless his position as a litigant was actually prejudiced. See, e.g.,
Chriceol v. Phillips, 169 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999); Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th
Cir. 1998); McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1998); Walker v. Navarro County
Jail, 4 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1993). In the instant case, plaintiff does not allege that he has suffered
any actual prejudice whatsoever from the purportedly inadequate law library and legal services, and
it is clear "an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's
law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.
Because plaintiff "has not alleged that he was actually denied access to the court or that any pending
litigation was prejudiced, ... [he] therefore has not stated a cognizable § 1983 claim." Clark v. Foti,
No. 94-30615, 1995 WL 136127, at *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 8, 1995). Accordingly, this claim must also
be dismissed.
11
E. Grievance Procedure Claim
Plaintiff also complains that the jail's grievance procedure is ineffective. Even if that it true,
this claim must be dismissed because inmates simply have no constitutional right to an adequate and
effective grievance procedure or to have their complaints investigated and resolved to their
satisfaction. Bonneville v. Basse, 536 Fed. App'x 502, 503 (5th Cir. 2013); Propes v. Mays, 169
Fed. App'x 183, 184-85 (5th Cir. 2006); Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373-74 (5th Cir. 2005);
Davis v. St. Charles Parish Correctional Center, Civ. Action No. 10-98, 2010 WL 890980, at *5
(E.D. La. Mar. 8, 2010); Carter v. Strain, Civ. Action No. 09-15, 2009 WL 3231826, at *3 (E.D. La.
Oct. 1, 2009); Tyson v. Tanner, Civ. Action No. 08-4599, 2009 WL 2883056, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug.
25, 2009); Mahogany v. Miller, Civ. Action No. 06-1870, 2006 WL 4041973, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug.
3, 2006), appeal dismissed, 252 Fed. App'x 593 (5th Cir. 2007). Therefore, this claim must likewise
be dismissed.
F. Racism Claim
Plaintiff next alleges that defendant Ennis "is a racist" who inappropriately referred to him
as a "boy."9 However, "[m]ere allegations of verbal abuse do not present actionable claims under
§ 1983." Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d 271, 274 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993); accord Orange v. Ellis, 348 Fed.
App'x 69, 72 (5th Cir. 2009) ("[C]laims of verbal harassment do not reveal a constitutional violation.
Mere words are not sufficient to support a Section 1983 claim." (citation omitted)); Dussett v.
Jefferson Parish Correctional Center, Civ. Action No. 09-6462, 2010 WL 2076772, at *4 (E.D. La.
Apr. 21, 2010) ("[T]he law is well settled the use of a racial epithet by a custodial officer does not
9
Rec. Doc. 7, p. 9.
12
give rise to a cause of action for violation of constitutional rights."), adopted, 2010 WL 2008982
(E.D. La. May 18, 2010). Moreover, "an officer's use of a racial epithet, without harassment or some
other conduct that deprives the victim of established rights, does not amount to an equal protection
violation." Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 706 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied & opin. clarified on other
grounds, 186 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, this claim must also be dismissed.
G. State Law Claims
Lastly, to the extent that plaintiff is asserting any claims under state law, the Court declines
to consider any state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) ("The district courts may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction ...."); see also Jackson v. Mizzel, 361 Fed. App'x 622, 627 (5th Cir.
2010) ("Because [the plaintiff] states not one valid federal claim, the district court properly declined
jurisdiction over his Louisiana causes of action."); Bass v. Parkwood Hospital, 180 F.3d 234, 246
(5th Cir. 1999) ("When a court dismisses all federal claims before trial, the general rule is to dismiss
any pendent claims."). If plaintiff wishes to pursue claims under state law, he must do so in the state
courts.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), the claims
against the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous
and/or for failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
13
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the unopposed "Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(c) or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56" is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's federal civil rights claims against Sheriff
Newell Normand, Edward Olsen, Howard Lavin, Martha Ennis, John Cotton, Carl Preyer, Gary
Cook, and Sue Ellen Monfra are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's state law claims, if any, are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their being asserted in the state courts.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this twenty-seventh day of April, 2015.
_______________________________________
SALLY SHUSHAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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