Castay v. Ochsner Health Systems et al
Filing
56
ORDER - IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendant Ochsner Health Systems is GRANTED.Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Ochsner Health Systems and Ochsner EAP are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction filed by Defendant Corphealth, Inc. d/b/a LifeSynch is GRANTED. Plaintiffs state-law claims against LifeSynch case are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Temporarily Stay Discovery filed by Defendant Ochsner Health Systems is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (bwn)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ANNE VICTORIA CASTAY,
Plaintiff
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 14-1356
OCHSNER HEALTH SYSTEMS, ET AL.,
Defendants
SECTION: “E” (2)
ORDER
Before the Court are the following motions: (1) a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendant Ochsner Health Systems
(“Ochsner”),1 (2) a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction filed by Defendant Corphealth, Inc. d/b/a LifeSynch (“LifeSynch”),2 and (3)
a Motion to Temporarily Stay Discovery also filed by Ochsner.3 For the reasons that
follow, both motions to dismiss are granted, and the motion to temporarily stay
discovery is denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
On April 29, 2013, Plaintiff Anne Victoria Castay filed suit against Ochsner Clinic
Foundation alleging interference with her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”) and retaliation for attempting to exercise her FMLA rights.4 Plaintiff is a
former surgical technician who was employed by Ochsner Clinic Foundation until she
was terminated on June 4, 2012. This Court granted summary judgment in favor of
R. Doc. 27.
R. Doc. 31.
3 R. Doc. 49.
4 Castay v. Ochsner Clinic Found., No. 13-2492, R. Doc. 1 (E.D. La.).
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Ochsner Clinic Foundation on all of Plaintiff’s claims.5 Plaintiff appealed, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Court’s ruling.6
On June 10, 2014, after the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to alter judgment but
before her appeal was docketed, Plaintiff filed a separate pro se Complaint against
Defendants Ochsner Health Systems, Corphealth, Inc. d/b/a LifeSynch, Ochsner EAP,
Beth Walker, and Joan Mollohan.7 On April 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint in which she voluntarily dismissed Defendants Beth Walker and Joan
Mollohan.8
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, for more than twenty years, she
has suffered from a mental health condition that constitutes a disability under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).9 She claims Ochsner was aware of her
condition because she used her health benefits to obtain treatment, and Ochsner made
no attempt to accommodate her disability. On June 4, 2012, Plaintiff was discharged
from her employment. She asserts Ochsner violated the ADA when it terminated her
employment, which caused her loss of income, mental anguish, and other damages.10
Plaintiff states in the Amended Complaint: “Ochsner’s denial of Castay’s FMLA request
is the subject of a separate proceeding . . . . Those claims for relief are, therefore, not
being reasserted in this instant action.”11
Id., R. Doc. 49.
Castay v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 604 F. App’x 355, 357 (5th Cir. 2015). On July 21, 2015, the judgment
was issued as mandate.
7 R. Doc. 1.
8 R. Doc. 26.
9 Id. at p. 2.
10 Id. at p. 5.
11 Id. at pp. 3–4.
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LAW AND ANALYSIS
Ochsner’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)12
On April 21, 2015, Ochsner filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims in their
entirety, with prejudice.13 First, Ochsner asserts Plaintiff’s Complaint and Amended
Complaint are barred by res judicata because her second suit arises out of the same
nucleus of operative fact as her first suit, regardless of whether Plaintiff states a different
legal theory for her second suit.14 In the alternative, Ochsner asserts Plaintiff’s ADA
claim is time-barred.15
Plaintiff opposes Ochsner’s motion, arguing “the claims or causes of action
asserted in the two suits are neither the same nor do they arise out of the same nexus of
operative facts,” and her ADA claim is timely.16 She admits the same employer and
employee were involved in both cases and that portions of the cases occurred during
similar time periods, but she contends the cases involved separate medical issues
afflicting different patients, arose under different Federal statutes, and sought different
forms of relief.17
“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on res judicata grounds may be appropriate when
the elements of res judicata are apparent on the face of the pleadings.”18 In deciding
such a motion, “the court may consider documents attached to or incorporated in the
R. Doc. 27.
Id. Plaintiff’s original Complaint named Ochsner EAP as a defendant. In her Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff states: “On information and belief, at all times material hereto, Ochsner did business under
various assumed business names, including ‘Ochsner Employee Assistance Program’ aka ‘Ochsner EAP.’”
R. Doc. 26. In its motion, Ochsner asserts Ochsner EAP is not a business entity. Plaintiff does not dispute
this assertion. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Ochsner EAP are dismissed.
14 R. Doc. 27-1, p. 4.
15 Id. at pp. 8–9.
16 R. Doc. 33, pp. 2–5.
17 Id. at p. 2.
18 Dean v. Mississippi Bd. of Bar Admissions, 394 F. App’x 172, 175 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).
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complaint and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.”19 “Federal law determines
the res judicata effect of a prior federal court judgment.”20
The Fifth Circuit has held that four elements are required for a claim to be barred
by res judicata: “(1) the parties must be identical in the two actions; (2) the prior
judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there must
be a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action must be
involved in both cases.”21 Essentially, “res judicata bars the subsequent litigation of
claims that have been litigated or should have been raised in an earlier suit.”22
1. Identical parties
The Fifth Circuit has held: “Res judicata does not require strict identity of the
parties. A non-party defendant to a prior suit may qualify as an ‘identical party’ for res
judicata purposes if it is in privity with a named defendant.”23 The Fifth Circuit has
recognized that privity exists in three circumstances: “(1) where the non-party is the
successor in interest to a party’s interest in property; (2) where the non-party controlled
the prior litigation; and (3) where the non-party’s interests were adequately represented
by a party to the original suit.”24
Plaintiff’s first suit was filed against her former employer, Ochsner Clinic
Foundation. In this suit, Plaintiff named Ochsner Health Systems as a defendant.
Ochsner’s motion states Ochsner Clinic Foundation is a subsidiary of Ochsner Health
Systems, which Plaintiff does not dispute. Thus, Ochsner Health Systems’ interests were
19 U.S. ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2003). See also
Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 372 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Federal courts are permitted to refer to matters of
public record when deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”).
20 Gulf Island-IV, Inc. v. Blue Streak-Gulf Is Ops, 24 F.3d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1994).
21 In re Ark-La-Tex Timber Co., Inc., 482 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir. 2007).
22 Id. (emphasis added).
23 Judy Chou Chiung-Yu Wang v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F. App’x 359, 364 (5th Cir. 2011)
(unpublished) (citing Gulf Island–IV, Inc., 24 F.3d at 746).
24 Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th Cir. 1990).
adequately represented in the prior suit.25 Plaintiff admits in her opposition to
Ochsner’s motion that both suits were filed by her against her former employer.26
Accordingly, the first element is met as to these parties.
2–3. Prior & Final Judgment
This Court issued prior judgment granting summary judgment in favor of
Ochsner Clinic Foundation on all of Plaintiff’s claims.27 This judgment was affirmed by
the Fifth Circuit, and judgment was issued as mandate on July 21, 2015.28 Plaintiff does
not dispute these two elements. Thus, the second and third elements are met.
4. Same Claim or Cause of Action
To determine whether the fourth element is met, the Court applies the
“transactional test.”29 The Fifth Circuit has described the transactional test as follows:
Under the transactional test, a prior judgment’s preclusive effect extends
to all rights of the plaintiff “with respect to all or any part of the
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the [original]
action arose.” Petro–Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 365 F.3d 385, 395–96
(5th Cir. 2004) (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1)
(1982)). What grouping of facts constitutes a “transaction” or a “series of
transactions” must “be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such
considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business
understanding or usage.” Id. (quoting the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 24(2) (1982)). The critical issue under the transactional test
is whether the two actions are based on the “same nucleus of operative
facts.” Id. at 396 (quoting In re Southmark Corp., 163 F.3d 925, 934 (5th
Cir.1999)). Thus, [the court] must review the facts contained in each
complaint to determine whether they are part of the same transaction or
Cf. Judy Chou Chiung-Yu Wang, 439 F. App’x at 364 (stating “[t]here can be no doubt that Prudential
Insurance Company of America, which was named in the prior suits, adequately represented the interests
of its subsidiaries—who are alleged to have committed the same wrongdoing—in the prior suit”).
26 Id. at p. 2.
27 Castay v. Ochsner Clinic Found., No. 13-2492, R. Doc. 49 (E.D. La.).
28 Castay v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 604 F. App’x 355, 357 (5th Cir. 2015).
29 Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2004).
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series of transactions, which arise from the same nucleus of operative
facts.30
In this instance, both complaints are by Plaintiff, a former employee of Ochsner,
against her former employer. Plaintiff’s first complaint alleged interference with her
FMLA rights and retaliation for attempting to exercise her FMLA rights when she was
terminated on June 4, 2012. Plaintiff’s instant complaint alleges Ochsner failed to
accommodate her mental health disability and violated the ADA when it terminated her
employment on June 4, 2012. Even though the federal statutes under which Plaintiff
asserts claims in both cases differ, the claims in question all originate from her
employment with Ochsner and ultimate termination on June 4, 2012 on the grounds
Plaintiff acted unprofessionally toward her immediate supervisor and co-workers.
In addition, the claims in both cases were so connected in time and space that
they could have, and should have, been brought in the first action to create a single,
convenient trial unit.31 It is not as though Plaintiff’s ADA claim came into existence only
after final judgment in her first action was issued, or even after that action was filed.32
Plaintiff was terminated on June 4, 2012. Her first suit was filed on April 29, 2013, and
the instant suit was not filed until June 10, 2014. As the Fifth Circuit has stated:
Id.
See U.S. v. Davenport, 484 F.3d 321, 325–26 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
94 (1980) (stating the doctrine of res judicata “‘relieve[s] parties of the cost and vexation of multiple
lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage[s] reliance
on adjudication’”)).
32 It is irrelevant that Plaintiff’s EEOC letter for the ADA claim was not issued until after summary
judgment was granted in the first case. Cf. Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 316 (5th
Cir. 2004) (“[A] plaintiff who brings a Title VII action and files administrative claims with the EEOC must
still comply with general rules governing federal litigation respecting other potentially viable claims.
Because the barred claims arose from the same nucleus of operative fact as the claims in [the first case]
and they predate that action, Appellants were on notice to include those claims in [the first case]. To
prevent their claims from being precluded, Appellants could have requested a stay in [the first case] until
they received their letters. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determination that Appellants’
claims predating and unrelated to the lieutenant promotion process were barred by res judicata.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The same reasoning holds true in this case.
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[I]t is black-letter law that res judicata, by contrast to narrower doctrines
of issue preclusion, bars all claims that were or could have been advanced
in support of the cause of action on the occasion of its former adjudication,
not merely those that were adjudicated. And it is equally settled that one
who has a choice of more than one remedy for a given wrong, as [Plaintiff]
did here, may not assert them serially, in successive actions, but must
advance all at once on pain of bar.33
Plaintiff’s ADA claim was predicated on conduct that allegedly occurred before she filed
her first suit against Ochsner. Thus, her claim could have been included in the earlier
suit.34 The Court finds the facts underlying Plaintiff’s complaints in both cases are part
of the same transaction or series of transactions, which arise from the same nucleus of
operative facts.
As all four required elements are met, Plaintiff’s ADA claims against Ochsner are
barred by res judicata and thus dismissed with prejudice.35
LifeSynch’s Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction36
On May 5, 2015, LifeSynch filed a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction.37 In its motion, LifeSynch argues: “[E]ven assuming
Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against LifeSynch, that claim does not have its
own independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Further, the allegations as to LifeSynch
in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint do not arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact
with her claims [against Ochsner under the ADA], such that the Court cannot exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over them.”38
Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Miss., 701 F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1983).
See supra note 30.
35 Because the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims in the above-captioned matter are barred by res judicata, it
need not address whether Plaintiff’s ADA claim was timely.
36 R. Doc. 31.
37 Id.
38 Id. at p. 1. LifeSynch notes “it is not entirely clear on what basis [Plaintiff] has brought LifeSynch into
this suit, [but] her Amended Complaint does make clear that she has not asserted a federal cause of action
against LifeSynch.” R. Doc. 31-2, p. 1.
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In this case, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is based on Ochsner’s alleged
violations of the ADA. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint makes no allegations that
LifeSynch violated the ADA or any other federal statute. Even assuming Plaintiff’s statelaw allegations as to LifeSynch are so related to Plaintiff’s federal ADA claims that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution, which would be required for the Court to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1367, the Court dismisses in this order all federal claims
over which it had original jurisdiction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(c), the Court may
then decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law
claims. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against LifeSynch case are dismissed
without prejudice.
Motion to Temporarily Stay Discovery filed by Defendants Ochsner Health Systems39
Defendant Ochsner Health Systems filed a motion for a protective order granting
a temporary stay of all discovery pending the Court’s ruling on Ochsner’s pending
dispositive motion.40 In this order, the Court grants Ochsner’s pending dispositive
motion. Accordingly, the motion to temporarily stay discovery is now moot.41
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendant Ochsner Health Systems is GRANTED.42
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Ochsner Health Systems and Ochsner EAP are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
R. Doc. 49.
Id.
41 Id.
42 R. Doc. 27.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction filed by Defendant Corphealth, Inc. d/b/a LifeSynch is
GRANTED.43 Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against LifeSynch case are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.44
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Temporarily Stay Discovery
filed by Defendant Ochsner Health Systems is DENIED AS MOOT.45
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of July, 2015.
________________________________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
R. Doc. 31.
The Court’s ruling dismisses all pending claims in this action.
45 R. Doc. 49.
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