Williams et al v. Saltamachia et al

Filing 12

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 . Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 1/26/15.(jjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LANNY WILLIAMS, JR.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 14-1428

AGENT SALTAMACHIA, et al.

SECTION: R(5)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff Lanny Williams, Jr.’s prisoner
complaint,1 and the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
("R&R") that Williams's petition be denied and dismissed with
prejudice.2

The Court, having reviewed de novo the complaint, the

record, the applicable law, the Magistrate Judge's R&R, and the
plaintiff’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R,3 hereby
approves the R&R and adopts it as its opinion.

To the extent that

plaintiff’s complaint can be construed as a petition for habeas
corpus, it is dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust
available state court remedies.

To the extent that plaintiff’s

complaint can be construed as a petition under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it
is dismissed with prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
Plaintiff filed his complaint on August 18, 2014, against
defendants Jason Saltamachia, Joey Alfonso, Lance Kramer, Clifford
1

R. Doc. 8.

2

R. Doc. 10.

3

R. Doc. 11.

Englande, and the St. Bernard Parish Narcotics Unit.4

Plaintiff

alleges that defendants caused numerous personal injuries as well
as property damage during the course of his February 22, 2013
arrest.5
Plaintiff was held as a pretrial detainee at St. Bernard
Parish Prison (“SBPP”) for ten months.6

Plaintiff alleges SBPP

prevented him from filing a claim against defendants by monitoring
his mail and phone calls.7

Following his conviction, plaintiff was

incarcerated at River Correctional Center (“RCC”).8

Plaintiff

alleges that he was again prevented from filing a complaint because
RCC had no standard § 1983 forms or the court’s mailing address.9
Plaintiff was then transferred to Concordia Correctional Center
(“Concordia”),
complaint.10

where

he

again

attempted

to

prepare

a

legal

Plaintiff alleges that Concordia “gave [him] the run

around” when he tried to obtain a § 1983 form and the court’s
address.11 Plaintiff was next transferred to Catahoula Correctional

4

R. Doc. 8.

5

Id. at 7.

6

Id. at 6.

7

Id.

8

Id. at 6, 8.

9

Id.

10

Id. at 8.

11

Id.
2

Center

(“Catahoula”),

Finally,

plaintiff

where

was

he

“still

transferred

to

had

no

Orleans

legal
Parish

help.”12
Prison

(“OPP”), where he obtained a § 1983 form, the court’s mailing
address, and the advice that he only had one year to file suit.13
This advice came after one year had already passed.14
The Magistrate Judge recommended that plaintiff’s § 1983 claim
against defendant Clifford Englande be dismissed because plaintiff
set forth no specific facts demonstrating Englande’s personal
involvement in plaintiff’s arrest.15

The Magistrate Judge also

recommended that plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the other
defendants be dismissed because plaintiff failed to file his
complaint within one year from the date of the incident giving rise
to his cause of action.16
Plaintiff filed three objections to the Magistrate Judge’s
R&R.17 First, he explained defendant Englade’s personal involvement
in his arrest.18

Second, plaintiff maintains that his failure to

file his legal complaint within one year was through no fault of

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

R. Doc. 10 at 3.

16

Id. at 4.

17

R. Doc. 11.

18

R. Doc. 11 at 1.
3

his own; plaintiff faults the prison facilities in which he was
incarcerated for their lack of legal assistance.19 Third, plaintiff
requests legal assistance to help him further pursue his claims.20
The Court construes this third “objection” as a motion to appoint
legal counsel.

For the sake of clarity, the Court will address

plaintiff’s objections out of order.
Plaintiff's primary objection is that he could not file his
complaint within the one-year period because the prisons in which
he

was

housed

assistance.21

failed

to

provide

him

with

sufficient

legal

The Court finds petitioner's argument to be without

merit.
Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a federal statute of
limitations period, the Court must look to the forum state’s
general personal injury limitations period. See Stanley v. Foster,
464 F.3d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Moore v. McDonald, 30
F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994)).
the

limitations

period

is

In Louisiana’s civil law system,

called

“prescription.”

McGuire

v.

Larpenter, No. 14-30498, 2014 WL 6440383, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 18,
2014).

Louisiana’s period of prescription for personal injury

claims is one year. See La. Civ. Code art. 3492(“Delictual actions
are subject to a liberative prescription of one year.”); Jacobsen

19

R. Doc. 11 at 1.

20

R. Doc. 11 at 1.

21

R. Doc. 11 at 1.
4

v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Elzy v.
Roberson, 868 F.2d 793, 794 (5th Cir. 1989)).
determines when the § 1983 claim accrues.

Federal law still

Wallace v. Kato, 549

U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Jacobsen, 133 F.3d at 319.

“[A] cause of

action under section 1983 accrues when the plaintiff knows or has
reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.”
Pete v. Metcalfe, 8 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In

addition

to

applying

the

forum

state’s

statute

of

limitations period, federal courts must also give effect to any
applicable tolling provision provided by state law.

Burge v.

Parish of St. Tammany, 996 F. 2d 786, 788 (5th Cir. 1993).
Louisiana law recognizes the principle of contra non valentem agere
nulla currit praescriptio (“contra non valentem”)--prescription
does not run against a party who is unable to act.

E.g., Wimberly

v. Gatch, 635 So. 2d 206, 211 (La. 1994); Corsey v. State Through
Dep’t of Corr., 375 So.2d 1319, 1321 (La. 1979).

Contra non

valentem tolls prescription in four situations:
(1) Where there was some legal cause which prevented the
courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or
acting on the plaintiff’s action;
(2) Where there was some condition coupled with a
contract or connected with the proceedings which
prevented the creditor from suing or acting;
(3) Where the debtor himself has done some act
effectually to prevent the creditor from availing himself
of his cause of action; and
(4) Where some cause of action is not known or reasonably
knowable by the plaintiff even though his ignorance is
not induced by the defendant.
5

Wimberly, 635 So. 2d at 211; accord Burge, 996 F.2d at 788.
doctrine

of

contra

non

valentem

recognizes

that

in

“The

limited

circumstances prescription should not run if good cause exists as
to why plaintiff [was] unable to exercise or was lulled into not
exercising a cause of action when it first became exigible.” Pracht
v. City of Shreveport, 830 So.2d 546, 551 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff admits that he filed his complaint beyond the usual
one-year prescriptive period.22

However, plaintiff argues that his

failure to timely file his complaint was through no fault of his
own.23

Plaintiff maintains that he repeatedly sought the materials

and information necessary to file a § 1983 claim, but prison
officials either did not have the proper materials or refused to
accede

to

plaintiff’s

requests.

Accepting

plaintiff's

characterizations as true, the Court finds the doctrine of contra
non valentem inapplicable.
The

mere

fact

prescription period.
6440383,

at

*2

(5th

of

imprisonment

does

not

suspend

the

McGuire v. Larpenter, No. 14-30498, 2014 WL
Cir.

Nov.

18,

2014)

(citing

Jackson

v.

Jefferson Parish Clerk of Court, 981 So. 2d 156, 161 (La. App. 5
Cir. 4/15/08)). The contra non valentem scenario most analogous to
plaintiff’s situation is that in which the debtor, or defendant,
has done something to prevent the creditor, or plaintiff, from

22

R. Doc. 11 at 1.

23

R. Doc. 11 at 1.
6

pursuing his cause of action.

See La. Civ. Code art. 1756 cmt. (c)

(“The terms ‘obligor’, synonymous with debtor, and ‘obligee’,
synonymous with creditor, have accordingly been preserved.”). Yet,
this exception is limited to cases in which the defendant himself
prevents the plaintiff from filing suit.

See, e.g., Vinzant v.

United States, 458 F. App’x 329, 332 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding the
petitioner

did

not

satisfy

contra

non

valentem

exception

by

alleging third parties prevented him from suing the defendants);
Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 158 (5th Cir. 1999) (defining the
relevant contra non valentem exception as applicable “when the
defendant prevents the plaintiff from bringing suit” (emphasis
added)); Wimberly v. Gatch, 635 So. 2d 206, 211 (La. 1994)(“The
third category applies to cases where the defendant engages in
conduct which prevents plaintiff from availing himself of his
judicial remedies.” (emphasis added)).

Because defendants in

plaintiff’s case are the individual narcotics agents who arrested
him and the actors who allegedly prevented plaintiff from filing
suit are various prison officials, contra non valentem does not
apply, and plaintiff’s claims are prescribed. See McGuire, 2014 WL
6440383, at *3 n.1 (noting the limited scope of contra non valentem
and recognizing that federal courts are “powerless to adopt a rule
contrary to Louisiana case law.”).
Next, plaintiff explains in his objections that he merely
forgot to allege defendant Englande’s involvement in plaintiff’s
7

allegedly unlawful arrest.24

Plaintiff claims defendant Englande

applied excessive force during plaintiff’s arrest by using a Tazer
while plaintiff was already detained in handcuffs.25
Facts and issues raised for the first time in a prisoner’s
objections to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R are not properly before
the district court. Flores v. Scott, No. 94-11075, 1995 WL 371237,
at *2 (5th Cir. June 9, 1995); United States v. Armstrong, 951 F.2d
626, 630 (5th Cir. 1992).

Therefore, the Court need not address

plaintiff’s new allegations. Moreover, even if the Court liberally
construed plaintiff’s additional factual information as a motion to
amend his original complaint, the claim nevertheless fails because
plaintiff failed to bring it within the one-year prescription
period.
Lastly, plaintiff requests legal counsel.

A pro se, civil

rights plaintiff is not entitled to appointed counsel absent
“exceptional circumstances.”

Lempar v. Livingston, 463 F. App’x

268, 269-70 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264,
266 (5th Cir. 1982)).

Whether exceptional circumstances exist

generally depends on two considerations–“the type and complexity of
the case, and the abilities of the individual bringing it.”

Id.

Plaintiff’s claims do not present any extraordinary circumstances–the facts of his case are relatively simple and not atypical of

24

R. Doc. 11 at 1.

25

R. Doc. 11 at 1.
8

other pro se civil rights claims.

See Krause v. Leonard, 352 F.

App’x 933, 937 n.19 (5th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff has also alleged

sufficient information for the Court to adjudicate his dispute.
See

Baranowski

v.

Hart,

486

F.3d

112,

126

(5th

Cir.

2007).

Moreover, because the Court dismisses plaintiff’s claims on the
basis of prescription, his motion to appoint legal counsel is now
moot.

See Krause, 352 F. App’x at 937.

Accordingly,
Lanny Williams, Jr.’s habeas corpus claims are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Williams’s federal civil rights claims are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of January, 2015
26th

SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

9