Roberts v. Inglese et al

Filing 30

ORDER AND REASONS. It is ORDERED that the defendants' 24 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and that plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sally Shushan. (gec)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHARLES OWENS ROBERTS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 14-1450-SS

MEDICAL DIRECTORS/DOCTORS
MR. R.D. INGLESE AND MR. FRENCH

ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff, Charles Owens Roberts, a state prisoner, filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Drs. R. Demaree Inglese and Gary French. In this lawsuit, plaintiff claims that he
was denied adequate medical care at the St. Tammany Parish Prison. All parties have consented to
the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.1
The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Plaintiff was ordered to file a response to that motion on or before April
9, 2015.3 Plaintiff's only filing since the issuance of that order was an incomprehensible statement
in support of his complaint.4

1

Rec. Doc. 20.

2

Rec. Doc. 24.

3

Rec. Doc. 28.

4

Rec. Doc. 29.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court may grant the motion when no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). There is no "genuine issue" when the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmovant. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
"Procedurally, the party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Taita Chemical Co., Ltd. v.
Westlake Styrene Corp., 246 F.3d 377, 385 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
The party opposing summary judgment must then "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own
affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate
'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 324 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56); see also Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel,
274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). The Court has no duty to search the record for evidence to
support a party's opposition to summary judgment; rather, "[t]he party opposing summary judgment
is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which
the evidence supports his or her claim." Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458
(5th Cir. 1998). Conclusory statements, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are not
competent summary judgment evidence and will not suffice to defeat a properly supported motion
for summary judgment. Id.; Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir.
1996).
2

In their motion, the defendants argue, inter alia, that the claims against them must be
dismissed because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. For the
following reasons, it is clear that the defendants are correct.5
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), as amended, provides that "[n]o action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).6
Federal courts have taken a strict approach to the exhaustion requirement. For example, the
United States Supreme Court held that the exhaustion requirement is "mandatory," Porter v. Nussle,
534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002), and "applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve
general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other
wrong," id. at 532. The Supreme Court further held that "an inmate must exhaust irrespective of the
forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues." Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,
741 n.6 (2001). The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals therefore concluded that
"[q]uibbles about the nature of a prisoner's complaint, the type of remedy sought, and the sufficiency
or breadth of prison grievance procedures were laid to rest in Booth." Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260
F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001).

5

Because plaintiff did not in fact exhaust his administrative remedies, the Court need not, and
does not, address the defendants' alternative grounds for dismissal.
6

"As used in this section, the term 'prisoner' means any person incarcerated or detained in any
facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of
criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary
program." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h).
3

The Fifth Circuit has emphatically held that the mandatory exhaustion requirement cannot
be excused by a federal court. The Fifth Circuit stated:
[T]here can be no doubt that pre-filing exhaustion of prison grievance processes is
mandatory. We thus hold that Underwood [v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 1998),]
has been tacitly overruled and is no longer good law to the extent it permits prisoner
lawsuits challenging prison conditions to proceed in the absence of pre-filing
administrative exhaustion. District courts have no discretion to excuse a prisoner’s
failure to properly exhaust the prison grievance process before filing their
complaint. It is irrelevant whether exhaustion is achieved during the federal
proceeding. Pre-filing exhaustion is mandatory, and the case must be dismissed if
available administrative remedies were not exhausted.
Gonzalez v. Seal, 702 F.3d 785, 788 (5th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Although
the mandatory nature of the exhaustion requirement may seem harsh, it is necessary to accomplish
the PLRA's goals. As the United States Supreme Court has explained:
Beyond doubt, Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and
improve the quality of prisoner suits; to this purpose, Congress afforded corrections
officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the
initiation of a federal case. In some instances, corrective action taken in response to
an inmate's grievance might improve prison administration and satisfy the inmate,
thereby obviating the need for litigation. In other instances, the internal review
might "filter out some frivolous claims." And for cases ultimately brought to court,
adjudication could be facilitated by an administrative record that clarifies the
contours of the controversy.
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002) (citations omitted).
In support of their motion, the defendants have submitted the affidavit of Warden Gregory
Longino, in which he outlined the Administrative Remedy Procedure put in place by the St.
Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office:
1.

Since July 26, 1990, he has been employed by Rodney J. Strain, Jr., in his
capacity as Sheriff of St. Tammany Parish ("Sheriff Strain"), and Sheriff
Strain's predecessor in office, under the auspices of the St. Tammany Parish
4

Sheriff's Office ("the STPSO"). He currently holds the rank of Major with
the STPSO.
2.

At all relevant times herein, Affiant has been assigned the post of Warden of
the St. Tammany Parish Jail ("the Jail"). In that role, he has direct
supervisory authority over and responsibility for all operations of the Jail –
including but not limited to all decisions regarding the handling of inmate
complaints and issues of inmate discipline – subject only to the direction and
supervision of Sheriff Strain and other superior officers within the STPSO.
As a result, he has personal knowledge of all facts set out below.

3.

In 1996, the STPSO adopted an Administrative Remedy Procedure ("ARP")
that permits inmates to lodge grievance complaints. The procedure allows
any inmate – whether they are being held by federal or state agencies after
conviction or are pre-trial detainees – to request in writing a review of a
complaint the inmate has about a policy, condition or incident that occurs
within the jail.

4.

The Jail's ARP was in place and functioning in the time-period of March
through June 2014, when the incidents giving rise to this lawsuit occurred.

5.

A summary of the ARP is contained in the Inmate Handbook that is given to
every inmate who is booked into the Jail. A photocopy of that summary, as
it appears in the handbook, is attached to and incorporated into this Affidavit.

6.

A copy of the complete ARP can also be found in the Jail law library, where
access is available to all inmates and was available to all inmates in July of
2012.

7.

The ARP, including the inmate complaint procedure, was posted in every
housing unit of the jail in January of 2013. Blank ARP forms were available
in every housing unit and made easily accessible to all inmates.

8.

An inmate can also ask any Jail deputy for a copy of the blank forms.

9.

In lieu of the blank forms, inmates may submit a written communication
containing the words, "This is a grievance through the ARP" or something
to that same effect.

10.

Under the procedure, a grievance must be filed within 90 days from the date
of the incident giving rise to the grievance. Any grievance filed more than
90 days after the incident is rejected as untimely.
5

11.

The written grievance first is forwarded to the First Level Respondent, who
must respond within 15 days of receipt of the grievance. This process is
designated as the First Step Review.

12.

If an inmate is not satisfied with the results of the First Step Review, the
inmate may appeal the response to Affiant, in his role as Warden, within five
days of the inmate's receipt of the First Step Review results. The Warden has
25 working days to reply to the appeal. This step is designated Second Step
Review.

13.

If an inmate is not satisfied with the results of the Second Step Review, the
inmate may appeal that result to the Sheriff within five days of the inmate's
receipt of the Warden's response. The Sheriff has 40 days to reply to this
appeal, which is designated Third Step Review.

14.

If an inmate does not receive a timely response to either of the first two steps
of the process, the inmate nevertheless is required to follow through to the
next step of the process.

15.

Inmate Charles Owens Roberts (DOB xx/xx/58; D.O.C. No. 415495) was
booked into the Jail at approximately 8:30 am on Thursday, March 20, 2014
and he was released into the custody of Lt. Styron Allen of the East Carroll
Parish Sheriff's Office, at 9:00 am on Tuesday, January 6, 2015.

16.

During this period of incarceration, Mr. Roberts initiated the ARP on only
two occasions.

17.

Because both grievances concerned issues related to the Jail's Medical
Department, they were both referred to Dr. Demaree Inglese, the Director of
that Department.

18.

The documentation contained in Mr. Robert's Jail administrative file
indicates that Dr. Inglese responded to one of the grievances, using the
prescribed form, on April 30, 2014 and that Mr. Roberts acknowledged
receipt of the response by his signature on the form on that same date.

19.

The documentation contained in Mr. Roberts' Jail administrative file
indicates that Dr. Inglese responded to the other grievance, using the
prescribed form, on May 22, 2014 and that Mr. Roberts acknowledged
receipt of the response by his signature on the form on that same date.
6

20.

On neither of the occasions described in the two preceding paragraphs did
Mr. Roberts ever initiate the next step of the ARP, the Second Step Review.

21.

As a result, Mr. Roberts did not exhaust his administrative remedies as
required by the Jail ARP concerning his claims that are the subject of this
lawsuit prior to filing the lawsuit.7

In that it is undisputed that the plaintiff did not pursue his claims past the first step of the
ARP, it is obvious that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. As the United States Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals has noted: "'Exhaust' is defined as 'to take complete advantage of (legal
remedies).'" Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 294 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Webster's New Int'l
Dictionary 796 (3rd ed. 1981)). As a result, administrative remedies are not exhausted unless a
prisoner pursued his grievance through the conclusion of a multi-step administrative remedy
procedure. Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Hemphill v.
Inglese, 359 Fed. App'x 537, 540 (5th Cir. 2010) ("[C]omplying with the first step of an
administrative grievance procedure will not suffice to exhaust administrative remedies if the
grievance procedure contemplates additional steps.").
Because the plaintiff failed to pursue his administrative remedies to their conclusion as
required by federal law, thereby giving the defendants a fair opportunity to consider and possibly
resolve the claims without litigation, it is not appropriate for this Court to consider those claims.
Therefore, plaintiff's claims must be dismissed.
Accordingly,

7

Rec. Doc. 24-4.
7

IT IS ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment, Rec. Doc. 24, is
GRANTED and that plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.8
New Orleans, Louisiana, this twenty-first day of April, 2015.

_______________________________________
SALLY SHUSHAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

8

A dismissal for failure to exhaust is generally without prejudice; however, because any new
grievance filed by plaintiff would be time-barred under the STPSO administrative remedy procedure
and his failure to exhaust therefore cannot be cured, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate in this
case. See Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 710 (5th Cir. 1995) (dismissal with prejudice warranted
when administrative relief is time-barred or otherwise precluded); Myrick v. Strain, Civ. Action No.
12-2962, 2013 WL 5232422, at *6 n.14 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 2013).
8