Brady v. St. John the Baptist Parish Council et al
Filing
24
ORDER & REASONS: Granting Motions to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants Whitney Joseph, Jr., Assessor (Rec. Doc. 14); Marvin Perrilloux, Chairman of St. John the Baptist Council (Rec. Doc. 15); Virgil Rayneri , Director of Utilities for St. John the Baptist Parish (Rec. Doc. 17); and St. John the Baptist Council (Rec. Doc. 18). FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 10/27/14. (sek)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRADY
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 14-1613
ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH
COUNCIL ET AL.
SECTION: "J”(3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Motions to Dismiss Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants Whitney Joseph,
Jr., Assessor (Rec. Doc. 14); Marvin Perrilloux, Chairman of St.
John the Baptist Council (Rec. Doc. 15); Virgil Rayneri, Director
of Utilities for St. John the Baptist Parish (Rec. Doc. 17); and
St. John the Baptist Council (Rec. Doc. 18). The motions are
unopposed. Having considered the motion and memoranda of the
parties, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that
the motions should be GRANTED for the reasons set forth more
fully below.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND FACTS
This action arises out of Plaintiff’s claims against St.
John
the
Baptist
Council
and
three
1
of
its
members,
Marvin
Perrilloux, Virgil Rayneri, and Whitney Joseph, Jr., who she
alleges denied her access to her home and land located at 185
West
16th
Street
in
Reserve,
Louisiana.
She
claims
that
Defendants are negligent and in violation of her constitutional
rights as a result of this denial. (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 1)
On July 14, 2014, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed suit
against St. John the Baptist Parish Council and three of its
members. (Rec. Doc. 1) In her complaint, Plaintiff asserts that
her house and land are not accessible from the north, south,
east, and west directions to emergency response vehicles. (Rec.
Doc. 1, p.1)
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on June 20,
2014, and on July 4, 2014, Acadian Ambulance Emergency Services
were unable to access her property at 185 West 16th St. (Rec.
Doc. 1, p. 3) Plaintiff further alleges that both her and the
emergency
violates
vehicles'
her
rights
inability
under
to
the
access
185
Fourteenth
16th
St.
Amendment,
the
West
Thirteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution, and Defendants are negligent in not
providing emergency access to 185 West 16th St. (Rec. Doc. 1, p.
4-5)
Defendants
filed
the
instant
Motions
to
Dismiss
Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (12)(b)(6) on August 27, 28, and
2
29,
2014.
(Rec.
Docs.
14,
15,
17,
18)
The
motions
remain
Plaintiff’s
claims
unopposed.
PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
Defendants
urge
the
Court
to
dismiss
because her complaint, “taken in its entirety,” is “impossible to
understand insofar as it purports to assert a claim for relief
against” Defendants.1 Defendants individually assert that they do
not possess a legal responsibility or owe a duty to Plaintiff
regarding
although
her
the
enclosed
Louisiana
property.
Civil
Code
Further,
does
they
provide
argue
that
remedies
and
relief for individuals with enclosed property, such remedies must
be pursued against those individuals specified in the Code, which
does not include any of the named Defendants.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The
complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Broudo,
544
U.S.
336,
346
(2005).
1
The
allegations
“must
be
Defendants' motions are nearly identical, so the Court addresses them
together.
3
simple, concise, and direct.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
must plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547
(2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads
facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A court
must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232-33 (5th Cir. 2009); Baker v.
Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
The court is not,
however, bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A plaintiff proceeding pro se is held to a less stringent
standard than a lawyer in drafted pleadings. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Fifth Circuit has held that pro se
briefs should be given a liberal construction. Brown v. Sudduth,
675 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir.2012) (citing Mayfield v. Tex. Dep't
of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir.2008)). “This
does not mean, however, that a court will invent, out of whole
cloth, novel arguments on behalf of a pro se plaintiff in the
4
absence of meaningful, albeit imperfect, briefing.” Slocum v.
Devezin,
948
F.
Supp.
2d
661,
667
(E.D.
La.
June
3,
2013)
(quoting Jackson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2010 WL 724108,
*2 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“If dismissal of a pro se complaint is warranted, it should be
without prejudice to allow [the plaintiff]
to file an amended
complaint.” Smart v. U.S. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 759 F. Supp.
2d 867, 870 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2010) (quoting Moawad v. Childs,
673 F.2d 850, 851 (5th Cir. 1982)). However, a court may dismiss
a pro se complaint with prejudice “when the plaintiff ‘is fully
apprised of [the] complaint's potential insufficiency and [has
been] given [an] opportunity to correct any insufficiencies.’”
Smart, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 871 (quoting Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d
1053, 1054 (5th Cir.1998)).
DISCUSSION
Construing Plaintiff's complaint liberally as this Court is
required to do, it is possible that Plaintiff has a claim for
forced passage under Louisiana law. An owner of an enclosed
estate, or an estate lacking access to a public road, "may claim
a right of passage over neighboring property to the nearest
5
public road."2 LA. CIV. CODE art. 693. "In an action seeking a
forced passage on the land of a neighbor, plaintiff is normally
the owner of the enclosed estate or his representative." 4 La.
Civ.
L.
Treatise,
Predial
Servitudes
§
5:12
(4th
ed.).
Additionally,
proper party defendant is the owner of the estate that
blocks plaintiff's access to a public road. When an
enclosed estate is surrounded by several estates that
communicate with a public road, the proper defendant is
the owner of the land on which the right of passage is
sought. Whether a particular neighbor must be joined as
a party depends on facts and circumstances. Impleading
all of the neighbors is usually recommended, unless the
record establishes with certainty that the passage
sought on the land of a particular neighbor is the
shortest and most convenient route to the public road.
If it does not appear from the record that the passage
sought on the land of the defendant is the shortest and
most convenient route to the public road, the action
will be dismissed unless the owner of the land that
offers the shortest and most direct route is before the
court.
Id. Thus, Plaintiff's claim is not cognizable against the parish
council and its members unless those members happen to own the
estates that block Plaintiff's access to a public road. Plaintiff
has not alleged as much, and the record does not suggest that to
be the case.
2
However, "[i]f an estate becomes enclosed as a result of a voluntary act
or omission of its owner, the neighbors are not bound to furnish a passage to him
or his successors." LA. CIV. CODE art. 693. In such a case, although a legal
servitude may not arise, a plaintiff may seek a conventional servitude allowing
for passage from a neighbor whose land would provide access to a public road.
6
Moreover, that Plaintiff's estate may be enclosed does not
give
rise
to
claims
against
negligence
or
violations
of
Defendants
the
named
Thirteenth
and
herein
for
Fourteenth
Amendments. First, a claim for negligence would require Plaintiff
to prove that Defendants had a duty to Plaintiff. Defendants have
no duty, however, to furnish a right of passage to Plaintiff or
to ensure that her estate is not enclosed. Second, the Thirteenth
Amendment abolishes slavery. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
Nothing in the instant case has anything whatsoever to do with
slavery. Lastly, Plaintiff's enclosed estate does not implicate
the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiff
provides conclusory statements that Defendants' actions violate
Due Process and Equal Protection, but Plaintiff alleges no facts
to show that her estate became enclosed due to State action.
Plaintiff cannot state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
absent an allegation, supported by the facts, that State action
somehow played a role in her injury. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1. Plaintiff therefore has failed to state claims for negligence
or violations of the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
(Rec. Doc. 14, 15, 17, 18) are GRANTED.
7
IT
IS
FURTHER
ORDERED
that
Plaintiff's
claims
against
Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of October, 2014.
____________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8
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