LeBlanc v. Panther Helicopters, Inc. et al
Filing
107
ORDER & REASONS: denying 95 Motion for Summary Judgment without prejudice to being refiled following sufficient discovery. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 3/23/16. (Reference: all cases)(sek)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MARVIN PETER LEBLANC, JR.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 14-1617
C/W 14-1772
14-1791
14-1875
14-2326
PANTHER HELICOPTERS,
INC. ET AL.
SECTION: “J”(4)
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc.
95)
filed
by
Defendant
Bell
Helicopter
Textron
Inc.
and
an
opposition thereto (Rec. Doc. 100) filed by Plaintiffs Marci L.
Becnel, on behalf of herself and her minor child, Casi G. Becnel;
Patrick R. Becnel Jr.; Jami M. Becnel; and E. Dale Lindsey Jr., in
his capacity as executor of the succession of Patrick R. Becnel
Sr. (collectively, “Becnel Plaintiffs”). Having considered the
motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law,
the Court finds that the motion should be DENIED without prejudice.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation derives from a helicopter crash that occurred
on October 9, 2013, as the helicopter departed from a platform in
the Gulf of Mexico. The pilot, Patrick R. Becnel Sr., was killed
in the crash. Three passengers, Marvin Peter LeBlanc Jr., Harvis
Johnson
Jr.,
and
Nichalos
Miller,
who
were
also
aboard
the
helicopter at that time, suffered various injuries.
The
crash
led
to
several
lawsuits
being
filed
in
this
district. LeBlanc filed the first complaint in relation to the
crash on July 14, 2014. (Rec. Doc. 1.) 1 Johnson filed suit next on
August 4, 2014. (14-1772, Rec. Doc. 1.) Miller then filed his
complaint on August 6, 2014. (14-1791, Rec. Doc. 1.) Each of the
three
passengers’
complaints
name
Panther
Helicopters,
Inc.
(“Panther”), the owner and operator of the helicopter; ENERGY XXI
GOM, LLC (“Energy XXI”), the platform owner; and Rolls-Royce
Corporation (“Rolls-Royce”), the manufacturer of the helicopter
engine, as defendants.
The Becnel Plaintiffs filed suit on August 15, 2014. (141875, Rec. Doc. 1.) The Becnel Plaintiffs assert a wrongful death
action and a survival action against Panther, Energy XXI, RollsRoyce, and two additional defendants: Wood Group PSN, Inc. (“Wood
Group”), the operator of the platform, and Bell Helicopter Textron
Inc. (“Bell”), the manufacturer of the helicopter. Id. at 2-3.
With respect to Bell, the Becnel Plaintiffs claim that various
defects in the helicopter’s manufacturing or design contributed to
Becnel drowning in the wreckage. Id. at 6. Specifically, the Becnel
Plaintiffs
allege
that
one
or
1
more
of
the
emergency
floats
All citations to record documents that do not include a case number refer to
the master case, 14-1617.
2
malfunctioned or separated from the helicopter, which caused the
helicopter to roll and invert in the water; Becnel’s seatbelt
malfunctioned and would not release such that he could not be
extracted for an extended period of time; and the controls or body
of
the
helicopter
extracted
for
an
trapped
extended
Becnel
such
period
of
that
time.
he
could
Id.
The
not
be
Court
consolidated the cases on August 27, 2014. (Rec. Doc. 14.)
After the accident, the National Transportation Safety Board
(“NTSB”)
conducted
an
investigation
to
determine
the
facts,
conditions, and circumstances relating to the accident and the
probable cause thereof. Until the NTSB investigation concluded,
the parties could not participate in full discovery. (See Rec.
Doc. 87.) The NTSB issued its report on January 14, 2016, after
which the Court conducted a scheduling conference with the parties.
(Rec. Doc. 98.) Pursuant to the current scheduling order, the
deadline for completing discovery in this matter is May 22, 2017.
(Rec. Doc. 99.)
Bell filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc.
95) on February 22, 2016. The Becnel Plaintiffs opposed the motion
on March 15, 2016, and requested oral argument. Because the Court
finds that oral argument is unnecessary at this time, the motion
is now before the Court on the briefs.
3
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Bell argues that the General Aviation Revitalization Act’s
statute of repose bars all of the Becnel Plaintiffs’ claims against
Bell because the accident giving rise to their claims occurred
more than eighteen years after Bell manufactured and delivered the
helicopter to its original purchaser. (Rec. Doc. 95-1, at 1.) In
support of its motion, Bell attached the affidavit of Steve Fuller,
a product certification specialist for Bell. (Rec. Doc. 95-5.)
According to Fuller, Bell sold and delivered the helicopter to its
original purchaser on May 13, 1991, over twenty-two years before
the accident. Id. at 2. Further, Bell claims that it has made no
changes to the helicopter after it was delivered to its original
purchaser. Id. Thus, Bell contends that the eighteen-year statute
of repose shields it from liability.
The Becnel Plaintiffs oppose the motion, arguing that it is
premature. (Rec. Doc. 100, at 1.) The Becnel Plaintiffs point out
that the parties have made only partial Rule 26(a)(1) initial
disclosures to date and Bell has produced none of its pertinent
documents. Id. at 6. As set forth in their Rule 56(d) declaration
accompanying their opposition, the Becnel Plaintiffs anticipate
that
discovery
will
disclose
defects
to
components
of
the
helicopter that were delivered within the last eighteen years and
that such defective components contributed to Becnel’s death. Id.
at 8. In particular, the Becnel Plaintiffs claim that documents
4
recently produced by Panther indicate that a Bell electric valve
assembly was replaced on the helicopter in July 2011. Id. at 2.
According to the Becnel Plaintiffs, this valve assembly controlled
the helicopter’s emergency float system, which they have alleged
malfunctioned during the crash. Id. Thus, the Becnel Plaintiffs
argue this creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
any defective components were installed on the helicopter within
the last eighteen years. Id. at 3. At the very least, the Becnel
Plaintiffs argue that they should be given reasonable time to
examine the helicopter and conduct discovery with respect to Bell’s
liability. Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any
material fact exists, a court considers “all of the evidence in
the record but refrains from making credibility determinations or
weighing
the
evidence.”
Delta
&
Pine
Land
Co.
v.
Nationwide
Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008). All
reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party,
5
but
a
party
cannot
defeat
summary
judgment
with
conclusory
allegations or unsubstantiated assertions. Little, 37 F.3d at
1075. A court ultimately must be satisfied that “a reasonable jury
could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Delta, 530
F.3d at 399.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party
will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must
come forward with evidence which would ‘entitle it to a directed
verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” Int'l
Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir.
1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the motion by either
countering with sufficient evidence of its own, or “showing that
the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade
the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the
moving party.” Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party
will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may
satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the
record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden
then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or
referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a
genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest
upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish
6
a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., id. at 325; Little, 37 F.3d
at 1075.
DISCUSSION
Congress enacted the General Aviation Revitalization Act of
1994 (“GARA”), Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 40101 note), apparently because it was “deeply concerned
about
the
enormous
product
liability
costs
suffered
by
manufacturers” of general aviation aircraft, and its belief that
“manufacturers were being driven to the wall because . . . of the
long tail of liability attached to those aircraft, which could be
used for decades after they were first manufactured and sold.”
U.S. Aviation Underwriters Inc. v. Nabtesco Corp., 697 F.3d 1092,
1097 (9th Cir. 2012).
In GARA, Congress established an eighteen-year statute of
repose for all claims arising from accidents involving “general
aviation aircraft” 2 brought against manufacturers of the aircraft
or components used in the aircraft. GARA § 2(a). “Thus, if an
accident occurs . . . on the day after the GARA period runs, no
action whatsoever is possible.” Nabtesco, 697 F.3d at 1095. Absent
certain exceptions, GARA provides that:
2 The term “general aviation aircraft” is defined as “any aircraft for which a
type certificate or an air-worthiness certificate has been issued by the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, which, at the time such
certificate was originally issued, had a maximum seating capacity of fewer than
20 passengers, and which was not, at the time of the accident, engaged in
scheduled passenger-carrying operations.” GARA § 2(c).
7
[N]o civil action for damages for death or injury to
persons or damage to property arising out of an accident
involving a general aviation aircraft may be brought
against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the
manufacturer of any new component, system, subassembly,
or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a
manufacturer if the accident occurred [after the
applicable limitation period].
GARA § 2(a). With respect to general aviation aircraft and the
components,
systems,
subassemblies,
and
other
parts
of
such
aircraft, the limitation period is eighteen years. Id. § 3(3).
GARA provides two different trigger dates for commencement of
the eighteen-year period of repose. The first trigger date begins
on “the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser or
lessee,” or to an intermediary seller or lessor. Id. § 2(a)(1).
The second trigger date, commonly referred to as the “rolling”
provision, occurs when “any new component,” which is alleged to
have caused the death, injury, or damage, replaces an existing
component or is added to the aircraft. Id. § 2(a)(2).
With respect to the rolling provision, the House Judiciary
Committee explained that it wished to ensure that the replacement
or addition of a new component would trigger a “rolling” period of
repose. “Over the lifespan of a general aviation aircraft, almost
every major component will be replaced.” H.R. Rep. 103-525, pt. 2
(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644, 1994 WL 422719. For
this reason, “[t]he statute of repose for component parts applies
on a ‘rolling’ basis.” Id. For example, if an aircraft’s original
8
piston engine is replaced, the new piston engine would have an
eighteen-year statute of repose commencing with its replacement.
See id. However, this provision applies only to new components. 3
Nabtesco, 697 F.3d at 1095. The repose period for a used component
is permanently linked to the delivery date of that component to
its first purchaser. Id.
Summary judgment is often appropriate when the statute of
repose has run in favor of the manufacturer. See, e.g., Alter v.
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 531, 536 (S.D. Tex.
1996) (granting summary judgment in favor of manufacturer because
the record showed that the helicopter and the component asserted
to have caused the crash were delivered more than eighteen years
before the crash). The burden rests with the manufacturer to show
that an affirmative defense such as GARA’s statute of repose
applies and, if the showing is made, then the plaintiffs have the
burden
of
showing
that
the
action
falls
within
one
of
the
exceptions. Furthermore, plaintiffs bear the burden of producing
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding the applicability of the rolling provision. Sulak v. Am.
Eurocopter Corp., No. 09-651, 2012 WL 6567237, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 17, 2012). Thus, the Becnel Plaintiffs must raise a genuine
3 A component that is removed for maintenance and returned to the aircraft does
not trigger a rolling period of repose. See Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller Inc.,
326 F. Supp. 2d 631, 663 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (“An overhauled propeller does not
replace another propeller and it is not added to the aircraft. It is removed
for maintenance and returned to the aircraft.”).
9
dispute that a new component replaced a component either originally
in the aircraft or was added to the aircraft and the new component
caused the claimed damages. See id.
Relying on Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Becnel Plaintiffs argue that Bell’s motion for summary judgment
is premature because they lack sufficient discovery at this time
to properly respond to Bell’s motion. Generally, summary judgment
is not appropriate before the opposing party has had a “full
opportunity to conduct discovery.” See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). Indeed, “[s]ummary judgment assumes
some discovery.” Brown v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 311 F.3d 328,
333 (5th Cir. 2002). Rule 56(d) permits a court to deny a motion
for summary judgment, or to defer consideration of it, pending
necessary discovery. Relief is available under Rule 56(d) when “a
nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
reasons,
it
cannot
present
facts
essential
to
justify
its
opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The rule “allows for further
discovery to safeguard non-moving parties from summary judgment
motions that they cannot adequately oppose.” Culwell v. City of
Fort Worth, 468 F.3d 868, 871 (5th Cir. 2006).
Rule 56(d) motions for additional discovery are “broadly
favored and should be liberally granted.” Raby v. Livingston, 600
F.3d 552, 561 (5th Cir. 2010). The nonmovant, however, “may not
simply rely on vague assertions that additional discovery will
10
produce needed, but unspecified, facts.” Id. Rather, a request to
stay summary judgment under Rule 56(d) must “set forth a plausible
basis
for
believing
that
specified
facts,
susceptible
of
collection within a reasonable time frame, probably exist and
indicate how the emergent facts, if adduced, will influence the
outcome of the pending summary judgment motion.” Id. “If it appears
that further discovery will not provide evidence creating a genuine
issue of material fact, the district court may grant summary
judgment.” Id.
The Court finds that Bell’s motion for summary judgment is
premature. This case is in its infancy. Bell filed the instant
motion two weeks before the Court entered a scheduling order.
Initial disclosures have not been completed and almost no discovery
has
been
conducted.
It
may
be
true
that
the
eighteen-year
limitation period under GARA applicable to the helicopter and its
original components would be easy to calculate. However, the time
calculation would be different for every new component added to
the aircraft or installed as a replacement.
The
Becnel
Plaintiffs
set
forth
a
plausible
basis
for
believing that discovery will produce evidence of new components
added to the aircraft within eighteen years before the crash. The
helicopter at issue was over twenty-two years old at the time of
the accident. The limited document production that has taken place
to this point shows that the helicopter had been serviced and at
11
least some components had been overhauled and replaced not long
before the accident. Discovery will be necessary to determine what
was done to the helicopter and when, and which parties have
manufactured parts of the helicopter that were less than eighteen
years old. Johnson v. Precision Airmotive, LLC, No. 07-1695, 2008
WL 2570825, at *3 (E.D. Mo. June 26, 2008) (denying summary
judgment on GARA defense as premature); see also Clark v. PHI,
Inc., No. 12-411, 2012 WL 3065429, at *6 (E.D. La. July 27, 2012)
(denying summary judgment as premature because there was a chance
that discovery would yield evidence that plaintiff could use to
invoke an exception to GARA’s statute of repose).
This is not to say that Bell must wait until the very end of
discovery before refiling its motion for summary judgment. This is
a large and complex case, and discovery is not scheduled to
conclude for over a year. There may well come a point later in the
litigation prior to the close of discovery when consideration of
Bell’s GARA motion is appropriate. Until then, however, he Court
will deny Bell’s motion without prejudice.
12
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Bell’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Rec. Doc.
95)
is
DENIED
without
prejudice
to
being
following sufficient discovery.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 23rd day of March, 2016.
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13
refiled
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