LeBlanc v. Panther Helicopters, Inc. et al

Filing 79

ORDER denying 59 Motion to Strike jury demand; denying 60 Motion to Strike jury demand; denying as moot 71 Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 1/26/15. (Reference: all cases)(sek)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LEBLANC

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 14-1617
c/w 14-1772
14-1791
14-1875
14-2326
SECTION: “J” (4)

PANTHER HELICOPTERS,
INC. ET AL.
ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court are Plaintiffs Marvin Peter LeBlanc, Jr.,
Harvis

Johnson,

Strike

Jury

Jr.,

Demands

and

Nichalos

(Rec.

Doc.

59)

Miller’s
and

Joint

Plaintiffs

Motion

to

Marci

L.

Becnel, Casi G. Becnel, Patrick R. Becnel, R., Jami M. Becnel,
and E. Dale Lindsey, Jr.’s Motion to Strike Jury Demands (Rec.
Doc.

60);

oppositions

thereto

filed

by

ENERGY

XXI

GOM,

LLC

(Energy) (Rec. Docs. 62, 63), Rolls-Royce Corporation (RollsRoyce) (Rec. Doc. 64), Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (Bell) (Rec.
Doc. 65), and Panther Helicopters, Inc. (Panther) (Rec. Doc.
66); and replies from LeBlanc, Johnson, and Miller (Rec. Doc.
76)

and

the

Becnels

(Rec.

Doc.

73).

Having

considered

the

motions and memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the
Court finds that Plaintiffs’ motions should be DENIED for the
reasons set forth more fully below.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This

litigation

derives

from

a

helicopter

crash

that

occurred on October 9, 2013, as the helicopter departed from a
platform in the Gulf of Mexico. The pilot, Patrick R. Becnel,
Sr., was killed in the crash. LeBlanc, Johnson, and Miller, who
were also aboard the helicopter at that time, suffered various
injuries.
LeBlanc filed the first complaint in relation to the crash
on July 14, 2014. (Rec. Doc. 1)1 Made Defendants therein were
Panther, the owner and operator of the helicopter; Energy, the
platform

owner;

helicopter

and

jurisdiction

engine.
over

Rolls-Royce,

Id.

at

2.

admiralty

the

LeBlanc

and

manufacturer

of

invoked

Court’s

substantive

this

general

the

maritime

law, 28 U.S.C. § 1333; 33 U.S.C. § 905(b); the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et. seq.; the General
Maritime Law of the United States; and the applicable laws of
the

State

of

Louisiana.

Id.

at

1.

Although

the

original

complaint did not designate the action as one in admiralty or
maritime under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h), LeBlanc
amended his complaint on July 15, 2014, to state, “This is an
admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h).”
(Rec. Doc. 4, p. 1) Defendants Panther (Rec. Doc. 21), Energy
(Rec.

Docs.

15,

16),

and

Rolls-Royce

1

(Rec.

Doc.

28)

later

All citations to record documents that do not include a case number refer to
case number 14-1617.

2

answered the complaints, and each Defendant requested trial by
jury.
Johnson filed suit on August 4, 2014. (14-1772, Rec. Doc.
1)

Johnson

Defendants
LeBlanc.

also
and

Id.

named

provided

at

1-2.

Panther,
the

Energy,

same

Johnson’s

and

Rolls-Royce

jurisdictional

complaint

statement

likewise

failed

as
as
to

include a Rule 9(h) designation. The Court consolidated the case
with

LeBlanc’s

on

August

27,

2014.

(14-1772,

Rec.

Doc.

8)

Defendant Energy answered on August 27, 2014 (Rec. Doc. 18) and
demanded

a

jury

trial.

Panther

answered

the

complaint

and

demanded a jury trial on September 24, 2014. (Rec. Doc. 37)
Rolls-Royce filed its answer, which included a jury demand, on
September 27, 2014. (Rec. Doc. 40) Johnson requested leave to
file an amended complaint on September 23, 2014, and the Court
accepted the amended complaint into the record on October 31,
2014. (Rec. Docs. 49, 51) The amended complaint specifically
designated the action as one in admiralty or maritime pursuant
to Rule 9(h). (Rec. Doc. 51, p. 1)
Miller filed his complaint on August 6, 2014. (14-1791,
Rec. Doc. 1) Miller named the same Defendants and included the
same

jurisdictional

included

a

Rule

statement.

9(h)

Id.

designation

in

at

1-2.

his

However,

original

Miller

complaint,

stating, “This matter is identified as an Admiralty and Maritime
Claim in accordance with the provisions of Rule 9(h) of the

3

[Federal

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure].”

Id.

at

1.

The

Court

consolidated the case with LeBlanc’s on August 27, 2014. (141791, Rec. Doc. 12) Energy, Rolls-Royce, and Panther answered
the complaints and demanded a jury trial. (Rec. Docs. 17, 32,
35)
Becnel’s survivors2 filed suit on August 15, 2014. (14-1875,
Rec. Doc. 1) They named Wood Group PSN, Inc. (Wood Group), the
operator of the platform; Energy; Bell, the manufacturer of the
helicopter;
Becnels

and

invoked

Rolls-Royce
this

Court’s

as

Defendants.

jurisdiction

Id.
over

at

2-3.

The

admiralty

and

substantive general maritime law, 28 U.S.C. § 1333; diversity
actions,

28

U.S.C.

§

1332;

the

Death

on

the

High

Seas

Act

(DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. § 30301, et seq.; the General Maritime Law of
the United States; any other applicable federal statutes; and
the

applicable

laws

of

the

State

of

Louisiana.

Id.

at

3.

Additionally, the Becnels designated the matter as a claim in
admiralty

or

maritime

pursuant

to

Rule

9(h).

Id.

The

Court

consolidated the action with the others on August 27, 2014.3 (141875, Rec. Doc. 7) Defendant Wood Group answered the complaint
on September 25, 2014, without making a jury demand. (Rec. Doc.

2

The Becnel Plaintiffs include Marci L. Becnel, Patrick R. Becnel, Sr.’s
widow, on behalf of herself and her minor child, Casi G. Becnel; Patrick R.
Becnel, Jr, son of the decedent.; Jami M. Becnel, daughter of the decedent;
and E. Dale Lindsey, Jr., in his capacity as Executor of the Succession of
Patrick R. Becnel, Sr. (14-1875, Rec. Doc. 1, p. 1)
3
Also consolidated with LeBlanc’s action is an intervention by Panther
(Becnel’s employer) and Panther’s insurer. (14-2326, Rec. Doc. 1)

4

38) Thereafter, the remaining Defendants answered the complaints
and demanded a jury trial. (Rec. Docs. 41, 42, 43)
On

December

19,

2014,

Plaintiffs

LeBlanc,

Johnson,

and

Miller filed a Joint Motion to Strike Jury Demands. (Rec. Doc.
59) Becnel’s survivors filed a Motion to Strike Jury Demands
(Rec. Doc. 60) on December 29, 2014. Defendants Energy (Rec.
Docs. 62, 63), Rolls-Royce (Rec. Doc. 64), Bell (Rec. Doc. 65),
and

Panther

(Rec.

Doc.

66)

opposed

the

motions.

The

Court

accepted replies from the Becnels (Rec. Doc. 73) and LeBlanc,
Johnson, and Miller (Rec. Doc. 76) on January 15, 2015.
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Plaintiffs

LeBlanc,

Johnson,

and

Miller

argue

that

the

Court should strike Defendants’ jury demands because admiralty
jurisdiction applies here and they properly invoked it. (Rec.
Doc. 59-1) First, in order for admiralty jurisdiction to apply,
“both a maritime situs and a connection to traditional maritime
activity must exist.” Id. at 3 (quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc.
v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995)). Their
claims

satisfy

the

maritime

situs

requirement

because

Defendants’ negligence “became operative” over navigable waters,
causing the helicopter in which Plaintiffs were traveling to
crash

into

connection

the
to

Gulf

of

traditional

Mexico.
maritime

Id.

This

activity

case

presents

because

the

a

U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that “the act of

5

a helicopter transporting persons over the seas is a maritimetype function.” Id. at 4 (citing Smith v. Pan Air Corp., 684
F.2d

1102,

1111

(5th

Cir.

1982);

Ledoux

v.

Petroleum

Helicopters, Inc., 609 F.2d 824, 824 (5th Cir. 1980)). Although
not

all

Defendants

were

involved

in

transporting

Plaintiffs,

“[t]he substantial relationship test is satisfied when at least
one alleged tortfeasor was engaging in activity substantially
related to traditional maritime activity and such activity is
claimed to have been a proximate cause of the incident.” Id. at
4-5

(quoting

Johnson,

and

Grubart,
Miller

513

U.S.

properly

at

invoked

541).
this

Second,
Court’s

LeBlanc,
admiralty

jurisdiction by indicating that their lawsuits were admiralty or
maritime actions and designating them as maritime claims under
Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

9(h).

Id.

at

2-3,

5-6.

The

Becnels adopt and advance these same arguments, and they add
that “their action is cognizable only in admiralty” because it
arises under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). (Rec. Doc.
60-1, pp. 1-2)
Defendant

Energy

concedes

that

admiralty

jurisdiction

exists over Plaintiffs’ claims, but argues that the alternative
grounds for federal jurisdiction existing under OCSLA enabled
Defendants to demand trial by jury where all Plaintiffs had not
yet designated their actions as maritime claims pursuant to Rule
9(h). (Rec. Doc. 62) Specifically, before Johnson amended his

6

complaint to add the Rule 9(h) designation, Energy and other
Defendants answered his original complaint and included a jury
demand. Id. at 3. Energy argues that, under Johnson v. Penrod
Drilling Co., 469 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1972), “Federal Rule
of

Civil

Procedure

39

‘controls

when

demand

for

jury

trial

occurs.’” (Rec. Doc. 62, p. 6)(quoting Johnson 469 F.2d at 901).
Accordingly,
invoked

Plaintiffs

right

to

jury

could

not

trial

defeat

without

Energy’s
its

properly

consent

or

a

determination by the Court that no right to a jury trial exists.
Id.

Because

neither

of

these

circumstances

exists

here,

the

Court should not strike Defendants’ jury demand. Additionally,
Energy

argues,

consolidated

with

“[b]ecause
those

of

Johnson’s
the

Complaint

remaining

has

plaintiffs

been

in

this

case, all of the claims herein must be tried to a jury.” Id. at
8

(citing

Fitzgerald

v.

U.S.

Lines

Co.,

374

U.S.

16,

20-21

(1963)). Energy argues that the U.S. Supreme Court in Fitzgerald
held that
(1) where multiple claims (arising out of the same set
of facts) are joined in the same lawsuit, some of
which must be tried to a jury and others which are
subject to the traditional admiralty rule requiring a
bench trial; (2) the plaintiff has not made a 9(h)
designation; and (3) a jury trial (as to the claims
for which a jury may be sought) has been sought, all
claims (even those cognizable only in admiralty) must
be submitted to the jury.
Id.

Thus,

although

some

of

the

claims

in

this

consolidated

action traditionally are cognizable only in admiralty, such as

7

the Becnels’ DOHSA action, all of the claims must proceed to
jury trial. (Rec. Doc. 63) Energy asserts that the Fifth Circuit
has extended this rule to cases involving multiple defendants.
(Rec. Doc. 62, p. 9) Energy further argues that these rules
apply

equally

when

a

defendant,

rather

than

the

plaintiff,

invokes its right to trial by jury. Id. at 10-11. Consequently,
Johnson’s failure to designate his action as one in admiralty
before

Energy

and

other

Defendants

demanded

a

jury

trial

requires this Court to submit all claims against all Plaintiffs
to a jury. Id. at 11-13. Defendants Rolls-Royce and Bell adopt
these arguments in their oppositions.4 (Rec. Docs. 64, 65)
Defendant Panther argues that Plaintiffs’ motions seeking
to strike Defendants’ jury demands are premature and improper.
First,

the

motions

are

premature

because

the

National

Transportation Safety Board has not issued its final report on
the accident at issue and the parties have not yet engaged in
discovery; thus, it is not yet clear that admiralty jurisdiction
applies here. (Rec. Doc. 66, pp. 2-5) Second, the motions are
improper because Panther “has a vested Constitutional right to a
jury trial,” which Plaintiffs cannot nullify with “an after-the4

Rolls-Royce adds, however, that if the Court finds that Plaintiffs correctly
designated the action as one in admiralty, the Court should “place these
consolidated cases on [its] non-jury docket” rather than strike Defendants’
jury demands. (Rec. Doc. 64, pp. 3-4) Further, the Court should add “the
proviso that if plaintiffs move to revoke their Rule 9(h) designation and/or
act in a matter inconsistent with proceeding in admiralty, Rolls-Royce
Corporation shall have the right to amend its pleadings to reinstate its jury
demands under Rule 15.” Id. at 4.

8

fact 9(h) designation” for the reasons set forth in Energy’s
opposition. Id. at 1, 6.
In their reply, the Becnel Plaintiffs argue that Defendants
have no right to jury trial over the claims of this consolidated
action. (Rec. Doc. 73) Johnson’s sole failure to make a specific
Rule 9(h) designation before Defendants replied and made jury
demands does not require that all Plaintiffs’ claims proceed to
jury trial where Johnson’s original complaint asserted that its
claims were in admiralty and the Court soon granted him leave to
amend his complaint to add the previously omitted designation.
Id. at 1-2. Additionally, the Becnel Plaintiffs assert that the
instant case is distinguishable from Johnson because there the
plaintiff demanded a jury trial. Id. at 3-4. Once demanded, the
plaintiff could not deny defendant a jury trial where defendant
had a right to trial by jury and had not consented to a bench
trial. Id. Here, none of the Plaintiffs requested a jury trial,
and

all

Plaintiffs

jurisdiction.

Id.

at

have
4.

invoked

The

Becnel

the

Court’s

Plaintiffs

admiralty

assert

that

Defendants should have challenged Johnson’s motion for leave to
amend his complaint and add the Rule 9(h) designation if they
were relying on its omission to support their jury demands. Id.
They

further

argue

that

“no

defendant

can

articulate

any

prejudice that it may suffer if this case [is] placed on the
court’s

bench

trial

docket”

because

9

it

is

early

in

the

litigation

and

the

Court

has

not

yet

set

a

scheduling

conference. Id. at 4-5.
Plaintiffs LeBlanc, Johnson, and Miller also filed a reply
refuting

Defendants’

assertions.

(Rec.

Johnson,

and

distinguish

Johnson,

Miller

Doc.

76)

assert

LeBlanc,
that

all

Plaintiffs properly invoked this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction,
and

dispute

Panther’s

claim

that

the

instant

motions

are

premature. Id. First, LeBlanc, Johnson, and Miller argue that
this case is distinguishable from Johnson. There, the plaintiff
included a jury demand in his complaint, which the defendant
relied upon for a period of three years before the plaintiff
amended the complaint to add a Rule 9(h) designation. Id. at 23. With that amendment, the plaintiff did not seek to withdraw
his jury demand. Id. Here, however, Plaintiffs did not make a
jury demand, and they promptly sought to amend their complaints
to

add

Rule

Plaintiffs

9(h)

argue

designations.

that

the

Id.

instant

at

3.

motions

Additionally,

constitute

their

compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39 by seeking a
judicial determination that Defendants have no federal right to
a jury trial. Id. Second, Plaintiffs herein properly invoked
this

Court’s

admiralty

jurisdiction

by

stating

in

their

complaints that theirs were admiralty or maritime claims. Id. at
3-5.

Finally,

LeBlanc,

Johnson,

and

Miller

argue

that

the

instant motions are not premature because courts have held that

10

“torts occur[] where the negligent act takes effect, not where
the act occurred,” and the record reveals that the helicopter
crashed into the Gulf of Mexico rather than the platform. Id. at
5-6.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant
plaintiff

to

whose

admiralty

Federal
claims

jurisdiction

Rule
are

“and

of

Civil

cognizable
also

within

Procedure
within

the

9(h),

a

the

Court's

court’s

subject-

matter jurisdiction on some other ground” may choose to proceed
on the admiralty side of the Court. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h)(“If a
claim

for

relief

jurisdiction

and

is

within

the

also

within

the

admiralty
court’s

or

maritime

subject-matter

jurisdiction on some other ground, the pleading may designate
the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim for purposes of
Rules

14(c),

38(e),

and

82

and

the

Supplemental

Rules

for

Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions.”);
see T.N.T Marine Serv. v. Weaver Shipyards & Dry Docks, Inc.,
702

F.2d

method

585,

for

587

electing

(5th
to

Cir.

1983).

proceed

in

Although
admiralty

the
is

preferable
an

express

designation invoking Rule 9(h), an express designation is not
necessary as long as the complaint includes a simple statement
identifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim. In re
Graham Offshore, Inc., No. CIV.A.98-724, 2000 WL 1263225, at *2
(E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2000) (citing T.N.T. Marine, 702 F.2d at 587–

11

88). When a plaintiff elects to proceed in admiralty, neither
party is entitled to a trial by jury. T.N.T. Marine, 702 F.2d at
587.

If,

admiralty

however,

a

plaintiff

jurisdiction

and

fails

pleads

an

to

invoke

alternative

the

court’s

ground

for

federal jurisdiction that grants the defendant a right to trial
by

jury,

then

such

plaintiff

may

not

revoke

a

jury

demand

without complying with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39.5 See
Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210, 1215-17 (5th Cir. 1986);
Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 469 F.2d 897, 903 (5th Cir.
1972).
The threshold question for this Court therefore is whether
Johnson’s original complaint sufficiently identifies his action
as one in admiralty such that Defendants have no right to a jury
trial in this case. The statement of jurisdiction in Johnson’s
complaint reads as follows:
This Honorable Court has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to admiralty jurisdiction and substantive
general maritime law, 28 U.S.C. 1333, and pursuant to
33 U.S.C. 905(b). Claimant brings suit in this Court
pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43
U.S.C. 1331 et. seq.), the General Maritime Law of the
United States, and the applicable laws of the State of
Louisiana.
(14-1772, Rec. Doc. 1, p. 1)
5

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39 provides the requirements for when a
trial must be by jury or by the court. It states in relevant part, “When a
jury trial has been demanded under Rule 38, the action must be designated on
the docket as a jury action. The trial on all issues so demanded must be by
jury unless: (1) the parties or their attorneys file a stipulation to a
nonjury trial or so stipulate on the record; or (2) the court, on motion or
on its own, finds that on some or all of those issues there is no federal
right to a jury trial.” FED. R. CIV. P. 39.

12

The Court concludes that this statement is insufficient to
identify Johnson’s claims as admiralty or maritime in nature.
Johnson’s

statement

suggests

that

he

brings

claims

under

maritime law and OCSLA. If the fact that he alleged a claim
pursuant to maritime law were sufficient to invoke Rule 9(h)
despite the alternative grounds asserted, then it is unclear why
any claimant would need to make an election under Rule 9(h).
This statement is distinguishable from those examined by this
Court

in

Breeden

v.

Transocean

Offshore

Ventures,

Inc.,

No.

Civ.A. 00-2561, 2001 WL 64772, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 24, 2001),
Hunt v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., No. Civ.A. 01-3037,
2002 WL 1906914, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2002), and In re
Graham

Offshore,

No.

CIV.A.98-724,

2000

WL

1263225,

at

*2-3

(E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2000). In Breeden and Graham, the plaintiffs
provided admiralty jurisdiction6 and diversity jurisdiction as
alternative bases for federal jurisdiction. 2001 WL 64772, at *
1; 2000 WL 1263225, at *2-3. The plaintiff in Hunt based his
claim upon the Jones Act and general maritime law and did not
assert

diversity

plaintiffs

in

jurisdiction.

these

cases

did

2002
not

WL

1906914,

assert

at

claims

*1.
under

The
an

alternative federal law. It therefore was clear even absent any

6

In Breeden, the plaintiff alleged jurisdiction under the Jones Act and
General Maritime Law. 2001 WL 64772, at *1. The Court does not mention the
Jones Act claim because such claim could not create a right to trial by jury
for defendant absent diversity. See Rachal v. Penrod Drilling Co., 469 F.2d
1210, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1986).

13

express Rule 9(h) designation that the plaintiffs invoked the
Court’s maritime jurisdiction. See Luera v. M/V Alberta, 635
F.3d

181,

190

(5th

Cir.

2011).

By

contrast,

here,

Johnson

asserts claims under alternative federal law, e.g. OCSLA. (141772, Rec. Doc. 1) Something more than the fact that Plaintiffs
happened to assert alternative claims under general maritime law
therefore was required to indicate that Plaintiffs wished to
proceed in admiralty.
Next, the Court examines whether Defendants have a right to
trial by jury and properly invoked that right. First, the Court
concludes that Defendants have a right to trial by jury in this
case. As discussed above, Johnson failed to invoke the Court’s
admiralty jurisdiction within the meaning of Rule 9(h). Thus,
because he pleaded an alternative federal claim that carries
with it a right to jury trial, Defendants indeed have a right to
trial by jury in this case.7 See Apache Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe
Drilling

Co.,

832

F.

Supp.

2d

678,

698

(W.D.

La.

June

4,

2010)(concluding that a right to jury trial exists for OCSLA
claims), aff’d sub nom. Apache Corp. v. Global Santa Fe Drilling
Co.,

435

F.

App’x

322

(5th

Cir.

2011).

Second,

Defendants

properly invoked this right by including the jury demand in
answers

to

Johnson’s

original

complaint.

7

See

FED. R. CIV. P.

Additionally, the Court finds no support for Plaintiffs’ contention that all
parties are bound by LeBlanc’s Rule 9(h) designation and will address it no
further.

14

38(a), (b); (Rec. Doc. 18). Thus, Defendants have a right to
jury trial and properly invoked that right herein.
Having concluded that Defendants have a right to jury trial
in this case, the Court examines whether Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 39 permits Plaintiffs to preclude trial by jury with
the instant motions to strike. According to Rule 39, once the
jury demand has been made, a court may move the action to its
nonjury docket only with the consent of the parties or upon
determining that no right to jury trial actually exists. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 39. Plaintiffs argue that their motions to strike
comply with the second requirement under Rule 39, that is, a
court finding that no right to jury trial exists. But as the
Court has expressed above, Defendants indeed have a right to
jury

trial

in

this

case.

The

Court

therefore

must

deny

the

instant motions to strike.8
Furthermore,

because

some

of

Plaintiffs’

claims

must

be

tried to a jury, the Court holds that all of them should be so
tried. See Luera, 635 F.3d at 195-96; Debellefeuille v. Vastar
Offshore, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 821, 826 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 20,
2001).

The

Court

cannot

now

serve

as

the

factfinder

for

Plaintiffs’ OCSLA claims without violating Defendants’ Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury. See Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines
Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20-21 (1963); Debellefeuille, 139 F. Supp. 2d
8

Because the Court finds the motions improper on these grounds, the Court
need not examine whether they were premature as argued by Panther.

15

at

826.

Importantly,

constitutional
claims;

it

right

is

Plaintiffs

to

custom,

a

nonjury

rather

lack
trial

than

the

a
for

countervailing
their

admiralty

Constitution,

that

provides for nonjury trials for maritime or admiralty claims.
Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 20 (noting that neither the Constitution
nor statute forbids jury trials in admiralty cases); Luera, 635
F.3d at 193-94, 196 (same). Additionally, the Court declines to
split factfinders between claims or claimants here where the
issues

of

fault

are

intertwined

and

arise

from

a

single

accident. See Luera, 635 F.3d at 192-96; Debellefeuille, 139 F.
Supp. 2d at 826. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that,
“when one of a plaintiff’s claims carries with it the right to a
jury trial, the remaining claims, though premised on admiralty
jurisdiction, may also be tried to a jury when both arise out of
one set of facts.” Luera, 635 F.3d at 195 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Thus, because a jury must hear
part of this matter and the Court declines to employ multiple
factfinders, all claims will be tried to a jury.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motions to Strike
Jury Demands (Rec. Docs. 59, 60) are DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Energy’s Motion for
Leave to File Sur-Reply (Rec. Doc. 71) is DENIED as moot.

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New Orleans, Louisiana this 26th day of January, 2015.

CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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