Seals et al v. Superior Options of LA, Inc. et al

Filing 37

ORDER AND REASONS granting Defendants' 16 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment; denying as moot Plaintiffs' 22 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs' section 1983 claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and their state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DEROME SEALS ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 14-1687

SUPERIOR OPTIONS OF LA, INC. ET AL.

SECTION "H"(4)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 16) and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. Doc. 22).

For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs' case is DISMISSED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs DeRome Seals and Jessie Wright, appearing pro se, make the
following allegations in their Complaint against Defendants Superior Options
of LA, Inc. ("Superior") and Anastasia Young. Plaintiffs allege that Superior, a
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privately owned corporation that provides home healthcare and social services
to clients with special needs, was hired to assist Wright, who suffers from
various mental illnesses and handicaps.
On April 5, 2014, Defendant Young, an employee of Superior, retrieved
Wright from his home and brought him to a doctor's appointment. On the way
home, an argument ensued between Young and Wright. Plaintiffs allege that
Young shouted obscenities at Wright and then ejected him from her car on the
Westbank Expressway. Young then called Seals, Wright's legal guardian, to
inform him that Wright had jumped out of her car and that she did not know
where he went.
Young informed Seals that Superior's protocol is to alert law enforcement
when a client is missing for a period of time. Seals agreed that Young should
follow the protocol. Accordingly, Young alerted police that Wright had jumped
out of her car and ran away and that she was concerned for his safety. A police
officer was able to locate Wright. The police report indicates that Wright shoved
the officer and fled. Wright was detained and arrested for resisting arrest,
battery on a police officer, and flight from an officer.
Plaintiffs bring this suit against Young and Superior under various
theories including failure to exercise due process, cruel and unusual
punishment, and false arrest pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as various
state law claims including negligence, misrepresentation, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for failure to state a
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claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough
facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."1 A claim is "plausible
on its face" when the pleaded facts allow the court to "[d]raw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."2 A court must
accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and must "draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor."3 The Court need not, however, accept as true
legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.4
To be legally sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a "sheer
possibility" that the plaintiff's claims are true.5 "A pleading that offers 'labels
and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action'"
will not suffice.6 Rather, the complaint must contain enough factual allegations
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each
element of the plaintiffs' claim.7 The Court's review "is limited to the complaint,
any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the
1

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
2

Id.

3

Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).

4

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 667.

5

Id.

6

Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

7

Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–57.

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motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the
complaint."8
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Section 1983 Claims
Although Plaintiffs' pro se Complaint does not expressly refer to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, their allegations of deprivation of due process, cruel and unusual
punishment, and false arrest necessarily come under this statute. Defendants
allege that Plaintiffs cannot succeed in their section 1983 actions because none
of the Defendants is a state actor. In order to state a claim under section 1983,
Plaintiffs must allege that (1) they were deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States and (2) Defendants deprived them
of that right acting under color of state law.9 In order for a defendant to act
"under color of state law" for the purposes of section 1983, his conduct must be
fairly attributable to the state.10 Defendants argue that their conduct is not
fairly attributable to the state because Young is a private citizen and Superior
is a private corporation.
Private individuals are generally not state actors, and Plaintiffs' sole
argument that Defendants should be treated as such is that Superior "receives
reimbursement from the State Medicaid program." The Fifth Circuit has held
that a hospital "is not a state actor, and cannot be considered as such solely
8

Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010).

9

Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978).

10

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).

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because it receives medicare and medicaid funds and is subject to state
regulation."11 Rather, the "inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."12
The Fifth Circuit has stated that:
A state is not responsible for a private party's decisions unless it has
exercised coercive power or has provided such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law
be deemed to be that of the State. The state's role must be active;
approval or acquiescence in a private party's actions is not
enough."13
In determining whether Plaintiffs state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the Court is mindful that "pro se complaints are held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."14 It is well established,
however, that "[e]ven a liberally construed pro se civil rights complaint . . . must
set forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief may be granted."15 Plaintiffs'
Complaint—even when construed liberally—fails to meet this minimal standard.
Plaintiffs' Complaint makes no allegation of any nexus between state funding
and the incident at issue in this case. Indeed, it is unlikely that Plaintiffs can
allege such given the nature of their complaints. The state presumably had no
11

Wheat v. Mass, 994 F.2d 273, 275–76 (5th Cir. 1993).

12

Daigle v. Opelousas Health Care, Inc., 774 F.2d 1344, 1348–49 (5th Cir. 1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
13

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

14

Taylor v. Books a Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
15

Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993).

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involvement with Young's decisions to eject Wright from her car or to call the
police, and this Court doubts Plaintiffs' ability to allege such. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim under section 1983, and this Court
holds that Plaintiffs could not, under these facts, allege a section 1983 claim
even if given leave to amend.16 Accordingly, Plaintiffs' section 1983 claims are
dismissed with prejudice.
II. State Law Claims
Because Plaintiffs' federal section 1983 claims have been dismissed, the
Court will sua sponte examine whether it should exercise jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs' remaining claims, which sound in state law.
When all federal claims are dismissed or otherwise eliminated before trial,
the court should generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
remaining state law claims.17

In deciding whether to continue exercising

jurisdiction, courts should consider "both the statutory provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c) and the balance of the relevant factors of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity."18
Having considered these factors, this Court declines to exercise subject
matter jurisdiction. Minimal discovery has taken place in this matter, and no
pre-trial deadlines have been set. In addition, Plaintiffs' remaining claims
16

Priester v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 708 F.3d 667, 678 (5th Cir. 2013) (stating
that amendment may be denied if it would be futile).
17

See Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 247 (5th Cir. 1999); Petroleum v. Dresser
Indus., 962 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992).
18

Batiste v. Island Records Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 227 (5th Cir. 1999).

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sound in state law and are best decided by a state court. Thus, declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction at this juncture is consistent with the
principles of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' remaining claims are dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED,
and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs'
section 1983 claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and their state law
claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 28th day of January, 2015.

___________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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