Curry v. Rippner, Inc.

Filing 15

ORDER granting 4 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown on 5/8/2015. (caa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ANNETTE CURRY

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 14-1908

LOU RIPPNER, INC.

SECTION: “G”(4)
ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Lou Rippner, Inc. d/b/a Lou Rippner’s Compass Furniture’s
(“Defendant”) “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).”1 Having considered the motion, the
memoranda in support and in opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court will grant the
motion.
I. Background
Curry, an African American woman, brings claims of sexual harassment and race
discrimination against Defendant, her former employer.2 In her complaint, Curry alleges that on
several occasions, a co-employee made unwanted and sexually suggestive remarks toward her.3
Curry alleges that she reported these remarks to management, but no action was taken and no
investigation was conducted.4 According to the complaint, on July 30, 2012, the same co-employee
“ran his fingers through petitioner’s hair while at work on the sales floor. Petitioner asked him to
stop, but he attempted this action again.”5 Curry alleges that she again complained to management,

1

Rec. Doc. 4.

2

Rec. Doc. 1.

3

Id. at ¶ 4.

4

Id. at ¶ 5.

5

Id. at ¶ 6.

1

but that no action was taken against the co-worker.6 According to the complaint, “the employer
advised Curry that ‘we can’t have you people doing these things in our store,’ and subsequently
terminated Curry’s employment.”7 Curry alleges that “the actions of defendant” constitute sexual
harassment and racial discrimination.8
Curry filed the complaint in this lawsuit on August 20, 2014.9 Defendant filed the pending
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on November 19, 2014.10 Curry filed a memorandum
in opposition on December 3, 2014,11 and Defendant filed a reply memorandum on December 9,
2014.12
II. Parties’ Arguments
A.

Defendant’s Arguments in Support of Dismissal
Defendant first argues that Curry’s complaint fails to support a claim of race discrimination

because Curry fails to allege how her race played a role in the decision to terminate her
employment.13 According to Defendant, Curry cannot merely invoke her race and automatically be
entitled to pursue relief. Rather, Defendant argues, she must allege facts demonstrating that race

6

Id. at ¶ 7.

7

Id. at ¶ 8.

8

Id. at ¶ 9.

9

Id.

10

Rec. Doc. 4.

11

Rec. Doc. 5.

12

Rec. Doc. 8.

13

Rec. Doc. 4-1 at p. 4.

2

was the reason for Defendant’s actions.14 Defendant contends that Curry may attempt to argue that
the employer’s alleged statement “we can’t have you people doing these things in our store” is
evidence of discrimination.15 However, according to Defendant, the phrase “you people” is not
inherently a racially-motivated statement and, moreover, a stray remark or isolated comment does
not create an inference of racial discrimination.16 Defendant argues that Curry’s subjective belief of
discrimination, however genuine, cannot be the basis of judicial relief.17
Next, Defendant argues that the allegations in the complaint do not support a claim for sexual
harassment because, to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment under Title VII, a plaintiff
must establish that (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome
harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on a prohibited ground; (4) the harassment
complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew
or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action.18
According to Defendant, Curry cannot satisfy the fourth prong of the prima facie test because the
incidents alleged in the complaint do not “rise to the necessary level of severity or pervasiveness.”19
Defendant cites Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada to support its argument that Curry’s allegations of “few
suggestive remarks and one incident of hair-touching do not suggest a workplace permeated with

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id. at p. 5 (citing Stone v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 2008 WL 4534374 at *7 (M.D. La. 2008) aff’d, 329
Fed. App’x 542 (5th Cir. 2009);
17

Id. (citing E.E.O.C. v. La. Office of Cmty. Serv., 47 F.3d 1438, 1448 (5th Cir. 1995)).

18

Id. at pp. 6–7 (citing Buisson v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana Cmty. & Technical Coll. Sys., 2013 WL
6000592 (E.D. La. 2013)).
19

Id. at p. 7.

3

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that were sufficiently severe or pervasive to have
altered the conditions of the Plaintiff’s employment.”20 Defendant contends that the allegations
stated in the complaint constitute simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents, which
did not affect a term, condition, or privilege of Curry’s employment.21 Defendant avers that Curry
failed to provide any details or information about the alleged “sexually suggestive” remarks, and that
Curry’s allegation that a co-worker ran his fingers through her hair is a “single, relatively minor act”
that is insufficient to support a hostile environment claim.22 Defendant cites several cases to support
this argument, including Chelette v. State Farm Mut. Auto. ins. Co., wherein, according to
Defendant, the court found that despite “egregious allegations of harassment and offensive touching”
by the plaintiff’s male supervisor, the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of sexual
harassment.”23
Defendant additionally avers that allowing Curry leave to amend her complaint to allege race
discrimination would be futile because “the other employee was also African American.”24
Similarly, Defendant argues that Curry could not amend her complaint to allege a prima facie case
of sexual harassment because “[d]uring [Defendant’s] investigation of her allegations of sexual
harassment, Plaintiff could only identify just one alleged remark by the co-worker, which concerned
an alleged comment by him that he was going to take a picture of Plaintiff from behind.”25

20

Id. (citing Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada, 597 F.3d 761, 771 (5th Cir. 2009)).

21

Id.

22

Id. at pp. 7–8 (citing Meriwether v. Caraustar Packaging Co., 326 F.3d 990, 992-93 (8th Cir. 2003)).

23

Id. at pp. 8–9.

24

Id. at p. 5.

25

Id. at p. 8.

4

B.

Curry’s Arguments in Opposition to Dismissal
In response, Curry argues that her complaint “states adequate information to place defendant

on notice of the causes of action as well as the nature and character of the events leading up to these
claims and therefore compels denial of this motion.”26 Curry restates the facts alleged in her
complaint, and adds that “because of inaction by management at Compass called [sic] the Jefferson
Parish Sheriff’s office. An outstanding warrant for the arrest of the co-worker remains in place.”27
C.

Defendant’s Arguments in Further Support
Defendant argues, first, that Curry’s memorandum in opposition to the pending motion

should not be considered because it was filed less than eight days before the noticed submission date
of the motion, in violation of Local Rule 7.5.28 Next, Defendant argues that Curry cites no law to
support her position and presents insufficient argument based on conclusory statements.29 With
respect to Curry’s race discrimination allegation, Defendant contends that a plaintiff cannot merely
invoke her race in the course of a claim’s narrative and automatically be entitled to pursue relief.30
Defendant reavers that the term “you people” does not constitute a racially-based statement.31
Defendant additionally contends that if such a comment was made by management, “it suggests
reference to ‘salespersons’ and not to African Americans.”32
26

Rec. Doc. 5 at p. 1.

27

Id. at p. 2.

28

Rec. Doc. 8 at pp. 1–2 (citing, e.g., Authenment v. Ingram Barge Co., 2012 WL 2716415 at *2 (E.D. La.

29

Id. at p. 2.

30

Id. (citing Brooks v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 1992 WL 245668 at *2 (E.D. La. 1992)).

31

Id. at p. 3.

32

Id.

2012)).

5

With respect to Curry’s sexual harassment allegation, Defendant reavers that Curry’s
allegations, “even if true, do not establish the requisite severity or pervasiveness which is necessary
to alter the conditions of the Plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”33
Defendant reavers that Curry’s allegations of few, unspecified, suggestive remarks and one occasion
of hair-touching do not suggest a workplace permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult that were sufficiently severe or pervasive.34
Defendant also argues that Curry’s opposition makes irrelevant accusations and other claims
not asserted in her complaint, including an allegation that Defendant failed to take prompt remedial
action after Curry allegedly reported the alleged sexual harassment.35 According to Defendant, such
an allegation is immaterial to determining whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently severe or
pervasive.36 Moreover, Defendant contends, Curry’s un-pled allegation that a warrant was issued
for the arrest of the co-worker is inappropriate and unfounded.37 Even taken as true, Defendant
argues, the statement does not establish that sexual harassment occurred.38
III. Applicable Law
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that, in response “to a claim for relief in
any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim” the pleader may raise

33

Id.

34

Id. at pp. 3–4.

35

Id. at p. 4.

36

Id.

37

Id. at p. 5.

38

Id.

6

by motion the defense of “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”39 In
considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the “court
accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”40
“[T]he plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” in
order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.41 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”42 Generally, a court should not dismiss an action for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving plaintiff “at least one chance to amend.”43
The Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. spoke to the pleading requirement in
employment discrimination cases.44 The Court held that a complaint need not contain specific facts
that would establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the framework of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.45 Instead, the Court held that all that is required in a complaint is a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required by Rule
8(a)(2), providing the defendant with “fair notice” of the plaintiff’s basis for relief.46 The Supreme

39

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

40

Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v.
Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)).
41

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

42

Id. at 1965 (quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted).

43

Hernandez v. Ikon Ofc. Solutions, Inc., 306 F. App’x 180, 182 (5th Cir. 2009); accord Great Plains Trust
Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002).
44

45

46

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508, 514.

7

Court’s holding in Twombly does not alter the requirements articulated in Swierkiewicz. In fact, the
Court in Twombly explicitly reaffirmed its holding in Swierkiewicz when it noted that the Court does
“not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.”47
IV. Analysis
Curry’s complaint does not indicate under which discrimination law she seeks to bring suit.
However, since she alleges race discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace, it appears
that Title VII is the applicable law in this case. Title VII states that an employer cannot discriminate
on the basis of an individual's “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”48
A.

Race discrimination Claim
Curry appears to allege that she was terminated because of her race, and that Defendant

failed to investigate or address her alleged sexual harassment claims because of her race.49 The only
facts alleged in the complaint to support either claim is that “the employer advised Curry that ‘we
can’t have you people doing these things in our store’” prior to terminating her, and that Curry is
African American.50
To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, a plaintiff may prove a claim of
intentional discrimination either by direct or circumstantial evidence. Under the McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green framework, a plaintiff must prove the following: (1) she is a member of a protected

47

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1973–74.

48

42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (West 2014).

49

Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 8–9 (alleging that “[t]he actions of [Defendant] constitute ... racial discrimination as
petitioner is African American”).
50

Id.

8

class; (2) she is qualified for the position; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and
(4) she was replaced by someone outside the protected class or show that similarly situated
employees were treated more favorably.51 As stated above, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Fifth
Circuit have clearly stated that a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case of discrimination to
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.52 Plaintiff must simply plead a plausible claim.53
However, “the prima facie elements are not entirely irrelevant, and no plaintiff is exempt from his
obligation to allege sufficient facts to state all elements of his claim . . . Instead, the alleged facts
must also be sufficient to at least create an inference that the plaintiff was discriminated against due
to his race.”54
Here, Curry alleges that she is a member of a protected class – namely, that she is an African
American. She has also pleaded factual allegations regarding her qualifications: she has never had
any adverse action taken against her by Defendant.55 In addition, she alleges that she was
terminated, which in law constitutes an adverse employment action.56
As for the fourth prong of the prima facie test, however, Curry has not alleged that she was

51
See McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir.2007); see also Shackelford v. Deloitte &
Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir.1999) (§ 1981); Mbarika v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 992 So.2d
551, 562 (La.App. 1 Cir.2008) (LEDL).
52

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–12 (2002); Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 330 (5th
Cir. 2013) (noting that the district court erred by “improperly substituting an ‘evidentiary standard’ for a ‘pleading
requirement’”).
53

EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, No. 11–3425, 2013 WL 1124063, at *5 (S.D.Tex. Mar. 18, 2012)
(recognizing that at the 12(b)(6) stage, the court does not require the plaintiff to plead a prima facie case).
54

Wesley v. Scobee Foods, Inc., 2013 WL 3324092, at *4 n. 6 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2013).

55

Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶ 3.

56
See Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 282–83 (5th Cir. 2004) (“It is beyond dispute that a termination
constitutes an adverse employment action.”).

9

replaced by someone outside her protected group or that she was treated less favorably than other
similarly situated employees outside the protected group.57 In fact, Curry has not alleged that she
was treated differently from any other employee, nor has she alleged any facts that might support
that inference. Moreover, the complaint does not allege the race of the co-worker who allegedly
harassed her, so the Court cannot determine whether the co-employee was outside of Curry’s
protected class, let alone whether he was treated more favorably than her.
Finally, to the extent that Curry relies on the single statement allegedly made by “the
employer” that “we can’t have you people doing these things in our store”58 as direct evidence of
racial discrimination, other courts in the Fifth Circuit have dismissed similar claims under Rule
12(b)(6) where the only perceived conduct alleged in the complaint was a single incident or
offensive remark.59 Accordingly, even accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the Court finds that Curry has not pled sufficient facts to state a claim for
race discrimination that “is plausible on its face.”60
B.

Sexual Harassment Claim
Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

57

McCoy, 492 F.3d at 556 (emphasis added).

58

Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶ 8.

59

See, e.g., Wilson–Robinson v. Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc., 2011 WL 6046984 at *3
(M.D.La. Dec. 6, 2011) (“[t]he solitary, isolated utterance of a single racial slur, standing alone, is not sufficiently severe
or pervasive to create Title VII liability....”); Fisher v. Dallas Cnty., 2014 WL 4797006 at *5 (N.D.Tex. Sept. 26, 2014)
(granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because “a single instance of a racial slur [ ] is insufficient to allege a plausible
claim” of racial harassment); Melson v. Chetofield, 2009 WL 537457 at *5 (E.D.La. March 4, 2009) (Vance, J.)
(dismissing disability harassment claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because the single insult alleged by plaintiff “was the
disability equivalent of a racial epithet or slur, and this is not enough to state a claim.”).
60

See Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974.

10

employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.”61 Harassment is a form of discrimination
affecting terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.62 There are two forms of harassment:
quid pro quo and hostile work environment.63 Curry does not allege that Defendant took a tangible
employment action that was conditioned on sexual favors; therefore, Curry does not have a claim
for quid pro quo harassment. Therefore, the Court proceeds with a hostile work environment
analysis.
A claim for sex discrimination under a theory of hostile work environment exists when:
(1) [the plaintiff] belongs to a protected group, (2) she was subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment, (3) the harassment complained of was based upon sex; (4) the
harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment
(i.e., that the sexual harassment was so pervasive or severe as to alter her conditions
of employment and create an abusive working environment); and (5) the employer
knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take proper action.64
Defendant only challenges the objective component of the analysis, arguing that the co-worker’s
conduct was not so severe or pervasive so as to be actionable. In support of this argument, Defendant
cites numerous summary judgment cases in which courts analyzed whether factual allegations and
evidence were sufficient to create a prima facie hostile work environment claim.65 Because the
standard for granting a motion for summary judgment differs greatly from the standard for granting
61

Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts of State of Texas, 168 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 1999).

62

See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986).

63

See Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., Inc., 297 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2002).

64

Farpella–Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1996); see also See Harris v. Forklift
Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (recognizing a Title VII claim for sex discrimination based on a hostile work
environment theory).
65

See, e.g., Chelette v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2006 WL 2513918, at *1 (W.D. La. Aug. 29, 2006);
Combs v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 2007 WL 3353504, at *1 (M.D. La. Nov. 7, 2007); Hockman v. Westward Commc’ns,
LLC, 407 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 2004); Derouen v. Carquest Auto Parts, 275 F.3d 42 (5th Cir. 2001); E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid
Corp.,2004 WL 1488578, at *1 (E.D. La. June 30, 2004); Paul v. Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., 309 Fed.Appx. 825 (5th
Cir. 2009).

11

a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court finds that none of the cited cases apply to
the instant motion.
To constitute “pervasive or severe” harassment, the conduct complained of must be both
subjectively perceived as abusive by the plaintiff and objectively hostile or abusive under a
reasonable person standard.66 In determining if conduct is severe or pervasive, the Court should
consider the totality of the circumstances, “including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct,
its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”67 Moreover,
“[i]ncidental, occasional or merely playful sexual utterances will rarely poison the employee’s
working conditions to the extent demanded for liability. Discourtesy or rudeness, ‘offhand
comments and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
changes in ‘terms and conditions of employment.’”68 The “severe or pervasive” standard is intended
to filter out complaints attacking “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic
use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.”69
In this case, Curry has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that the conduct at issue

66

Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22; Aryain, 534 F.3d.

67

Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874. See, e.g., Royal v. CCC & R Arboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 401–02 (5th Cir.
2013) (evidence of “[t]he sniffing and hovering over a woman, by two men, in a small, confined space” and comment
that defendant “needed a release” sufficed to create jury question on plaintiff's hostile work environment claim); Steward
v. Caton, 2013 WL 4459981, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 2013) (plaintiff sufficiently pleaded hostile work environment
claim when plaintiff alleged that defendant “lifted her shirt and touched her breasts, installed cameras to look down her
shirt, and made repeated comments of a sexual and/or derogatory nature”); E.E.O.C. v. Jamal & Kamal, Inc., 2006 WL
285143, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 7, 2006) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss when plaintiff alleged “unwelcome and
offensive sexual overtures, the initiation of graphic, sexually-oriented conversations, and touching and rubbing”).
68

Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1999).

69

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (citation omitted).

12

affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment (i.e., that the alleged sexual harassment was
so pervasive or severe as to alter her conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment). Curry alleges only that “[o]n several occasions a co-employee made unwanted
remarks towards petitioner which were sexually suggestive.”70 The complaint does not plead any
facts alleging the frequency or content of these remarks, nor does it allege the identity of the coworker.71 Curry also alleges that the co-worker touched her hair on one occasion. Although touching
of intimate body parts can constitute sexual harassment,72 Curry cites no legal authority for her
argument that a single instance of touching of her hair can also constitute sexual harassment. The
conduct alleged in the complaint does not state a claim for sexual harassment upon which relief may
be granted.
For the foregoing reasons, Curry has failed to state a claim for either racial discrimination
or sexual harassment pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a
court should “freely give leave [to amend a complaint] when justice so requires.”73 Nevertheless,
a party must “expressly request” leave to amend.74 Although this request need not be contained in
a formal motion, “[a] bare request in an opposition to a motion to dismiss – without any indication
of the particular grounds on which the amendment is sought – does not constitute a motion within

70

Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶ 4.

71

Id.

72

See, e.g., Harvill v. Westward Communications, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Undoubtedly,
the deliberate and unwanted touching of [plaintiff's] intimate body parts can constitute severe sexual harassment.”)
(citing Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 268 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[D]irect contact with an intimate body part constitutes one
of the most severe forms of sexual harassment.”)).
73

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

74

Law v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 587 Fed. Appx. 790, 796 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing U.S. ex
rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir. 2003)).

13

the contemplation of Rule 15(a).”75 The Court has been provided no reason to believe that Curry
could remedy the deficiencies in her complaint by amendment.
Here, Curry’s memorandum in opposition to the pending motion contains no language that
might be construed as a request for leave to amend her complaint, let alone express language
requesting leave and indicating the particular grounds on which the amendment was sought. Curry
has not filed a separate motion requesting leave to amend or offered a proposed amended complaint.
Although she states in her briefing additional facts not presented in her complaint – namely, that she
called the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s office and “[a]n outstanding warrant for the arrest of the coworker remains in place”76 – these facts, even if properly pled, do not remedy the deficiencies in
Curry’s pleadings as identified above. Considering that Curry has not requested leave to amend, the
Court will not sua sponte grant her an opportunity to amend her complaint to state a viable claim
where, as here, amendment appears futile.77
V. Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6)”78 is GRANTED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this ______ day of May, 2015.
8th
________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
75

Willard, 336 F.3d at 387.

76

Rec. Doc. 5 at p. 2.

77

See Willard, 336 F.3d at 387.

78

Rec. Doc. 4.

14