Roberts v. Inland Salvage Inc

Filing 130

ORDER granting 122 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Jay C. Zainey. (jrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KENNETH ROBERTS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 14-1929

INLAND SALVAGE, INC.

SECTION A (4)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding
Unseaworthiness (Rec. Doc. 122) filed by Defendants: Hiscox Dedicated Corporate Member
Limited and Catlin Syndicate Limited Subscribing to Covernote NO4MM-34-1049-03, and Chubb
Syndicate 1882 (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Defendants”). Defendants also filed a
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding
Unseaworthiness. (Rec. Doc. 128). Plaintiff Kenneth Roberts (“Roberts”) has filed a response to
this motion. (Rec. Doc. 129). The motion, set for submission on March 7, 2018, is before the
Court on the briefs without oral argument. 1 This matter is set as a jury trial beginning on May 14,
2018 at 8:30 a.m. Having considered the motion and memoranda of counsel, the record, and the
applicable law, the Court finds that the Defendants’ motion should be GRANTED for the reasons
set forth below.
I.

Background

Defendants bring this motion contending that Roberts’s unseaworthiness claim must be
dismissed. (Rec. Doc. 122). In his Complaint, Roberts asserts claims for negligence under the

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Defendants have requested oral argument, but the Court is not persuaded oral argument would be helpful.

Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 30104), as well as claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure
under general maritime law. (Rec. Doc. 1).
This matter arises from a maritime personal injury action. Roberts contends that on
November 22, 2013, he experienced an accident resulting in serious injuries while employed by
Inland Salvage, Inc. (“Inland Salvage”). (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 2, ¶ 5). On August 22, 2014, Roberts
filed a Seaman’s Complaint for Damages against Inland Salvage. (Rec. Doc. 1). However, Inland
Salvage filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy prior to Roberts filing his Complaint. (Rec. Doc. 19-1,
p. 1). Roberts was then precluded from maintaining an action against Inland Salvage due to the
automatic stay on actions against Inland Salvage during bankruptcy proceedings. 2 (Rec. Doc. 13,
pp. 1–2).
Thereafter, on June 10, 2016, Roberts filed a First Supplemental and Amended Complaint,
directly naming the following entities as defendants: American Equity Underwriters, Inc.;
Castlepoint National Insurance Company; and Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London Chubb Syndicate
1882 (“Chubb”). (Rec. Doc. 21, pp. 1–2, ¶¶ 13–15). Roberts did so in accordance with Louisiana’s
Direct Action Statute (La. R.S. § 22:1269), which allows him to maintain this action directly
against the insurer-defendants. Id. at pp. 1–2, ¶¶ 17–18. After discovering the true identity of
Inland Salvage’s insurers, Roberts again amended his Complaint to add Hiscox Dedicated
Corporate Member Limited and Catlin Syndicate Limited Subscribing to Covernote NO4MM-341049-03 as direct defendants (hereinafter referred to as “Hiscox”). (Rec. Doc. 93). Defendants
Hiscox and Chubb bring the instant motion seeking partial summary judgment dismissing the
unseaworthiness claim.

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Roberts dismissed Inland Salvage from this suit on November 2, 2017, leaving only insurer-defendants. (Rec.
Doc. 105).

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II.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” when viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-movant, “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact.” TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 447 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986)). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine”
if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id.
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). The court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
Once the moving party has initially shown “that there is an absence of evidence to support
the non-moving party’s cause,” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the nonmovant must come forward with “specific facts” showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Id.
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)).

Conclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences,

unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific
facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (1993)).
III.

Law and Analysis

A brief summary of Roberts’ allegations is necessary before getting into the crux of
Defendants’ arguments. In his original Complaint, Roberts includes a claim for unseaworthiness
against Inland Salvage based upon the general maritime law. 3 (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶ XI). On
November 22, 2013, Roberts allegedly experienced an accident which resulted in serious painful
injuries to his back, shoulder, and other parts of his body while employed by Inland Salvage. Id.

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Roberts maintains this action, including the unseaworthiness claim, against Defendants through Louisiana’s Direct
Action Statute.

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at p. 2, ¶ V. According to his deposition, Roberts was working on a salvage job upon the M/V
Crown Charger when he fell down the interior steps of the vessel and suffered the alleged injuries.
(Rec. Doc. 122-3, p. 11).
Defendants bring the instant motion seeking to dismiss Roberts’s unseaworthiness claim
on two grounds. First, Defendants argue that the vessel which Roberts was salvaging at the time
of his alleged accident, the M/V Crown Charger, was neither owned nor operated by Roberts’
employer, and therefore, Inland Salvage did not owe Roberts a warranty of seaworthiness. Second,
Defendants argue that no warranty of seaworthiness is owed to Roberts because the M/V Crown
Charger was not in navigation at the time of Roberts’ alleged accident.
In support of their first argument, Defendants put on extensive evidence that proves the
vessel on which Roberts was injured was neither owned nor operated by Inland Salvage—Roberts’
employer. Records of the U.S. Coast Guard show that Crown Transportation, Inc., of Jackson,
Tennessee owned the M/V Crown Charger. (Rec. Doc. 122-2). Moreover, Roberts admits, via
deposition testimony, that the M/V Crown Charger was not owned by Inland Salvage. (Rec. Doc.
122-3, p. 11). Roberts’ co-workers also provide deposition testimony supporting the contention
that the M/V Crown Charger was neither owned nor operated by Inland Salvage. Gary Griffin,
Director of Operations for Inland Salvage at the time of the incident, testified that Inland Salvage
did not own the M/V Crown Charger. (Rec. Doc. 122-4, p. 18). Chris Ingram, employed by Inland
Salvage at the time of the incident, also testified that Inland Salvage never owned or operated the
M/V Crown Charger. Rather, Inland Salvage was hired only to salvage the vessel from its sinking
at a dock in Bayou Teche in Patterson, Louisiana. (Rec. Doc. 128-1, p. 3).
In response to the instant motion, Roberts agrees that Inland Salvage and its insurers—
Defendants—cannot be held liable for the unseaworthiness of the M/V Crown Charger. (Rec.

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Doc. 129, p. 1). Roberts concedes that the M/V Crown Charger was not owned or operated by
Inland Salvage and was not capable of navigation at the time of the accident at issue. Id.
Accordingly, Roberts “does not have opposition to the specific issue addressed in Defendants’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of Unseaworthiness.” Id. (internal citation
omitted).
According to the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff can bring an unseaworthiness claim only against
the owner of the vessel and the vessel itself. Baker v. Raymond Intern., Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 181
(5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).

In order to be held liable for breaching the duty of

seaworthiness, the defendant “must be in the relationship of an owner or operator of a vessel.” Id.
(citing Daniels v. Florida Power & Light Co., 317 F.2d 41, 43 (5th Cir. 1963), cert denied, 375
U.S. 832 (1963)). The Fifth Circuit echoed this rule in Guidry v. Continental Oil Co., holding that
an “[unseaworthiness] remedy traditionally is available only against the shipowner and the vessel.”
640 F.2d 523, 530 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Stokes v. B. T. Oilfield Services, Inc., 617 F.2d 1205,
1207 (5th Cir. 1980)).
The Court agrees that an unseaworthiness claim cannot be maintained against Defendants.
The evidence provided unquestionably shows that Defendants’ insured, Inland Salvage, never
owned or operated the M/V Crown Charger—the vessel on which the alleged injury took place.
Rather, Inland Salvage was providing services to salvage the vessel. For these reasons, an
unseaworthiness action cannot be maintained against Defendants.
IV.

Conclusion

Defendants have successfully argued that Plaintiff’s unseaworthiness claim should be
dismissed. Because the Court finds merit in Defendants’ first argument seeking to dismiss
Roberts’ unseaworthiness claim, the Court finds it unnecessary to reach Defendants’ second

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argument—i.e., that no warranty of seaworthiness is owed on a vessel not in navigation, and the
M/V Crown Charger was not in navigation.
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding
Unseaworthiness (Rec. Doc. 122) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Hiscox
Dedicated Corporate Member Limited and Catlin Syndicate Limited Subscribing to Covernote
NO4MM-34-1049-03 and Chubb Syndicate 1882 for unseaworthiness is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
April 2, 2018
__________________________________
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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