Automotive Experts, LLC v. St. Charles Pontiac Inc
Filing
16
ORDER AND REASONS granting defendant's 9 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle. (ijg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
AUTOMOTIVE EXPERTS, LLC
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 14-1941
ST. CHARLES PONTIAC INC.
SECTION “B”(3)
ORDER AND REASONS
I.
NATURE OF MOTION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Before the Court is Defendant St. Charles Pontiac, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). (Rec. Doc.
9). Plaintiff, Automotive Experts, L.L.C., opposes the motion
(Rec. Doc. 12) and Defendant has filed a reply. (Rec. Doc. 13).
For the reasons that follow,
IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Automotive Experts, L.L.C., filed a Complaint in
this Court on August 26, 2014, invoking the Court’s diversity
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and alleging breach of
contract for failure to pay on an open account by Defendant St.
Charles Pontiac Inc. (Rec. Doc. 1). Plaintiff is a Louisiana
limited liability company, with its registered office in the
Parish
of
Orleans,
State
of
Louisiana,
which
provides
advertising and promotional services to automotive dealerships.
1
(Rec. Doc. 1 at 1). Defendant is a Delaware corporation licensed
to do business in Illinois. (Rec. Doc. 9-2 at 1). It has one
place of business located in the town of St. Charles, Illinois
from which it sells new cars to customers in the Chicago market.
(Rec. Doc. 9-2 at 1).
On
or
about
November
14,
2013,
Plaintiff
and
Defendant
entered into two “Contracts of Retention” under which Plaintiff
was to provide advertising and promotional services to Defendant
in
connection
with
certain
upcoming
sales
promotion
events.1
(Rec. Doc. 1 at 2). Although the parties do not specify, it
would appear that the first contract may have been entered into
between
Plaintiff
and
an
affiliate
of
Defendant,2
while
the
second contract was entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant
directly. (See Rec. Doc. 12-1 at 1, 3). In any event, both
contracts appear to have been signed by the same individual,
above a legend reading “Nissan of St. Charles.” (Rec. Doc. 12-1
at 2, 4).
According
to
Plaintiff’s
Complaint,
it
performed
all
services due under the contracts but was never paid by Defendant
for the services rendered. (Rec. Doc. 1 at 3). On July 11, 2014,
1
The contracts specifically state: “. . . Automotive Experts will provide
highly skilled management team [sic] consisting of two managers who will be
paid by Automotive Experts and a number of sales professionals on a temporary
basis for the dates and terms of the Sales Promotion to assist and supplement
Client’s sales staff. . . .” (See Rec. Doc. 12-1 at 1, 3).
2
Defendant notes in its Motion to Dismiss that it has “an affiliate, PreOwned of St. Charles, L.L.C., with locations in West Chicago and East
Dundee.” (Rec. Doc. 9-2 at 1). Defendant purports to sell new cars, while its
affiliate sells used cars.
2
Plaintiff
claims
it
sent
a
certified
letter
making
demand
pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. ann. § 9:2781 for payment of an
invoice in the amount of $91,768.00 within 30 days of receipt.
(Rec. Doc. 1 at 3). When Defendant allegedly failed to respond
or pay within the designated period, Plaintiff instituted the
instant
breach
of
contract
action
seeking
that
amount
in
addition to reasonable attorney fees and costs. (Rec. Doc. 1 at
3).
III. CONTENTIONS OF MOVANT
Defendant contends this Court lacks personal jurisdiction
over it for purposes of the instant suit. In support of this
contention,
Defendant
argues
it
lacks
the
minimum
contacts
necessary to establish jurisdiction in Louisiana and has never
availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
Louisiana, nor invoked the benefits or protection of Louisiana
law. (Rec. Doc. 9 at 1). Further, Defendant argues the contract
at issue was negotiated and performed in Illinois, rather than
Louisiana. Consequently, Defendant argues the Court has neither
general nor specific personal jurisdiction over it and should
dismiss the case. (Rec. Doc. 9 at 1). Alternatively, Defendant
argues the Court should transfer the case to the appropriate
federal district in Illinois for further resolution. Id.
IV. CONTENTIONS OF OPPONENTS
3
Plaintiff argues the Court has personal jurisdiction over
Defendant
for
contract
with
the
reasons
that:
Plaintiff,
a
Defendant
Louisiana
entered
resident;
into
a
Plaintiff
executed the contract in Louisiana; Plaintiff retained services
of other Louisiana entities in fulfilling its obligations under
the contract; all marketing materials were printed and mailed
from Louisiana; and the parties agreed the contract would be
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the
State
of
Louisiana.
(See
Rec.
Doc.
12
at
2).
Accordingly,
Plaintiff argues “there is no question this Court has personal
jurisdiction over St. Charles and it must answer for the torts
it
committed
under
Louisiana
law.”
(Rec.
Doc.
12
at
3).3
Alternatively, Plaintiff contends Defendant waived objection to
the
Court’s
exercise
of
personal
jurisdiction
by
failing
to
timely file an answer in these proceedings and by participating
in a Rule 16 scheduling conference. (See Rec. Doc. 12 at 5).
V. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
Where
a
defendant
challenges
personal
jurisdiction,
the
party seeking to invoke the power of the court bears the burden
of proving that jurisdiction exists. Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d
276,
280
(5th
Cir.
1982).
The
plaintiff
need
not,
however,
establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence; a
prima facie showing suffices. Id. This court must resolve all
3
The reference to torts is perplexing in light of the contractual nature of
the instant cause of action.
4
undisputed facts submitted by the plaintiff, as well as all
facts contested in the affidavits, in favor of jurisdiction. Id.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
that no federal court may assume jurisdiction in personam of a
non-resident
defendant
unless
the
defendant
has
meaningful
“contacts, ties, or relations” with the forum state. Int'l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95
(1945).
Jurisdiction may be general or specific. Where a defendant
has “continuous and systematic general business contacts” with
the forum state, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984),
the court may exercise “general” jurisdiction over any action
brought against that defendant. Id. at 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868 n. 9.
Where contacts are less pervasive, the court may still exercise
“specific” jurisdiction “in a suit arising out of or related to
the defendant's contacts with the forum.” Id. at 414, 104 S.Ct.
1868
n.
8.
Because
it
is
continuous
and
systematic
Louisiana,
this
case
undisputed
general
presents
only
that
Defendant
business
the
has
contacts
issue
of
no
with
specific
jurisdiction.
A federal court may satisfy the constitutional requirements
for specific jurisdiction by a showing that the defendant has
“minimum contacts” with the forum state such that imposing a
5
judgment would not “offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154;
Luv N’ care, Ltd. V. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 469 (5th
Cir. 2006). In Nuovo Pignone v. STORMAN ASIA/MV, 310 F.3d 374
(5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit “consolidated the personal
jurisdiction inquiry into a convenient three-step analysis:”
(1) Whether
the
defendant
purposely
directed its activities toward the forum
state or purposely availed itself of the
privileges of conducting activities there;
(2) Whether the plaintiff’s cause of action
arises
out
of
or
results
from
the
defendant’s forum-related contacts; and,
(3) Whether
the
exercise
of
personal
jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.
See also, Luv N’ care, Ltd., 438 F.3d at 469. A forum state may
create additional jurisdictional restrictions by statute, which
bind the federal courts. However, Louisiana’s so-called “longarm” statute extends jurisdiction to the constitutional limits
of due process, causing the inquiries here to fold into one. Id.
(citing La. Rev. Stat. ann. § 13:3201(B)).
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Minimum Contacts
In
the
context
of
the
instant
Rule
12(b)(2)
motion,
Plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of
personal jurisdiction. Thus, as a preliminary matter, Plaintiff
6
must
establish
both
that
Defendant
had
sufficient
“minimum
contacts” with Louisiana and that its cause of action “arises
out of” those contacts.
As to the issue of minimum contacts, Plaintiff relies upon:
(1)
Defendant’s
domiciliary,
entering
(2)
the
into
a
choice
of
contract
law
with
a
provision
Louisiana
designating
Louisiana law as applicable to the contracts, and (3) various
other items relating to Plaintiff’s relations with the forum.4
These latter items reflect a misapprehension of the proper focus
of the minimum contacts analysis. “The inquiry whether a forum
State
may
assert
specific
jurisdiction
over
a
nonresident
defendant focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115,
1121-22,
188
L.Ed.2d
12
(2014)(internal
quotations
omitted,
emphasis added). The Supreme Court has “consistently rejected
attempts
inquiry
to
by
satisfy
the
demonstrating
defendant-focused
‘minimum
contacts
the
between
contacts’
plaintiff
(or
third parties) and the forum state.” Id. The various instances
of contact between Plaintiff and the forum in connection with
the
contract
minimum
or
contacts
otherwise
analysis.
are
therefore
Accordingly,
4
inapposite
it
remains
to
to
the
be
These include Automotive Experts, LLC: being domiciled in Louisiana;
executing the contract in the State of Louisiana; retaining services from
other entities domiciled in Louisiana in fulfilling the contractual
obligations; as well as, marketing materials being printed in Louisiana and
artwork and graphic design services being performed in Louisiana. (See Rec.
Doc. 12 at 2).
7
determined whether the circumstances surrounding execution of
the contract between the parties, and inclusion of a choice-oflaw clause therein, are sufficient to establish minimum contacts
between Defendant and the forum.
With respect to the negotiations leading up to execution
of the contract, Plaintiff’s Opposition and the declaration of
Vincent Iacono, a manager for Plaintiff, state merely that: “St.
Charles entered into a contract with the plaintiff, Automotive
Experts,
LLC.”
(See
Rec
Docs.
12
at
2,
12-2
at
1).
Iacono
expounds that no representative of Plaintiff visited Defendant’s
location and that “all negotiations regarding the contract and
sales were done on the telephone.” (Rec. Doc. 12-2 at 1). By
contrast, in its Rule 12(b)(2) motion, Defendant asserts that:
“In
2013,
regarding
Automotive
the
approached
possibility
of
St.
conducting
Charles
in
sales
events
Illinois
at
St.
Charles’s location.” (Rec. Doc. 9-2 at 2). Further, Defendant
asserts that it executed its contract in Illinois, while stating
that
upon
information
and
belief,
Plaintiff
never
executed
either contract. (Rec. Doc. 9-2 at 2). Plaintiff, however, avers
that it executed the contract at its office in New Orleans.
(Rec. Doc. 12-2 at 1). As to this issue, the Court notes that
copies of the contracts attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint are
only signed by Defendant (See Rec. Doc. 1 at 5,7), while the
copies attached to Plaintiff’s Opposition to the instant motion
8
appear to be signed by both parties (See Rec. Doc. 12-1 at 2,4).
While the Court must accept as true all the allegations in the
complaint and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the
plaintiff, here, this merely compels the conclusion that all
negotiations were conducted via telephone and that the parties
executed the contracts at their respective locations. Further,
Plaintiff has failed to introduce any evidence or arguments that
conflict with Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff initiated
contact
with
it
for
purposes
of
negotiating
the
service
agreements. Thus, these facts are insufficient to demonstrate
that Defendant has “purposefully directed its activities at the
forum state.” Burger King v. Radziewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105
S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)).
As to the terms of the contract itself, Plaintiff places
particular emphasis on the inclusion of a choice-of-law clause
applying the laws of the State of Louisiana. (See Rec. Doc. 12
at 4). Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit has held that choice-oflaw
provisions,
without
more,
are
insufficient
to
create
personal jurisdiction or put a defendant on notice that it might
be subject to suit in a different state. See Stuart v. Spademan,
772
F.2d
weight
invoked
1185,
in
the
1195
(“Choice-of-law
considering
benefits
jurisdictional
whether
and
purposes,
a
defendant
protection
although
9
provisions
of
such
a
a
has
warrant
some
purposefully
state’s
provision
laws
for
standing
alone would be insufficient to confer jurisdiction.”)(internal
citations omitted). Unlike a forum-selection clause, a choiceof-law
provision
anticipation
of
Accordingly,
itself
the
Louisiana
law
being
does
haled
provision
is
merely
not
evince
into
the
relating
one
foreign
to
factor
the
the
to
be
defendant’s
forum.
Id.
application
of
considered
in
determining whether sufficient minimum contacts exist for the
Court to exercise jurisdiction.
In light of the foregoing, the Court must turn to the terms
of the contracts and the performances contemplated thereunder in
order to determine whether any further evidence supports minimum
contacts
“retains
in
this
case.
[Plaintiff]
The
to
contracts
provide
the
state
that
services
Defendant
listed
at
[Defendant’s] dealership” for the specified term. (See Rec. Doc.
12-1
at
3,
5)(emphasis
added).
Thus,
the
parties’
agreement
anticipated that performance would be rendered by Plaintiff in
Illinois. While Defendant agreed to certain payment obligations
under the contract, there is no indication that any amount of
performance by Defendant was required or even contemplated in
Louisiana. This is in stark contrast with cases in which the
contractual relationship was found to create sufficient minimum
contacts with a foreign forum. In Burger King, supra, the Court
concluded
that
the
contract
10
at
issue
had
“substantial”
connections with the forum state. 471 U.S. at 480. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court emphasized that the defendant:
. . . entered into a carefully structured
20-year
relationship
that
envisioned
continuing and wide-reaching contacts with
[the plaintiff] in Florida. In light of [the
defendant’s] voluntary acceptance of the
long-term and exacting regulations of his
business
from
[the
plaintiff’s]
Miami
headquarters, the ‘quality and nature’ of
his relationship to the company in Florida
[could] in no sense be viewed as ‘random,’
‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated.’
Id.
at
Mech.,
480.
Inc.,
By
contrast,
the
Fifth
in
Hydrokinetics,
Circuit
concluded
Inc.
that
v.
Alaska
insufficient
contacts existed with the forum (Texas), where the plaintiff
relied merely on the following facts:
(1) Alaska Mechanical agreed to purchase
specific goods to be manufactured in Texas;
(2) payment for these goods was to be made
in Texas; (3) before any written agreement
was
signed,
extensive
communications
occurred between the parties, originating in
Texas and Alaska; (4) officers of Alaska
Mechanical traveled to Texas to “close” the
deal; and (5) the contract was formally
created in Texas because that was the place
of the acceptance of Alaska Mechanical's
offer by Hydrokinetics.
700 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1983).5 In the instant case,
where
the
parties
under
which
no
entered
amount
of
into
contracts
performance
5
was
of
short
required
duration,
or
even
The Court notes that Hydrokinetics was decided before Burger King, supra,
however the minimum contacts analysis conducted therein remains valid
following that decision, and the opinion was cited with approval by the Fifth
Circuit as recently as Parker v. Pro W. Contractors, L.L.C., 536 F. App’x
400, 401-02 (5th Cir. 2013).
11
contemplated
in
the
forum,
the
mere
facts
that
one
of
the
parties was domiciled in the forum and that the contract applied
the forum State’s law are insufficient to establish the minimum
contacts
required
for
exercise
of
the
Court’s
personal
jurisdiction. “For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent
with
due
process,
the
defendant’s
suit-related
conduct
must
create a substantial connection with the forum State. . . . Due
process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority principally
protect
the
liberty
of
the
nonresident
defendant
–
not
the
convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.” Walden v. Fiore,
134 S.Ct. at 1121-22 (internal citations omitted). Under the
present facts it cannot be said that Defendant’s conduct, which
appears
to
domiciliary
be
limited
to
contracting
and
engaging
in
limited
with
a
telephone
Louisiana
discussions,
created a substantial connection with Louisiana. Further, the
record
indicates
that
Plaintiff
sought
out
Defendant
for
purposes of confecting the agreement at issue, further belying
any
claim
that
Defendant
purposely
directed
activity
at
Louisiana. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has
failed to carry its threshold burden of making out a prima facie
showing
of
minimum
contacts
necessary
to
support
specific
jurisdiction. The Court need not therefore address the issues of
whether the instant cause of action arises out of those contacts
or
whether
the
exercise
of
jurisdiction
12
would
be
fair
or
reasonable under these circumstances. Nuovo Pignone v. STORMAN
ASIA/MV, 310 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2002).
B. Waiver
The
Court
argument,
that
turns
now
Defendant
briefly
to
Plaintiff’s
waived
its
objection
alternative
to
personal
jurisdiction by failing to timely file an answer in the instant
proceedings, and in allegedly failing to object at the Rule 16
scheduling conference.
Waiver of the defense of personal jurisdiction is governed
by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1), which provides:
(1)
In
the
A party waives any defense listed in Rule
12(b)(2)-(5) by:
(A) omitting it from a motion in the
circumstances
described
in
Rule
12(g)(2); or
(B) failing to either:
(i)
make it by motion under this rule; or
(ii)
include it in a responsive pleading
or in an amendment allowed by Rule
15(a)(1) as a matter of course.
instant
Complaint,
case,
Defendant
following
sought
and
the
was
filing
granted
of
an
Plaintiff’s
extension
of
time, to October 20, 2014, within which to answer or file other
responsive
pleadings.
(See
Rec.
Doc.
6).
It
is
true
that
Defendant did not comply with this deadline, failing to file the
instant
responsive
pleading
until
December
23,
2014.
In
the
interim, the parties held a Rule 16 scheduling conference with
the Court on December 4, 2014. (See Rec. Doc. 7). Defendant
13
contends its failure to file a timely answer or other pleading
was
caused
by
its
belief
that
Plaintiff
would
voluntarily
dismiss this action after the Attorney General for the State of
Illinois
performance
instituted
under
an
the
investigation
contract
at
into
issue
in
this
Plaintiff’s
case
and
subsequently reached an agreement with Plaintiff prohibiting it
from doing business in the State of Illinois.6 (Rec. Doc. 13 at
6). While this was certainly a foolhardy tack to adopt, given
the risk of default, the Court is aware of no legal authority
(and the parties cite none) for treating a party’s failure to
timely respond as a waiver of the 12(b)(2) defense of lack of
personal jurisdiction. Compare Swanson v. City of Hammond, Ind.,
411 F.App’x 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2011)(“As long as defendants
comply with the rules by raising their defenses in their first
responsive
pleading
or
consolidate
their
defenses
in
a
pre-
pleading motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), they do not waive
their Rule 12(b) defenses.”)
Under
the
present
circumstances,
the
only
responsive
pleading filed by Defendant was the instant motion to dismiss,
which raised the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Thus,
Defendant complied with the requirements of Rule 12(h)(1) as
they pertain to waiver of that defense. Further, it is no answer
6
Although it is immaterial for present purposes, the subject of the
investigation appears to relate to allegations of violations of Illinois
advertising regulations and potentially fraudulent behavior.
14
that
counsel
for
Defendant
participated
in
the
Rule
16
scheduling conference, as counsel indicated at that conference
that
the
instant
motion
was
to
be
forthcoming.
Mere
participation in a scheduling conference will not suffice to
waive a Rule 12(b) defense, particularly where the participating
party indicates its intention to assert the defense at issue.
See, e.g., Rojek v. Catholic Charities, Inc., 2009 WL 3834013
(E.D. Mich. 2009)(finding that defendant did not waive defense
of
insufficient
process
by
participating
in
scheduling
conference and citing to Rule 12(h) as the source of the rules
governing waiver). In light of the foregoing, the Court finds
that
Defendant
did
not
waive
its
Rule
12(b)(2)
defense
by
participating in the December 4, 2014 scheduling conference.
C. Transfer
As to the issue of transfer, Plaintiff does not request
this
form
of
relief
and
the
Court
declines
Defendant’s
invitation to transfer the matter to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Although this would
undoubtedly
be
a
proper
venue,
given
Defendant’s
statements
pertaining to its business operations, the Court is unable to
conclude
that
this
is
the
appropriate
action,
absent
any
indication from Plaintiff. It may be that Plaintiff would prefer
to attempt to establish personal jurisdiction in some other,
15
more convenient forum, and this Court’s order will not prevent
it from so doing.
VII. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff failed to carry its burden of making out a prima
facie showing of personal jurisdiction, specifically by failing
to establish minimum contacts between Defendant and Louisiana.
Plaintiff further failed to establish that Defendant waived its
Rule 12(b)(2) defense either by failing to timely answer or by
participating in the Rule 16 scheduling conference. Because the
Court
declines
Defendant’s
to
Motion
transfer
is
this
GRANTED
and
case,
IT
IS
Plaintiff’s
ORDERED
claims
THAT
against
Defendant in this action are dismissed without prejudice.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 25th day of February, 2015.
____________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16
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