Taylor v. New Orleans Police Department et al

Filing 93

ORDER AND REASONS that defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment Rec. Doc. 64, is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles, III on 11/23/2015. (cms)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ROBERT PAUL TAYLOR

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 14-1972-DEK

NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT –
SEVENTH DISTRICT TASK FORCE, ET AL.
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff, Robert Paul Taylor, a state prisoner, filed this pro se federal civil rights complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sued the New Orleans Police Department - Seventh District
Task Force, Sergeant Michael A. Stalbert, Leslie Guzman, Patrice Swan, Detective T. Perez, and
other unidentified individuals. In this lawsuit, plaintiff claims that excessive force was used to
effect his arrest for stealing a vehicle.
On March 18, 2015, plaintiff’s claim against the New Orleans Police Department - Seventh
District Task Force was dismissed with prejudice. 1
The remaining defendants have now filed a “Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary
Judgment.” 2 Plaintiff filed responses opposing that motion,3 the defendants filed a reply to those
responses, 4 and plaintiff filed sur-replies. 5
I. Motion to Dismiss
The defendants first move for dismissal of plaintiff’s claims as “frivolous” pursuant to this
Court’s statutory screening authority. For the following reasons, that motion is DENIED.

1

Rec. Doc. 36.
Rec. Doc. 64
3
Rec. Docs. 77, 78, 79, 80, and 81.
4
Rec. Doc. 84.
5
Rec. Docs. 85 and 86.
2

Federal law mandates that federal courts “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a). Regarding such lawsuits, federal law further requires: “On review, the court shall
identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint … is frivolous ….” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Additionally, with respect to actions
filed in forma pauperis, such as the instant lawsuit, federal law similarly provides:
“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action … is frivolous ….” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
As an initial matter, the mandated screening is a function that the Court must perform sua
sponte, and it is at least questionable whether it is appropriate for the defendants to move for
dismissal under the cited statutes. See Vo v. St. Charles Parish, Civ. Action No. 10-4624, 2011
WL 743466, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2011) (“[T]he Court cautions counsel that 28 § 1915(e)(2)(B)
does not create a right by a party to request that the Court fulfill its statutory duty.”), adopted, 2011
WL 740909 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2011). Nevertheless, even if the Court assumes for the purposes
of this decision that such a motion is appropriate, plaintiff’s complaint cannot properly be
dismissed as “frivolous.”
A complaint is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Reeves v. Collins,
27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). Here, defendants argue that plaintiff is mentally ill and that his
allegations stem from his delusions. It is true that complaints which are clearly based on delusions

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are subject to being dismissed as frivolous. However, as the United States Supreme Court has
explained:
[A] court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are
“clearly baseless,” a category encompassing allegations that are “fanciful,”
“fantastic,” and “delusional.” As those words suggest, a finding of factual
frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational
or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts
available to contradict them. An in forma pauperis complaint may not be
dismissed, however, simply because the court finds the plaintiff’s allegations
unlikely. Some improbable allegations might properly be disposed of on summary
judgment, but to dismiss them as frivolous without any factual development is to
disregard the age-old insight that many allegations might be “strange, but true; for
truth is always strange, Stranger than fiction.” Lord Byron, Don Juan, canto XIV,
stanza 101 (T. Steffan, E. Steffan & W. Pratt eds. 1977).
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).
In the instant case, plaintiff alleges that he was savagely assaulted by police officers during
an arrest. Unfortunately, as any casual viewer of the news is aware, such incidents do in fact occur
on occasion. Therefore, the allegations are not inherently fanciful, fantastic, or delusional. 6
It is true that plaintiff’s version of the events differs starkly from the versions related by
the defendants and their witnesses. For example, plaintiff alleges that he was sitting calmly in the
stolen vehicle with his hands over his eyes when he was apprehended. Officers then shattered a
vehicle window, opened the door, entered the vehicle, and began beating him. They then threw
him from the vehicle, continued beating him, twisted his left arm which was in a cast as a result of

6

Plaintiff’s allegations are, for example, obviously different in kind from the ones that are normally considered
delusional, such as: an allegation that the federal government was using satellites to beam a genetic code to infect the
plaintiff with a virus, Flores v. United States Attorney General, 434 Fed. App’x 387 (5th Cir. 2011); an allegation that
the plaintiff was “being harmed by electroconvulsive treatments, laser rays, and other forms of radiation through
computer monitoring as part of the Gang Renouncement and Disassociation (GRAD) Process,” Delgadillo v. Texas
Violent Gang Task Force, 134 Fed. App’x 741 (5th Cir. 2005); or an allegation that the plaintiff was being “exploited
by ‘wealthy persons’ from Europe and Asia who have sought to ‘clone [his] spiritual persona’ and ‘remov[e] [his]
Reproductive Fluids,” Johnson v. Drug Enforcement Agency, 137 Fed. App’x 680 (5th Cir. 2005).

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a prior break, and handcuffed him. 7 On the other hand, the defendants and their witnesses state
that no windows were broken on the vehicle, plaintiff exited the vehicle and surrendered without
incident, and there was no physical altercation whatsoever between plaintiff and any officer. 8
However, those disparities do not inexorably lead to the conclusion that plaintiff’s allegations are
delusional, because it is always possible, as it is in any case, that the version of events offered by
defendants and their witnesses is untrue.
Therefore, although the Court has been presented with materially different versions of what
actually occurred on the night in question, neither version is inherently implausible. Where, as
here, factfinding is required to resolve such disputes, dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s complaint as
“frivolous” is inappropriate. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. 9
II. Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants have alternatively moved for summary judgment. For the following reasons,
that motion is likewise DENIED.
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court may grant the motion when no
genuine issue of material fact exists, and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). However, as already explained, the material issues of fact as to what actually
occurred on the night in question are vigorously disputed by the parties in the instant case. The

7

Rec. Doc. 64-4, pp. 48-68.
Rec. Docs. 64-5, 64-6, 64-7, and 84-1.
9
In reaching this conclusion, the Court does note that certain other representations made by plaintiff do appear to be
delusional. For example, at his deposition, plaintiff testified that he is a renowned author and that one of his books,
Crime Wave!: The Robert Paul Taylor Story, won an award for “the best selling book in Texas history” and has been
the “number one” book on amazon.com “for twenty-eight months.” Rec. Doc. 64-4, pp. 16-17. (The Court notes that,
on October 27, 2015, a check of amazon.com revealed that a book by that name does in fact exist, although the author
is listed as Jimmy L. Gettings and its “Amazon Best Sellers Rank” was listed as #7,547,966.) Nevertheless, even if,
as defendants argue, plaintiff is a troubled man who suffers from mental illness and delusions, it does not necessarily
follow that no excessive force was used in this case. Obviously, a mentally ill arrestee is no less likely to be the victim
of police brutality than a wholly sane one.
8

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defendants have offered competent summary judgment evidence supporting their version, such as
their own affidavits and an affidavit from a seemingly impartial third person, the stolen vehicle’s
owner. However, other competent summary judgment evidence supports plaintiff’s version of the
events, such as his verified complaint 10 and his deposition testimony. Obviously, “[s]ummary
judgment is improper if there is a genuine dispute of material fact such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Cardenas v. Lee County, Texas, 569 Fed. App’x 252,
255 (5th Cir. 2014).
That result is not changed by the fact that defendants argue that they are protected by
qualified immunity. It is true that where, as here, qualified immunity has been asserted, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to rebut that defense. Harris v. Serpas, 745 F.3d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 2014).
However, plaintiff has met his burden in this case.
The United States Supreme Court has explained:
In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, courts
engage in a two-pronged inquiry. The first asks whether the facts, taken in the light
most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show the officer’s conduct violated
a federal right. When a plaintiff alleges excessive force during an investigation or
arrest, the federal right at issue is the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
seizures. The inquiry into whether this right was violated requires a balancing of
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion.
The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks whether the right
in question was “clearly established” at the time of the violation. Governmental
actors are shielded from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known. The salient question is whether the state of the law at the time
of an incident provided “fair warning” to the defendants that their alleged conduct
was unconstitutional.

10
Factual assertions in a prisoner’s verified complaint made under penalty of perjury constitute competent summary
judgment evidence. Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2003).

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Courts have discretion to decide the order in which to engage these two
prongs. But under either prong, courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in
favor of the party seeking summary judgment. This is not a rule specific to qualified
immunity; it is simply an application of the more general rule that a judge’s function
at summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary
judgment is appropriate only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a). In making that determination, a court must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the opposing party.
Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865-66 (2014) (citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets
omitted; emphasis added).
The first prong of the foregoing analysis is clearly met in the instant case. It cannot
seriously be questioned that plaintiff’s allegations, taken in the light most favorable to him, support
his claim that the defendants’ conduct violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Such a
violation requires that a plaintiff to be able to show “(1) an injury; (2) which resulted directly from
a use of force that was clearly excessive to the need; and (3) the force used was objectively
unreasonable.” Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 719 (5th Cir. 2014). In this case, plaintiff testified
at his deposition that all the named defendants, i.e. Stalbert, Guzman, Swan, and Perez, were
involved in the use of force, 11 that he was not resisting in any way whatsoever, 12 and that he
sustained numerous injuries in the attack, including a broken arm. 13
The second prong is likewise met. The right of an arrestee not to be subjected to excessive
force has long been clearly established, and the defendants had fair warning that it was

11

For example, plaintiff testified: “I recognized the ones that assaulted me brutally and sadistically. I looked at their
name tags and I’ll never forget their names. Michael A. Stalbert. Thomas Perez. Leslie Guzman. Patrice Swan.”
Rec. Doc. 64-4, p. 54.
12
See, e.g., Rec. Doc. 64-4, pp. 59-62.
13
See, e.g., Rec. Doc. 64-4, pp. 63 and 67.

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unconstitutional to savagely beat an unresisting suspect. See Brown v. Lynch, 524 Fed. App’x 69,
9 & n.49 (5th Cir. 2013).
This, of course, is not to say that plaintiff’s version of the events is true or that he will be
able to prove his claims at trial. It is to say only that genuine issues of material fact remain in
dispute, and, therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate based on the record currently before
the Court.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ “Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary
Judgment,” Rec. Doc. 64, is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this twenty-third day of November, 2015.

__________________________________________
DANIEL E. KNOWLES, III
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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