Magee v. Reed et al
Filing
54
ORDER AND REASONS granting 39 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle. (ijg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ROGER D. MAGEE
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 14-1986
WALTER P. REED, ET AL.
SECTION "B"(1)
ORDER AND REASONS
I.
NATURE OF MOTION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Before the Court is Defendant’s, Jerry Wayne Cox (“Cox”),
“Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(c) or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment” (Rec. Doc. 39)
and
Plaintiff’s
responsive
pleadings
thereto
(Rec.
Doc.
50).
Defendant Cox seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims
for
false
retaliation
as
claims
battery
for
arrest,
well
as
and
excessive
for
force,
Plaintiff’s
excessive
force.
and
free
Louisiana
In
the
speech
state
law
alternative,
Defendant seeks summary judgment.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff alleges that, commencing on or about 2010 through
April or May of 2012, he provided information to the Federal
Bureau
of
(“Cox”),
a
Investigation
Pentecostal
(“FBI”),
Preacher
concerning
and
Minister
Jerry
in
Wayne
Cox
Franklinton,
Louisiana, and his actions with respect to insurance claims for
property damage and his relationship with Walter Reed (“Reed”),
the former District Attorney for Tammany Parish. (Rec. Doc. 23
1
at
6).
Plaintiff
relationship
that
alleges
involved
that
a
Cox
and
personal
Reed
had
business
“joint
injury
a
venture”
that helped support expensive lifestyles led by both men. (Rec.
Doc.
23
at
7).
Plaintiff
alleges
that
Reed
and
Cox
were
concerned about Plaintiff’s discussions with the FBI because it
could lead to the discovery of the underreporting of income and
tax fraud related to the personal injury settlement proceeds.
(Rec. Doc. 23 at 7). During the first weekend in August of 2012,
Plaintiff alleges that Cox informed him that he was aware that
Plaintiff was communicating with the FBI and threatened that “if
and when [Plaintiff] crossed state lines [into Louisiana], Reed
[would] handle [him].” (Rec. Doc. 23 at 8).
On or about October 25, 2012, an Order for Body Attachment
concerning unpaid child support was filed in the matter entitled
Crystal Magee v. Roger G. Magee. (Rec. Doc. 23 at 9).1 The Order
allowed
Plaintiff
to
Support
Enforcement
make
in
payments
Conway,
to
Arkansas,
the
Office
which
of
Child
forwarded
the
payments to Louisiana where the child was domiciled. (Rec. Doc.
23
at
9).
Due
to
Plaintiff’s
filing
for
Social
Security
Disability benefits, an Order to Recall Body Attachment (“Recall
Order”) was signed by the Circuit Court of Faulkner County on
July 12, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 23 at 10). Plaintiff alleges that the
issuance of the above Order for Body Attachment was orchestrated
1
See also Crystal Magee v. Roger D. Magee, No. DR 2010-1066 (Circuit Court of
Faulkner County Arkansas, Fourth Division).
2
by Reed, through his connections with the District Attorney’s
Office, and Cox. (Rec. Doc. 23 at 10). Plaintiff further alleges
that Randy “Country” Seal (“Seal”), as Sheriff of Washington
Parish, Cox, and Reed had knowledge of the Recall Order. (Rec.
Doc. 23 at 10).
On March 28, 2014, Plaintiff traveled from Arkansas to his
aunt’s home in Louisiana to visit with his family. (Rec. Doc. 23
at 11). Within minutes of his arrival, Plaintiff alleges that at
least
five
units
of
police
officers
converged
upon
the
residence, descending upon the house and rear patio. (Rec. Doc.
23 at 12). Plaintiff alleges that some or all of the officers
had
their
weapons
drawn
(removed
from
their
holsters
or
“leather”). (Rec. Doc. 23 at 12). He alleges that he then stated
that, if this had to do with child support payments, he was “in
compliance”
officers
with
the
the
Recall
state
of
Arkansas
Order
that
and
relieved
could
show
the
of
his
Plaintiff
obligations due to his disabilities. (Rec. Doc. 23 at 12). As he
proceeded
toward
the
doors
to
retrieve
the
Recall
Order,
Plaintiff alleges he was “rushed by the officers,” and tased in
his back, which caused him to crash headfirst onto the concrete
floor. (Rec. Doc. 23 at 13). Plaintiff was then handcuffed and
allegedly tased again. (Rec. Doc. 23 at 13).
As
a
result
of
the
above,
Plaintiff
alleges
that
he
suffered severe traumatic brain injury, experienced a number of
3
symptoms while incarcerated, and injured his left foot, left
knee, and left shoulder. (Rec. Doc. 23 at 13). Plaintiff did not
know the full extent of his brain injury at the time he filed
his complaint and was still undergoing testing. (Rec. Doc. 23 at
13). After Plaintiff was booked, he was incarcerated at the
Washington Parish Jail where he alleges black mold covered the
walls and ceilings and he was forced to sleep on the floor due
to overcrowding, which he further alleges is a policy of the
Washington Parish Jail. (Rec. Doc. 23 at 15-16). Plaintiff also
alleges that he was denied medical treatment for his various
injuries, and that, although he made it clear that he required
daily insulin injections due to chronic injuries, he was denied
insulin for three to four days at a time. (Rec. Doc. 23 at 16).
During
his
ninety-seven
(97)
days
of
incarceration,
Plaintiff alleges that he requested bail through his family and
criminal defense counsel, and those requests were refused due to
a “DA hold.” (Rec. Doc. 23 at 18). On July 7, 2014, Plaintiff
was released from Washington Parish Jail on the condition that
he
plead
(Failure
guilty
to
Pay
to
a
Child
violation
Support)
of
and
La.
La.
Rev.
Rev.
Stat.
Stat.
§
§
14:75
14:108
(Resisting an Officer). (Rec. Doc. 23 at 18). In exchange for
his plea agreement and agreement to pay restitution, Plaintiff
was given probation for a period of five (5) years. Plaintiff
has since filed a notice of appeal. (Rec. Doc. 23 at 18).
4
Plaintiff
asserted
causes
of
action
against
various
Washington Parish employees, Reed, in his official capacity as
District
Attorney
for
Washington
Parish
and
in
his
personal
capacity, and Cox.2 The allegations against the Defendants are as
follows: under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff brings an action for
false
arrest/excessive
force
against
all
Defendants
except
Defendant Jim Miller, Warden of the Washington Parish Jail; for
procedural
due
Defendants
process
Seal
and
violations/false
Reed;
free
imprisonment
against
retaliation
against
speech
Defendants Cox, Reed, and Seal; and conditions of confinement
against Defendants Seal, Haley, and Miller. (Rec. Doc. 23 at 1927).
Additionally
under
42
U.S.C.
§
1983,
Plaintiff
alleges
Monell municipal violations against Defendant Reed and against
Defendant
Seal.
(Rec.
Doc.
23
at
30-32).
Finally,
Plaintiff
alleges a Louisiana state law claim for battery and excessive
force against all Defendants (including the Washington Parish
officers involved in the arrest). (Rec. Doc. 23 at 33).
Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on August 29, 2014,
establishing jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Rec.
Doc. 1). On August 19, 2015, this Court granted Defendant Reed’s
Motion to Dismiss all claims against him. (Rec. Doc. 37). On
October
20,
2015,
this
Court
dismissed
2
all
claims
against
Plaintiff also brought causes of action against Walter Reed, in his official
capacity as District Attorney for Washington Parish and in his personal
capacity, but those claims were dismissed subject to this Court’s Order
granting Defendant Reed’s Motion to Dismiss. (Rec. Doc. 37).
5
Defendants
Seal,
Miller
and
the
other
Washington
Parish
employees, except for Plaintiff’s excessive force claims. (Rec.
Doc. 49). As such, much of this Court’s analysis in considering
the instant motion is governed by its review in those Orders.
Accordingly,
Judgment
on
the
IT
IS
ORDERED
Pleadings
is
that
GRANTED
Defendant’s
and
Motion
Plaintiff’s
for
claims
against Defendant Cox are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, as stated
more fully herein.
III. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS STANDARD
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the
same standard as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir.
2008). A motion to dismiss allows a party to move for dismissal
of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Such a motion is
rarely granted because it is viewed with disfavor. See Lowrey v.
Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir.1997) (quoting
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,
677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts must accept all
well-pleaded
facts
as
true
and
view
them
in
the
light
most
favorable to the non-moving party. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190,
196 (5th Cir. 1996). However, “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
6
Bell
Atl.
Corp.
v.
Twombly,
550
U.S.
544,
555
(2007).
“To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Gonzales v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600,
603 (5th Cir. 2009)(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949
(2009))(internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
The
Supreme
Court in Iqbal explained that Twombly promulgated a “two-pronged
approach” to determine whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. First, courts must
identify those pleadings that, “because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id.
Legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.”
Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at
1949.
Upon
identifying
the
well-pleaded
factual
allegations,
courts “assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 1950. A
claim has facial plausibility when the movant pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the nonmovant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at
1949.
This
is
a
“context-specific
task
that
requires
the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Id.
7
IV.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions,
interrogatory
affidavits,
answers,
show
that
and
there
admissions,
is
no
together
genuine
issue
with
as
to
any
any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
A genuine issue exists if
the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict
for the nonmovant.
242, 248 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
Although the Court must consider the evidence
with all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, the nonmovant must produce specific facts
to demonstrate that a genuine issue exists for trial.
Webb v.
Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs. of N. Texas, 139 F.3d 532, 536
(5th Cir. 1998).
The
informing
moving
the
party
bears
the
district
court
of
initial
the
basis
responsibility
for
its
of
motion.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The movant must point to “portions of
‘the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories,
and
admissions on file, together with affidavits’ which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). If and when the movant carries
this burden, the nonmovant must then go beyond the pleadings and
use
affidavits,
depositions,
8
interrogatory
responses,
admissions,
or
other
evidence
to
establish
a
genuine
issue.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986).
“[W]here the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial,
the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence, thus
shifting
to
competent
material
the
summary
fact
non-movant
judgment
warranting
the
proof
trial.
burden
that
.
.
of
demonstrating
there
.
Only
is
an
when
by
issue
of
‘there
is
sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to
return a verdict for that party’ is a full trial on the merits
warranted.” Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 16 F.3d 616 (5th
Cir. 1994). Accordingly, conclusory rebuttals of the pleadings
are insufficient to avoid summary judgment.
Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Liljeberg Enter., Inc., 7 F.3d 1203, 1207 (5th Cir. 1993).
V.
DISCUSSION
Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims
for
false
arrest,
excessive
force,
and
free
speech
retaliation as well as for Plaintiff’s state law claims for
battery and excessive force. This Court will briefly discuss all
of these claims, but notes that the free speech retaliation
claim is the only one at issue, as Plaintiff did not oppose any
of Defendant Cox’s other arguments.
9
A. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for False Arrest and False
Imprisonment
For the same reasons as outlined in this Court’s prior
Orders (Rec. Docs. 37, 49), these claims against Cox cannot
prevail,
and
Plaintiff
does
not
oppose
dismissal
in
his
opposition. Specifically, Plaintiff’s causes of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and false imprisonment are Heckbarred.
In Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held
that:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,
or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal
authorized
to
make
such
determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.
512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Heck prohibits a plaintiff from
using a § 1983 suit to challenge the validity of his conviction
or
sentence,
conviction
invalidated,
or
unless
the
sentence
also
plaintiff
has
known
in
as
demonstrates
some
the
way
been
that
reversed
“favorable
the
or
termination
requirement.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008).
Consequently, “a plaintiff's claim is Heck-barred despite its
theoretical
compatibility
with
10
his
underlying
conviction
if
specific factual allegations in the complaint are necessarily
inconsistent with the validity of the conviction.” Id. at 498
(quoting McCann v. Neilsen, 466 F.3d 619, 621 (7th Cir. 2006));
see
also
Connors
v.
Graves,
538
F.3d
373,
376-77
(5th
Cir.
2008). This is because “factual assertions in pleadings are . .
. judicial admissions conclusively binding on the party that
made them.” Davis v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 823 F.2d 105,
108 (5th Cir. 1987) (alterations and citation omitted).
To
prevail
on
his
false
arrest
and
false
imprisonment
claims, Plaintiff would have to show that there was not probable
cause to arrest him. Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653,
644 (5th Cir. 2004)(“To ultimately prevail on his § 1983 false
arrest/false imprisonment claim, [plaintiff] must show that [the
officer] did not have probable cause to arrest him.”); see also
Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 204 (5th Cir. 2009).
Generally, where a plaintiff was arrested for crimes of which he
was ultimately convicted, Heck bars recovery for false arrest
and
false
imprisonment,3
because
the
conviction
necessarily
implies that there was probable cause for the arrest. Walter v.
Horseshoe
Entm’t,
483
F.
Appx
884,
887-88
(5th
Cir.
2012).
Because Plaintiff pled guilty to the charges of resisting arrest
and failure to pay child support, his claims are barred by Heck.
3
It also bars recovery for free speech retaliation, as will be discussed,
infra.
11
Accordingly,
IT
IS
ORDERED
that
Defendant’s
Motion
for
Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED so that Plaintiff’s claims
for
false
arrest
and
false
imprisonment
are
DISMISSED
WITH
PREJUDICE.
B. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Free Speech Retaliation
Plaintiff’s
free
speech
retaliation
claim
is
similarly
Heck-barred, as was stated in this Court’s previous Orders (Rec.
Docs. 37, 49). To prevail on his free speech retaliation claim,
Plaintiff would have to show that there was not probable cause
to
arrest
him.
Hartman
v.
Moore,
547
U.S.
250,
252
(2006)
(holding that want of probable cause to support the underlying
criminal charge must be alleged and proven for a First Amendment
violation to be actionable). Where a plaintiff was arrested for
crimes of which he was ultimately convicted, Heck bars recovery
for free speech retaliation because the conviction necessarily
implies that there was probable cause for the arrest. Walter,
483 F. Appx at 887-88. Because Plaintiff pled guilty to the
aforementioned charges, his claims are barred by Heck.
Plaintiff
argument
in
now
his
seeks
to
opposition
dodge
to
Heck
suggest
by
restructuring
that
Defendant
his
Cox’s
threats directed at Plaintiff, as opposed to Plaintiff’s arrest,
are the acts constituting retaliation. (Rec. Doc. 50 at 4-5).
Plaintiff
attempted
this
same
12
strategy
in
his
previous
opposition to a motion to dismiss,4 and the Court rejects this
attempt for the same reasons and adopts its prior analysis.
Plaintiff’s current theory for recovery was not alleged in
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, which relies on the arrest as the
relevant retaliation. As this Court has already concluded twice,
the Amended Complaint failed to state a claim for free speech
retaliation upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). This Court does not find that Plaintiff’s new claim
should be considered so as to potentially alter this conclusion;
moreover, the “new” claim as raised now appears to be fruitless
and unwarranted.
When a claim is raised for the first time in response to a
motion, this Court must construe that claim as a motion to amend
the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). See Riley v. Sch. Bd.
Union Parish, 379 Fed. Appx. 335, 341 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing
Stover v. Hattiesburg Pub. Sch. Dist., 549 F.3d 985, 989 n.2
(5th Cir. 2008); Sherman v. Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236, 1242 (5th
Cir.
1972)).
While
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
15(a)
evinces
a
liberal
amendment policy, see Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 318
(5th Cir. 1998), leave to amend is not automatic and is within
the
sound
discretion
of
the
trial
court.
See
Addington
v.
Farmer's Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 650 F.2d 663, 666 (5th Cir.
4
In Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss filed by the Washington
Parish officers and employees, Plaintiff argued that the extreme use of
force, as opposed to the arrest, was the action constituting retaliation.
(Rec. Doc. 41 at 10-11).
13
1981).
In
exercising
its
discretion,
the
Court
may
consider
factors such as the repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments
previously
allowed
and
undue
prejudice
to
the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment. Gregory
v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981).
Here,
the
Court
finds
that
such
an
amendment
is
not
warranted. Plaintiff was given the opportunity to introduce this
allegation in his Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. 23), as well as
in his two prior oppositions (Rec. Docs. 30, 41). Plaintiff only
now, after the issuance of this Court’s Order granting the other
Defendants’ motions to dismiss, brings up this alternate theory
for
he
recovery.
could
amend
Contrary
without
to
any
Plaintiff’s
prejudice
to
statement
Cox[,]”
that
allowing
Plaintiff to amend his complaint at this time would unfairly
prejudice Defendant Cox. For this reason, the Court declines to
consider Plaintiff’s most recent claims and again concludes that
Plaintiff’s
free
speech
retaliation
claim
does
not
provide
factual allegations that are “enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Finally, while the Court need not take a stance on whether
Plaintiff’s “new” claim would prevail if asserted initially, the
Court notes that the alleged threats do not at first glance
appear
to
meet
the
threshold
for
restricting
“a
person
of
ordinary firmness from continuing to” speak, even under the law
14
cited by Plaintiff which states that the curtailment “need not
be great in order to be actionable.” Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d
252,
258-59
(5th
admits that in
incidents
with
Cir.
2002)
(citations
omitted).
Plaintiff
Keenan, “the Fifth Circuit held that several
an
‘undercurrent
of
violence,’
which
included
being stopped by officers and being detained, were sufficiently
chilling to satisfy the second element.” (Rec. Doc. 50 at 5)
(quoting Keenan, 290 F.3d at 259). Plaintiff’s new allegations
against Defendant Cox make no mention of threats of violence,
nor do they refer to Plaintiff being stopped or detained for any
unlawful reason. Consequently, this Court fails to recognize how
this claim could prevail, even if accepted.
Accordingly,
IT
IS
ORDERED
that
Defendant’s
Motion
for
Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED so that Plaintiff’s claim
for free speech retaliation is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
C. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Excessive Force
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
(1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law. Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir.
2004). A plaintiff “must identify defendants who were either
personally
acts
are
involved
causally
in
the
connected
constitutional
to
15
the
violation
constitutional
or
whose
violation
alleged.” Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995).
Because Plaintiff’s excessive force claim deals with actions of
the
officers
Defendant
Cox
who
effectuated
was
not
the
present
at
Plaintiff’s
the
time
arrest
of
the
and
arrest,
Defendant is not “causally connected” to Plaintiff’s excessive
force claim. Thus, the claim is not one upon which relief can be
granted, making dismissal proper.
Accordingly,
IT
IS
ORDERED
that
Defendant’s
Motion
for
Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED so that Plaintiff’s claim
for excessive force is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
D. Louisiana
Force
State
Law
Claims
for
Battery
and
Excessive
This Court previously determined that Plaintiff’s state law
claims for battery and excessive force warrant dismissal because
they
force
are
unreasonably
claims
under
42
duplicative
U.S.C.
§
with
1983,
Plaintiff’s
excessive
and
state
merely
an
alternate theory of recovery. An action may be dismissed as
malicious and frivolous if it duplicates claims raised by the
same plaintiff in previous or pending litigation. See Pittman v.
Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 994–95 (5th Cir. 1993); Wilson v. Lynaugh,
878 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff’s intentional tort
claims of assault and battery under state law are essentially
the same as his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus warrant
dismissal.
16
Therefore,
IT
IS
ORDERED
that
Defendant’s
Motion
for
Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s state law
claims
for
battery
and
excessive
force
such
that
they
are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
VI.
CONCLUSION
As
previously
stated,
Defendant
Cox’s
Motion
must
be
granted for the same reasons as outlined in this Court’s prior
Orders (Rec. Docs. 37, 49). Additionally, because Plaintiff does
not contest the majority of Defendant’s Motion, the Court holds
that there is even more reason to grant it.
As such, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment
on
the
Pleadings
is
GRANTED
and
all
of
Plaintiff’s
claims
against Defendant Cox are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 28th day of October, 2015.
____________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
17
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