Cruz v Fulton, et al

Filing 141

ORDER AND REASONS denying 138 Motion for New Trial. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 1/25/17. (clc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ELADIO CRUZ, INDIVIDUALLY
AND ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR
CHILD, MELISSA CRUZ

CIVIL ACTION

V.

NO. 14-2015

TRACY FULTON

SECTION "F"
ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Louis Koerner’s motion for a new trial on
the sanctions the Court imposed in its Order and Reasons, dated
December 8, 2016. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
Background
This is a storied proceeding about one lawyer’s bizarre antics
toward the Court and his patent disregard of his professional
obligations. 1
Koerner was brought on as lead counsel for a civil rights
suit in this Court based on his “experience” in the federal forum.
Despite having knowledge of the October 3, 2016 trial date months
ahead of time, Koerner arranged for, and took, a tropical vacation
days before the commencement of trial. The record establishes that
counsel failed to comply with critical deadlines the Court set for
documents due before trial. Plaintiff’s counsel failed to timely
deliver a bench book to the Court and to the defendant’s counsel.

1

The Court hereby adopts its Order and Reasons dated December 8,
2016.
1

This

failure,

plaintiff’s

coupled

counsel,

with

caused

other
the

Court

untimely
to

requests

issue

an

from

Order

on

September 28, 2016 continuing the case’s trial date. As a result,
the Court ordered a contempt hearing for a determination of whether
Koerner and his co-counsel should be held in contempt of Court.
The Court held a contempt hearing on December 8, 2016. In its
Order and Reasons the Court found Koerner in contempt of Court, in
violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and ordered him to pay all of the fees and costs
that the defendant, Tracy Fulton, had incurred from September 3,
2014 until September 28, 2016.
Koerner now moves the Court to reconsider its sanctions
imposed on December 8, 2016.
I.
Motions requesting reconsideration of court orders generally
fall under Rule 54(b), Rule 59(e), or Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Higgins v. Cain, No. 07–9729, 2012
WL 3309716, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2012); Waste Mgmt. of La.,
Inc. v. River Birch, Inc., No. 11–2405, 2012 WL 876717, at *1 (E.D.
La. Mar. 14, 2012); Castrillo v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc.,
No. 09–4369, 2010 WL 1424398, at *3–4 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2010).
Rule 59(e) provides that a motion to alter or amend a judgment
must be filed no later than twenty-eight days after the entry of
judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Rule 60(b), on the other hand,
2

applies to motions filed after the twenty-eight day period, but
demands more “exacting substantive requirements.” See Lavespere v.
Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173–74 (5th Cir.
1990), abrogated on other grounds, Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37
F.3d 1069, 1078 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
II.
“A Rule 59(e) motion ‘calls into question the correctness of
a judgment.’” Templet v. Hydrochem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478 (5th
Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Transtexas Gas Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581
(5th Cir. 2002)). Because of the interest in finality, Rule 59(e)
motions may only be granted if the moving party shows there was a
mistake of law or fact or presents newly discovered evidence that
could not have been discovered previously. Id. at 478–79. Moreover,
Rule 59 motions should not be used to relitigate old matters, raise
new arguments, or submit evidence that could have been presented
earlier in the proceedings. See id. at 479; Rosenblatt v. United
Way of Greater Houston, 607 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2010)(“[A]
motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) ‘must
clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must
present newly discovered evidence’ and ‘cannot be used to raise
arguments which could, and should, have been made before the
judgment issued.’”)(citing Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d
854, 864 (5th Cir. 2003)(quoting Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d
1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)). The grant of such a motion is an
3

“extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.” Indep. Coca–
Cola Employees’ Union of Lake Charles, No. 1060 v. Coca–Cola
Bottling Co. United, Inc., 114 F. App’x 137, 143 (5th Cir. Nov.
11, 2004) (citing Templet, 367 F.3d at 479). The Court must balance
two important judicial imperatives in deciding whether to reopen
a case in response to a motion for reconsideration: “(1) the need
to bring the litigation to an end; and (2) the need to render just
decisions on the basis of all the facts.” Templet, 367 F.3d at
479. 2
III.
The first, and most comic, argument Koerner urges is that the
Court misinterprets its own deadlines. The Court’s scheduling
order, given to counsel months in advance of trial, instructed
that a bench book of exhibits is to be delivered to the Court five
working days before trial. A trial set to commence on Monday,
October 3, 2016, would mean that the bench book would be due to
the Court on Friday, September 23, 2016; that is, five working
days before trial. Koerner ridiculously argues that the Court
misapplies the meaning of “five working days” before trial; he
argues that five working days before October 3, 2016 would be

2

In his motion for a new trial, Louis Koerner failed to explicitly
provide the legal standard for the Court to consider the motion.
The Court takes the liberty of assuming Koerner specifically
intended to move for a new trial under Rule 59(e), which is a
motion to alter or amend a judgment.
4

Monday, September 26, 2016. Not only is such an argument wholly
insincere, it is a distortion of common sense. 3
Koerner seeks to invoke e-mails and documents, which he argues
show that his co-counsel, Adam Lambert, was responsible for the
bench book and trial preparations in Koerner’s absence in the days
before trial. Koerner had months to submit this material to the
Court before his December 8, 2016 hearing date. In fact, he and
his two co-counsel each submitted a memorandum to the Court before
the contempt hearing. At no time did Koerner attempt to include
the

exhibits

he

now

presents

to

the

Court.

The

pattern

of

professional lapse continues. Instead, Koerner arrived the morning
of his hearing and attempted to offer new documents, presumably
the ones submitted with this current motion. The Court rejected
his untimely offer of evidence because he had ample time to notify
the Court of those documents in support of his position. 4
IV.
Accordingly, Louis Koerner’s motion for a new trial is DENIED.
He stands in contempt of this Court.

3

Remarkably, Mr. Koerner failed to even comply with his own selfserving interpretation of “five working days.” The bench book was
not delivered to the Court even by Mr. Koerner’s September 26,
2016 tortured reasoning.
4 The Court also rejects Koerner’s attempt to use this motion as a
means to retaliate against his co-counsel for a professional
relationship that turned sour during the course of this lawsuit.
Moreover, at an extensive hearing, the Court found that co-counsel
were not in contempt of Court.
5

New Orleans, Louisiana, January 25, 2017

______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6