D & S Marine Transportation, L.L.C. v. S & K Marine, L.L.C. et al
Filing
106
ORDER AND REASONS denying 94 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Mary Ann Vial Lemmon on 6/27/16. (cbn)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
D & S MARINE TRANSPORTATION,
LLC
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 14-2048
S & K MARINE, LLC, ET AL.
SECTION: "S" (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Renewed Motion to for Summary Judgment
(Doc. #94) is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This matter is before the court on a renewed motion for summary judgment filed by
defendants, S & K Marine, L.L.C. and Ben Strafuss.
Plaintiff, D & S Marine Transportation, LLC, is a marine transportation company that
operates a fleet of tow boats that move barges. Its vessels are time chartered to other companies.
D & S Marine alleges that in 2013, before the formation of S & K Marine,1 one of its owners, Pat
McDaniel, engaged in discussions with Calvin Klotz, who would become a member of S & K
Marine, "leading to an initial agreement" regarding two vessels under construction at New
Generations Shipyard that were to be owned by S & K Marine, and operated by D & S Marine. D
& S Marine alleges that it entered into a bareboat charter agreement with S & K Marine regarding
the vessels, and that S & K Marine breached that contract in bad faith. As to the formation of the
contract, D & S Marine alleges that:
[t]he parties entered into a bareboat charter agreement establishing a
fixture by agreeing on essential terms of the charter such as the rate,
1
S & K Marine was registered with the Louisiana Secretary of State on December 11, 2013, as a
limited liability company. Calvin Klotz and Ben Strafuss are members of S & K Marine.
initial term of five (5) years with option to extend for another five (5)
year term, vessel maintenance, and option to purchase after the initial
term, all while working out remaining details to finalize agreement.
D & S Marine also alleges in the complaint that the parties continued to "refine minor details of their
agreement through February 2014," and that, with defendants' consent, it "undertook a significant
amount of work with the shipyard to modify the vessel under construction to meet the configurations
required and used in [its] fleet." McDaniel testified at his deposition that sometime in July or
August 2013, D & S Marine entered into an oral bareboat charter agreement with Klotz and Strafuss.
McDaniel testified that on November 4, 2013, he outlined the essential terms of the charter
agreement in an email to D & S Marine's external attorney, and asked the attorney to draft a bareboat
charter agreement. These terms included a five-year term and five-year renewal option of the
charter party, a purchase option, an $850.00 daily charter rate, and that D & S Marine would supply
all fuel, lube and related taxes, would crew and maintain the vessel, and carry vessel insurance.
McDaniel testified that Klotz and Strafuss requested that D & S Marine undertake to draft an
agreement that could be marked up as needed. McDaniel sent the first draft to Strafuss on
November 19, 2013.
On December 10, 2013, Strafuss emailed Klotz and S & K Marine's attorneys regarding sales
and use tax for the vessel, a revised agreement, delivery of the vessel, insurance, documentation and
the charter agreement. As to delivery of the vessel, Strafuss stated that "we need to get D&S to take
delivery yet this year and out it under charter so we can qualify for the accelerated depreciation
uniquely available until Jan 1. The boat will continue to be finished and so we won't actually accept
it as compete until sometime in February."
2
On December 11, 2013, Klotz returned a redline version of the bareboat charter agreement
to McDaniel. Significantly, this version added a paragraph regarding the assignment of warranty
or guarantee rights, and added or changed language in the paragraphs regarding taxes, maritime
liens, sub-charter agreements, limitation of liability, the right of first refusal and the purchase option.
After D & S Marine received Strafuss and Klotz's December 11, 2013, redline version of the
draft bareboat charter agreement, D & S Marine and its attorney modified the draft several times.
On January 31, 2014, McDaniel sent an email to Klotz stating that they "should finalize the contract
next week as [McDaniel] will send [Klotz] a copy to review." McDaniel also indicated that he did
not think that there were any other changes other than those that were previously discussed. Klotz
replied that they would meet the following week to finalize the contract. Also on January 31, 2014,
D & S Marine entered into a time charter agreement with Canal Barge Co., one of its customers, for
one of the vessels under construction that was the subject of the alleged bareboat charter agreement.
On February 10, 2014, McDaniel sent an email to Klotz stating that D & S Marine's attorney
"is sending over a final version [of the bareboat charter agreement] today, as we will get it to you
shortly for review. I think we are done??" That same day, McDaniel sent the draft to Klotz via email
with the note: "Attached should be the latest Bareboat Charter with all needed changes? Please
review and let us know if you should have any questions." This draft had changes from December
11, 2013, draft. Specifically, the February 10, 2014, draft increased the charter rate for the second
five-year term to $900 per day; changed the formula for calculating the purchase price in right of
first refusal clause; and, left out the purchase option clause. This draft also added provisions that:
the owner warranted certain aspects of the vessel's construction and would assume the responsibility
for and the expense of repairing certain items if defects were discovered within one year of delivery
3
of the vessel; prevented the owner from creating liens on the vessel except for one first preferred
ship mortgage; and, changed the provision regarding the additional lease option for another vessel
to include terms for purchasing that vessel.
D & S Marine alleges that between February 10, 2014, and February 14, 2014, Strafuss met
with Walter Blessey, Chairman and CEO of Blessey Marine Services, Inc., and thereafter informed
Klotz that "he would be chartering the vessels to Blessey Marine Services, Inc." D & S Marine
claims that it "became aware the charter agreement [that it had with S & K Marine] was breached
when workers at [the shipyard] informed [it] that major changes had been ordered on the vessel."
On February 17, 2014, Klotz sent an email to Strafuss in which Klotz discussed the alleged
bareboat charter agreement with D & S Marine and the proposed deal with Blessey. Klotz compared
the two, and concluded that "both deals are good." However, Klotz states that he would prefer to
charter the first vessel to D & S Marine, and offer the second vessel to Blessey. Klotz informed
Strafuss that he spoke with McDaniel over the telephone and that McDaniel "was very upset if [S
& K Marine] did not go through with the bareboat charter with D&S and thought [they] had a verbal
and hand shake agreement." Klotz also said that D &S Marine has "been working with [S & K
Marine] since day one helping with the yard and [S & K Marine] even ordered the wheels and gears
to meet [D & S Marine's] needs among other things." Further, Klotz says "we did move forward
with D&S in August 2013 having numerous meetings and many contact[s] and in fact would not
have signed second vessel on October 16, 2013[,] if we did not have their verbal commitment to do
a deal . . . I think we should try to honor the D&S deal on boat #1 . . . we always thought D&S was
a fair deal and moved forward with them for many months."
4
On February 18, 2014, Strafuss sent an email to Klotz explaining why he thought that
making a deal with Blessey was a better option than working with D & S Marine. He also stated
that his "straightforward view is that [D & S Marine] did not accept [S & K Maine's] proposal," and
that they "were not able to work out an acceptable contract by the end of the year." Strafuss stated
that he wanted to accept Blessey's offer because he "personally took all the risk and put up 100%
of the money," and Blessey is a "very loyal customer and friend" that made a "much better offer."
On February 20, 2014, Strafuss sent another email to Klotz in which he reiterated that "D&S rejected
the terms [S & K Marine] offered and thus we did not come to terms and thus I moved on."
D & S Marine filed this action against defendants in the Thirty-Second Judicial District
Court, Parish of Terrebonne, State of Louisiana alleging that defendants breached a bareboat charter
agreement entered into between D & S Marine and S & K Marine. D & S Marine also alleges that
defendants breached that contract in bad faith, that Strafuss committed an intentional interference
with contractual relations, and that defendants are liable for detrimental reliance. Defendants
removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
arguing that D & S Marine failed to state any viable claims under either Louisiana law or the general
maritime law.
Applying Louisiana law, this court denied the motion to dismiss as to D & S Marine's breach
of contract, bad faith breach of contract, and detrimental reliance claims against S & K Marine, and
its tortious interference with contractual relations claim against Strafuss.2 The court found that the
2
The court granted the motion as to D & S Marine's breach of contract, bad faith breach of contract,
and detrimental reliance claims against Strafuss and BJS Blessey, L.L.C.
5
parties contemplated that the final bareboat charter agreement would be in writing and signed by the
parties, which did not occur. However, the court also found that by alleging that it "undertook a
significant amount of work with the shipyard to modify the vessel under construction to meet the
configurations required and used in [its] fleet[,]" D & S Marine alleged that it began performance
under the bareboat charter agreement by spending money to make modifications to the vessel while
it was under construction. Thus, the court found that this, along with the other pertinent allegations
in the complaint, was sufficient for D & S Marine to state claims for breach of contract and bad faith
breach of contract against S & K Marine, and for tortious interference with contractual relations
against Strafuss. Further, the court found that D & S Marine sufficiently stated a claim for
detrimental reliance against S & K Marine, because it alleged that it relied on S & K Marine's word
and conduct regarding the formation of the charter agreement, and alleged that D & S Marine
changed its position to its detriment by spending money to modify the vessel under construction and
by entering into a sub-charter agreement with one of its customers.
Thereafter, S & K Marine and Strafuss filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that
all remaining claims against them must be dismissed because the only remaining issue was whether
D & S Marine spent money modifying the vessel, which it did not. To support their argument,
defendants filed the affidavits of Wilton Joseph Gregory, the owner of New Generations Shipyard,
and Strafuss. Gregory declared that D & S Marine did not have any agreements with the shipyard
related to the vessel or pay for any modifications to the vessel; Strafuss paid for the slot where the
vessel was being constructed, and 100% of the vessel, including all modifications to it; and, Strafuss
and Klotz, with Strafuss' approval, had the sole and exclusive authority to order any changes to the
vessel. Strafuss similarly declared that he personally paid for 100% of the vessel, including all
6
modifications; D & S Marine did not pay for any modifications to the vessel; he had the sole and
exclusive authority over any changes to the vessel; and, he made all modifications because he
"desired and authorized" them, regardless of whether D & S Marine also wanted any such
modifications.
In opposition, D & S Marine argued that it "commenced work" under the bareboat charter
agreement. D & S Marine submitted the affidavits of Dean Cheramie, an owner of D & S Marine,
and McDaniel in which they declared that D & S Marine began working with Klotz on the bareboat
charter agreement in June or July 2013, and that the parties "reached an agreement to bareboat
charter the vessels" sometime before October 16, 2013. They both stated that D & S Marine
"commenced work immediately to ensure the vessels were prepared to begin working upon their
completion," which included "expend[ing] funds to equip [the vessel] with an aluminum service
vessel, motor and satellite compass." McDaniel stated that he made "many visits to New Generation
Shipyard to view and discuss ongoing progress and delays of the vessel building, modification, and
change orders with [Gregory] and meeting, negotiating, and entering into time charter agreement[s]
with Kirby Inland Marine and Canal Barge Co." McDaniel and Cheramie also declared that S & K
Marine knew of and encouraged the actions that they claim D & S Marine took in furtherance of the
bareboat charter agreement. Specifically, McDaniel and Cheramie both declared that the bareboat
charter agreement was necessary to S & K Marine's decision to purchase the vessels because S &
K Marine needed D & S Marine to ensure that the vessels would be working immediately upon their
completion. D & S Marine also cited Klotz's February 17, 2014, email to Strafuss as evidence that
D & S Marine and S & K Marine had entered into the bareboat charter agreement.
7
The court denied the motion finding that the countervailing affidavits and Klotz's February
17, 2014, email to Strafuss demonstrated that there were disputed issues of fact regarding what steps
D & S Marine took in performance of the contract it believed it had with S & K Marine, and whether
S & K Marine knew about those actions so as to effectuate S & K Marine's tacit acceptance of the
contract regardless of whether it was in the contemplated written form. In ruling on the first motion
for summary judgment, the court assumed that the parties had reached an agreement as to the
essential terms of the bareboat charter agreement. S & K Marine limited its argument to the issue
whether D & S Marine spent any money modifying the vessel. The parties did not argue or submit
any evidence regarding whether an agreement was actually reached as to the contract's essential
terms.
After engaging in discovery, defendants filed the instant renewed motion for summary
judgment. S & K Marine argues that D & S Marine cannot prevail on its breach of contract claim,
or the related bad faith breach of contract claim because the evidence demonstrates that the parties
never formed a contract due to a lack of consent. S & K Marine argues that the exchange of multiple
draft contracts in which essential terms, such as the charter rate, fuel requirements, maintenance, and
purchase option, were changed demonstrates that there was never a meeting of the minds, which is
required to form a contract. Thus, S & K Marine argues that it could not have tacitly accepted the
terms of the unexecuted charter party. S & K Marine also argues that D & S Marine's detrimental
reliance claim must be dismissed because D & S Marine was unreasonable in its alleged reliance on
any purported promises due to the back-and-forth nature of the contract negotiations. Further,
Strafuss argues that the tortious interference with contractual relations claim against him must be
dismissed because there was no contract.
8
D & S Marine argues that there was an oral contract because McDaniel and Klotz agreed
upon the contract's essential items of the charter rate and five year term. D & S Marine argues that,
although there was never an executed written contract, S & K Marine tacitly accepted the terms of
the agreement by allowing D & S Marine to begin work under the contract.
ANALYSIS
A.
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the "court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Granting a motion for summary judgment is proper if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits filed in
support of the motion demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10 (1986). The court must find "[a] factual dispute . . . [to be]
'genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party
. . . [and a] fact . . . [to be] 'material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Techs., Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson,
106 S.Ct. at 2510).
If the moving party meets the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence of the existence of a genuine issue for
trial. Celeotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). The non-movant cannot satisfy the
summary judgment burden with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla
of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). If the
9
opposing party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party does not have to submit
evidentiary documents to properly support its motion, but need only point out the absence of
evidence supporting the essential elements of the opposing party’s case. Saunders v. Michelin Tire
Corp., 942 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1991).
B.
D & S Marine's Breach of Contract and Bad Faith Breach of Contract Claims against
S & K Marine
In its renewed motion for summary judgment, S & K Marine argues that there was never a
contract that it could have tacitly accepted because there was never an agreement as to the essential
terms. Thus, there was no consent, or "meeting of the minds."
Under Louisiana law, "[a] contract is an agreement by two or more parties whereby
obligations are created, modified, or extinguished." La. Civ. Code art. 1906. The formation of a
valid contract requires: (1) capacity to contract; (2) mutual consent; (3) a certain object; and, (4) a
lawful purpose. Id. at arts. 1918, 1927, 1966, and 1971. There is no dispute in this matter regarding
capacity, object and lawful purpose. The parties disagree about whether there was mutual consent.
Consent of the parties to a contract is established through offer and acceptance. Id. at art.
1927. To be an enforceable contract, there must be a meeting of the minds. Read v. Willwoods
Cmty., 165 So.3d 883, 887 (La. 2015). "[W]here there is no meeting of the minds between the
parties the contract is void for lack of consent." Mark A. Gravel Properties, LLC v. Eddie's BBQ,
LLC, 139 So.3d 653, 657 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Phillips v. Berner, 789 So.2d 41, 45 (La. Ct.
App. 2001)).
“Unless the law prescribes a certain formality for the intended contract, offer and acceptance
may be made orally, in writing, or by action or inaction that under the circumstances is clearly
indicative of consent." La. Civ. Code art. 1927. Further, “[u]nless otherwise specified in the offer,
10
there need not be conformity between the manner in which the offer is made and the manner in
which the acceptance is made.” Id. However, "[w]hen, in the absence of a legal requirement, the
parties have contemplated a certain form, it is presumed that they do not intend to be bound until
the contract is executed in that form." Id. at art. 1947. The presumption created by Article 1947 can
be rebutted by demonstrating that the parties tacitly accepted the agreed upon terms by beginning
performance. See Myers v. Burger King Corp., 618 So.2d 1123 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
A party claiming the existence of a contract has the burden of proving that the contract was
perfected. Id. at art. 1831. An oral contract valued in excess of $500 must be proved by at least one
witness and other corroborating circumstances. Id. at 1846.
D & S Marine argues that the parties entered into an oral contract when McDaniel and Klotz
agreed that the charter rate would be $850 for the first five-year term.3 It argues that Klotz testified
at his deposition that these terms were agreed upon at the outset. D & S Marine contends that the
rest of the contract terms were details that would be worked out later. Further, D & S Marine argues
that S & K Marine tacitly accepted the terms of the oral contract by permitting D & S Marine to
begin work to ensure that the vessels would be prepared to begin working upon their completion.
D & S Marine claims that such work included purchasing an aluminum service vessel motor and
satellite compass; McDaniel's visiting the shipyard to view and discuss ongoing progress and delays
of the vessel building, modification, and change orders; and, McDaniel's meeting, negotiating, and
entering into time charter agreements with Kirby Inland Marine and Canal Barge Co. Further, the
3
D & S Marine also argues that an agreement between McDaniel and Klotz as to the essential terms
of the bareboat charter agreement established a "fixture," or binding contract subject to details, under the
general maritime law. In ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss, this court found that Louisiana law, not
the general maritime law, applies because the vessels were under construction. See Doc. #35.
11
shipyard began adapting one of the vessels to fit D & S Marine's specifications, such as painting the
vessel with D & S Marine's color scheme.
D & S Marine has established, as confirmed by Klotz's deposition testimony, that the parties
agreed at the outset that the term of the proposed charter party would be five years and that the
charter rate would be $850 per day for the first five years. Klotz testified at his deposition that it
was necessary to have a basic agreement on "high-level" items to begin negotiating the contract as
a whole. He also testified that the charter rate for the first five-year term was agreed upon at the
outset, but the parties continued to negotiate the charter rate for the second-five year term and that
taxes were not discussed until much later. Further, McDaniel testified that there was intent to
include the purchase option as "an agreement of [the] partnership," but that the details were being
negotiated. The initial term of five years and the $850 per day charter rate for that term were the
essential terms of the alleged contract, and they remained consistent as written drafts of the bareboat
charter agreement were exchanged. Although other terms changed, such as the charter rate for the
optional second five year term, the right of first refusal and the purchase option, there is a genuine
issue of fact as to whether those terms were essential and material to the contract considering that
they would not be implicated until five years into the charter party.
Klotz's testified that there was no oral contract and that he did not have authority to make,
and never entered into, a final bareboat charter agreement with D & S Marine. Further, Strafuss
testified at his deposition that Klotz's role was to "flesh-out some negotiating levels" and that D &
S Marine knew that Strafuss was making the final decision because he was "writing all the checks."
However, Klotz appeared to be the person that was doing most of the negotiating on S & K Marine's
behalf. Indeed, D & S Marine claims that McDaniel and Klotz entered into the alleged oral contract.
12
McDaniel testified that there was an agreement between him, Dean Cheramie, Klotz and Strafuss
to charter the vessels, the scope of which never changed while the "bells and whistles" were
negotiated, and that D & S Marine was committed and prepared to take delivery of the vessels upon
completion. Strafuss's December 10, 2013, email in which he discusses D & S Marine taking
delivery of the vessel indicates that he may have thought that there was a contract, and McDaniel
testified that he believed Klotz relayed the information about the contract formation and sub-charter
agreements to Strafuss. Thus, there are disputed issues of material fact of whether Klotz had
apparent authority to act on S & K Marine's behalf in forming the alleged oral contract, and whether
all parties believed that there was an oral contract.
In ruling on S & K Marine's prior motion for summary judgment, the court, assuming that
there was an oral contract, held that there were disputed issues of fact regarding whether S & K
Marine tacitly accepted that alleged oral contract. Here, the court finds that there are disputed issue
of fact regarding whether there was an oral contract. Therefore, S & K Marine's motion for
summary judgment is DENIED as to the breach of contract and bad faith breach of contract claims.
C.
D & S Marine's Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations Claim against
Strafuss
Strafuss argues that D & S Marine cannot sustain a claim against him for intentional
interference with a contract because there was no contract.
In 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So.2d 228, 234 (La. 1989), the Supreme Court of
Louisiana recognized a limited cause of action for tortious interference with contractual relations
that pertains "only a corporate officer's duty to refrain from intentional and unjustified interference
with the contractual relation between his employer and a third person." The elements of the cause
of action are:
13
(1) the existence of a contract or a legally protected interest between
the plaintiff and the corporation; (2) the corporate officer's
knowledge of the contract; (3) the officer's intentional inducement or
causation of the corporation to breach the contract or his intentional
rendition of its performance impossible or more burdensome; (4)
absence of justification on the part of the officer; (5) causation of
damages to the plaintiff by the breach of contract or difficulty of its
performance brought about by the officer.
Id. at 234.
Because the court finds that there are disputed issues of fact regarding whether an oral
contract was formed, Strafuss's motion for summary judgment on this claim is DENIED.
D.
D & S Marine's Detrimental Reliance Claim against S &K Marine
S & K Marine argues that D & S Marine cannot sustain a cause of action for detrimental
reliance because D & S Marine's reliance on any alleged promises made by S & K Marine was
unreasonable in light of the back-and-forth nature of the contract negotiations.
The doctrine of detrimental reliance is provided in Louisiana Civil Code article 1967, which
states:
Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself. A party may be
obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the
promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment
and the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be
limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result
of the promisee's reliance on the promise. Reliance on a gratuitous
promise made without required formalities is not reasonable.
There are three elements required for the application of the doctrine of detrimental reliance:
(1) a representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable reliance thereon; and (3) a change of position
to one's detriment because of the reliance. Morris v. Friedman, 663 So.2d 19, 25 (La. 1995). “[T]he
basis of detrimental reliance is ‘the idea that a person should not harm another person by making
promises that he will not keep.'" Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 907 So.2d 37, 59 (La.
14
2005). “Thus, the focus of analysis of a detrimental reliance claim is . . . whether a representation
was made in such a manner that the promisor should have expected the promisee to rely upon it, and
whether the promisee so relies to his detriment." Id. It is not necessary for a plaintiff to establish
the existence of an enforceable contract to recover for detrimental reliance. Rogers v. Brooks, 122
Fed. Appx. 729, 732 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Newport Ltd. v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 6 F.3d 1058,
1069 (5th Cir. 1993)). However, reliance on an alleged promise is unreasonable when the parties
anticipate entering into a written agreement and negotiate the terms of a written agreement that were
not mutually agreeable. Id.
Although D & S Marine and S & K Marine anticipated entering into a written bareboat
charter agreement, McDaniel and Klotz reached an agreement as to the essential terms of the five
year term and with a daily charter rate of $850. For months the parties proceeded under the premise
that these terms were agreed upon. In his February 17, 2014, email to Strafuss, Klotz stated that D
& S thought "they had a verbal and hand shake agreement" and that S & K Marine had been moving
forward with D & S Marine for months. Thus, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding
whether D & S Marine reasonably relied on representations made by S & K Marine. Therefore, S
& K Marine's motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to D & S Marine's detrimental reliance
claim.
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Renewed Motion to for Summary Judgment
(Doc. #94) is DENIED.
15
27th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of June, 2016.
____________________________________
MARY ANN VIAL LEMMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?