Boyd v. Social Security Administration

Filing 18

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 . Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 12/14/15.(jjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LISA ESTELLA BOYD

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 14-2166

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY

SECTION: R

ORDER AND REASONS
Having reviewed the complaint,1 the parties' motions,2 the applicable
law, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation,3 and the plaintiff's
objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation,4 the Court
approves the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and adopts it
as its opinion with the following additional analysis. Thus, it is ordered that
plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

1

R. Doc. 1.

2

R. Doc. 13; R. Doc. 14.

3

R. Doc. 15.

4

R. Doc. 16.

I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lisa Boyd seeks judicial review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") denying her
claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social
Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423. Boyd filed her application for DIB on January
22, 2009, alleging disability beginning December 26, 2008, due to pain in her
back, joints, and hands.5 After conducting a hearing, an Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ") denied Boyd's application on February 26, 2010.6 Boyd
requested review by the SSA's Appeals Council, which vacated the ALJ's
decision and remanded the case to the ALJ on April 6, 2011.7 A different ALJ
held a second hearing and rendered an unfavorable decision on August 15,
2011.8 The Appeals Council again vacated and remanded to the ALJ for
further evaluation and fact-finding.9

After conducting three additional

hearings, the ALJ denied Boyd's application on March 27, 2014.10 Again, Boyd

5

R. Doc. 15 at 1.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id. at 2.

9

Id.

10

Id.
2

requested review by the Appeal's Council, which denied the request.11 Boyd
then brought this action under Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act,
seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the SSA.
The case was referred to the Magistrate Judge, who ordered the parties to
submit memoranda concerning Boyd's appeal. The Magistrate Judge's Report
and Recommendation ("R & R") recommends that the Court dismiss Boyd's
complaint with prejudice.12

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
The function of this Court on judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is

limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the Commissioner's final decision, and whether the Commissioner
applied the appropriate legal standards in reaching the decision. See Martinez
v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995); Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357,
360 (5th Cir. 1993). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a
preponderance, and such that a reasonable mind might accept a conclusion
based thereon. See Spellman, 1 F.3d at 360. A finding of no substantial
evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical
11

Id.

12

Id. at 64.
3

findings exist to support the Commissioner's decision. See Johnson v. Bowen,
864 F.2d 340, 343–44 (5th Cir. 1988). The Court may not reweigh the
evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner. See Martinez, 64 F.3d at 173; Spellman, 1 F.3d at 360.
Conflicts in evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve, not the courts. See
Patton v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 590, 592 (5th Cir. 1983).

III. DISCUSSION
Boyd objects to the Magistrate Judge's R & R for a number of reasons.
Specifically, Boyd objects to the R & R's findings related to the ALJ's decision
to discount the opinions of Boyd's treating physician, the ALJ's reliance on the
opinions of non-treating and non-examining physicians in making his residual
functional capacity determination, and the ALJ's alleged failure to follow the
Appeals Council's remand orders with respect to Boyd's depression and
obesity. The Court addresses each set of objections in turn.
A.

The ALJ's Decision to Discount the Opinions of Boyd's
Treating Physician

Boyd objects to the Magistrate Judge's alleged failure to recognize the
ALJ's error in giving reduced weight to the opinion of Boyd's treating
physician, Dr. Heidenreich. First, Boyd argues that the ALJ was required, as
4

a matter of law, to give controlling weight to Dr. Heidenreich's opinions in
evaluating her application for DIB. According to Boyd, while the ALJ was
permitted to consider the views of the non-treating physicians who testified
at Boyd's hearings, the ALJ was obligated to adopt Dr. Heidenreich's opinions
to the extent that the medical experts disagreed. This argument is without
merit. As the Fifth Circuit has made clear, the ALJ, not the treating physician,
has "sole responsibility for determining a claimant's disability status."
Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Gutierrez v.
Barnhart, No. 04-11025, 2005 WL 1994289, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2005)
(noting that a treating physician's "medical opinions are not conclusive
because it is the ALJ's role to decide the claimant's status"). In fulfilling this
responsibility, "[t]he ALJ is entitled to determine the credibility of medical
experts . . . and weigh their opinions accordingly." Ramirez v. Colvin, 606 F.
App'x 775, 779 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Scott v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 482, 485
(5th Cir. 1985)). An ALJ is therefore free to assign little or no weight to the
opinions of a treating physician when good cause is shown. Newton v. Apfel,
209 F.3d 448, 455-56 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 237).
Here, the ALJ found good cause to give reduced weight to some of Dr.
Heidenreich's opinions. Specifically, while the ALJ accepted Dr. Heidenreich's
diagnoses of Boyd, he gave "little weight" to opinions that Dr. Heidenreich
5

provided in a check-the-box form regarding Boyd's functional abilities.13 The
ALJ reasoned that Dr. Heidenreich completed the form more than six months
after Boyd's date last insured, making it less relevant than earlier treatment
records, and that the applicable treatment records provide little support for
the opinions at issue.14 As for Dr. Heidenreich's hearing testimony, the ALJ
found that the physician's opinions deserved only "some weight" because he
was "equivocal" in his presentation.15 Because the ALJ found that good cause
existed, the ALJ did not err in declining to adopt Dr. Heidenreich's views in
toto or in resolving certain conflicts in favor of other physicians. See Byrd v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 368 F. App'x 542, 543 (5th Cir. 2010) ("Though the ALJ
appears to have given less weight to the treating physician's opinions than to
those of the medical expert called at the hearing, conflicts of evidence are for
the Commissioner, not the courts, to resolve." (quoting Perez v. Barnhart, 415
F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005)); Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 790 (5th Cir.
1991) ("The ALJ as factfinder has the sole responsibility for weighing the
evidence and may choose whichever physician's diagnosis is most supported
by the record.").
13

R. Doc. 15 at 38, 42.

14

Id.

15

Id. at 48-49.
6

Second, Boyd contends that the ALJ incorrectly applied the six-factor
test set forth in Newton v. Apfel when he decided to depart from Dr.
Heidenreich's opinions.16 In Newton, the Fifth Circuit held that even when
good cause exists to discount a treating physician's opinions, the "ALJ must
consider the following factors before declining to give any weight to the
opinions of a treating doctor: length of treatment, frequency of examination,
nature and extent of relationship, support provided by other evidence,
consistency of opinion with record, and specialization." Myers v. Apfel, 238
F.3d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Newton, 209 F.3d at 458).

Here,

although the ALJ explained his rationale for giving reduced weight to Dr.
Heidenreich's check-the-box form, his analysis did not expressly refer to the
sixth Newton factor: Dr. Heidenreich's specialization.

Under the Fifth

Circuit's guidance in Newton, it is unclear, when good cause exists, whether
an ALJ must apply the six-factor test when he declines to give a treating
physician's opinion controlling weight, or instead only when he flatly rejects
a treating physician's opinion.17 Under the latter interpretation, the ALJ would
16

R. Doc. 16 at 12.

17

Compare Jones v. Astrue, 821 F. Supp. 2d 842, 852 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (finding
that because "the ALJ did not entirely reject [the treating physician's opinion] and
instead properly gave it less weight [it[ therefore did nto need to perform the six-step
analysis discussed in Newton") with M.P.B. v. Astrue, No. 12-cv0088, 2013 WL 869385,
at *5 (W.D. La. Feb. 11, 2013) (holding that "it is not only when the ALJ elects to give no
weight to the opinion of the treating physician that Newton and the regulations require
7

not be required to apply the six-factor test in this case because he had good
cause to give Dr. Heidenreich's opinion less weight and still considered it fully,
as opposed to rejecting it. Even assuming the ALJ was required to apply the
six factors, however, any error committed by the ALJ was harmless. As the
Magistrate Judge noted, the ALJ's analysis acknowledged five of the six
Newton factors.

Moreover, the factor that the ALJ failed to address,

specialization, strengthens the ALJ's decision to discount the opinion of Dr.
Heidenreich, a family medicine practitioner, in relation to the opinions of nontreating physician Dr. Janese, a board-certified neurosurgeon. Thus, the Court
finds that a more complete application of the Newton six-factor test would not
have caused the ALJ to reach a different conclusion as to whether Dr.
Heidenreich's opinions should be given more weight or whether Boyd was
capable of performing work that exists in substantial numbers in the national
economy. Accordingly, even if the ALJ erred, the Court declines to remand
this case to the ALJ because Boyd suffered no prejudice. See Brock v. Chater,
84 F.3d 726, 729 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that decision will not be reversed
when claimant makes no showing that she was prejudiced by deficiencies she
alleges).

the six-factor analysis").
8

Third, Boyd disputes the Magistrate Judge's finding that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ's decision to give reduced weight to Dr.
Heidenreich's opinions.18 This objection is essentially a recitation of the
arguments that Boyd raised before the Magistrate Judge, which are thoroughly
addressed in the R & R. The Court rejects this objection for the reasons
provided by the Magistrate Judge.
B.

The ALJ's Assessment of Boyd's Residual Functional
Capacity

Boyd next objects to the R & R on the grounds that the Magistrate Judge
failed to recognize the ALJ's error in giving "particular weight" to the opinion
of a non-treating, non-examining physician in making his residual functional
capacity determination.19

These objections repeat Boyd's arguments

concerning the discount that the ALJ applied to Dr. Heidenreich's opinions-arguments which are addressed in the R & R and in the previous section of this
order.20 As the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded, the ALJ applied the
correct legal standard, and substantial evidence supports the manner in which

18

R. Doc. 16 at 14-16.

19

Id. at 16-19.

20

Id. at 18 ("The ALJ's preference of Dr. Lee's opinion has all of the same
problems as his reliance on Dr. Janese's opinion to discredit Dr. Heidenreich's
assessment. The ALJ must prefer a treating, examining physician's opinion to a nontreating, non-examining physician's opinion.").
9

the ALJ weighed the evidentiary value of the various physicians' opinions.
Boyd's arguments to the contrary are without merit.
C.

The ALJ's Analysis Regarding Boyd's Depression

Boyd also contends that the ALJ violated the Appeals Council's remand
order by failing to adequately evaluate whether Boyd's depression constituted
a severe impairment at step two of the sequential analysis.21 Boyd's arguments
do not challenge the precedent cited in the R & R or dispute the Magistrate
Judge's legal analysis. For instance, the Magistrate Judge found, correctly,
that because the ALJ denied Boyd's benefits based on his analysis at step five
of the sequential analysis, the ALJ's alleged failures at step two are irrelevant
and non-prejudicial.22 Without addressing this finding, Boyd continues to
present past critiques of the ALJ's step two analysis and urges the Court to
remand to the ALJ. These arguments are without merit.
D.

The ALJ's Evaluation of the Effects of Boyd's Obesity

Boyd's final objection is that the ALJ violated the Appeals Council's
remand order by failing to conduct a more "transparent" analysis of the effects
of Boyd's obesity.23 Again, Boyd neither challenges the precedent cited in the
21

Id. at 19-20.

22

R. Doc. 15 at 58-60.

23

R. Doc. 16 at 21.
10

R & R nor raises any arguments disputing the analysis therein. Instead, she
merely reiterates old arguments and insists that her case must be remanded.
The Magistrate Judge addressed each of Boyd's arguments at length, finding
each to be without merit. The Court rejects Boyd's objections for reasons the
reasons set forth in the R & R.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 14th
___day of December, 2015.

_____________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11