Fabre v. Yoli et al

Filing 21

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AND REASONS. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown.(jrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
AHMON J. FABRE

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 14-2220

CHRISTOPHER YOLI, et al.

SECTION “G”(2)

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff, a state prisoner in St. Tammany Parish Jail, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against St. Tammany Parish Jail Warden Gregory Longino (“Longino”), Corporal
Christopher Yoli (“Yoli”), Lieutenant Scotty Payne (“Payne”), Major Phillip Casnave of the St.
Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office Internal Affairs Department (“Casnave”) and the St. Tammany
Parish Sheriff’s Office (collectively “Defendants”), alleging that his constitutional rights were
violated by false arrest, excessive force, failure to protect from harm, verbal harassment, an
inadequate jail grievance procedure and disciplinary placement in solitary confinement.1 Plaintiff
also asserted several state law claims.2 This case was referred to the Magistrate Judge, who issued
a Report and Recommendation on November 17, 2014, recommending that this Court dismiss
Plaintiff’s federal law claims with prejudice and dismiss his state law claims without prejudice.3
Plaintiff objected to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.4
On August 19, 2015, this Court issued an Order overruling Plaintiff’s objections in part and

1

Rec. Doc. 1.

2

Id. at 1–2.

3

Rec. Doc. 13.

4

Rec. Doc. 16.

1

adopting the Report and Recommendation in part.5 The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s verbal abuse and
harassment, solitary confinement and ineffective grievance procedure claims.6
The Court deferred ruling, however, on Plaintiff’s excessive force, protection from harm, and
false arrest claims.7 The Court noted that Plaintiff was charged with battery of a correctional facility
employee and resisting an officer in connection with the incident from which his claims arose.8 The
Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court dismiss these claims as barred by the Heck doctrine.9
The Heck doctrine provides that a civil action for alleged civil rights violations that attacks the
validity of state criminal conviction or confinement, which have not been reversed, expunged,
invalidated, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, is not
cognizable under Section1983.10 The Court noted that the Fifth Circuit has held that a district court
should stay proceedings in a Section 1983 case where the criminal charges remain pending.11 Here,
it was unclear whether the criminal charges were pending. Accordingly, the Court ordered the
parties to file supplemental briefing on or before September 4, 2015, regarding the status of the

5

Rec. Doc. 18 at 15.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id. at 2–3. According to Plaintiff, on September 25, 2013, he was using the phone at the St. Tammany
Parish Jail, when a lockdown was announced. Rec. Doc. 1 at 3. Plaintiff asserts that Yoli approached him and “told
him to get off the phone in [an] aggressive tone.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that he complied with Yoli’s request, but Yoli
continued to verbally abuse him. Id. He contends that “a physical altercation ensued.” Id. Following the altercation,
Plaintiff asserts that he was placed in “an isolated area and was not allowed to relieve himself for five hours.” Id.
According to Plaintiff, he suffered injuries to his back and shoulder, and as a result of the incident charges were
brought against him for battery of a corrections officer and resisting an officer. Id. at 3–4.
9

Rec. Doc. 13 at 5–8.

10

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994).

11

Rec. Doc. 18 at 10 (citing Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 745 (5th Cir. 1995); Brown v. Taylor, 130 F.
App’x 613 (5th Cir. 2005).

2

battery of a correctional facility employee officer and resisting an officer charges. The Court also
deferred ruling on whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.12
I. Parties’ Arguments
On September 24, 2015, Defendants responded to the Court’s request for supplemental
briefing.13 Defendants assert that on January 20, 2015, after a bench trial, Plaintiff was found guilty
of both the battery of a correctional facility employee and resisting an officer charges.14 Defendants
attached a copy of the minute entry from the proceeding, which was obtained from the St. Tammany
Parish Clerk of Court electronic database.15 Defendants assert that because Plaintiff “was in fact
found guilty of crimes arising directly out of the behavior forming the basis for his lawsuit, the Heck
doctrine unquestionably should apply in this situation.”16
Plaintiff has not filed any supplemental briefing despite the Court’s order directing him to
due so on or before September 4, 2015.
II. Standard of Review
A. Review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
When designated by a district court to do so, a United States Magistrate Judge may consider
prisoner petitions challenging the conditions of confinement and recommend his/her disposition to
the district court judge in accordance with the Magistrate Judge’s findings of fact and determinations

12

13

Id. at 14.
Rec. Doc. 20.

14

Id. at 2.

15

Id.; Rec. Doc. 20-1.

16

Rec. Doc. 20 at 2.

3

of law.17 A district judge “may accept, reject or modify the recommended disposition” of a
Magistrate Judge on a dispositive matter.18 The district judge must “determine de novo any part of
the [Report and Recommendation] that has been properly objected to.”19 However, a district court’s
review is limited to plain error of parts of the report that are not properly objected to.20
B. Standard for Frivolousness
A district court has board discretion in determine the frivolous nature of a prisoner’s
complaint.21 A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.22 A claim has no
arguable bases in law if “it is based on indisputable meritless legal theory.”23 It lacks a basis in facts
if “the facts alleged are clearly baseless.”24 If a court finds that a prisoner’s claims are frivolous, the
court must dismiss the claims sua sponte.25
III. Law and Analysis
A.

The Heck Doctrine
The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants

used excessive force, failed to protect Plaintiff from harm and falsely arrested him as barred by the
17

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

18

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

19

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

20

See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded
by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).
21

See Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

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Heck doctrine.26 Plaintiff objected to this finding.27 Therefore, this Court considers the issue de novo.
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held:
In order to recover damages from allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . . .28
Accordingly, “a claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not
been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.”29 In Clarke v. Stalder, the Fifth Circuit held
that “Heck applies to [] claims for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages under §
1983.”30 Where dismissal of the § 1983 claim is proper under Heck, the Fifth Circuit stated the
procedure for dismissal in Johnson v. McElveen: a plaintiff’s “claims are dismissed with prejudice
to their being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met.”31
In Hudson v Hughes, the plaintiff was convicted of battery of an officer.32 The Fifth Circuit
noted that “[b]ecause self-defense is a justification defense to the crime of battery of an officer, [the
plaintiff’s] claim that [the defendant’s] used excessive force while apprehending him, if proved,

26

Rec. Doc. 13 at 5–8.

27

Rec. Doc. 16 at 4–7.

28

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).

29

Id.

30

Lavergne v. Clause 591 Fed.Appx. 272 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 190-91
(5th Cir. 1998) (en blanc)).
31
32

Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996).
98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996).

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necessarily would imply the invalidity of his arrest and conviction for battery of an officer.”33
Here, Plaintiff has been convicted of battery of a correctional facility employee and resisting
an officer. He claims that during the incident giving rise to these charges Defendants used excessive
force, failed to protect him from harm and falsely arrested him. Plaintiff’s claims, if proven, would
imply the invalidity of his arrest and conviction for battery of a correctional facility employee and
resisting an officer. His claims, therefore, fall within the Heck bar. Accordingly, on de novo review,
the court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice to their being asserted again until the Heck
conditions are met.
B.

State Law Claims
The Magistrate Judge also recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.34 Plaintiff objected to this recommendation “out of an
abundance of caution.”35 Accordingly, the Court will consider this issue de novo.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” In deciding
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction the Court must balance the relevant factors of “judicial
economy, convenience, fairness and comity.”36 Here, the Court finds that these factors weigh in
favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. No federal claims remain in this case, and
the state law claims have not been addressed by this Court. Accordingly, on de novo review, the

33

Id.

34

Rec. Doc. 13 at 14–15.

35

Rec. Doc. 16 at 10.

36

Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350–51 (1988).

6

Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims and dismiss
these claims without prejudice.37
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants used excessive force,
failed to protect him from harm and falsely arrested him are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to
their being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met.38
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s state law claims are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

30th
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this ______day of September, 2015.
_______________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

37

See Brown v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 311 F.3d 328, 334 n.6 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[U]nadjudicated
pendant state law claims must be dismissed without prejudice to allow the plaintiff to refile in state court when a
district court dismisses the federal claims serving as the basis for its jurisdiction and elects not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.”).
38

See Johnson, 101 F.3d at 424 (“Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice to their being asserted
again until the Heck conditions are met.”); see also Clarke, 154 F.3d at 190-91 (Heck applies to claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief).

7